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**Research Interests**

Sub-national politics, decentralization,  
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## The Durability of Sub-National Political Leaders in Post-Authoritarian Indonesia \*

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### Abstract:

*Post-authoritarian Indonesia has shown some sub-national political leaders fell from power before their first term while others have survived through it. I argue that the durability of these leaders is influenced by two factors: strategy of extraction and populist policy. Sub-national leaders need to extract in order to collect resources and in turn finance political strategies to maintain their power. They can go even further by delivering the resources to the population in the form of populist policies. A case investigated in this paper, however, describes that without delivering welfare to the society, a sub-national leader can still be durable, particularly by performing illicit behaviors such as corruption. Moreover, the different political strategies employed by the leaders have resulted in three institutional outcomes: durable-populist office, durable-exploitative office and non-durable office.*

**Keywords:** durability, political leaders, extraction, populist policy

### 1. The Puzzle

A new emerging democratic country usually faces two fundamental questions: how to develop democratic institutions and how to make significant political actors comply with those institutions. Indonesia has relatively succeeded to answer the first question, marked by the regular elections as the salient instance. Indonesia, however, has struggled to answer the second question. The ministry of domestic affairs reported that during 2004-2014, 318 out of 524 sub-national political leaders involved in corruption (<http://www.republika.co.id>). Within 2004-2012,

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290 sub-national political leaders involved in corruption: 20 governors, 7 vice governors, 156 *bupati* (head of regent), 46 vice *bupati*, 41 mayors and 20 vice mayors.

These facts suggest that there has been a gap between the construction of democratic institutions and behaviors associated with values embedded in those institutions. Two theoretical problems arise here: how to govern the sub-national elites and how these elites actually endure within a democratic context. This paper focuses more on the second question instead of the first. This paper inquires how leaders can endure amidst the monitoring of their behavior from the institutions set up at the national level. Some Indonesian sub-national leaders have endured while others could not. This paper questions what kinds of political strategies employed by these leaders in order to stay in their office and how these strategies gave different impact to the durability of these leaders. The cases here are: why the former governor of Banten, Ratu Atut (2006-2014), and the governor of South Sumatra, Alex Noerdin (2008-present), managed to maintain their power, while the former governor of North Sumatra, Syamsul Arifin (2008-2011) did not manage even to finish his first term?

This paper proposes that, sub-national leaders apply extraction and populist policy to maintain their durability. Extraction refers to how leaders use means of extraction at the local level to collect resources in maintaining their power. Populist policy refers to the disbursement of resources to finance people's basic needs. These two strategies work in different phases. Extraction is relevant in providing capital for leaders. Populist policy works to garner mass support, especially when a leader has to face an election. The interaction between these strategies and monitoring institutions at the national level decide the durability of the leaders.

## **2. Theoretical Frameworks**

### **2. 1. Leaders and Durability**

Three elements characterize leadership: 1) its relational character, 2) its domain specificity, and 3) its instrumentality (Ahlquist & Levi, 2011, p. 5). It is “relational” because leaders require followers. It is always a dyadic (or multiple) relationship, meaning that the interaction must be between two parties, leaders and followers, who together can be considered a group (ibid). It is “domain specific” because leaders dwell in a particular social organization, mostly a durable one. A leader in one organization may not necessarily be a leader in other organizations. Lastly, leadership is “instrumental” because it involves the intention of leaders to make their followers do something that they (leaders) want. Instrumentality of leadership further implies three qualities. First, it may concern an effort to coordinate actions among followers regarding the group’s main objective. Second, it may include an effort to structure actions among followers who do not know their own preferences. Third, it may involve “special characteristics” of a leader, such as charisma.

This paper proposes that leaders are self-interested and rational (Levi, 1989, p. 3). Leaders act based on resources they possess. Resources are significant in upholding a leader’s projects that may range from gaining personal income to increasing the welfare of others. Regardless of their objectives, leaders always need resources to materialize their goals. Based on the assumption of self-interest and rationality, leaders are seen here as maximizing-benefit actors, meaning that they have a tendency to extract resources as much as they can (ibid). Consequently, with this assumption, this paper inclines toward the realist notion of leadership, understanding leadership as always about “to make things happen in the real world” (Maloy, 2013, p. 7). This stance does not disregard that leaders can act motivated by ideological reasons. Values help leaders to decide which policies are needed to be executed (Jacob et. al., 1968, p. 53). Nevertheless, materializing certain ideals has to consider means available to the leaders. The

difference between the realist and idealist stances affirms Weber's distinction between ethics of responsibility and ethics of conviction (Gane, 1997, p. 550). The first refers to rational calculation of means and ends by politicians while the latter addresses value-driven actions by politicians without considering the rational calculation (*ibid.*, pp. 550-551). The focus of this paper is more on how leaders utilize means available to them in order to preserve their power as the pre-condition to materialize their goals.

One of the powerful means for leaders is office. This paper argues that when leaders are in office, they tend to defend their position. The reason is clear enough: office is vital because office provides leaders with the means to extract resources. No leaders would step down from office unless forced to do so by other actors or circumstances (e.g., mass demonstration, assassination). Durability then is a built-in characteristic of leadership. It is a logical consequence of leaders' being self-interested and rational actors. In other words, leadership is about survival of leaders in office based on opportunities and constraints of their social contexts. Leaders may aim, for instance, to increase people's welfare or, in contrast, benefiting themselves. To achieve such objectives, leaders, however, in the first place must make sure that they can survive in their office. No leaders' objectives can be materialized without being durable in office.

This paper understands durability as durability of executive political leaders--at the provincial level, the governors. I disregard the argument of political coalition theories that defines durability as cabinet durability (see for instance, Warwick, 1979; Wright & Goldberg, 1985; Glazer, 1989; Fischer et. al., 2012.). The reason is that executive political leaders at the sub-national level do not form cabinets. They are helped by bureaucrats who, despite being selected by the executive leaders, do not depend on the decision of parties in the parliament to

endure. Moreover, since 1999 decentralization has conferred sub-national political leaders with authority to manage local resources. Although national political leaders still have not surrendered all authority to sub-national political leaders, the latter have the primary power to organize their own resources based on their means of administration and the coercion attached to their positions. Although other actors such as oligarchs (see for instance, Robison & Hadiz, 2004; Winters, 2011) or paramilitary groups (Wilson, 2006) may influence politics in the contemporary Indonesian politics, the coordination of those actors and the exercise of their power are limited by sub-national leaders as the controllers of the state's power. For instance, a company's lobbying to get a mining concession still needs a permit (legal or illegal) from political leaders, as the latter organize how coal extractions can be done.

