Best

Essays

of 2015

ISRSF
Best Essays
of 2015

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www.ISRSF.org

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PREFACE

ISRSF conducted three national essay competitions in 2015. One focused on the writings of women authors on any topic. The other two were open to men and and women and focused on Indonesian history and social sciences issues. This book contains the top prize winning essays in each category as well as the honorable mention essays that also displayed excellence.

The centerpiece of ISRSF's current work is the Arryman Fellows program, which sends talented young Indonesians to Northwestern University in Chicago, USA, to pursue doctoral studies in the social sciences and humanities.

ISRSF sponsors essay competitions as a recruiting instrument to attract the attention of bright Indonesians who may not have heard of the Arryman program. Our Foundation wants to find the most promising, talented, and committed young students who are inclined to pursue a life-long devotion to teaching, research, and scholarship. What better way than a national essay competition to find some of Indonesia's best writers and analysts?

The top essays in each category receive a cash prize. But one of the greatest benefits of winning these competitions is a guaranteed interview in the Arryman Fellows selection process if the winners decide to apply.

The Essay Competition for Indonesian Women represents ISRSF's endeavor to make sure Indonesia's most serious young intellectual women come forward and walk through the door we have opened to do their doctorate at Northwestern, one of the leading universities in the U.S. and the world. We believe higher education and the cultivation of new scholars is an important part of the struggle to give women a fair and equal voice in education and public life across Indonesia. We are happy to announce that this essay competition for women authors attracted an even larger number of brilliant contestants than last year.

The Indonesian History Essay Competition and the Social Science Essay Competition proved to be an effective tool for finding Indonesians dedicated to studying history and becoming world-class scholars in that field and the social sciences more generally. In previous years, the Arryman program has attracted many political scientists and sociologists. But it is much harder to find young students dedicated to history. This year's essay competition found a strong crop of such students, and we are delighted most of them applied to become Arryman Fellows.

We are delighted that nearly all of the authors contained in this book decided to apply for the 2016 Arryman Fellows program. And although the interviews and

selection process are not yet finished, we are confident that several of them will be strong candidates for the doctoral program.

On behalf of ISRSF, I would like to thank the three Panels of Judges who carefully read and assessed all the essays we received. The judges for the Women's Essay Competition were Dr. Dewi Chandraningrum, Dr. Chusnul Mariyah, and Dr. Mildred Wagemann. The judges for the History Essay Competition were Dr. Baskara Wardaya, Dr. Ignas Kleden, M.A, and Didi Kwartanada. The judges for the Social Sciences Essays were Dr. Robertus Robet, Toenggoel P. Siagian, and Dr. Yosef Jakababa.

Our sincere thanks to everyone who wrote essays and participated in all aspects of these essay competitions. We hope you enjoy reading these short writings, and perhaps they will inspire some of you to join the essay competition later in 2016 and become an Arryman Fellow as well!

Dewi Puspasari
ISRSF Director of Operations

WOMEN'S ESSAYS

INTRODUCTION

Working in collaboration with two other judges, Dr. Chusnul Mariyah and Ibu Milly Wagemann, the 2015 Women's Essay Competition by ISRSF has been an engaging experience, with six winners focusing on array of feminist analyses of contemporary Indonesia.

Feminism has reached a stage in its debates on how it views the relationship between women's identity, agency, and representation which goes beyond essentialism. Feminism also faces the basic problem of existentialism that links women to the power of language. Julia Kristeva and other feminists discuss how problems in narrating her-story has hindered the feminists' movement in the case where women are not connected to systems of representation that employ language as its basic tool. Therefore, the starting point of women's narrative is to begin by writing women's own experiences.

Feminism provides a new privileged status for the narrative of women — especially minority women — because of its exemplary staging of the current human condition and the insights it offers into the evolving new value systems of the ethical turn of the language of equality, which is also the language of LGBT and other vulnerable groups. This is an important experience in celebrating diversity as well as in defeating monolithic narratives. It opens a more critical and interrogative awareness of the writing process, an influence that operates against the grain. It teaches generations of modern Indonesians the multiple arrays of voices that has long inhabited spaces at the margins.

The 2015 competition starts with the discussion of the recent fear of secularism. "Getting the 'Post-Secular' Right: Reading the Aceh Singkil Tragedy with Charles Taylor" by Lailatul Fitri as the first prize winner. She writes that the burning of a church in Aceh's Singkil region represents the presence of religious discourse in the public sphere that turned into a triumphalistic endeavor for the majority to systematically oppress the minority. In her essay she brilliantly advocates for a stronger government tole to make a room for the plurality of voices in the public sphere without elevating one over the other to the level of independent ethics. If that plurality of voices is not safeguarded, orthodox doctrines will reign over other religious traditions and create a systemic oppression in the process.

The impressive essay, "Deconstructing Stigma in Amurwani Dwi Lestariningsih" by Isyfi Afiani was the second prize winner. She challenges the reader to grasp that the return of the repressed voices of the women of 1965 does not suggest that women's writing is a symptom of a historical disease.Rather, she proposes a hermeneutic recovery of women's voices. As a return of the repressed, this narrative serves as a textual and political unconsciousness of the dominant phallocentric narrative of contemporary Indonesia that can be deciphered in relation to honesty and sincerity in establishing "her-story."

The third prize winner is the essay "The Impact of Women's Representation in Politics and Society: Towards Cultural and Religion Perspectives" by Juniar Laraswanda Umagapi. She argues that democracy without the participation of women is not a real democracy. Her essay shows that governments of many countries have reserved seats especially for women to contest elections and be present in the movement of politics. She pointed to the trend that more and more women are getting active in politics in order to make their presence more effective in the world of politics.

The Panel of Judges also nominated three amazing essays for honorable mention. In "A Case of West Java: Behind Popularity of Indonesian Coffee: Does This Popularity Show Famers' Empowerment?" by Resna Ria Asmara, we learn that the increase in coffee products exported to international markets has no linear causality with the empowerment of coffee farmers because they are underpaid labors. Her essay reminds readers of the dark side of the recent boom of Cafes throughout cities in Indonesia as well as the export system that stands unjustly toward its own farmers.

"The Influences of Culture and Stigma on Health Condition in Communities" by Mustika Yundari explains how the efforts to control health problems in Indonesia are still oriented towards health services in bigger cities and hospitals rather than in small cities and villages. This removes the roles of local cadres, traditional healers, and traditional birth attendants from the general picture.

"The Reinterpretation of Gender: Inspiring Women in Modern Life" by Lenni Lestari argues that the task of revisiting the conceptualization of traditional gender roles could break the modus of domination and subordination in gender inequalities. She concludes that a reinterpretation is needed to accommodate voices, roles, access, and representation in a more just livelihood.

All of these women's works are a collection of stories that present cultural markers as significant metaphors of protest against as unjust Indonesia. Their narratives are like entering into Indonesian women's experiencesas these authors present a vision of transforming the quality of equality. Her-stories reflect the struggle, voices, and resistance narrated by women. This marvelous collection of essays resonates those voices!

Dewi Candraningrum
Jurnal Perempuan, Indonesian Feminist Journal
www.jurnalperempuan.org

Getting the 'Post-Secular' Right: Reading the Aceh Singkil Tragedy with Charles Taylor

by **Lailatul Fitriyah**

International Relations
University of Jember, March 2010

Kroc Institute for International Peace Studies
University of Notre Dame, 2015

"This excellent article opens the door to a wider theoretical discussion of phenomena which have been taking place throughout Indonesia for many years. The destruction of houses of worship – including mosques of the Ahmadiyah movement – has usually been reported and treated merely as disparate items of local news."

Dr. Mildred L.E. Wagemann

The burning of a church in Aceh Singkil region, Aceh Province, Indonesia, on October 13th, 2015, started what then became an institutionalized process of eliminating the places of worship for the Christians minority in Aceh Singkil. In this paper, I argue that what happened in Aceh Singkil is a representation of the presence of religious discourse in the public sphere that turned into a triumphalistic endeavor for the majority to systematically oppress the minority. However, as bad as it might sound, this is not a reason to eliminate the attempts to open the public sphere for religious discourses in Indonesia. Far from being obsolete, the exercise in the 'post-secular' needs to be refined and rectified. The purpose of this paper is to analyze the state of the post-secular in Indonesia by taking up the tragedy in Aceh Singkil as a point of observation.

Models of post-secularism proposed by Charles Taylor[1] will serve as a theoretical framework for the paper, and thus, for examining the inclusion of religious voices in a public sphere once defined by normative ideals of secularism. The paper will be organized as follows: the first part of the paper will talk about the chronology of the Aceh Singkil attack as a point of departure for seeing the state of post-secularism in Indonesia. Meanwhile, the second part of the paper will be dealing with the question of post-secularism and Charles Taylor's models of post-secularism as a theoretical device to observe the practices of the post-secular in Indonesia.

The Attack in Aceh Singkil and the Current State of Post-Secularism in Indonesia

October 13th, 2015, became a nightmare for, at least, twenty thousand[2] Christians in Aceh Singkil region when a mob consisted of approximately 700 Muslim youths burned down a church in the region[3]. The arson occurred after a group of conservative Muslim youths under the banner of Aceh Singkil Islamic Care Youth Student Association (Gerakan Pemuda Aceh Singkil Peduli Islam)[4] held a demonstration a week earlier demanding the local government to dismantle ten churches in the region deemed to be established without the necessary permit.

1. Charles Taylor, "What Does Secularism Mean?" in *Dilemmas and Connections: Selected Essays* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2011), pp. 326–346; Charles Taylor, "Western Secularity," in *Rethinking Secularism*, eds. C. Calhoun, M. Juergensmeyer, and J. VanAntwerpen (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), pp. 31–53; Charles Taylor, "The Meaning of Secularism," *The Hedgehog Review* 12, (2010): pp. 23–34; Charles Taylor, *A Secular Age* (Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press of Harvard University Press, 2007); Charles Taylor, "Modes of Secularism," in *Secularism and Its Critics*, ed. R. Bhargava (New Delhi: Oxford University Press, 1999), pp. 31–53.
2. Ging Ginanjar, "*Gereja Tanpa Izin di Aceh Singkil Dijadwalkan Akan Ditertibkan*," *BBC Indonesia*, last modified November 25, 2015, http://www.bbc.com/indonesia/berita_indonesia/2015/10/151018_indonesia_singkil_simpang_siur.
3. "*Aceh Singkil Mencekam, Satu Gereja Dibakar, 2 Tewas*," *Tempo Online*, last modified November 25, 2015, http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/10/13/058709127/aceh-singkil-mencekam-satu-gereja-dibakar-2-tewas.
4. Hotli Simanjuntak, Apriadi Gunawan, "Thousands leave Aceh After Church Burning," *The Jakarta Post Online*, last modified November 25, 2015, http://www.thejakartapost.com/news/2015/10/15/thousands-leave-aceh-after-church-burning.html.

The government came back with a promise to tear down the churches two weeks after the demand was made[5], yet it was not fast enough for the disenchanted youth that they took the matter in to their own hands. On October 15th, 2015, the government of Aceh province, through the Indonesian Forum for Interreligious Harmony (*Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama*/FKUB), held an emergency meeting to open a dialogic process among leaders from different religious traditions in the region[6]. However, the fate of ten other 'illegal' churches in the region have been sealed[7]. On October 19th, 2015, the government of Aceh began to demolish ten more churches located at Aceh Singkil.

If one only gets to see how the tragedy unfolds, it would be easy for one to think of the radicalization of Muslim communities in Aceh Singkil region as the culprit of the attack. However, the concern on Muslim conservative groups will quickly turn into a bigger question when one traces back the history of Muslim radicalism in Aceh Singkil region. It is because the Muslim communities in Aceh Singkil are known as one of the most tolerant communities in a province where Muslims make up approximately 99% of the total population, which is Aceh[8]. Some other accounts from local religious leaders taken after the attack confirmed this claim[9].

I argue that we need to see the political processes in Aceh that place the Muslim majority in a dominating position vis a vis other religious believers as a contributing factor to the conflict. The radicalization of the minds does not happen in a vacuum. In the context of Aceh Singkil, it is important to remember that the 13 October tragedy was not the first attack directed towards the minority Christians and their churches. There were at least seven similar incidents occurred in the region during the period of 1979-2015[10]. Despite the high intensity of the attacks, the most important thing to observe from this chain of tragedy is the responses taken by the local government to quell the perpetrated conflict. One example, in post-1979 conflict between Muslims and Christians in the region, the government facilitated a peace agreement between the two communities and came up with a highly discriminative decision in favor of the Muslim communities. The 1979 peace

5. Anggi Kusumadewi, "*Akar Kerusuhan di Aceh Singkil Versi Bupati*," *CNN Indonesia Online*, last modified November 25, 2015, http://www.cnnindonesia.com/nasional/201510a3165830-20-84748/akar-kerusuhan-di-aceh-singkil-versi-bupati/.
6. "*Agar Kasus Aceh Singkil Tak Meluas, Berikut Cara Mencegahnya*," *Tempo Online*, last modified November 25, 2015, http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/10/16/058710019/agar-kasus-aceh-singkil-tak-meluas-berikut-cara-mencegahnya.
7. Kate Lamb, "Religious Violence Flares in Indonesia as Mob Torches Aceh Church," *The Guardian Online*, last modified November 25, 2015, http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/oct/23/religious-violence-flares-in-indonesia-as-mob-torches-aceh-church.
8. Fadjri Alihar, "Singkil: ein Zuwanderungs- und Kolonisationsraum in Sud-Aceh, Nord-Sumatra, Indonesien," (Ph.D. Dissertation, University of Kassel, 1996); Muhammad Ansor, "We are from the Same Ancestors: Christian-Muslim Relations in Contemporary Aceh Singkil," *al-Albab: Borneo Journal of Religious Studies* 3, no. 1 (2014): 3-24.
9. Agus Setyadi, "*NU Cerita Jalan Panjang Toleransi di Aceh Singkil Sebelum Konflik Warga*," *Detik News*, last modified November 29, 2015, http://news.detik.com/berita/3044551/nu-cerita-jalan-panjang-toleransi-di-aceh-singkil-sebelum-konflik-warga.
a10. "*Ini Sejarah Penyerangan Gereja Aceh Singkil Sejak 1979*," *Tempo Online*, last modified November 27, 2015, http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/10/17/063710342/ini-sejarah-penyerangan-gereja-aceh-singkil-sejak-1979.

agreement stated that there are only thirteen churches around Aceh Singkil that can be registered and have legal status[11].

It is somewhat predictable that the 1979 discriminative deal could not put the conflict to an end. In 2001 at least ten churches in the villages of Gunung Meriah, Simpang Kanan, and Danau Paris were forced to shut down due to the same accusation of the lack of necessary permit to build house of worship[12]. The incident led to the renewal of the 1979 peace agreement in 2001 without necessarily correcting the discriminative tone in it[13]. As if it could get any worse, The Regulation of the Governor of Aceh Number 25 Year 2007 (*Peraturan Gubernur Aceh Nomor 25 Tahun 2007 tentang Pedoman Pendirian Rumah Ibadah*) stated that:

In addition to some requirements mentioned in verse 1, there are some requirements needed to get a permission to build a house of worship, which are: a. List of names and copies of national IDs of the members of congregation with a minimum number of 150 people signed and legalized by the local authority; b. A prove of support of at least 120 society members of the respective locale for the establishment of a new house of worship, signed and legalized by the local authority; c. A written recommendation from the Ministry of Religious Affairs at the respective township; and, d. A written recommendation from the Indonesian Forum for Interreligious Harmony (Forum Kerukunan Umat Beragama) at the respective township[14].

It does not take a theorist to say that these regulations are there to make the establishment of a new place of worship for the religious minority almost impossible. The Regulation of the Governor of Aceh Number 25 Year 2007, is only one from a bunch of other regulations that were created to venerate Islamic doctrines as a normative filter to get your voices heard in the public sphere. Of course, historically, Aceh is also inseparable from its position as the intellectual and spiritual center of the Malay world.[15] However, since the regulation on the special autonomy status of the Aceh Province was signed in 1999, the presence of systematic discriminatory treatment to non-Muslims was very clear. Demands to adopt the Islamic code of clothing and restricted access to juridical processes are only some of the discriminatory measures that non-Muslims must face in post-1999 Aceh.[16]

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11. Ging Ginanjar, "*Gereja Tanpa Izin di Aceh Singkil Dijadwalkan Akan Ditertibkan*,".
12. "*Ini Sejarah Penyerangan Gereja Aceh Singkil Sejak 1979,*" Tempo Online.
13. Anggi Kusumadewi, "*Akar Kerusuhan di Aceh Singkil Versi Bupati*,".
14. "*Peraturan Gubernur Aceh Nomor 25 Tahun 2007 tentang Pedoman Pendirian Rumah Ibadah*", Governor or Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, accessed from: http://www1-media.acehprov.go.id/uploads/P-25.pdf.
15. Peter G. Riddell, "Aceh in the Sixteenth and Seventeenth Centuries: Serambi Mekkah and Identity," in *Verandah of Violence: The Background to the Aceh Problem*, ed. Anthony Reid (Singapore: National University Press, 2006), 40.
16. Some studies stated that in the later period, non-Muslim Acehneses eventually supported the implementation of Sharia law in the province, though it is not clear in what condition do the non-Muslims could accept rules and regulations that are clearly discriminating them in the first place. See: Marzuki, "*Kerukunan dan Kebebasan Beragama Dalam Pelaksanaan Syariat Islam di Aceh,*" Jurnal Harmoni IX, no. 36 (2010): pp. 157-170.

The strong Islamic fervor of socio-political life in Aceh province reached its peak with the birth of the Free Aceh Movement (*Gerakan Aceh Merdeka*/GAM) in 1976. Furthermore, Aceh's Islamic aspiration finally found its way to the public sphere with the signing of Law Number 44 Year 1999, which recognized the special status of the province and granted a right to the region to implement *Sharia* law. What is interesting about this specific regulation is the discourse that came with it. Both the central government and the Aceh society saw the Law Number 44 Year 1999 as a fulfilment of the representation of Islam in the public sphere that is long overdue. On one hand, the central government sees it as a form of reparation after many decades of oppression that the Islamic movement in Aceh suffered during the Sukarno's and Suharto's regimes. On the other hand, the Acehnese society welcomes the special status of their province as a newly opened avenue for Islamic representation after decades of stifled religious expression under two mostly secularist regimes[17]. With these considerations in mind, a post-secularist framework offered by Charles Taylor can serve as a constructive approach in observing the practices of post-secularism in the light of Aceh Singkil tragedy on October 13th, 2015.

Charles Taylor's Post-Secularism on the Special Autonomy of Aceh Province

In the realm of post-secularism,[18] models and methods of accommodating religious perspectives into the once secular public spheres are dominating the discussion. Big names like Charles Taylor, Jurgen Habermas,[19] and Judith Butler,[20] served their own models of post-secularism to find a balance between secular and religious presence in the public sphere. For the purpose of this paper I would like to use Charles Taylor's notion of overlapping consensus to criticize the practice of Indonesian post-secularist politics in light of the gratification of special autonomy for Aceh in 1999.

Charles Taylor proposed that the turn into a post-secularist state is characterized by three historical development of secularism, they are, common ground,

17. Muhammad Ansor, "We are from the Same Ancestors", pp. 8.
18. Defined here as "the abandonment of the belief in the death of God and of the death of religion." See: Camil Ungureanu, Lasse Thomassen, "The Post-secular Debate: Introductory Remarks," *The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms* 20, no. 2 (2015): pp. 103-104. And as the awareness on the side of the secular society to accept religious perspective as a competing paradigm that can also shape and influence the public sphere. See: Ulrike Spohn, (2015) "A Difference in Kind? Jürgen Habermas and Charles Taylor on Post-secularism," *The European Legacy: Toward New Paradigms* 20, no.2 (2015): pp. 121.
19. Jurgen Habermas, *Between Naturalism and Religion: Philosophical Essays* (Cambridge: Polity, 2008); Jurgen Habermas, *An Awareness of What is Missing: Faith and Reason in a Post-Secular Age* (Cambridge: Polity, 2010).
20. Judith Butler, *Giving an Account of Oneself* (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005); Judith Butler, "Is Judaism Zionism?" in *The Power of Religion in the Public Sphere*, eds. Eduardo Mendieta and Jonathan Van Antwerpen (New York: Columbia University Press, 2011), pp. 70–91; Judith Butler, "Afterword," in *Bodily Citations: Religion and Judith Butler*, eds. Ellen T. Armour and Susan M. St. Ville (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006), pp. 276–392.

independent ethic, and overlapping consensus.[21] Common ground refers to the first development of secularism that took place right after the Reformation in Christianity. At this stage, socio-political communities are searching for a common ground to create a socio-political context that is free of confessional positions resulted from the Reformation. The second phase, independent ethic, refers to a situation where the notion of 'humanity,' instead of Christian values, is used to create a socio-political order based on the supremacy of reason. While the third phase, overlapping consensus, refers to a socio-political order in which people from different confessional commitments could agree to some set of principles of justice though they might disagree on a deeper foundational level of these values. The overlapping consensus is Taylor's proposed model of post-secularist socio-political order.

I argue that what happened in Aceh is a representation of Habermasian post-secularist model that generates Islamic values as 'independent justification.'[22] In Taylor's framework, the phase of independent ethic is best represented with what happened with the inauguration of Aceh as a province with special autonomy and the right to implement *Sharia* law. This is the case because Law Number 44 Year 1999 did not only grant a special status to the Aceh province, but also produced a set of new institutions and forms of social order based on the notion of Islamic jurisprudence. Hence, opening the previously secular public sphere for Islamic values and adopting the values, instead of positioning it as one of the competing paradigms, into the framework of normative social order.

In conclusion, I also argue that in order for the diversity of confessional positions in Aceh to be well accommodated, both the central government of Indonesia and the provincial government of Aceh need to turn into the mode of overlapping consensus. This being said, the government has to make a room for plurality of voices in the public sphere without elevating one over the other to the level of independent ethics. Otherwise, what would ensue is exactly what we have now with Aceh where the Islamic doctrines reign over other religious traditions and create a systemic oppression in the process.

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21. Charles Taylor, "Modes of Secularism," pp. 33-35.
22. Jurgen Habermas, "Religion in the Public Sphere: Cognitive Presuppositions for the 'Public Use of Reason' by Religious and Secular Citizens," in *Between Naturalism and Religion*, pp. 138.

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"*Ini Sejarah Penyerangan Gereja Aceh Singkil Sejak 1979.*" *Tempo Online*. Last modified November 27, 2015. http://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2015/10/17/063710342/ ini-sejarah-penyerangan-gereja-aceh-singkil-sejak-1979.

"*Peraturan Gubernur Aceh Nomor 25 Tahun 2007 tentang Pedoman Pendirian Rumah Ibadah*", Governor of Nanggroe Aceh Darussalam, accessed from: http:// www1-media.acehprov.go.id/uploads/P-25.pdf.

2nd Prize Winner

Deconstructing Stigma in Amurwani Dwi Lestariningsih's GERWANI: The Story of Women as Political Prisoners in Plantungan Camp (1969-1979)

by **Isyfi Afiani**

Economics
S. T. I. E Solusi Bisnis Indonesia, May 2008

Language Studies
Muhammadiyah University of Surakarta, 2015

"This insightful and important essay brings to our ears the repressed voices of the women of 1965. The writing is compelling as it confronts us with an honesty and sincerity in establishing her-story."

Dr. Dewi Candraningrum
Jurnal Perempuan

ABSTRACT

This essay aims to explain the stigma deconstruction reflected in Amurwani Dwi Lestariningsih's book entitled GERWANI: the Story of Women as Political Prisoners in Plantungan Camp (1969-1979). In this essay, I conduct the library research, and the New Historicism approach in examining the stigma deconstruction reflected in Lestariningsih's book. By demonstrating how the stigma on Gerwani is constructed by the New Order regime and how Lestariningsih counters the stigma through her writing, this study has succeeded in revealing the stigma deconstruction of Gerwani through the shifting paradigm from the actors (of sexual violence) into the victims (of sexual violence).

Introduction

The studies on G30S (30th September Movement) 1965 in Indonesia and its issues have been a progressive study to unearth. And one less unearthed issue is the sexual violence against women in the post G30S. Putting my attention on the alternative writings of women history in Indonesia, in this occasion, I would like to conduct the research on Amurwani Dwi Lestariningsih's *GERWANI; the Story of Women as Political Prisoners in Plantungan Camp (1969-1979)* in order to reveal how the New Order regime constructs the stigma on Gerwani, and how Lestariningsih's book counters the stigma.

Lestariningsih's book of *GERWANI* is an ethnography study—the lucidity requires to unmask in each situation what is related to a social position monopolizes the interpretive effort (Baszanger and Dodier in Silverman, 2003, pp. 26)—which locus and tempus are taken in Plantungan camp in 1969-1979. This study conducts three dimensions of ethnography research; the involvement with and participation in the topic being studied, attention to the social context of data collection, and sensitivity to how the subjects are represented in the research text (Marvasti, 2004, pp. 35). Since the ethnography involves an ongoing attempt to place specific encounters, events, and understandings into a fuller, more meaningful context (Tedlock in Silverman, 2003, pp. 467), and the fieldworkers are careful to connect the facts that they observe with the specific features of the *backdrop* against which these facts occur which are linked to historical and cultural contingencies (Baszanger and Dodier in Silverman, 1997, pp. 10), this study has given a great contribution to the alternative writings of women history in Indonesia.

In conducting the study on Lestariningsih's *GERWANI*, this essay employs the library research, in which the data collection is done by a document analysis in the core of the New Historicism. The New Historicism is understood as one latest development in the field of contextual approach, which builds on post-structuralism and deconstruction, with their focus on text and discourse, but adds a historical dimension to the discussion of the texts, including non-literary phenomena in the definition of text (Klarer, 2004, pp. 95).