Second, durability is defined here as when a governor has occupied office for a *minimum* of one term (five years). This definition aims to exclude some possibly inexact definitions of durability. For instance, strictly requiring two full terms in power as the criteria for durability may exclude many political leaders who last only until the second or third year of their second term. Moreover, not all local elections are held in the same year. For instance, in 2005 there were only 68 local elections from a total of 414 regents and 33 provinces. Moreover, theoretically, defining durability as two terms in power may veer this research into a different direction. First, as the rules limit the terms in power for two terms, leaders who exceed this criterion may forge a different political entity such as sub-national authoritarianism (Gibson, 2012) or competitive authoritarianism (Levitsky & Way, 2010) at the local level. The criteria employed by Levitsky and Way (*ibid.*, p. 37) to define stable authoritarianism confirms the objection to define durability at minimum two terms in power.

Third, threats to durability may vary. Lijphart's argument suggests that threats to cabinet durability may come from parties in the parliament or even personal troubles of an executive leader (e.g., sickness, death) (Lijphart, 1984, pp. 266-267). In a different way, Robertson's argument expands the notion of threat to external factors such as inflation and unemployment (Robertson, 1983, p. 939). In contrast with these arguments, this paper contends that threats emanate from multiple sources, coming from both horizontal and vertical institutions (see also in Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 12). These institutions monitor the behavior of sub-national leaders and they have power to end the leaders' term in office. In addition, this paper portrays leaders as agents with imperfect knowledge whose actions convey both intended and unintended consequences. This perspective is based on Archer's approach that explains that agency shapes structure through intended and unintended consequences (Archer, 1995, p. 5). Imperfect information may lead leaders to plan actions that have different consequences. Intentionally, extraction and populist policies are intended to preserve leaders' office. However, because of other factors such as monitoring institutions unintended consequences of leaders' actions may reduce the durability of their office.

## **2. 2. State Capacity and Extraction**

State capacity implies the functioning of state apparatuses (e.g. military, bureaucrats) in exercising power in a state's jurisdiction (Skocpol, 1985, p. 16). Specifically, state capacity requires a state to perform two functions: extracting and deploying resources. Extracting resources refers to processes by which the state collects taxes from society for the state's means of administration (see for instance Tilly, 1985, p. 181). Deploying resources, or "implementational capacity," concerns how collected resources are distributed based on the local elites' objectives (see, for instance, Cummings & Norgaard, 2004, p. 688).

The question then, is how to conceptualize the relation between state capacity and sub-national political leaders. The autonomist camp always positions a state as independent from interests of dominant social groups in a society (for instance, see Skocpol, 1979, p. 14). In such an argument, a state pursues different objectives, mostly framed as “public interests.” On the contrary, the instrumentalist camp denies that such an image exists since dominant social groups always control the state (for instance, see Marx, 2007, p. 11). I support the argument of the instrumentalist camp but reject the tendency to reduce the state’s instrumental position to the economic interests of the dominant class. I situate the state as an instrument for sub-national political leaders to realize their interests, particularly in defending their power. Instead of using class, however, I position sub-national political leaders as the unit of analysis, stressing the role of human agency as the representation of a state (Wight, 2004, p. 275).

High state capacity allows sub-national political leaders to bargain with political actors at both the national and sub-national level. The bargaining is allowed through the construction of institutions. This paper emphasizes that leaders form institutions to extract resources from society. Four types of institutions may arise: private, public, joint, and no extraction (Snyder, 2006, p. 948). Snyder argues that leaders prefer public extraction over private extraction. The reason is that public extraction gives leaders more leverage in controlling and managing their resources, including channeling the resources to their own pockets. Nevertheless, under a democratic system and supervision by institutions at the national level, leaders usually take another route, especially when they aim to take resources for themselves: joint extraction. This method camouflages the extraction, framing it as private extraction. Still, some leaders directly extract and channel resources for themselves by using state apparatuses without forming external institutions. This paper contends both sub-national leaders use these institutions to maintain the



durability of their office. As leaders, they can extract resources for the welfare of the population or direct it into their own pockets. On the other hand, leaders can also keep the resources as state revenue but then deliver them as social benefits to the people. Both of these strategies work to maintain the durability of the leaders. The different consequences are different types of office forged by these different types of extraction.

### **2. 3. Populist Policy**

The durability of sub-national political leaders also rests on populist policies that leaders deploy. Conceptually, populism has two different meanings: first, the emotional politics of channeling people's voices; and second, an opportunistic tactic to manipulate symbols related to the people in order to gain votes (Mudde, 2004, p. 542). The first definition is related to the struggle of the people against corrupt elites. In populism, public opposition to elites is also associated with other ideas such as "redemptive politics" (Canovan, 1999), "heartland" (Taggart, 2000; 2004), "people sovereignty" (Abts & Rummens, 2007), "charismatic leadership" (Conniff, 1999), and "the status of outsiders" (Barr, 2009).

This paper defines populism as a strategy (Weyland, 2010, p. 11) with populist policies aimed at attracting public support by providing goods to a large segment of the population. Populist policies such as free health care and free education have been prevalent among Indonesian sub-nationals. Defining populism as a political strategy excludes a research agenda to investigate populism as only a discursive phenomena. Moreover, conceptualizing populism as a strategy facilitates the study of leaders as actors who use ideas and policies of populism and material resources as tools to maintain their power. Therefore, treating populism as a strategy situates power as a central problem in the research. The focus of this paper is to explain how sub-national political leaders use populist policies in maintaining their power. The types of populist

policies vary, but two are the most important. First, some populist policies are entrenched as a long-term commitment of leaders to the provision of public goods by using state resources. Free health care and free education are included in this type. These kinds of policies are usually understood as programmatic distribution (Stokes, 2013, p. 7). Second, other populist policies are short-term in nature and aimed at mobilizing supports and gaining a brief period of loyalty, especially in a crucial period such as an election. This latter type is usually understood as vote buying, principally disbursing money to targeted constituents (ibid., p. 14).

I argue that leaders are aware that these two types of populist policy are available to cement support for their durability, and they employ each of them in different circumstances. Leaders usually employ programmatic politics to institutionalize support to a large segment of population. Although they have implemented programmatic politics, however, their popularity during an election may decline because of money politics utilized by other contestants. In this case, the notion of discount rate comes in (Levi, op. cit., p. 13). Despite their existing programmatic policies, leaders see they may lose an election because in a democratic system, everybody can beat anybody. Therefore, leaders lower their discount rate, garnering available resources to be used in the election. The uncertainty in an election is the main driver of the limitation of long-term programmatic politics; such politics cannot be solely relied upon for the safe durability of leaders.