Gerwani as an Indonesian Women Movement: a Historical Account

Gerwani—Gerakan Wanita Indonesia (Indonesian Women Movement)—is one big organization in Indonesian women movement history. Previously, *Gerwani* was *Gerwis* (*Gerakan Wanita Indonesia Sedar*), initiated by S.K. Trimurti — a woman who had a great effort for Indonesia's independence—and several women who were involved in the second military aggression. Gerwis was composed of women who had a good political understanding. Basically Gerwis was the coalition of six organizations; *Rukun Putri Indonesia* (Rupindo), *Persatuan Wanita Sedar*, *Gerakan Wanita Rakyat Indonesia Kediri* (Gerwindo), *Perjuangan Putri Republik Indonesia*, and *Persatuan Wanita Sedar Madura* (Lestariningsih, 2010, pp. 35).

Formerly, Gerwis was proposed by Rupindo, Persatuan Wanita Sedar Surabaya and Persatuan Wanita Sedar Bandung in May 7, 1950. This coalition persuaded other women organizations to join in. And then in June 3-6, 1950, this coalition formed a congress that resulted in Gerwis—Gerakan Wanita Sedar—and its structural hierarchy leadership form—Tris Metty as the leader, Umi Sardjono as leader II, S.K. Trimurti as leader III, and Siti Koesnapsiyah as the secretary. Gerwis was formed in a fundamental understanding that women have an important effort in fighting against imperialism and capitalism by engaging Pancasila as its fundamental ideology. As a non-political organization, Gerwis had its basic purpose to free the society from the slavery and any other oppression, in relation between human to human, group to group, nation to nation in order to reach human equality (Lestariningsih, 2010, pp. 36-37).

Basically, Gerwis was a non-political organization, yet it concerned upon the national political and feminism problems and allowed its members to join up any political party like PKI or PNI (Indonesian National Party). Gerwis/Gerwani experienced five times of congress, and the second congress resulted the change from Gerwis to Gerwani and the change of its orientation from cadre oriented to mass oriented. Apparently the participation of PKI in Gerwani had been seen since it was Gerwis. To the point of fact, PKI participated in forming the formation of Gerwis structural leadership. Gerwani started showing their effort in political arena since the third congress was held. In the fourth congress in 1961, Gerwani's political activities were synchronized with President Soekarno's political policies. And finally, in the fifth congress in 1964, Gerwani was affiliated with PKI (Lestariningsih, 2010, pp. 47-66).

In the night of October 1st, 1965, there was a coup known as G30S—the abduction and killing of six generals and one lieutenant by a group that called itself G30S, composed of some army colonels and a few members of the Special Bureau of the PKI (Wieringa, 2015, pp. 14). After the coup, there was the mass murder of anything between 500.000 and three million leftist people culminating in the handing over of power to General Suharto in March 1966 (Wieringa, 2015, pp. 15). And Gerwani,

as the affiliation of PKI, had to be responsible to what had been accused to them; their involvement in the killing of the six generals and one lieutenant in Crocodile Hole neighborhood.

Gerwani after G30S 1965: Stigma Construction and the Role of the New Order Regime

Lestariningsih's *GERWANI* depicts how the stigma of Gerwani after the G30S was constructed by the New Order regime through the media propaganda. Sexual violence was the main issue of this propaganda. Gerwani was narrated as young girls who had been present in the field where the generals were killed and buried in a disused well in the neighborhood of Crocodile Hole, and were accused of having performed an erotic dance, of having seduced, castrated and killed the generals and the lieutenant who were not yet dead when they were brought to the field. They were also said to have gouged out their eyes (Wieringa, 2015, pp.15). Hence, Gerwani was asserted as the ones who were responsible of the murder of the six generals and one lieutenant in Crocodile Hole (Lestariningsih, 2010, pp. 67). However this accusation had not been proved yet since the confession of a doctor who did the autopsy to the generals stated that there were no castration indications found in the General's body; based on Lestariningsih's data compiled from D & R Magazine (2005).

According to Butler (1999), the foundational reasoning of identity politics tends to assume that an identity must first be in place in order for political interests to be elaborated, and subsequently, political action to be taken (pp. 81). By this view, the New Order's propaganda that linked the socio-political issues to the castration men's sex identity was intended for their political interest. However, Lestariningsih explicitly narrates that the achievement of media propaganda by the New Order regime was supported by the cultural construction in Indonesian society, which was still employing the patriarchy model. Hence, the New Order regime has easily constructed the public opinion about the cruelty of Gerwani by relating the socio-political issues to the men's sex identity symbol in order to politicize the women movement. Subsequently, the political action was done by arresting Gerwani and other onderbuow of PKI and interrogating them before they were sent to Plantungan camp as the political prisoners. Apparently, Plantungan camp was established by the New Order regime in order to doctrine and rehabilitate the mental and moral of those who were considered as Gerwani and other onderbuow of PKI. Their goal was to educate Gerwani with the ideology of Pancasila.

In depth explanation, Lestariningsih narrates that the stigma labeled on Gerwani was not contemporarily tagged on them. In fact, after being released from the Plantungan camp, the ex prisoners (Gerwani) had to face the reality of being isolated by society. However, the enforcement of "*Bersih Lingkungan*"—a

political policy prevailed to all citizens that they have to enclose the statement letter explaining that they are not involved in G30S in order to ally a job as a civil servant—tended to make the ex political prisoners' family to avoid the ex political prisoner. Furthermore, the New Order regime also enforced the special label—ET (Ex Tapol/ex political prisoner) code—on their identity card, and also other laws that consequently negate the civil right of the ex political prisoner.

Conclusion: Countering the Stigma

If history is a collective memory, Gerwani is narrated as an image of women without moral and humanism value. However, history is neither 'a hard core of facts' surrounded by a 'pulp of disreputable interpretation' nor 'a hard core of interpretation surrounded by a pulp of disreputable facts' but a dialectic between the two (Carr, 1986: 4, pp. 18). Furthermore, historical descriptions cannot be proved true beyond all possibility of error; they can often be proved probably true, given empiricist assumptions (McCullagh, 1984). In doing so, deconstruction is seen as a transgression of boundaries, a revelation of contradictions, and a dissection, so it is no 'critique,' but rather an '*Abbau*' (German in the original: *mining*, but also *gradual removal)*. The deconstruction of the text and the subject is intended to dissolve the violent and illusory unity which makes the two poles of power what they are (Derrida in Zima, 2002, pp. 24). By this view, Lestariningsih's book has revealed a contradiction toward Gerwani's stigma through her research about political prisoner women in Plantungan camp and revealed another narrative history of Gerwani from the ex political prisoner women's witness as the counter of the stigma labeled by the New Order regime.

The deconstruction stigma on Gerwani as the red whores—who did the erotic dance and the castration to the generals—reflected in Lestariningsih's *GERWANI* is emerged by the revelation of the facts arisen in Plantungan camp. Through *GERWANI*, Lestariningsih reveals the failure of Pancasila doctrinal implementation to Gerwani and other political prisoner women in Plantungan camp. The failure is mainly caused by the nonstandard attitude of the certain jailers in Plantungan camp to Gerwani and other the political prisoners. Gerwani and other prisoner women considered as the onderbouw of PKI in Plantungan camp, they confessed that they had been experiencing sexual violence since the interrogation process until they were jailed in Plantungan camp. These confessions, therefore, are in contrast with the fundamental purpose of doctrinal ideology of Pancasila proposed for Gerwani in Plantungan camp, since certain people used the stigma on Gerwani as their consent to do the sexual violence against Gerwani. By this view, the transgression of boundaries is seen by the shifting paradigm (of Gerwani) from the **actors** of sexual violence into the **victims** of sexual violence.

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The Impact of Women's Representation in Politics and Society Towards Cultural and Religion Perspectives

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Muhammadiyah University of Yogyakarta, June 2014

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"This impressive essay is well researched, written in an authoritative style, and presents strong and important arguments."

Dr.Chusnul Mariyah
University of Indonesia

Abstract

This essay shows the impact of women political representation in politics and generally in society, general barriers to women's political representation in Indonesia. From the past until now, the issue of women's political representation is important because of recent issue about discrimination against women's position in society. Indonesia as a developing country, also as the fourth biggest number of population in the world, is still facing some problems towards democratization. Jung Sook Kim and Khofifa Indar Parawansa's theory about women's representation and the factors influencing women representation in the Parliament influence the author's ideas about women rights. That concludes that many factors influence their representation such as Selection Process of Candidates and Culture include religion and tradition as well. With that conclusion, this paper uses a qualitative and quantitative method to interview Women candidates in politics in Indonesia. And one of those problems is to make equal rights between men and women. This paper also shows the key statement of the importance for having women in politics and why we need women in politics and society.

Keywords: Indonesia, barriers, women, representation, discrimination, selection process of candidates, culture, society, religion, tradition

Introduction

Women's issues in 21th century are getting more attention in recent years. Human trafficking has caused a lot of problem in Indonesia and most of the victim are women. Women child labor and women migrant worker, sexual abuse and domestic violence also are the main issues of women violence in the society.

Most of these women are trafficked for sexual exploitation. The most disturbing is that in parts of the Middle East, "honor killings" are still practiced. These killings can be brought on by women engaging in homosexual acts or sexual acts outside of marriage, wanting to end or prevent arranged marriage or even dressing too provocatively. Many countries like Indonesia right now trying to solve women discrimination in the society and they are still facing some problems to get women rights in the society.

Some scholars argue that there are some barriers to women's political participation. "The cultural context is still heavily patriarchal, the selection of candidates by political parties, male political leaders have a disproportionate influence over political parties and women do not receive much support, and experience poverty and low levels of education."[1]

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1. Khofifah Indar Parawansa "*study case : Hambatan terhadap Partisipasi Politik Perempuan di Indonesia*" IDEA International Journal (2005), accessed 15 September 2015, doi: idea.int/publications/wip/upload/CS-Indonesia.pdf.

Other scholars also add some barriers like religion involve in the cultural context also, unfair party nomination and election campaign also influence the number of women's representation in politics. Some countries have different problem with other country regarding this issue.[2]

The general question will be like "What are the barriers to women representation in the national parliament and how the women representation in Indonesian politics and society can be improved"?

The Barriers to Women's Political Representation in Indonesia

1. Selection Process of Candidates

Indonesia has many parties and 10 of them have the seat in national parliament. One of the biggest parties in Indonesia is GOLKAR. Deputy Secretary General of Golkar Nurul Arifin said that the party is recruiting internal candidates: "We're not going to open a shop like the other parties." GOLKAR party prefers internal candidates as it is felt that it has many reliable functionaries. GOLKAR has a list of names from central to local officials who already built a base in the community. To capture the internal candidates, Regeneration and Membership Affairs Organization of the party has already started working. They have already begun to identify prospective party candidates. Lists of potential candidates were prepared, ranging from district / city and province. As for the House of Representatives candidates, the name of each area will be filed by the provincial coordinator. Typically, the prioritized maximum is only 10 percent of candidates from outside the party. They can come from the professional, businessmen, academics, journalists, and celebrities.

"According to one of the women candidates in Ternate district, North Maluku province, Farida Djamal, who already became a member of GOLKAR party almost 26 years ago, actually there are no differences between men and women. It is true GOLKAR is very strict with the selection, but not to prevent women candidates from being elected, but for to look for someone with good skills in politics to become a candidate. Because women are considered trustworthy by society, it is very important if women avoid the behavior of politics, which in society's perspective always means corruption and something illegal. So women who become a candidate must represent good behavior and good skill, because it is still in the paradigm of society that women must avoid politics to avoid doing something that is not good in their life. GOLKAR provides political education to all of the candidates so they have more knowledge in politics."[3]

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2. Jung Sook Kim, "Women's Political Participation and Strategies for Greater Equality" (paper presented at The 6th Asia Pacific Congress of Women in Politics in Philipines on February 10, 2006.
3. Interviewing the Golkar politician in ternate district by using interview guide method.

After looking further into the study's data on the spread of female representatives across political parties, the Center for Political Study saw that the level of compliance and support from each political party for women candidates varied drastically. The table below shows that some political parties, such as Demokrat, PKB, and Hanura, have over 20 percent female members in the national parliament, while only 5 percent of PKS members are female. Political parties were not complying with affirmative action legislation across all levels of government. This lack of consistency hampers women's chances of being elected.[4]

Source : Asia Foundation

There are still many problems, like political party putting women in infamous district or unwinnable district so women will face difficulty to enter the politics and be a leader. There are still a lot of issues if they put women with a lack of ability and not famous in the region with not a lot of achievement so it would not bring a lot of attention to the society. Political parties only want to pass the requirements without care who will be the candidates.

" It was not only inexperienced newcomers who missed out, but also seasoned political players. Just like their male counterparts, women candidates were impacted by allegations of vote buying and the fixing of election results by local election committees. Eva Kusuma Sundari, a prominent female candidate from the PDI-P Party, a champion of gender equality and human rights and a member of parliament since 2004, claimed she lost her seat at the national parliament because of vote buying."[5]

4. http://asiafoundation.org/ Hana A Satriyo "Can Affirmative Action Increase Women's Ability to Get Elected in Indonesia?" last modified 1 June 2011, http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2011/06/01/can-affirmative-action-increase-womens-ability-to-get-elected-in-indonesia/
5. http://asiafoundation.org/ Hana A Satriyo "What's in Store for Indonesia's Women Candidates, Win or Lose? " last modified 30 April 2014, http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2014/04/30/whats-in-store-for-indonesias-women-candidates-win-or-lose/

Through a list of candidate nomination system in which women are listed at the bottom of the list, it is also the reason for its inadequate number of women sitting in legislative bodies. In Indonesia the regulations want the party to fulfill 30% women candidates in the election. Many political parties find difficulty to fulfill these recruitments. The impact is that many parties gather women candidates carelessly, only to fulfill the regulation.

This condition is very terrible. If there is selection with no honesty, the candidates will have no quality to compete with each other. In this selection, parties must work hard for selecting woman candidates with high quality Therefore, they should not only follow the government regulation to fulfill 30% of the quota but the political parties must also look for the quality and ability of women candidates.

We can see a lot of women candidates with no background politics at all, they are famous in the other field like as an actress but not have any knowledge about politics before that but to achieve the goals to gain the voters, the political party use them and to fill the requirements also.

2. Culture

There are many criminal actions against women in society. Domestic violence, which often puts women in a weak position, is an example where real women do not have the strength to fight injustice and the tyranny of men. Political barriers are one of the substantial barriers faced by women in Indonesia. This is not only reflected in the product legislation and regulations, which tend to be "Masculine", where everything is seen through the lens of men's interests, but also involves a still limited space for women to take part in public office.

Although lately there has been recognition of the need for the role of the women in politics, these policies are still applied in a "half-hearted" way, and are not maximized. Therefore it is not surprising that the number of women entering the world of politics is still very limited. Culture is a barrier to women's access to politics. Another obstacle is the view that tends to prefer money rather than politics, and rather than looking at who can be the best leaders.

The problem is also that not many people want to join politics. Politics needs someone who has a really strong spirit and is smart enough to influence others, and many women feel that place is not suitable for them. Many people believe that politics make the people turn out to be immoral and the environment will make them to do something bad in their life. That is why women do not want to take this chance and feel is not suitable for them.

In the religious context, because up to 80% of the people belong to Islam in Indonesia and follow the principles of Islam, Indonesians always look for the foundation of Islamic teachings. "Women have been assigned second-class status in Islam based upon Quran 4:34, which says, "Men have responsibility for and priority over women, since God has given some of them advantages over others and because they should spend their wealth for the support of women. The contemporary impact is that many people have noted that the "priority" referred to in this verse is based upon men's socioeconomic responsibilities for women."[6]

Marriage culture also influences the women political representation in Indonesia, for example education is the most important aspect for your carrer in the future. The highest education you can achieve, the high position also, you will get in your jobs including your ability. Many women do not have confident to continue their study because they think it will waste your time because in the end you will be the housewife as always and take care your children and husband, clean the room and so on. So what is the point to waste your time if you know that you already have a permanent job in the end. Thats the opinion of all women, especially in small city. The other problem also if you always study and achieve the high education they said that its not good because men will feel embarassed because of your position and do not want to marry to a woman with a higher position than him.

"Although there are provisions laws prohibiting early marriage, there is also facilities dispensation. Religious Courts and the Office of Religious Affairs often give dispensation if the bride was still underage. In Indonesia is still common practice for underage marriages. Marriage Act of 1974 does not expressly prohibit the practice. According to the Marriage Act, new girls can marry at the age of 16, a boy over the age of 18 years. But there is also a dispensation. Sutik, a woman from Tegal Dowo, Rembang, Central Java, got engaged the first time from her parents at the age of 11 years. The strong tradition of hereditary makes it unable to resist. Moreover, Sutik also do not understand the meaning of a wedding. Sutik is one of many girls in the region Tegaldowo, Rembang, who got married because of tradition ties. The strong tradition of forcing the girls here does early marriage. Rooted tradition of early marriage is linked to the persistence of the strong belief of the myth of girls. As disclosed by Suwandi, employee records maker of Tegaldowo marriage in Rembang, Central Java, "Indigenous people here that had a daughter already applying to be accepted, if it is not accepted until the old can not have a husband." In this area, children and teens that are married, even many who already holds the status of a widow, whether

6. http://azgaralimd.blogspot.ru/ Mohammad Azgar Ali , '' The Status of Women in Islam " last modified on 10 December 2012, http://azgaralimd.blogspot.ru/2012/12/the-status-of-women-in-islam.html

the child is willing to be married or not. Most importantly, according to the parents, get married first, even though later they may get a divorce. Parents want to speed up the marriage with a variety of economic reasons, social, and the assumption is tha education is not essential for girls and the negative stigma against old virgin status.[7]

SOLUTION

For the selection process of candidates and culture barriers, the recent action which is done by the government to increase women political representation in Indonesia can be continued, such as:

1. Strict Affirmative action, the recent policy of governments proved successfully to overcome and increase the women political representation in Indonesia. Since 2008, they government apply certain law to incerase women participation in politics. First, they adopted a law that requires political parties to allocate a 30 percent quota for women candidates on political party lists. The law also prescribes sanctions to those parties that fail to comply with the provision.

• The disadvantage for this affirmative action is the political party only focus on quantity and to pass the regulation so their party can success in parliament and take as many seats as possible, and they do not paid attention for the quality of the women candidates, for example many women candidates have no political background before, but because they are famous as actresses in Indonesia. However, they do not understand what is politics, but the political party only want to get a vote without realize the ability from the candidates itself.

2. Second, the Parliament adopted a "Zipper" system, by which political parties have to alternate between men and women candidates throughout the party lists, with at least one woman for every three candidates. This ruling forces women candidates to compete openly with male candidates and negate the hard-fought gains for affirmative action.

• As women candidates are disadvantaged by several factors, this means they must work extra hard to be elected. Women lack access to funds and control over the political party machineries that would help them in running successful campaigns and ultimately win seats in the Parliament and local legislatures.

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7. http://www.dw.com/Noni Arni "*Kuatnya Tradisi, Salah Satu Penyebab Pernikahan Dini*" last modified on 16 November 2009, http://www.dw.com/id/kuatnya-tradisi-salah-satu-penyebab-pernikahan-dini/a-4897834

3. "In anticipation of the April 2009 elections, the Royal Norwegian Embassy in Jakarta is supporting The Asia Foundation with wide-ranging programs to support women's political participation, especially for women candidates to win seats in the Parliament. The first step of the program was to support electoral law reform and strengthen the capacity of women candidates to build their constituency networks, while helping women candidates develop sharp and focused media and voter education campaigns. Between September 2008 and January 2009, over 400 women candidates in the four provinces of Aceh, East Java, South Sulawesi, and Jakarta participated in trainings on effective campaigns. Since January this year, these women candidates have launched massive campaigns on radio and in local print media to boost voters' knowledge about them, their programs and platforms. The Asia Foundation supports a nation-wide media campaign with over 200 radio stations across the country, national newspapers, and magazines promoting women candidates and appealing to the nation to give women candidates a chance to prove their campaign promises."[8]

- The disadvantage of this policy is it needs many resources and financial for the parties to do training and campaign and parties will take many from the candidates itself or their party money and the women candidates must repay after they are selected. It will give an impact in the case of corruption and nepotism in the end and it will bring a lot of trouble for Indonesian government because we cannot solve this problem until now. To achieve the maximum quotas for women's in parliament it will just open another issue like corruption and nepotism.

Civil society has been listening to these, and other, concerns. The fierce rivalry among candidates – even from the same party – and lower than expected numbers of women securing seats in parliament have led to calls for Indonesia to return to the closed proportional system it used before 2009. A closed proportional system would limit intraparty rivalry, ensuring that one in every three seats from a party went to women candidates, and lowering the campaign costs for individuals, which are understood to be one of the key driving factors for corruption when legislators get into power. Reversion to a closed system, however, would surrender decision-making power to the political parties, and voters will not be able to vote for their favorite candidates.

For the solution in culture barriers, it is important for the government or also NGO as the information function to tell to everybody the impact for marriage in the young age and the role of women in the society. Increasing the awareness for

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8. www.asiafoundation.org , Hana A Satriyo "The Ongoing Struggle for Women's Political Participation" last modified on March 11, 2009, http://asiafoundation.org/in-asia/2009/03/11/the-ongoing-struggle-for-women%E2%80%99s-political-participation/

women to get education and just imagine that you will have an enough knowledge in the future to teach your own children because their parents are smart enough to teach them.

"Culture change in the structure of society for generations as is the tradition of early marriage is not easy. But slowly in Rembang Tegaldowo and other small city also, the NGO called Plan Indonesia, which focused to helping marginalized children to access their rights to health, sanitation, education, livelihoods and protection active to provide the information and change the paradigm in many small cities. The tradition of early marriage in Rembang Tegaldowo began to erode, after an international humanitarian organization that focuses on children, Plan, became active. Institution which is provides awareness for the negative impact of early marriage for underage children."[9]

The Importance of Women in Politics

Women's political representation in Indonesia prove to be increasing, even though it has not dramatically increased if we see the history of women political representation.

Year	Number of Seats	Women Elected	CEDAW Reserve
2004-2009	550	61 (11,1%)	Yes
2009-2014	560	104 (18,57%)	Yes

Sources : CEDAW Indonesia

The assumption arises that even though women's representation in the House and the Budget Committee has increased, it has failed to fulfill the quota stipulated, which means that budgetary policy continues to fall short of meeting the needs of women.

The high level of participation of women can be shown in following and understanding the political issue, and involvement in political activities. Conversely, if the level of political participation of women is low and less well regarded, it is characterized by a lot of women who do not pay attention to politics or state. As a result, in the event of a lack of fear of opinion on political needs of women put forward, then the head of state to be less responsive to the needs and aspirations of women and tend to be neglected so would serve the interests of some groups only. Various paths can be done women as a form of active participation in politics and the main thing is women who want a career in politics can be a member of one political party in accordance with their ideology, especially in the fight for women, and concerned may nominate themselves as members of the

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9. http://www.dw.com/Noni Arni "*Kuatnya Tradisi, Salah Satu Penyebab Pernikahan Dini*" last modified on 16 November 2009, http://www.dw.com/id/kuatnya-tradisi-salah-satu-penyebab-pernikahan-dini/a-4897834

legislature to be chosen by the public. Female members of Parliament can give priority to women's struggle, as regulations permit a longer maternity leave or a day off for women who are menstruating. That's why we need more women in the parliament.

Summary and Conclusion

Democracy without the participation of women is not real democracy. Women play a very important role in the development of society. Women's empowerment is very crucial in the entire world. Without the assistance and the cooperation of women there will not be any sort of fair politics in the world. Governments of many countries have reserved seats especially for women to contest the elections and make a presence in the movement of politics. More and more women are getting active in politics in order to make their presence more effective in the word of politics.

After entering into politics, women have shown that they are not only good at managing their homes but they can also manage the politics of grand success. In Indonesia also, Megawati Soekarno Putri became the first female president in Indonesia. This was not through a general election but it proved it was possible, and gave a chance to other women to compete with men in Parliament. It also gives a good chance to women to choose what life path they want and shows them they do not need to only become a housewife. The higher of number for women enter parliament it will cause the higher degree of number of democracy also. In the economic field, if men and women work together, it has a better effect on the family. As women are turning to politics, in this way one thing is guaranteed – that the welfare of women and children is increasing more and more and women are supported by rules that are being implemented for the safety and the proper education to women.

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The Case of West Java: Behind The Popularity of Indonesian Coffee, Does This Popularity Show Farmers' Empowerment?

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Introduction

The production of Indonesian coffee has been increasing from year to year. As Gareta reported, Indonesia was the third largest country producer in the world after Vietnam and Brazil, and the increasing number amounted to 9.9% in 2014 compared to the previous year.[1] Moreover, Raharjo also states that Indonesia is the fourth largest coffee exporter in the world and has gained 11% of the world's market share.[2] Under these circumstances, coffee exporters in Indonesia predict that the price of Indonesian coffee will increase by 20% this year.[3] The increasing price of Indonesian coffee and the warm welcome greetings of the world towards Indonesian coffee are good news for Indonesian societies, especially Indonesian coffee farmers, the role these societies play in the coffee commodity processing. But, is there a linear causality relationship between the increasing coffee price and the empowerment of Indonesian coffee farmers? This essay intends to understand the empowerment of Indonesian coffee farmers, through Zimmerman's empowerment theory. In this essay, discussions will be more focused on the case of coffee farmers in West Java, because this area has been a coffee-producing region since 17th century[4], and in the 2000s, many coffee farmers has tried to cultivate this commodity[5]. Furthermore, this essay will also describe a dark history of West Java coffee farmers and their present day challenges, which uncovers how empowered West Java coffee farmers are nowadays in managing their commodity.