## **2. 5. Theoretical Frameworks**

### **P1. Institutional conditioning (Decentralization)**

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### **P2. Player interaction (Selection of political strategies)**

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### **P3. Institutional outcome (Durability of sub-national)**

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I propose the following arguments to combine the concepts of state capacity and populist policies and to incorporate them into three phases of analysis (see schema above). Inspired by Archer's approach (1995), I include the phases of 1) institutional conditioning, 2) player action, and 3) institutional outcome.

1. **Institutional conditioning.** The first phase discusses the establishment of decentralization through the set up of new rules in 1999 and 2004. Two conditions have emerged from these institutional changes. First, decentralization transformed the authority of local political leaders. Under the New Order, sub-national political leaders did not have power in organizing their territories since everything was decided at the national level. Since decentralization, sub-national political leaders have been given more authority in deciding matters related to their territories and controlling resources in their area. Second, however, decentralization has also created new challenges and threats to sub-national leaders. It established institutions at the national level that attempt to control the behavior of the leaders. In 2004, local direct election was introduced, regularly threatening the durability of the sub-national leaders. If under the authoritarian regime, the local parliament members directly appointed sub-national leaders, since 2004, the competition has been more open; local leaders must participate in elections to compete for or defend their office.

**2. Player action.** As the first phase establishes the ground on which players interact, the second phase discusses the strategic interaction of sub-national political leaders, particularly in selecting strategies to defend their office. As explained above, the two strategies are: using state capacity to extract resources and deploying populist policies. At this point, sub-national political leaders do not freely choose the two strategies, since the leaders are limited by the institutional settings of the first phase, principally the supervision by the institutions at the national level and the availability of resources in an area.

**3. Institutional outcome.** The strategic interactions between sub-national political leaders and their institutional conditions result in different institutional outcomes. There are three possible institutional outcomes: 1) durable-populist office, 2) durable-exploitative office, and 3) non-durable office. The first is the result of extraction converted as intensive deployment of populist policies. The second reflects stable sub-national political leaders who extract without delivering populist policies to the population. The third shows an unstable office as a product of different phase of extraction.

### **3. Institutional Conditioning: Decentralization**

In this section I explain the historical origins of Indonesian decentralization and mark the point when it veered in a different direction. This section covers both the history of Indonesian decentralization and how it unfolded after 1998. The former concentrates on the trajectory of decentralization since the colonial era. The latter focuses on two aspects of contemporary Indonesian decentralization: political and economic. When Indonesian decentralization prevailed in 1999 and 2004, it provided, on the one hand, a ground on which sub-national political leaders

could draw resources for their strategies to maintain power. On the other hand, it also established a new challenge for sub-national leaders in seizing office due to direct local election. In addition, in 2003, the Corruption Eradication Commission (*Komisi Pemberantasan Korupsi - KPK*) was installed as an institution that monitored the behaviors of elites at both the national and sub-national level. For sub-national leaders, the existence of KPK poses a threat to leaders who rely mostly to corruption as the mode of extracting resources. In other words, Indonesian decentralization has produced institutions that provide opportunities and set limitations to sub-national leaders.

### **3. 1. A Brief History of Indonesian Decentralization**

Developed countries have decentralized earlier while developing countries have initiated decentralization as they have gained independence. Literatures refer to the 1960s as a period when decentralization was initiated in developing countries, particularly Africa (see, for instance, Conyers, 1983, p. 98; Samoff, 1990, p. 513). The main objectives were to reduce the burden of central government in providing public services and to establish democratic system in contrast to previous colonial administrations (Conyers, op. cit. p. 99). During 1980s, International agencies (e.g., USAID, UNDP, the World Bank) expanded the discourse of decentralization beyond the aforementioned objectives by highlighting the role of participation of local communities in local development (Conyers, op. cit., p. 100).

Indonesia was no stranger to decentralization. Since the Dutch colonial era, it has been exposed to various levels of decentralization. In 1922, the colonial administration established provinces and districts as a part of a strategy to halt resistance against the colonial government. Due to the communist uprising in 1926, however, the Dutch recentralized its administration to recover the security in the colony (Nordholt, 2003, p. 561). After the Independence in 1945, the

Indonesian government initiated Law 1/1957, arranging for governors and *bupati* (the regent head) to be elected by provincial and regent parliaments (ibid., p. 562). The Indonesian government also installed Law 32/1957 to manage the fiscal relationship between the central and sub-national governments. Even though the spirit of the Law was to allocate resources from the central to sub-national governments, the central government remained dominant in coordinating resource distribution, including benefiting from exports (ibid., p. 562). In reality, the decentralization never fully occurred because in the 1950s Indonesia faced local rebellions (e.g., PRRI/PERMESTA, DI/TII) and reenacted a centralized government under Sukarno's Guided Democracy (ibid., p. 562). The rise of the New Order in 1966 reinforced this centralization of Indonesian government. Through Law 5/1974, the New Order regime admitted provinces and regents as autonomous entities. Practically, however, the central government heavily influenced the politics in the provinces and regents. Governors and *bupati* were still appointed by the central government, and military forces were deployed to sub-national territories to monitor oppositions (ibid., pp. 562-563).

The fall of Suharto paved the way for the reinstatement of decentralization in the Indonesian political system. B. J. Habibie, the president after Suharto, clung to Team 7, a group of American-educated Indonesian intellectuals, to initiate political reform. Gaining support from Habibie, in 1999 Team 7 proposed a draft of a bill to create regional autonomy. In May 1999, the parliament passed the draft as Law 22/1999 on regional autonomy, followed by Law 25/1999 on fiscal decentralization. The success of Team 7 in promoting the laws was due primarily to its ability to convince political elites (e.g., Habibie, Golkar Party) to pass the reform since it could bolster their popularity as democratic actors (Smith, 2008, p. 213). Five years later, Indonesia passed Law 32/2004, initiating direct local election at the local levels.

### 3. 2. Political Decentralization

Law 22/1999 and Law 32/2004 introduced a different political configuration for sub-national political leaders. Under the New Order regime sub-national political leaders were elected by the local parliaments, but since the establishment of Law 32/2004, sub-national political leaders have been elected directly through local elections. The local elections occur every five years to select a pair of leaders. The elections are held to elect leaders for various positions at the sub-national: province, regent, and city. Candidates can participate in a local election if they are supported by political party or a coalition of political parties with at least 15% of seats in the local parliament or 15% of the popular vote. The duration in office of a winning candidate is five years. If a candidate wins in the first election, they are given a chance to compete once again for a second term. In addition, embedded within the political position of sub-national leaders are rights to manage matters such as healthcare, education, labor, and land. Before 1998, sub-national authorities could not determine these matters. Nevertheless, the central government has not fully surrendered authority to sub-nationals. Through the introduction of the minimum service standard (MSS), the central government obliges sub-nationals to fulfill certain criteria in delivering public service.