In order for our minds to have the same definition of empowerment, a theory proposed by Zimmerman defines empowerment as, "the process and consequences of efforts to exert control and influence over decisions that affect one's life, organizational functioning, and the quality of community life."[6] Furthermore, Zimmerman also divides empowerment into three parts, consisting of individual, organizational, and community level of analysis[7]. But, in this essay, organizational and community level of analysis will be used to understand the collective action of Indonesian coffee farmers, which is showed by processes and outcomes below:

1. Sella Panduarsa Gareta, "*Ketiga Terbesar di Dunia, Produksi Kopi Indonesia di Bawah Brazil*," *Antara News*, October 1, 2015, http://www.antaranews.com/berita/521121/ketiga-terbesar-di-dunia-produksi-kopi-indonesia-di-bawah-brasil
2. Rico Pahlevi, Wan Abbas Zakaria, and Umi Kalsum, "*Analisis Kelayakan Usaha Agroindustri Kopi Luwak Di Kecamatan Balik Bukit Kabupaten Lampung Barat*," *JIIA*, January 2014, pp. 48-55.
3. "*Eksportir Optimistis Harga Kopi Bisa Naik 20%. Ini Sebabnya*," *Gatra News,* April 22, 2015, http://www.gatra.com/ekonomi-1/perdagangan/143621-eksportir-optimis-harga-kopi-bisa-naik-20-persen,-ini-sebabnya%E2%80%8F.html
4. Jan Breman, "*Keuntungan Kolonial dari Kerja Paksa: Sistem Priangan dari Tanam Paksa Kopi di Jawa, 1720-1870,*" (Jakarta, Yayasan Pustaka Obor, 2014) pp. 1.
5. "*Perlindungan Indikasi Geografis (IG) Kopi Arabika Java Preanger (KAJP)*," West Java Provincial Plantation Office, September 9, 2014, http://disbun.jabarprov.go.id/index.php/artikel/detailartikel/43
6. Julian Rappaport and Edward Seidman, eds., "*Handbook of Community Psychology* (New York: Springer Science and Business Media New York)," pp. 43.
7. *Ibid*., pp. 46.

Table 1. Processes and Outcome in Empowerment Levels of Analysis[8]

Levels of Analysis	Process (Empowering)	Outcome (Empowered)
Organizational	• Opportunities to participate in decision making • Shared responsibilities • Shared leadership	• Effectively compete for resources • Networking with other organizations • Policy influence
Community	• Access to resources • Open government structure • Tolerance for diversity	• Organizational coalitions • Pluralistic leadership • Residents' participatory skills

A Dark History of West Java Coffee

To understand better why coffee cultivation had a dark history, there were products that could tell about the darkness of coffee history, namely *aia kawa daun* and *kopi luwak*. *Aia kawa daun* is a traditional beverage from West Sumatra produced from coffee leaves. When this area was colonialized, the West Sumatrans did not have a chance to taste a cup of coffee, because these beans were a priority commodity for colonizers, and to fulfill the natives' curiosity of coffee, the West Sumatrans processed coffee leaves, so leaves could be drunk by natives as tea.[9]

Relevant to this story above, *kopi luwak* also has a similar story. Coffee farmers were forbidden to taste a cup of coffee because this commodity was valuable for colonizers. But, these coffee farmers found that there were civets, an animal species that like to eat coffee beans, produced feces still containing the coffee beans that they previously consumed. Then, coffee farmers cleaned coffee beans from the civets' feces, and tried to process these beans as a form of beverage. Surprisingly, this "civet coffee" was tasty and also became a colonizer commodity.[10]

Aside from the tasty taste of *aia kawa daun* and *kopi luwak*, these products' history had a linkage; that is coffee farmers were not allowed to taste a cup of these two coffee types, because these products had a high value and been a priority commodity for the colonizers' trading. These histories also strongly show

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8. *Ibid.*, pp. 47.
9. Asro Suardi, "*Aia Kawa Daun: Teh Daun Kopi*," Good *News from Indonesia*, April 14, 2015, http://www.goodnewsfromindonesia.org/2015/04/14/aia-kawa-daun-teh-daun-kopi/
10. Wiji Nurhayat, "*Kisah Kopi Luwak RI yang Ada Sejak Zaman Penjajahan Belanda*," *Detik Finance*, November 16, 2013, http://finance.detik.com/read/2013/11/16/165519/2414936/4/kisah-kopi-luwak-ri-yang-ada-sejak-zaman-penjajahan-belanda

that Indonesian coffee farmers were colonized, inferior, and had no power to encourage themselves in having, processing, and trading coffee products. Even though the lands were theirs, but the colonizer used a systematic power to control Indonesian coffee farmers and their agricultural products.[11]

As *Breman* had explained in his book, native coffee farmers from Priangan, an area currently known as West Java, had experience a very sad and long journey. Previously, colonizers visited their lands to buy their coffee beans commercially, but they changed the rules and coffee farmers were forced to store their coffee beans,[12] and they were paid very low fees of only 5 cents for 225 days in the 17th century.[13] Moreover, Priangan coffee farmers worked harder with very high target compared to other regions, and they were asked to cause deforestation to their lands in order to convert these lands into coffee plantations. The story did not stop there. Conducting deforestation was not an easy task, as they were forbidden to plant rice in these lands. Thus, they suffered from hunger for a long time. Moreover, some workers had died from being eaten by wild animals while performing deforestation.[14]

Jan Breman's discovery written in his book shows that coffee farmers were just labors for the colonizers. They had no right and opportunity to fully manage their products. They were forced to accomplish the colonizers' target and were paid unfairly. Moreover, they had no competency or power to influence the government, because they were colonized by the Dutch. This evidence strongly shows that they could not empower themselves under the colonizers, even when they relentlessly complied with the governments' rules at that time. However, the party who received the gold was not coffee farmers, but the colonizers. They received income and profit through their coffee trading, supplying the world's demand. In reflecting the coffee farmers' condition today, this essay will also describe coffee farmers' present day challenges; are West Java coffee farmers nowadays getting fair profit and income for their work? Are they successfully empowering themselves under present circumstances?

Coffee Farmers: Present Day Challenges

Nowadays, coffee farmers have to face other challenges in trading coffee products. Mostly, these coffee farmers sell their coffee beans to Coffee Exporters Association through collectors.[15] According to *Neilson*, the reason why coffee farmers sell their coffee beans to this coffee association is because their influential and political

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11. Jan Breman, "*Keuntungan Kolonial dari Kerja Paksa: Sistem Priangan dari Tanam Paksa Kopi di Jawa, 1720-1870*", pp. 1.
12*. Ibid.*
13*. Ibid.*, pp. 224.
14*. Ibid.*, pp. 217.
15. Ria Pratiwi, "*AEKI: Tidak Ada Dukungan Nyata dari Pemerintah*," *Swa Online*, August 2,2013, http://swa.co.id/headline/aeki-tidak-ada-dukungan-nyata-dari-pemerintah

role in coffee-exporting, which is mandated by the government to this day.[16] In increasing the number of coffees that can be exported, this coffee association also has concerns to increase coffee farmers' productivity; because as the productivity of coffee farmers rise, more coffee can be exported by this association. On the other hand, West Java coffee farmers have faced a weak financial capital in producing coffee beans and as labors, these coffee farmers are also underpaid, even lower than the regional minimum wage, only 1$ per day, because they are uneducated and have no chance to choose other jobs.[17] This reality is also confirmed by the Central Agency of Statistics (*Badan Pusat Statistik*), which argued that the index of farmers' terms of trade, especially for smallholders estate crops subsector in West Java, has decreased from 2012 to 2013 by 5%.[18]

The news of Indonesian coffee farmers nowadays does not make society happier; the reality of these coffee farmers condition strongly shows that the increasing of Indonesian coffee exporting have no linear causality with coffee farmers' empowerment. In addition, as *Putra* reported, Coffee Exporters Association tends to suggest coffee farmers to focus their efforts in increasing coffee productivity. So, coffee farmers should not spend their time roasting coffee beans, creating signature drinks, or trading their coffee.[19] Under these circumstances, this strongly shows that the role of coffee farmers is just limited to being labors with limited power and access to meet other stakeholders, and also have no competency to fully manage their resources. That is a sign that Indonesia coffee farmers, especially in West Java, are still less empowered.

An Opportunity for Empowerment

In contrast with the story above, there are coffee farmers in West Java who are successful in harvesting higher value of coffee commodity that they have planted. The hard work started when they were given advice by a coffee professional to plant coffee according to international standards.[20] After adapting their plantation and post production techniques to international standards, these coffee farmers could sell their coffee at higher prices.[21] In another area of West Java, there was

16. Jeff Neilson, "*Cultural Sociology of the Middle East, Asia, & Africa,*" An Encyclopedia, East and Southeast Asia*, edited by Peter J. Seybolt, vol. 3*, (USA: Sage Publications, Inc), 2012, pp. 241.
17. Ria Pratiwi, "AEKI: Tidak Ada Dukungan Nyata dari Pemerintah."
18. "*Indeks Harga yang Diterima Petani (It), Indeks Harga yang Dibayar Petani (Ib), dan Nilai Tukar Petani Subsektor Tanaman Perkebunan Rakyat (NTPR) Menurut Provinsi (2007=100), 2008-2013*," Central Agency of Statistics*, n.d, http://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1485
19. Yudha Manggala P. Putra, "*Pemerintah Diharap Perhatikan Petani Kopi*," *Republika Online,* October 3, 2015, http://nasional.republika.co.id/berita/nasional/daerah/15/10/03/nvnjiw284-pemerintah-diharap-perhatikan-petani-kopi
20. "*Kopi Priangan Tembus Pasar Internasional*," *Pikiran Rakyat Online*, July 29, 2012, http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/ekonomi/2012/07/29/197662/kopi-priangan-tembus-pasar-internasional
21. Ahmad Fikri, "*Kopi Asal Garut Ini Berasa Buah Plum*," *Tempo.co Travel*, April 9, 2015, http://travel.tempo.co/read/news/2015/04/09/201656397/kopi-asal-garut-ini-berasa-buah-plum

even a coffee farmer who had an opportunity to sell their coffee beans to the international market at competitive prices.[22]

The performance of West Java coffee farmers is quite progressive. Moreover, the Indonesian government had revised its policy about exporting coffee through The Minister of Trade Regulation Number: 48/M-DAG/PER/12/2011. This policy makes it easier for any new exporter to export coffee, because it removes the rule of paying some deposit to the Coffee Exporters Association.[23] So, the revision of that policy is a good sign for coffee farmers, because they now have a chance to sell their products despite not being members of Coffee Exporters Association.

On the other hand, the progression of West Java coffee farmers is not equally distributed in other areas, because farmers in other areas do not have the means to upgrade their skills, network, and activities. If they understand the need to upgrade their competency, they can independently sell their coffee products to the local or international market. However, reality shows that coffee farmers' role is still limited to becoming labors.[24] Moreover, the welfare of these coffee farmers is still weak, because they have limited access to education, especially in the coffee field. Consequently, limited access to education in the coffee field influences their coffee prices, because the coffees they produced are lacking in quality.

More importantly, to harvest a golden price of their coffee products, it is better for coffee farmers to not only having skills in coffee processing or producing, but also important skills such as deciding the right clients or partners and marketing coffee products. Below is a story that shows how important technical and behavioral skills is for coffee farmers.

Two coffee farmers from West Java, Supriatna Danuri and Asep Sukmana, are an example of how the flow of coffee-producing undergoes a long process. Danuri reported that coffee farmers have not yet enjoyed the results of their harvesting, because they have no access to end users, or they just sell coffee cherry with low prices, or green coffee beans. Besides that, people who harvest the golden price for soluble coffees from the local or international market are sellers outside of West Java.[25] Similar to Supriatna Danuri, Asep Sukmana also said that he wanted to learn how to sell coffee, because previously, the role of selling soluble coffee was still taken by other sellers outside of West Java.[26] These examples show that the ability to thrive above their competitors (sellers outside of West Java) is still lacking, and as Danuri reported, coffee farmers is less empowered because

22. "*Berdagang Kopi dari Gunung Halu sampai ke Brussel-Belgia*," Provincial Plantation Office of West Java , September 10, 2014, http://disbun.jabarprov.go.id/index.php/artikel/detailartikel/45
23. Asnil B, Very Nurhansyah Tragistina, and Maria Rosita, "*Aturan Ekspor Kopi Diperlonggar*," *Kontan.co.id*, May 7, 2011, http://industri.kontan.co.id/news/aturan-ekspor-kopi-diperlonggar-1
24. Ria Pratiwi, "*AEKI: Tidak Ada Dukungan Nyata dari Pemerintah*."
25. "*Para Petani Belum Menikmati Hasil Panen Kopi*," *Pikiran Rakyat Online*, November 7, 2013, http://www.pikiran-rakyat.com/ekonomi/2013/11/07/257651/para-petani-belum-menikmati-hasil-panen-kopi
26. "*Berdagang Kopi dari Gunung Halu sampai ke Brussel-Belgia*," Provincial Plantation Office of West Java.

government did not help coffee farmers in developing their competencies through agricultural extensions.[27] This evidence shows that coffee farmers have no influence to the creation of policy by the government, have no access to open government structure, have less opportunity in decision making, cannot maintain network with any organization, and cannot build their competencies through important resources.

To achieve their goals and to become a competent community, a strong communal sense, sound decision making, and solid networking are needed to empower coffee farmers, as *Zimmerman* had explained about organizational empowerment and community empowerment.[28] So, to increase the communities' quality of life, producing soluble coffee is not the only answer. The ability to influence or propose ideas to the government for the sake of the communities' quality of life, the ability to sell or distribute coffee to the right segment or customers, and the ability to choose the right partners in running this business are also required by coffee farmers, because these abilities will empower coffee farmers and they will be empowered by these abilities.

Conclusion

The increasing coffee products exported to the international market has no linear causality with the empowerment of coffee farmers. This lack of empowerment is because of the role of coffee farmers is only limited to underpaid labors. In addition to facing this reality, most coffee farmers have no competency to influence government policies in supporting their needs. Consequently, they cannot harvest their hard work, because the ability to produce soluble coffees and the ability to sell products to end users still rests with sellers outside of West Java. This evidence strongly shows that they did not maintain networks for distributing their products.

On the other hand, there is an opportunity for empowerment through the revision of coffee exporting policy by the government, thus giving every coffee seller the tool to be an exporter without becoming a member of the Coffee Exporters Association and having to pay some deposit to this association. However, this chance has not yet been achieved, because implementing this project requires a strong communal sense in each coffee farmer. This sense will empower coffee farmers in understanding what their goals and needs are, and how to achieve these goals through influencing policy, networking, accessing and managing their resources.

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27. Adi Ginanjar, Wisnu Wage, and Hedi Ardhia, "*Bibit Kopi Minim Sertifikasi, Penetrasi Pasar Lokal & Eksport Terhambat*," *Bisnis.com*, April 13, 2015, http://industri.bisnis.com/read/20150413/99/422213/bibit-kopi-minim-sertifikasi-penetrasi-pasar-lokal-ekspor-terhambat
28. Julian Rappaport and Edward Seidman, "Handbook of Community Psychology."

This essay also suggests that the government should maintain and support coffee farmers so that these coffee farmers have technical and behavioral competencies in empowering themselves through coffee products, such as through workshops about coffee producing, post production techniques, marketing, and export import skills. Hopefully, the increasing number of coffee producing and coffee exporting activities will have a linear causality with the empowerment of coffee farmers in the future, so coffee farmers can improve their welfare independently.

Even though this essay has captured the empowerment of Indonesian coffee farmers, especially in West Java, but it has a limitation. The research has a limited scope and empirical evidence through other data collections. By observing group dynamics of coffee farmers, descriptions of empowering and empowered behavior will be captured and comprehensively understood. Nonetheless, this essay is beneficial to understand that the increasing numbers of coffee exports has a paradox with coffee farmers' ability in empowering themselves.

The Influences of Culture and Stigma on Health Condition in Communities

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Introduction

Health problem is still a crucial issue in Indonesia, especially for those living in cities and villages. This circumstance can be observed from many health programs that had been implemented and developed continuously, but then had not been running well. These have caused an insufficient number of effective health programs, causing a high rate of maternal and child mortality (Anggorodi, 2009: pp. 10), and diseases like Acute Upper Respiratory Infections, and tuberculosis (TB).

TB is curently placed at second on the deadliest diseases list in Indonesia and Indonesia is on the 5th rank among countries in the world known for TB cases. TB becomes a frightening disease for people who live in cities or villages because of the stigma in society that TB is a disease that can not be cured, or TB is caused by black magic or witchcraft.

Other factors that should become the concern of health provider is the high rate of maternal and child mortality case, and Acute Upper Respiratory Infections. These have happened because pregnant women prefer to deliver at home, assisted by traditional birth attendants (TBA), and after that, the mother and the baby are smoked for 40 days. These are part of beliefs, traditions and local custom in communities.

There is no doubt that modern medicine has developed rapidly over the years, allowing various applications of medical technologies in curing diseases (Anggorodi 2009: pp. 10).

The efforts in public health such as increasing the level of individual health, providing health education, preventing and eradicating the communicable diseases and mother and child health should take into consideration other knowledges that exist in traditions and beliefs, such as norms, stigma, local wisdom and the level of knowledge on traditional medicine which has been established in communities for a long time as a heritage from ancestors. The health programs are often unsuccessful because culture has never been taken into consideration and programs are implemented through top-down approach, which means the communities are not being involved directly in the development of health programs that would be implemented in their region. This condition is exacerbated by the quality of knowledge of health staff, which is, unfortunately, inadequate.

Then, what is the relation between culture and stigma, and the health of communities? Can local tradition influence the good or the bad of health condition in communities living in cities or villages? Do norm, tradition, beliefs and local wisdom need to be improved in order to support health programs? What are the roles of community leaders, such as traditional leaders, religious leaders,

head village, as well as local cadres in influencing a positive health behavior in communities so that they become healthier?

The following are the author's experiences in conducting health assistance in several areas in Indonesia.

Aspect of culture (traditions, beliefs, norms, local wisdom) and stigma that influence the condition of communities' health.

Ambon (Moluccas) and South Aceh, Aceh province are two of several areas in Indonesia that have the highest number of TB patients. The disease is rapidly spreading not only because of bad sanitation, poverty, lack of health facilities, or lack of health staffs' knowledge on TB (prevention, transmission, treatment, side effects TB drugs, etc), but also because of the stigma in society that TB is an incurable disease, TB is a disease caused by witchcraft or black magic, TB is a genetic disease, or TB is a disease for poor people. All of those make most people diagnosed with TB refuse to take medication because of shame. There is also a tendency that TB patients and their families are discriminated by society.

Here are some of the complaints collected from TB patients and their families related to TB disease and its treatments.

 "Madam, if you want to come to my house, you must come alone, there is no need to be accompanied by health staff from Puskesmas *(Primary Health Center). I feel embarrassed if my neighbour asks me why my house is visited by guess from* Puskesmas*? My husband is healthy, he does not have TB. We are rich family and always go to private doctor to check up our condition. TB is the disease for poor people and black magic disease---we are not poor and my husband does not have any enemy."(S, 45 years old, a wife of a man diagnosed with TB)*

 "Madam, I am a teacher, an educator. I teach hygiene to my students. It is impossible for my daughter to get TB. My house is clean, I sweep and mop my house everyday. I bath my daughter twice a day, I cut her nails once a week. Madam, you can see for yourself, there is not a single dust in my house. I refuse to have my daughter diagnosed as having TB! I will not follow the treatment in Puskesmas*. TB is a disease for poor people who live in slum area. I do not live in slum area and my house is clean. Madam, TB is genetic disease, and there has not been any member of my family who has had TB before". (A father who works as a teacher, whose daughter has been diagnosed with TB).*

 "I do not want to continue my TB treatment again because after taking the drugs, my skin was red and itchy. Also, I got sore throat. I have talked to the nurse in Puskesmas

about my complaints but they did not give any explanation and only gave me other drugs. The nurse said that the drugs given were to reduce or eliminate my itch and allergy. But, there was no progress or change, it was still the same, my skin was still itchy. Right now, after stopping all of the medication, I feel better than before, I do not cough again, I am cured". (TB patient, 55 years old, had followed the treatment for only two months).

The first complaint came from a wife whose husband suffered from TB lung. The second complaint came from a father whose daughter had been diagnosed with TB lung. Both of them refused the fact that one of their family member suffered from TB and rejected to follow the treatment that were provided by *Puskesmas* (Primary Health Center). The last complaint came from a TB patient that had followed the treatment for two months, but then stopped the treatment due to the side effect of TB drugs, and because he had felt that he had been cured.

The three cases explained above are three of dozens of cases in which TB patients and their families declined to follow TB treatments; these cases were supposed to receive special attention from health staff. The lack of sympathy from the health staff in responding to patients' complaints also takes part in reducing the patient's trust to health staff, therefore the patients are not in adherence to the treatment (not taking medication according to schedule), stopping the treatment in the middle of treatment period without any explanation to the health staff.

Ambon and Aceh are also known as two areas in Indonesia that had experienced conflict for several years (3 decades in Aceh and 5 years in Ambon). During the periods of conflict, when situation deteriorated, the population was displaced and many patients did not complete the treatment (De Gryse 2006: pp. 2). The entire health system also suffered massive destruction and had often been regarded as a major cause to high defaulter of TB treatment. As a result, when the conflict was finished and communities could re-access health facilities, the number of TB patients in both areas were higher than before the occurrence of conflicts. It is important to emphasize the fact that conflicts are merely a trigger that causes an increase in the rate of TB cases, but the main cause of the high rate of TB cases itself is in fact the stigma that has long existed in communities.

If stigma is a main cause of the high rate of TB cases in Ambon and Aceh, in other areas such as SOE, NTT (Nusa Tenggara Timor/East Nusa Tenggara) province, and South Aceh, Aceh Province, local customs, beliefs, and tradition are believed to be the main cause of the high rate of Acute Upper Respiratory Infections and maternal and child mortality. This happens because the majority of pregnant women who live in those areas prefer to choose Traditional Birth Attendant (TBA) rather than midwife at the time of delivery.

TBA is a woman or a man who helps a delivery process, whose capability is handed down from generation to generation, from mother to child or other close family, by

internships of their own experiences or by the time they helped a delivery process. In general, TBA is a person who is respected by the communities or powerful figures in the community (Anggorodi 2009: pp. 10). People believe TBA is an expert person who can help a delivery process, has lots of experiences, has supernatural power to prevent evil spirits, has a traditional medication which can recover the mother's condition quickly, and has magical words to calm the mother during the delivery process. A TBA cuts the baby's umbilical cord by sharp bamboo rather than sterile equipment, such as scissors.

Besides choosing TBA over midwife, there is another tradition that is still being followed, believed to help recover the condition of mother and baby quickly and prevent evil spirit, which is smoking the mother and the baby after the delivery for 40 days in a special room inside the house. During the process, the mother and baby are not allowed to get out of the room, even if they face health problems and need to seek professional help. In such cases, either their husbands or relatives will get the drugs in Puskesmas or hospitals, or health staff comes to check on them and bring the drugs. All activities, such as taking shower, eating, drinking, defecating, and urinating are conducted in that one room.

In SoE, NTT province, most people live in a *bebak* house (*bebak* is special wood that only exist in NTT); the wall is made by bebak wood, the roof from straw, and usually the floor is ground. In bebak house, there is a special room for the delivery: no windows, with a fireplace in the corner, and pieces of burning woods under the bed of the mother and the baby; in South Aceh, Aceh province, the incense burner is placed beside the mother and baby, and is burned every days. The aim of both of the processes is to avoid mother and baby from evil spirit, to make them stronger and not easily ill, and to make the baby's bones stronger.

In SoE, NTT province, another thing that is believed to recover mother's health is for the mother to take a shower every day using a cloth dipped in hot water, and then tapped on the mother's body. The aims of this process is to speed up blood circulation and stop bleeding experienced by the mother after delivery.

Accommodating Community Values Into Health Principle

Beliefs, traditions, local wisdom and norms are part of Indonesian's culture that are inherited from ancestors and should always be preserved. If we look at the health cases more deeply, there seem to be several aspects of beliefs, traditions, local wisdom and norms that must be converted to make them in accordance with health principles; however, these can be done without breaking the local custom's rules. The following strategies are based on the author's experience while working in several areas in Indonesia together with NGOs:

a) Provide training to community leaders about public health, such as distribution, transmission and prevention of infectious and communicable diseases, etc. People who live in the village have great respect to community leaders who live in their village; hence, by making them as local cadres in their village, we can expect them to be the agent of change in improving communities' behavior and in motivating communities to become healthier.

a) Integrating psychology in health program must be done by improving basic counseling skills (such as health education, listening skill and motivational support to patients), example in TB program (De Gryse 2006: pp. 6). Counseling is important in a TB program because counseling can reinforce and therefore helps to prevent the failure of the treatment. Counseling for adherence is a key tool to promote effective self-administered treatment (De Gryse 2006: pp. 5). During TB counselling sessions patients will receive information about TB and treatment, they will also ask questions and clarify doubts, and together counsellor and patient define a plan to intake anti-TB-drugs at home. It is also a moment for patient's expression of feelings and for health staff (nurse or doctor) to use all the knowledge acquired in counselling process together with communication skills. Another important task is to build motivation for patients and putting them responsible for their own treatment and cure.

Concluding Remarks

The efforts to control health problems in Indonesia are still oriented towards health services in bigger cities and hospitals rather than in small cities and villages, thus removing the roles of local cadres, traditional healers, and TBAs from the general picture.

Based on the description above, it can be concluded that traditions, local customs, and beliefs are important elements in society, especially in rural areas or village, which can not be disregarded; until now, these still exist in the communities because they are believed to save lives. As for stigma, currently there is not much known about the relationship between stigma and health perceptions, especially in the case of the high rate of TB disease. A variety of multidisciplinary science, such as anthropology, psychology and health survey, is needed to avoid cultural clashes and find appropriate health intervention and ways to communicate the message.

The approaches should start from bottom to up, in which outsiders assist communities to identify important problems related with their lives, and help them to develop strategies to solve the problems. Another thing that must receive

appropriate attention is the involvement of local cultural elements, such as local wisdom, traditions, and beliefs to support health programs and to improve communities' health. People can still preserve their traditions that has been passed from their ancestors without contradicting the principles of health. Stigma, which also exists in communities, should also receive appropriate attention, or else it will prevent any medical programs to be implemented effectively.