As noted, the existence of Law 22/1999 and Law 32/2004 does not automatically imply that sub-national political leaders have full autonomy from the central government. In fact, the new laws include regulations that can influence the durability of sub-national political leaders. These regulations can be considered threats in the sense that the durability of a leader's office can cease when institutions enforce the regulations. Consider some of these rules:

1. In Law 32/2004, if local political leaders break rules, then *DPRD* recommends the president to discharge the leaders based on the assessment made by the *Supreme Court*.

2. Government Rule 3/2007 updates Law 32/2004 by adding two mechanisms for discharging a sub-national political leader. The two mechanisms are: 1) indirectly by a recommendation *or* a verdict by *DPRD* with *a president's approval*, and 2) directly by *presidential decision* with or without an approval by the *sub-national parliament*.

3. Non-institutionalized threats that may come from actors at the national level. The form of these threats may emerge as political contestation between politicians at the national level and sub-national leaders. Disputes between them may end as political conflict between them, resulting in the employment of national politicians' power to intervene sub-national leaders' authority (See Gibson, *op. cit.* p.32). Another instance is the withdrawal of nomination by the central party leadership to run for the second term in local elections.

These rules illustrate imminent threats for the durability of a sub-national political leader. Two types of threats imply by those rules: horizontal and vertical (see also Gibson, *op. cit.*, p. 12). Horizontally, threats come from *DPRD* as an institution that has a right to propose a discharge for a sub-national political leader. The horizontal threat drives a political leader to make consensus with *DPRD*. Vertically, a sub-national political leader also faces threats to his durability from the president and the Supreme Court because they are able to discharge him if he violates the rules of the game. In addition to the President and the Supreme Court, the establishment of *KPK* in 2003 also poses threat to the durability of sub-national leaders especially those who employ illegal strategies in maintaining their power. As a preliminary research, this paper discusses threats emerges from these institutions. The focus is on threats that emerge from public offices that act as monitoring institutions to sub-national leaders. This focus does not mean other threats are not important. Take for example, threats that come from civil



society groups. Civil society groups may important, especially when they act in reporting corruption conducted by the sub-national leaders. This paper limits the scope by examining the authoritative relationship between monitoring institutions and sub-national leaders.

### **3. 3. Fiscal Decentralization**

The post-New Order decentralization has restructured the economic relationship between the central and sub-national governments. The nature of the fiscal decentralization is that even though sub-nationals have resources distributed to their pockets, the central government still decides the amount of resources deployed. In this sense, Indonesian fiscal decentralization cannot be understood as complete control on the part of sub-nationals to manage their own local resources.

The economic relationship between the central and sub-national governments is mediated primarily by two mechanisms: the first is the General Purpose Grant (*Dana Abadi Umat – DAU*) and the second is the Special Purpose Fund (*Dana Alokasi Khusus – DAK*) (Lewis, 2005, p. 294). These two components of cash transfer are deployed from the central government to finance most of the spending of sub-nationals. During 2006-2012, the size of the cash transfer is between 31%-34% of the national state budget for each year (FITRA, 2012, p. 54). The negative consequence of cash transfer, however, is that some sub-nationals tend to rely on it as the main revenue of their budget (Brodjonegoro, 2004, p. 6). The dependence on cash transfer varies for different levels of sub-national. During 2008-2011, for instance, Indonesian provinces relied their revenue from DAU, estimating around 49% of the local state budget in 2008, 45% (2009), 44% (2010), and 41% (2011) (ibid., p. 55). The level of dependence increased at the district level, comprising of 89% of the local state budget in 2008, 86% (2009), 84% (2010), 80% (2011) (ibid., p. 55).

Besides DAU and DAK, fiscal decentralization confers sub-nationals with *revenue sharing*. Law 25/1999 justifies revenue sharing, aiming to compensate resource-rich sub-nationals for having been exploited under the New Order regime (Brodjonegoro, 2002, p. 4). Revenue sharing consists of two types of income: natural resources and taxes. The former includes income generated from oil and gas, mining, and forestry and fishery. The latter is based on personal income tax as well as existing revenue from property and land taxes. Although revenue sharing does not provide a large proportion of the allocation to sub-nationals compared to DAU, revenue sharing can matter for a sub-national with abundant natural resources. In that case, the share from natural resources may increase. Principally, Law 25/1999 manages how the sharing among central and sub-national governments is conducted. Regarding the taxation system, the distribution is mostly given to the second tier sub-national governments (the districts and municipals) as shown by Table 2 above. The tax rate is set by the central government. In addition, sub-national governments also have their own rights to establish new taxes and charges. At the provincial level, sub-nationals may generate new taxes and charges while at the district level, the new taxes and charges must meet certain criteria set by the national government (Lewis, 2003, p. 177). Based on the new authority to create new taxes and charges, the sub-nationals have been more aggressive in creating new income for the local state budget (Lewis, 2005). For instance, in 2000-2001, there were 310 new local tax and charges initiated by the sub-national governments (Lewis, op. cit.).

**Table 1 Natural Resources Sharing between Central and Sub-national Governments (in %)**

Item	Central Government	Provincial Government	Resource Producing Local Government	Other Local Governments in the Same Province	All Local Governments in Indonesia (Equal Share)
Oil	85	3	6	6	
LNG	70	6	12	6	

Mining: Land Rent	20	16	64	0	
Mining: Royalty	20	16	32	32	
Forestry: Land Rent	20	16	64	0	
Forestry: Resources Provision	20	16	32	32	
Fishery	20				80

Source: Law 25/1999 (quoted in Brodjonegoro, 2002, pp. 4-5)

**Table 2 Tax Revenue Sharing between Central and Sub-national Governments (in %)**

Item	Central Government	Provincial Government	District/Municipal Government in the Same Province	Collection Fee	All District/Municipal Government in Indonesia (Equal Share)
Property Tax		16.2	64.8	9	10
Land Transfer Fee		16	64		20
Personal Income Tax	80	8	12		

Source: Government Regulation 104/2000, Law 17/2000 (quoted in Brodjonegoro, 2002, p. 5)

Analyzing the structure of revenue sharing, it can be concluded that for two commodities, oil and LNG, the central government still controls the larger share of the revenue. For other commodities, sub-nationals have more shares. Based on the structure, saying that sub-nationals have full autonomy from the central government is incorrect. The reason is that there is a competition between the central government and the sub-nationals in managing vital resources such as oil and LNG. The central government always aims to control the majority of these commodities because of their significance in propelling the Indonesian economy. When Indonesia experienced the oil boom in the 1970s, the windfall profits were used to finance the expansion of economic development. Although the revenue from oil and gas has not been dominant as in the 1970s, the central government still wants to control them for their contribution to state income derived from their export. If the control of these two commodities is surrendered to sub-national governments, then the income cannot be considered as national income.