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The Reinterpretation of Gender: Inspiring Women in Modern Life

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Al-Ummahat al-Madrasah al-Ula means the mother is the first school (for her family). This statement is very popular. In the culture of Aceh, a wife or a mother, is called *"poe rumoh"* or the owner of home. It means that a mother has a significant role in the household. Therefore, a woman should have three provisions, which are knowledge, moral and good social interaction. In Al-Qur'an, there are many verses that have close relation with these provisions. Although many people said that Al-Qur'an constrained women to be a leader or mover, but this statement can be answered by other verses which support the role of women in any aspect.

Al-Qur'an and Gender Relations

In the last decade, the interpretation of gender verses was an important study. This study is not only finished on the academic tables, but also have a significant influence on the interaction among women and men. Nurun Najwah said that it happened because an assumption that the understanding of religion is considered as one of the factors of the inequality of gender. For example, there is a dogma which said that texts of *hadits* related to women created a patriarchal culture and is discriminating against women.[1]

The study of gender in Indonesia has a close relation with the interpretation of the Al-Qur'an, which has been developed since classic era until now. Many thoughts of different authors have coloured the paradigm of society and government. Therefore, many women's movements have appeared since a long time ago.

In Indonesia, women movements have appeared since the nineteenth century, both in education and war.[2] This case can be understood by the rising of the first organization of women that opposed the regime of the New Order government, which centralized all aspects in life. Their organization was called *"Suara Ibu Peduli"*.

Not only in Indonesia, the movements of women also appeared in Australia. I acquired this information from the Muslim Exchange Program (MEP) Indonesia-Australia, in March, 2015. There are several women organizations who improved the situation of moslem women individually and build their collective capacity, such as; *Australian Muslim Women's Centre for Human Rights* in Melbourne, established in 1991 and *United Muslim Women Association Inc* in Lakemba, established in 1983. They work for the rights of Muslim women by empowering women's self determination, inspiring positive action and providing information, education and training on Islamic practices. All of the women's organizations mentioned above are the examples of the reinterpretation of gender verses.

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1. Nurun Najwah, introduction to *Wacana Spiritualitas Perempuan Perspektif Hadis,* by Nurun Najwah (Yogyakarta: Penerbit Cahaya Pustaka, 2008), pp. v.
2. Gunawan Riyadi, *Dimensi-dimensi Perjuangan Kaum Perempuan Indonesia dalam Perspektif Sejarah*, in *Dinamika Gerakan Perempuan di Indonesia*, ed. Fausi Rizal. (Yogyakarta: Tiara Wacana, 1993), pp. 99. Quoted by Munirul Abidin, *Paradigma Tafsir Perempuan di Indonesia* (Malang: UIN-Maliki Press, 2011), pp. 90.

The Reinterpretation of Gender Verses in Modern Life

A study of the relation between Al-Qur'an verses and gender relation is an important study. Therefore, we need to always renew our understanding of gender verses. The verses discussed in this paper are the verses that are only related to the story of women in Al-Qur'an, that is; 1) Hawwa', the wife of Prophet Adam, 2) Sarah, wife of Prophet Ibrahim, 3) Asiah, wife of Fir'aun and 4) Arwa binti Harb, The wife of Abu Lahab.

In Al-Baqarah; 35-36, Hawwa' is a woman who accompanies Prophet Adam in paradise. First, Hawwa' is expressed to be a different gender than prophet Adam. Then, Hawwa' is a symbol of religious model and value structure.[3] In this story, Hawwa' is very loyal to her husband. Al-Qur'an has never mentioned that Hawwa' was the one who persuaded her husband to eat the forbidden fruit (khuldi). Al-Qur'an only discusses about Hawwa' and Prophet Adam eating together without any one persuading or being persuaded by the other.

From this story, we can conclude that the loyal wife is a very important character. A wife should understand all of the conditions of her husband and her household. Therefore, Hawwa' should be a model for women today. One of the important thing that must be underlined here is that the story of Hawwa' is not a form of discrimination for women. Many of Al-Qur'an classic interpreters said that Hawwa' is the first case of discrimination to women. This paradigm must be straightened by the reinterpretation of verses related to story of Hawwa' and then must be announced that Hawwa' is not a cause of inherited sin.

Furthermore, the story of queen Bilqis and her kingdom was mentioned in Al-Naml: 23-44. In the first story, she was illustrated as a queen with a palace, including a splendid throne. Some scholars interpret it as implicit and symbolic meaning, which is justifying women of leading a country. The Qur'an, whether implicitly or explicitly, does not depreciate her leadership. In contrast, the Qur'an appreciates her benevolences and decision or policy-making as a leader of Saba'.

According to the story, it is important to note that there are some leadership characteristics of queen Bilqis; 1) a *democratic leader*. Before deciding to respond to Sulaiman's letter, she asked for careful opinions from her advisors illustrated in chapter 27:32. This story illustrates queen Bilqis as a democratic leader due to her willingness to discuss before making decision. 2) *A wise leader cares about the people's prosperity*. In decision-making, she prioritized her people's interests as in chapter 27:34. The verse proved that she did not prefer to wage war against Sulaiman because it may harm her people. Therefore, she did not tend to make decisions recklessly. 3) *An intelligent and a diplomatic woman*. Once, prophet Sulaiman had moved queen Bilqis' throne to his palace with a slight modification on its ornaments, she said then carefully: *"it is as though it was my throne"*. The

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3. Barbara Freyer Stowasser, *Reinterpretasi Gender: Wanita dalam Al-Qur'an, Hadis dan Tafsir,* translated by Mochtar Zoerni (Bandung: Pustaka Hidayah, 2001), pp. 70.

answer showed that queen Bilqis was a smart woman although she realized the throne was like hers, yet she did not say "yes" or "no". This showed that queen Bilqis had a great intelligence and carefulness.

The four characteristics of queen Bilqis are those of an ideal leader. The Qur'an proved that she was able to become a capable leader although she was a woman. It also means that a particular sex is not the main requirement to be leader, but it must consist of the capability and charisma in leadership.[4] Leadership is not merely in public domain but also domestic domain. In addition, the capability of a woman in supporting her husband in ruling the family is one of characteristic of a great wife.

Subsequently, there are some verses presenting the story of another inspiring-woman, Asiah. The Qur'an has recorded her commitment in holding firm to her faith in chapter al-Tahrim 66:11. In this verse, Allah mentioned Asiah's last praying before being killed by her husband, Fir'aun, due to her known faith in Allah.[5] The point of Asiah's story is a woman's commitment to submit to nothing except Allah and the faithful to obey all his orders. The piety of Asiah proved that it is an obligation of the believers to bear witness that Allah is oneness although in hard condition.

Another important thing from the story of Asiah is her motherhood.[6] This character reflected on her desire to adopt Musa, as mentioned in chapter al-Qasas 28:9. With her motherhood, she was able to escape Musa from male babies murder conducted by Fir'aun. She took care of Musa until he grew up, becoming a great prophet.

The two important things must become inherent characters in each mother. As Maryam Jameelah said, the principal role of mother is to teach her children to keep practicing values of the Qur'an and sunnah.[7] In Addition, a mother must be able to prevent her children from family violences.

Regarding this point, Indonesia is one of countries with high rate of family violences. The chairman of Indonesia Commission of Child Protection (KPAI), Arist Merdeka Sirait, explained that the figure of children violences was 21.689.797 in the last three years.[8] Therefore, KPAI encourages Indonesian women, especially mothers and wives to take care of their children intensely and seriously. Nowadays, UNICEF collaborates with The Ministry of Women's Empowerment and Child Protection and Non-Governmental Organization (NGO). For this reason, some academicians and volunteers have conducted "Child Protection" program. This program is aimed to teach society how violence against children could be prevented, and to

4. Sahiron Syamsuddin, *Hermeneutika dan Pengembangan Ulumul Qur'an* (Yogyakarta: Pesantren Nawasea Press, 2009), pp. 95-99.
5. Hadis Bukhari : 3485. See in Abu al-Fida'i Isma'il bin 'Umar bin Kasir al-Qarsyi al-Dimasyqi, *Tafsir al-Qur'an al-'Azim*, vol 8 (T.tp: Dar Tayyibah li al-Nasyr wa al-Tauzi', 1999), pp. 173.
6. Stowasser, *Reinterpretasi Gender*, pp. 147.
7. Maryam Jameelah, *Islam in Theory and Practice* (Delhi: Taj Company, 1983), pp. 86-90.
8. "*Antaranews.com*", last modified November 24, 2015.

create a community of child protection.[9] In Australia, the organization of Muslim Women Association (MWA) has conducted similar social movement through MIM *(Mothers Inspire Mothers)* and SAY IT *(Saturday Afternoon Youth Intensive)* which were designed to give inspiration, knowledge and motivation to moslem women in Australia.

Last but not least, the story of Arwa binti Harb, Abu Lahab's wife. This story was told in surah Al-Lahab: 1-5. In these verses, Arwa binti Harb is a woman who supports her husband to exploit the economic field of people in Makkah. In the context of modern life, this story is an example for woman who supports her husband to work in the wrong way. A wife muast properly be aware of her role in the family. She should invite her husband and family to avoid the exploitation of economy in any aspect.

Today, in Indonesia, we are still discussing about corruption. This case has caused several women activists to establish a women movement called The National Movement- I am an Anti-corruption Woman or *Gerakan Nasional-Saya Perempuan Anti Korupsi* (GN-SPAK). This movement supports women on their roles in society, especially in the family life. A mother or wife should take and give information to her family to minimize corruption. The existence of this movement has proven that women have a strategic role in any aspect, not only in domestic area, but also in public area.

By learning from the stories above, we are able to conclude that the reinterpretation of verses related to women should be developed. It is important to do in order for women to be aware that God have given them the strategic and proportional position to express their capability in any aspect.

Wallahu a'lam bi al-shawab.

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HISTORY ESSAYS

History Matters

An Introduction

When recently the Institute for Contemporary History in Munich, Germany, was planning to republish Adolf Hitler's book *Mein Kampf* (My Struggle) in 2016, the plan generated public controversy. The controversy came about despite the fact that when being republished the book was going to be very heavily annotated, with about 3,700 critical footnotes on Hitler's remarks.[1] Moreover, the first edition of the book had actually been published in 1925—or 90 years earlier. The question is: why is it that republication of a timeworn book that is already 90 years old and critically footnoted still generates controversy today? The answer is: because the book has a lot to do with history.

As we know, *Mein Kampf* was written through dictation by Adolf Hitler, the future leader of Germany's Nationalist Socialist German Worker's Party (or the NAZI party) and was responsible not only for the outbreak of the Second World War, but also for the killing of millions of Jews and others, known as the Holocaust. In this book Hitler expressed his hatred for the Jews which later helped many Germans become more easily provoked to annihilate the Jews and many other "undesired" groups.[2]

Considering the author and the content of the book, a group of people were trying to stop the republication, while another group supported it. Interestingly enough, both groups were using the same basis in justifying their positions, and that is *history*. The former group believes that the republication of the book would only make history repeat itself, i.e. would regenerate hatred toward the Jews and other categories of people. Meanwhile the latter group maintains that precisely in order to avoid history from repeating itself, people should read Hitler's book and learn from how hatred and intolerance could lead to a disastrous mass murder.

Regardless of our view on the two groups' positions, the controversy provides us with a clear example on how an event or events that took place many decades ago (in some cases even many centuries ago) still have a strong influence in the life of people today. Events that happened long ago will not always automatically disappear into the dustbin of time. To the contrary, they often significantly influence what is happening today. The above case is just one example. Clearly, history matters.

And that is why history essay competitions like the one that is annually held by ISRSF (Indonesian Scholarship and Support Foundation) are very important.

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1. *Financial Times*, December 5, 2015, p. 11
2. Christopher R. Browning. *The Origins of the Final Solution*, William Heinemann, London, 2004.

They generate interest among young Indonesians in their nation's past events or ideas that still have strong relevance and influence today. At the same time a competition like this can also produce interesting academic research and writings on historical topics that are rarely discussed.

Take the 2015 ISRSF History Essay competition for example. More than forty essays were submitted and many different history topics were covered. They ranged from the human rights concept in the Konstituante of 1957-59, to how capitalism played role in the fishing activity in Muara Angke, near Jakarta; from the jury system in 19th century Java, to the first gay movement in Indonesia. One paper even talked about the very specific topic of the *keris* (traditional dagger) of General Sudirman. Each of the topics is discussed in such a way that the reader will be able to see how different perspectives can be used to tackle past issues which remain relevant for us today.

The topics of some of the best essays selected by the judges in this competition are particularly interesting. The essay awarded first prize, for example, is entitled "Years of Living Experimentally: Big Science Failure during Indonesia's Guided Democracy, 1959-1967," by Rahadian Rundjan. It examines how President Sukarno endeavored to make Indonesia not only independent from colonial repression but also thrive in scientific undertakings. Under Guided Democracy, according to the essay, President Sukarno was very eager to develop large-scale scientific (or "big-science") projects for national development. At the beginning the projects went very well. In August 1964, for instance, under the PRIMA Project, Indonesia successfully launched the Kartika-I rocket, followed by another successful rocket-launching in August 1965. Rahadian notes that "Indonesia became the second country in Asia which launched its own self-sufficient rocket, after Japan." However, due to the tumultuous political and economic situation of the mid-1960s, the big-science projects eventually failed, along with the chaotic situation of the mid-1960s that eventually brought down President Sukarno himself from power.