#### 4. Player Action

This section outlines how sub-national political leaders deal with the installment of decentralization. The cases are the governorship of Alex Noerdin in South Sumatra, Ratu Atut Chosiyah in Banten, and Syamsul Arifin in North Sumatra. The focus of the explanation is how these three leaders maintain their durability by navigating themselves within institutional constraint and opportunities. The main focus is on how these three leaders employ political strategies of extraction and disburse populist programs.

#### 4. 1. South Sumatra

Alex Noerdin was not a new political player in South Sumatra. Before he became a governor of South Sumatra, he was *bupati* of Banyuasin for two terms (2001-2006, 2007-2012). Before finishing his second term as *bupati*, he won the governor election in 2008, becoming the first directly elected governor of South Sumatra.

When he was the *bupati* of Banyuasin, Noerdin installed a series of populist policies. First, under Noerdin, Banyuasin was one of the first regents, alongside Jembrana (Bali), Kutai Kertanegara (East Kalimantan), and Bantaeng (South Sulawesi), that allocated 20% of the local budget for education. In 2006, the regent allocated 27% of its local budget for education. Based on this policy, students from elementary school to high school, both in public and private schools, could receive and education for free. Noerdin's view on his policy was

*“If the people are smart and properly educated, then developing a region is far easier. It would be useless if the roads are immaculate yet the people backward wouldn't it?”* (Jakarta Post, 9/14/2006)

In 2006, Noerdin won the election as *bupati* of Musi Banyuasin for the second time. He teamed up with Pahri Azhari, a politician from National Mandate Party (*Partai Amanat Nasional* - PAN). They won by gaining 61.36% votes. After winning the election, Noerdin established a

program called SMART, standing for *Sejahtera* (prosperity), *Mandiri* (independence), *Adil* (Justice), Religion and *Terdepan* (in the forefront) (Jakarta Post, 4/16/2007). This program was a continuation of the initiatives in Noerdin's first term, focusing principally on education and infrastructure of Musi Banyuasin. With his success in campaigns in Musi Banyuasin, Noerdin then entered the contest for governor in the 2008 election. He resigned as *bupati* and paired with Eddy Yusuf, *bupati* of Ogan Komering Ilir. Both were supported by the Golkar Party, the National Mandate Party (PAN), the Crescent Star Party (PBB), the Democratic Party (PD), and the National Freedom Bull party (PNBK) (Jakarta Post, 9/12/2008). He ran against the incumbent governor Syahrial Oesman who was paired with Helmi Yahya, an artist and supported by the PDI-P. Noerdin and Yusuf won the election by a small margin in a vote of 51.40% to 48.60%.

Adopting from his success in Musi Banyuasin, as he became governor, Noerdin swiftly installed his highly regarded policy: free healthcare and free education. First, he introduced free health care for people in South Sumatra. He basically argued that the funding was possible even for the scale of South Sumatra since the provincial government shared the fund with the regents. The provincial government funded 70% of the cost, while the regents funded the remainder. In supporting his program, he coordinated 15 *bupati* in South Sumatra to endorse the program. Before Noerdin was in power, 48% of 7.12 million South Sumatrans did not have healthcare insurance (Jakarta Post, 1/13/2009). When he was in power, South Sumatra disbursed US \$21 million for free healthcare service for 3.7 million people (Jakarta Post, 1/30/2009). In addition, reflecting his campaign promise, Noerdin also established free education in the region. Starting from July 1, 2009, he forbade the schools, from public to private and from elementary to vocational, from requiring a school fee from the students. The South Sumatran government

allocated US \$1.8 million to finance education for 1,680,165 students (Jakarta Post, 7/1/2009). Noerdin also created a policy of free legal-aid for people in South Sumatra (Jakarta Post, 2/14/2009). All of these populist policies were supported by abundant natural resources owned by the province (Aspinall, 2014, p. 6).

Throughout his political career, Noerdin did not rely on populist policies alone. In 2009, he also strengthened his political position by seizing leadership of the Golkar Party for the South Sumatra branch. He won with almost unanimous support, getting 14 votes from 15 branches. One of the contenders, Muhammad Yansori, resigned from the contestation while another candidate, Sulgani Pakuali, did not remain in the competition because of personal illness. Noerdin's control of the party was instrumental in his winning as governor for the second time.

In the middle of his first term as the South Sumatran Governor (2012), Noerdin risked his durability by running for governor of Jakarta. With the support of Golkar Party, PPP and PDS, he ran with Nono Sampono, a retired lieutenant general. The other other candidates included Fauzi Bowo and Nachrowi Ramli, the incumbent governor and vice governor; Joko Widodo and Basuki Tjahja Purnama (PDI-P and Gerindra); Faisal Basri and Biem Benjamin (independent); and Hendarji Supandji-Achmad Riza Patria (independent). Noerdin and Sampono managed to gather only 4% of votes, failing to proceed into the second round. Although he lost in the election, he returned to South Sumatra to continue his term as governor.

Noerdin's durability in power was tested in 2013 when he faced his second gubernatorial election in South Sumatra. In this election, he ran with Ishak Mekki, the former *bupati* of Ogan Komering Ilir, against Herman Dheru and Maphilinda Boer (supported by 20 parties including three major parties PPP, Gerindra, and Hanura); Eddy Santana and Annisa Juwita (PDI-P and PKPB); and Iskandar Hasan and Hafisz Tohir (PKS, PAN and PBR). Against these pairs,

Noerdin won the election by gaining 36.02% of the vote, followed closely by Dheru and Boer (32.25%) (<http://www.thejakartapost.com>). Meanwhile, Santana and Juwita acquired only 17.83%, and Iskandar and Hafisz were in last place (10.26%). The close margin between Noerdin and Dheru led to an accusation that Noerdin and Mekki cheated in the election. Following an investigation, the Constitutional Court annulled the win of Noerdin and Hafisz. The court argued that they used the local state budget to mobilize votes in four municipalities and regents and in a district (<http://www.thejakartapost.com>). The court specified that Noerdin and Mekki disbursed approximately 1.4 trillion rupiah (US \$133 million) to voters, taken from the social assistance fund budget (<http://www.thejakartapost.com>). Noerdin has faced other questions of corruption. He has been investigated regarding his role in the corruption of sport facilities for South East Asian Games (SEA Games), an event held every other year; KPK has accused him of accepting a bribe of 4.7 billion rupiah (US \$- 549,676) (Jakarta Post, 7/19/2011). Thus far, however, he has not been detained on any charges in these cases.

#### **4. 2. Banten**

In understanding Atut's reign, the investigation must trace the roles of Tubagus Chasan Sohib, Atut's father, who actually paved the political career of his daughter. Sohib presents a portrait of how a local political actor uses informal power to seize formal political office. Sohib was born in Serang in 1930. His path as an informal leader started when he provided logistics for the Indonesian Army in 1967 (Masaaki, 2004). After assisting the army, he established a construction company, PT Sinar Ciomas Raya. His company benefited mostly from projects contracted by PT Krakatau Steel, the biggest steel company in Southeast Asia (ibid). In working on these projects, Sohib relied primarily on his informal network of *jawara*, local strongmen who derive their power from martial arts. Together with *ulama*, local religious leaders, *jawara* is a

building block for the Bantenese informal power structure. The position of both groups became stronger in the 1970s when they were incorporated under the wing of the Golkar Party, the government-sponsored party in the New Order era (ibid). The *ulama* was organized as the Ulama Work Squad (*Satkar Ulama*) while the *jawara* was coordinated as the Martial Artist Work Squad (*Satkar Pendekar*) (ibid). Sohib was one of the executive committee members of the former and chair of the (ibid).

After student movements forced out Suharto from power, Sohib's position remained intact as a prominent figure in Banten. His position was even reinforced when the central government delegated authority to sub-nationals through decentralization. Sohib's first tactic to entrench his power in the era of decentralization was to establish a new province as a new bastion of his existing power structure. Within a new region, the existing power network can arise and capture state power, creating formal mechanisms for expanding the sub-national political actors' influence. Starting in 1999, Sohib organized local political actors to initiate the establishment of Banten as a province separate from West Java. In 2000, using his local networks as *jawara*, he mobilized rallies and money to propel this initiative, successfully installing Banten as a new province in February 2000 (ibid).

Sohib's second strategy for entrenching his power was by positioning his family members in office. This is when Atut started to take over some of Sohib's authority. At first, in 2001, Sohib supported the nomination of Joko Munandar from the United Development Party (*Partai Persatuan Pembangunan*) and Atut from the Golkar Party as a pair for the positions of governor and vice governor (ibid). The election itself was indirect, with the local parliament voting. They competed against other candidates such as Ace Suhaedy Masdupi and Tb Mamas Chaerudin, supported by the Struggle-Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P), and Heruman



Haeruman-Ade Sudirman, supported by Al-Bantani, a faction consisting of three parties (PKB, PKP and PP). The pair won the election in 2001, launching Atut's political debut as vice governor of Banten. Two years after this triumph, Atut's path to the top of Banten politics was opened when Munandar faced prosecution for corruption involving a housing project for local parliament members, causing the loss of ten billion rupiah from the state budget. In 2004, the high attorney of Banten detained Munandar and, as a result, Atut replaced Munandar as the governor of Banten.

After finishing her first term in 2006, Atut ran for governor, pairing with Mohammad Masduki, a civil service retiree. This was Banten's first direct election. Atut was able to garner support from Golkar, the Struggle Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI-P), the Reform Star Party (PBR), the Crescent Moon Party (PBB), and the Concern for the Nation Functional Party (PKPB). The other candidates in the election were Tryana Syamun and Benjamin Davnie (supported by PPP and PAN); and Zuelkiflimansyah and Marissa Haque (PKS-PS). Due to the massive disbursement of money, collected mostly from state projects, Atut and Masduki won (Masaaki and Hamid, 2008, p. 130). Their broad coalition succeeded in pooling 40% of votes, lifting them to the leadership of Banten from 2007 to 2012.

In her first term, Atut cemented her power by positioning her family in the Bantenese political structure. She followed the example of her father by filling political positions in Banten with family members. Her brother Tubagus Chaeri Wardana was her right hand in organizing state projects. He presided over the United Banten Volunteers, (*Relawan Banten Bersatu* -RBB), a nationalist-leaning organization formed by Sohib in 2005. The main objective of the organization has been "to correct" the democratization in Indonesia that has been felt to be out of control. Regardless of the stated objective of RBB, its real intent was to mobilize political

support from *jawara* for Atut's run for governor in 2006. The RBB's strategy was to pool support from the two biggest *jawara* organizations: the PPPSBBI and BPPKB (ibid).

In 2009, her husband Hikmat Tomet won a seat as a member of the House of Representatives from the Golkar Party. In the same year, her son Andika Hazrumy gained a seat as a member of the Regional Representative Council for Banten. Hazrumy's wife Adde Rossi Khoerunissa was elected as Deputy Speaker of Serang Council. Two years later, Atut supported her another brother, Tb Haerul Jaman, as Serang's Mayor. Moreover, her stepmother Heryani was Pandeglang Deputy Regent while her sister-in-law Airin Rachmy Diany, also Wardana's wife, has been the Vice Bupati of South Tangerang District. Diany won her election in 2010, paired with Jazuli Juwaini, the district head candidate from Prosperous Justice Party (*Partai Keadilan Sejahtera* – PKS), an urban-based Moslem party.

When Atut entered her second term as governor, she developed even further her method of maintaining her political influence. Atut did the same thing when she tried to support the candidates that they favored in the regent election in Lebak in 2013. Together with her brother Wardhana, she tried to bribe the Constitutional Court Judge Akil Mochtar. The bribe was intended to alter the decision of the *bupati* election in Lebak in 2013. The candidates were Amir Hamzah, the vice bupati of Lebak, and Amir Kasmin, a Banten DPRD member from the Golkar Party, competing against Iti Oktavia, the incumbent *bupati*, and Ade Sumardi, the chief of DPRD Lebak. When the first pair, supported by Atut, lost to the second pair, Atut and Wardana tried to pay Mochtar to alter the decision by a bribe of 1 billion rupiah, before they were caught by KPK.

Corruption was the method of Atut's to mobilize resources. During her term as governor Banten had a chronic problem of corruption. One of the sectors that had such a problem was health sector. A report by Indonesian Corruption Watch (ICW) notes that during 2001-2013,

Banten had nine cases of corruption related to the health sector, causing 71.59 billion rupiah loss, the second biggest loss compared to other 25 provinces (ICW, 2013). One of the cases involved Atut's power circle and Atut herself. In recent months, the Corruption Eradication Commission (KPK) has been investigating the corruption in health equipment procurement in Banten during 2011-2013. The corruption cost the state 23 billion rupiah (<http://www.thejakartapost.com>). In this period, two cases occurred in South Tangerang, involving a fraudulent markup of the cost of healthcare equipment charged to the local state budget. The method of the corruption was by marking up the real prices of the health equipment (<http://nasional.kompas.com>). Moreover, Atut and her family also involved with the corruption in infrastructure sector. According to ICW, during 2008-2013, Atut's family companies won 52 state projects with a total value of 723.333 billion rupiah (ICW, 2013). Her corruption was channeled through 10 family companies that directly controlled by her family members and 24 companies that indirectly related to her (ibid) To cover up her involvement, she delegated the authority to manage the project to bureaucrats below her (<http://nasional.kompas.com>).

The corruption in health sector was damaging especially considering Banten had only allocated few resources to healthcare compared to other expenditures. For instance, in 2012, Banten only spent 5.53% from their local budget for healthcare (<http://www.thejakartapost.com>). Overall, Banten spent only less than 10% of their local budget for healthcare during 2006-2012. Most of the budget went to pay personnel expenditures while the real allocation that went to people, for instance, infant and maternal health was only 0.14% in 2012 (ibid). In addition the progress of Banten in developing healthcare and education lacked behind compared to 20 provinces. Banten managed only to get 5.85% progression rate compared to 6.25% progression rate at the national level (ibid).

Atut's strategy to maintain and expand the influence of her office was through using joint extraction, utilizing state power and private family companies to channel resources to Atut's pockets. Referring to Snyder's account on the types of extraction, she combined the two and pooled resources for her political purposes. First, she used state power to extract resources through taxes and revenue sharing from the central government. After that, she formed family companies that bid for state projects, like happened in the corruption in the health sector. Thanks to Atut's political influence, the companies won the rights to run the projects. Once the money was collected, it went to finance Atut's political projects. The money was useful when Atut had to face a crucial moment in defending her office, such as in the 2006 provincial election. Referring to my definition of durability as "at minimum one term in office," local direct election is the main obstacle to durability for a sub-national leader. Using resources collected through joint extraction, Atut managed to mobilize money, disburse it through her political networks, and win the election, overcoming any obstructions to prolonging her durability.

#### **4. 3. North Sumatra**

Before coming into power as a governor in 2008, Syamsul Arifin was the *bupati* of Langkat (2000-2008). He won the governorship of North Sumatra through the province's first direct election. Arifin's power base relied mostly on his affiliation with thug organizations (Hadiz, 2010, p. 116). Thug organizations have historically entrenched their influence in North Sumatra where the two most prominent ones are Youth Pancasila (*Pemuda Pancasila* - PP) and the Association of Functional Group Youths (*Ikatan Pemuda Karya* - IPK) (Hadiz, 2004, p. 626). PP was established in the 1950s as a project to stem the rising influence of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI). When political upheaval occurred in 1965, PP had a significant role, alongside the Islamic organizations, in conducting mass murder of Indonesian communists,

especially in North Sumatra (Ryter, 1998, p. 55). Under the New Order regime, PP was taken under the wing of the Golkar Party. IPK is a significant political organization in Medan, the capital city of North Sumatra. The organization was an important player for its role in running gambling businesses in the city.

Arifin rested his power on these types of organization. Three prominent thug-youth organizations were significant in his rise to power: Indonesian Youth National Committee (*Komite Nasional Pemuda Indonesia – KNPI*), Youth Pancasila (*Pemuda Pancasila – PP*), and Communications Forum for Sons and Daughters of Indonesian Retired Servicemen (*Forum Komunikasi Putera-Puteri Purnawirawan Indonesia – FKKPI*). Arifin was a chair of KNPI during the New Order era. This position helped him to become a parliamentarian at the local level. Arifin's membership in PP and FKKI was unusual because those organizations have been involved in rivalries. Nevertheless, Arifin was able to identify himself with both of them.

In the 2008 provincial election, Arifin was formally supported by the coalition of eleven parties in the local parliament. They were PPP, PBB, PKS, PP, PKPB, PKPI, PPDI, PM, PSI, PDK and PPNUI. In the election, Arifin paired with Gatot Puji Nugroho, a local politician from PKS. They earned 28.31% votes, defeating the other pairs such as Tri Tamtomo and Benny Pasaribu (21.69%); Abdul Wahab Dalimunthe and Raden Muhammad Syafi'I (17.40%); Siahaan and Suherdi (16.58%); and Ali Umri and Maratua Simanjuntak (16.01%) (<http://www.thejakartapost.com>). Despite the large number of parties supporting him, only PKS had seats in the provincial parliament at that time; it had 8 seats from a total of 58 seats. (<http://sumut.bps.go.id/?opt=1&qw=tstasek&kd=1216>).

Arifin's reign as a governor lasted only three years. The Corruption Court accused him of corruption when he was the *bupati* of Langkat (2000-2007). The mode of corruption relied

mostly on the bureaucrats as his staffs to move the money (<http://www.tribunnews.com>). The bureaucrats were Buyung Ritonga (1998-2006), a treasurer for Langkat Regent, names that consecutively acted as the head of finance division of Langkat Regent: Surya Djahisa (1998-2003), Aswan Sufri (2004-2005 and 2006-2007), and Taufik (2007-2008) (ibid). Using his authority, Arifin ordered them to transfer money from the local state budget to his family members' accounts. The Corruption Court then sentenced him to two and a half years in prison for causing a loss of 102 billion rupiah for the local state (<http://www.thejakartapost.com>).

The detention of Arifin sparked a political rivalry between him and Rahmat Shah who had reported Arifin's involvement in the corruption., Shah was Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono's head of campaign in North Sumatra when Yudhoyono ran for Previously, Shah had had a feud with Arifin regarding Shah's claim to state land in Binjai, Medan. According to Arifin, Shah's motivation to report his corruption was driven by Shah's failure to gain the land. Arifin's accusation prompted Shah to file a lawsuit against Arifin. The quarrel between Arifin and Shah shows that the politics at the sub-national level cannot be isolated from the politics at the national level.

## **5. Institutional Outcome**

The three cases conclude with three different institutional outcomes: durable-populist office (Noerdin), durable-exploitative office (Atut) and non-durable office (Arifin). The first case, Noerdin, shows a leader who uses his office to convert abundant resources into populist policies. Despite their range from long-term benefits such as free healthcare and free education to illegal ones such as the misuse of a social assistance fund, the policies he initiated were mostly populist-oriented, meaning to deliver welfare to a large segment of the population. Such a programmatic politics is reinforced by the success of the same policy when he was *bupati* of

Musi Banyuasin. After he won the gubernatorial election, he has had a leverage to implement the populist policies because larger provincial fund and stronger authority helped him. Particularly, the embedded right of a governor as the supervisor of *bupati* helped him to achieve his goals, since by using his authority Noerdin was able to force *bupati* in South Sumatra to implement his policies for providing free healthcare and free education.

However, although Noerdin has established populist policies, such an approach was not enough for him. He went further to use the social assistance fund in the state's local budget to buy votes. The high uncertainty within the election forces Noerdin to lower his discount rate, motivating him to mobilizing bureaucracy and social assistance fund to win the election in 2013. The question then is how he still managed to govern and win the reelection in 2013 after being proved to have misused that budget? The answer is in the institutional setting of political competition. First, In the case of Noerdin, the Constitutional Court made a surprising argument. It said that there is no such thing as a 100% clean election. As long as the violation of election rules are not "systematic and structured" and does not influence the outcome of the election, then the court could not revoke the result (<http://www.antaranews.com>). Second, KPK could not investigate the case based on the court's decision. It can only investigate it if it is proven by the Supreme Audit Agency (*Badan Pemeriksa Keuangan – BPK*) that it causes lost for the state budget (<http://www.tribunnews.com>). Therefore, the durability of Noerdin is a product of how a leader manages to maneuver within the loopholes of the law and a weak monitoring and enforcement system. These factors, combined with the authority of a sub-national leader to use resources, permit Noerdin to be durable.

The second case, Atut, suggests a different outcome. Atut's political strategies construct an office with little deliveries to local population. In fact, it is exploitative since resources are not

delivered back to the population, causing slow progress of development of Banten, particularly in welfare sectors such as healthcare and education. Although did not deliver for the population, Atut still managed to acquire durability. By manipulating public policies and exercising his personal networks (Hidayat, 2007, p. 212), Atut performed joint extraction. Resources mobilized through joint extraction provide her with resources needed when she must face political contestation (i.e., election) and lobby the national politics in order to maintain her political influence in the province (i.e., bribing the Constitutional Court's judge).

Atut's reign in Banten shows a durable but precarious office. It is durable because when Atut opted for joint extraction she simultaneously plunged herself into a dangerous game; the extraction was both beneficial and corrosive for her office. In the short term, her strategy to hijack state resources through her family companies provided her with immense resources, especially in facing key moments such as the 2006 election for governor. The election was a crucial time when Atut had to contest with other candidates who were able to take her office. To maneuver in the election, Atut relied on the capacity of her networks in garnering resources in her first period that were transformed into the disbursement of money to voters (Masaaki, op. cit.). In the long run, seizing state resources through private companies endangered her position because such an act became a subject of monitoring for KPK. Nevertheless, based on my definition of durability, such a strategy could provide her a durable office.

In the case of Arifin, his office is characterized by the inability to deliver welfare because of his short term in power. The main cause of this is that the time of corruption he did in the past. The decision to corrupt when he was *bupati* planted a time bomb that destroyed his durability when he became a governor. His path to power was ensured by the extraction period when he was *bupati* of Langkat (2000-2007). However, his strategy to rely only on public extraction



endangered the durability of his office. Utilizing public extraction as private extraction is dangerous because by directly taking the money from the state budget can be easily detected by the monitoring institutions at the national politics. Because of this different phase of corruption, Arifin's office was not durable enough to stay in power for at least five years.

The comparison among different institutional outcomes shows that the period of extraction can matter in determining the durability of sub-national leaders. Among the cases, only Noerdin seemed not rely heavily on corruption as a means of extraction in supporting his office. Although some indications exist that Noerdin may have been involved in corruption, the main difference among the cases is that Noerdin was the only leader who provided expansive social policies for a vast number of recipients by using the state budget. Moreover, he was able to maneuver among different institutional loopholes and weaknesses, particularly evading from the monitoring institutions at the national politics.

For the other two cases, extraction was conducted in the first term in power; such extraction should lead to greater durability because there is a time span to discovery of whether or not such an extraction violates the law. That is applicable for Atut's case but not to Arifin's. Arifin's rise to power was colored by corruption before he was inaugurated as North Sumatra's governor, providing KPK time to investigate his political resources. Atut's extraction was different from Arifin's in that she formed a separate mean of extraction (i.e., family companies), providing her leverage to laundry the illicit money through her family's companies. Therefore, her office was relatively durable, although the same method gave her a problem in the long run.

## **6. Conclusion**

The cases exemplify different patterns of leader durability at the Indonesian sub-national level. This paper emphasizes that the difference should be traced to the institutional settings

based on the rules on decentralization established in 1999 and 2004. These rules are institutions that both limit and open opportunities for Indonesian sub-national political leaders in defending their office. Some institutions have become threats to the durability of sub-national leaders. Institutions such as DPRD, the President, KPK and the Supreme Court have the potential of endangering the durability of these leaders, especially when the leaders violate rules set up by these institutions. At the same time, decentralization also provides opportunities to the leaders for accumulating resources because decentralization has given more leverage to leaders in managing local resources.

The recipe for leader durability is actually simple: obey the rules of the game. Democracy requires the leaders to govern based on democratic rules. The delivery of welfare to the population through populist policies helps a leader like Noerdin to entrench his popularity in his province. Nevertheless, considering the threats come from the election, the shifting of strategy must be done by employing the state bureaucrats and budget to mobilize votes. In contrast to Noerdin, Atut case shows that a leader can maintain their power by breaking the rules without delivering to the population. It shows that an office can still be durable through illicit behaviors. For her, the office was durable, based on the definition of a minimum of one period, by using resources extracted through illegal ways. Based on the assumption of this paper, resources matter to endure in office. The resources are especially vital in facing an election, a time when the durability of a leader is tested. In contrast, Arifin's durability could not be maintained through illicit behaviors. There are two reasons for his outcome. First, the extraction of state resources occurred when he was *bupati*. As Arifin entered a new office as governor, his corruption in the previous era implicated his durability in his new office. The second reason is that the disciplining institutions monitored such corrupt behavior. Arifin's durability could not continue because KPK

monitored his behavior and enforced the rules, causing him to step down from office before he finished his first term.

This preliminary investigation raises some issues for future research. First, the stories of Noerdin and Atut convey some under-investigated terrain, primarily in the politics within the enforcer institutions. The questions that might be raised are; How do these institutions actually work in enforcing rules? Why were some leaders able to complete their first period but later faced prosecution because of corruption? Is there any selectivity in enforcing rules? If so, on what interests is this selectivity built? These questions should lead to the investigation of the institutions above the Indonesian sub-national leaders such as the court, the Attorney General, and KPK.

Second, the lens of future research should move to the durability of leaders at the regent level. There are two considerations for this agenda. First, Rule 32/2004 has positioned regents as the arena in which leaders actually control the deployment of resources. Based on the rule, the provincial level is the agent that merely controls the performance of leaders at the regent level. Therefore, a key question concerns how a regent leader navigates between controls exerted at the provincial level and monitoring institutions at the national level.

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