The essay awarded second prize, titled "Reading Raden Saleh in Postcolonial Perspective" by Zakiyah Derajat, discusses the dilemmatic situation of Raden Saleh (1811-1880), a well-known painter from Java during the colonial period. In 1829 Saleh received a scholarship to study in the Netherlands and stayed in Europe for the next 20 years. For a brief period he returned home to Java, but then decided to go back to Europe. Through this process, according to Zakiyah, Saleh developed a "hybrid identity" in which he had an equally strong inclination toward both his native land's traditions and European ways of thinking. As a result, he stood between two strong positions. One the one hand he wanted to be loyal to his colonized homeland. But on the other hand he starved for knowledge provided by the Netherlands, which colonized his people. Because of this, the writer of this essay considered Saleh as an "ambivalent" man who was facing dilemmatic space situation, between his native land and Europe. From today's perspective this kind of dilemma, perhaps, does not not

only belong Raden Saleh but also to many other Indonesians in the face of the increasingly globalized world.[3]

While it cannot be said that all the essays in this competition were flawless (as some were marred by typographical and grammatical errors, while others appeared to be using standard online translation programs), the topics and the way they were approached demonstrate how wide the area of interest of young Indonesians is in dealing with the history of their nation. At the same time, the limited presence of essays that deal with the political violence of 1965-66—only two out of more than forty essays—can also be seen as a reflection of the general ignorance or reluctance (if not fear) among young Indonesians in dealing with the topic, despite the fact that the events of 1965-66 involved a horrible mass murder and were a very determining turning point in the post-independence history of Indonesia.[4]

As in the previous years, we sincerely hope that the writers of the best essays—including those receiving honorable mention—will be able to move forward and become Arryman scholars to study at Northwestern University. Upon their return to Indonesia, we further hope that they will help build their country, especially through their excellent academic contributions.

Asked about using the republished and annotated *Mein Kampf as part of teaching materials for the students, the president of Germany's teacher's association Josef Kraus said: "Professional treatment of excerpts in class can make an important contribution to inoculating young people against political extremism."*[5] It is our hope that generating a love of history among young Indonesians will not only prevent them from any form of political extremism, but will also help deepen their love for their nation and its future.

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3. See for instance, Christopher Clapham, "The Challenge to the State in a Globalized World". *Development and Change* (The Hague), Vol 33, Issue 5, November 2002, pp. 775–795.
4. Asvi Warman Adam, *Melawan Lupa, Menepis Stigma*. Penerbit Buku Kompas, Jakarta 2015, pp. 3-29.
5. *The Times of Israel*, January 8, 2016.

Years of Living Experimentally: Big Science Failure during Indonesia's Guided Democracy, 1959-1967

by **Rahadian Rundjan**

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"A well-researched piece of work, this essay reminds us how President Sukarno not only wanted Indonesia to be free from colonialism, but also to thrive in big-science endeavors. The Founding Father wanted Indonesia to be as great as other nations—in all fields."

Baskara T. Wardaya SJ
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Introduction

Guided Democracy sparked the science dynamics in Indonesia, which was once lackadaisical after the nation's independence. It was at the time of the said era that Indonesia truly put a high enthusiasm in science development. President Sukarno decided that the state would fully support science activity as long as it was in rhyme with his national vision of revolutionary struggle and self-sufficient policy. This "Big Science" initiative, where the state-sponsored science carried the nation's political agenda, resulted in the flourish of high science projects as it was carried on behalf of national development.

The term Big Science first coined in 1961 by an American nuclear physicist from Oak Ridge National Laboratory, Alvin M. Weinberg. The term was popularized when Weinberg responded to Dwight D. Eisenhower's farewell address, in which the departing president argued about financing big-budget science and danger of military-industrial complex. Weinberg defended by saying that it was actually through the large-scale science project a.k.a Big Science, that scientific research could be improved into more complex and progressive model; which could not be achieved by only individual or small groups effort a.k.a "Small Science."[1]

This paper analyzes how Sukarno's science initiative and technological projects were conducted during Indonesia's Guided Democracy and how the Big Science concept and characteristics were applied. Finally, this paper explains why in the end the initiative eventually failed to reach the main aims and largely abandoned after Sukarno was overthrown from power.

Guided Indonesian Science

Mastery of science played a big role in the Cold War politics. The national movement sparkled in Asia and Africa, followed by the transfer of science knowledge from the Western countries. Soon, leaders of independence movements, such as Sukarno in Indonesia, fostered a rapid science and technology advance as a part of the nation-building enterprise.[2] Through Guided Democracy, Sukarno led Indonesia to break from both United States (US) and Uni Soviet political dependency, yet still receptive for their technological aid offers.[3] Internally, Sukarno formulated a

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1. See Alvin M. Weinberg, "Impact of Large-Scale Science on the United States," *Science* 134 no. 3473 (1961): pp. 161-164; Big Science can be defined from the scope of the projects, or its vast resources associated with bringing it to fruition. It is important to note that Big Science is usually associated with large-scale government projects. See Raphael Sassower, *Compromising the Ideals of Science* (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2015), pp. 24; About the outline of historic evolution of Small Science into Big Science, see Derek J. de Solla Price, *Little Science Big Science* (New York: Columbia University Press, 1963).
2. These leaders believed that mastering science and developing big technology could transform their predominantly agrarian countries into industrial ones overnight. But this approach led to a kind of technology dependency on the advanced countries. Paul R. Josephon, *Resources under Regimes: Technology, Environment, and the State* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2004), pp. 181.
3. Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism under Sukarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 82-83.

unity of science matter under the state guidance. He projected Indonesia to have its own Big Science project self-sufficiently to improve the country's welfare. When Sukarno finally secured a strong executive power through the Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, he then gained political momentum to realize his vision.

Sukarno was indeed a man of science. He gained an architecture degree during colonial era in 1926 from the now Bandung Institute of Technology (ITB). Even when he did not continue his academic path, Sukarno's intellectuality was still widely recognized. During his presidency, Sukarno received 26 degrees of Doctor honoris causa for various subjects from home and foreign universities. In his vision, science should initially be used to serve the country and harmonize with the Guided Democracy revolutionary ideology of Manipol-USDEK.[4] For the greater aims, he believed that developing science was important as Indonesian needed to catch up with the rising demand of living in the time of atomic and outer space age. Furthermore, he stated that science was one of the main components of Indonesian socialism, which would free Indonesia from suffering before reaching justice and prosperity.

"Science for revolution, science to serve the revolution. And because our revolution is to fulfill the Message of the People's Suffering (*Amanat Penderitaan Rakyat*, Ampera), our science is just one, only one that serves to the execution of the Message of the People's Suffering."[5]

Some general characteristics that have been identified in Big Science implementation are politicization, bureaucratization, high risk, and loss of autonomy.[6] These practices were evident under the Guided Democracy system. For example, in around 1962, the Indonesian Sciences Council (*Madjelis Ilmu Pengetahuan Indonesia*, MIPI), lost its autonomy and was transformed into bureaucratic institution by the National Development Council (*Dewan Perancang Nasional,* Depernas), where they were given tasks to unify Indonesian science orientation. Research institutions, universities, and intellectual communities across the country obliged to follow the Manipol-USDEK values in their research. Consequently, it became difficult for scientists to balance their research universal values with the government ideology, which was reflected when Bogor Botanical Garden journal, *Reintwardia*, was banned in 1963 for making sympathy towards imperialism because it cited Dutch botanist work and it referenced to the British Malaya.[7]

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4. Manipol (Manifesto Politik) was a political manifesto of the 1945 constitution. USDEK was an acronomy for *Undang-undang 1945; Sosialisme; Demokrasi Terpimpin; Ekonomi Terpimpin*; and *Kepribadian Indonesia* (1945 Constitution; Socialism; Guided Democracy; Guided Economy, and Indonesian Identity).
5. Sukarno, "President Sukarno's Mandate at the Third Anniversary of College and Science Department" (Gelora Bung Karno Sports Complex, Jakarta, April 14, 1964).
6. Robert W. Smith, "The Biggest Kind of Big Science: Astronomers and the Space Telescope," *Big Science: The Growth of Large-scale Research*, edited by Peter Gallison and Bruce William Helvy (California: Stanford University Press, 1992), pp. 186.
7. Andrew Goss, *Belenggu Ilmuwan dan Pengetahuan* (Depok: Komunitas Bambu, 2014), pp. 269-270.

But how was the Indonesian science dynamics in the early Guided Democracy era? According to Richard J. Russell, an American geologist who became a consultant for MIPI in October 1959-January 1960, the situation was far from ideal. Scientists were poorly paid and research was limitedly funded, which caused their research to become stagnant. The once prominent institutions, such as the Bogor Botanical Garden and Eijkman Institute, no longer gained their international reputation as when they were administered by the Dutch in colonial era.[8] However, this condition did not stop Sukarno from believing that through a rapid self-sufficient works his ambition would be fulfilled.

Failed Big Science Initiative

During the Guided Democracy, Indonesia antagonized the Western powers of which Sukarno referred to as "colonialism, neo-colonialism, and imperialism forces." The opposition towards the Western influence was reflected in the Indonesian confrontation against the Dutch in West Irian (1961-1962) and the British in Malaysia (1963-1966). This situation effectively reduced communication between the Indonesian scientists and their Western colleagues. As an alternative, Sukarno approached Asian countries for technical cooperation, especially in developing the military-industrial strategic technology. So when the civil institutions suffered, it was actually the military which benefited the most from the Sukarno's science policy.

Like in most Big Science infrastructures, Sukarno combined the intellectual capacity of civil experts with military funding to execute his large-scale projects. Such cooperation was performed in Cendrawasih Expedition, in which West Irian mountain environment was researched and climbed.[9] Continued with Baruna Expedition in eastern part of Indonesia's sea, in which new oil reserve in Kangean Island, Madura, was discovered; both in 1964.[10]

Nevertheless, one of the large-scale science projects that best defined the Indonesian Big Science implementation was when Sukarno sought to possess rocket technology. It was a relatively small project compared to the Cold War rocket competition between US and Soviet; however, it can be categorized in the Big Science concept, especially the application of five 'M's: money, manpower, machines, media, and military.[11]

The development of world's rocket technology during the Cold War inspired Indonesian students in Bandung and Yogyakarta to build their own small-scale

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8. Richard J. Russell, *Report on Scientific Research in Indonesia* (Jakarta: MIPI, 1960), pp. 13.
9. See Azwar Hamid, *Madju Terus Pantang Mundur!: Kisah Pendakian Puntjak Sukarno* (Jakarta: KOTI, 1964).
10. See Komando Operasi Baruna, *Laporan Komando Operasi Baruna Kepada Presiden, 29 Djuli 1964* (Jakarta, 1964).
11. Jon Agar, *Science in the 20th Century and Beyond* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 330.

rocket projects.[12] Several successful launches happened in between 1963-1964 and were widely reported by national media. The government soon learned that it would be beneficial to support this self-sufficient attempt for greater purpose. The government decided to fund two big-scale rocket projects involving the students, scientists, and military personnel, for two main purposes; to join the international scientific event, the International Quiet Sun Years (IQSY) 1964-1965, and to defend against the approach of Western threats.

The first self-sufficient rocket project, PRIMA-project, was quite successful, with Kartika-I rocket launched on August 14, 1964. Meanwhile, in the second project, called S-project, which was facilitated in collaboration with Japanese scientists, Indonesia bought 10 Kappa-8 rockets from Japan for research purpose and sent their scientists to study there. In the following year, on August 9, 1965, the modified Kappa-8 rockets launched to the space. Their scientific results was then submitted to the IQSY committee, which put Indonesia in scientific map of world rocket technology. The rocket projects placed Indonesia's national prestige on high level. As a result, Indonesia became the second country in Asia which launched its own self-sufficient rocket, after Japan.[13]

Ironically, the successful launch marked the end of the Indonesian's rocket project; so did to the Indonesian Big Science initiative. The attempt to improve the self-sufficient project into the military-industrial level failed for three main factors. The first factor was the Guided Democracy's reluctance to receive full support from two biggest technologically advanced countries of the Cold War, US and Soviet. Sukarno always tried to play one against another as he sought to maintain the nation ideology as a non-aligned state where he believed that with self-sufficient methods, or *gotong royong* (mutual self-help), Indonesian science could be established without dictation of US or Soviet.[14] Unfortunately, Indonesia did not have enough human resources and facilities to operate high level science on its own. Depicted in early 1965, Sukarno made a serious political maneuver by approaching China in attempt to develop Indonesian nuclear capability.[15]

However, the nuclear aspiration was never implemented and US saw Sukarno's move was only a desperate propaganda to strengthen the relationship with the Communist Bloc. It was similar with the rocket projects, as Indonesia never reached the industrial level with its own resources. For that reason, the rocket

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12. Gadjah Mada University's students launched GAMA rockets in 1963, followed by Bandung Institute of Technology's students who launched their Ganesha rockets in 1964. See Yuni Ekawati, et al., *Menerobos Kendala Menembus Dirgantara* (Jakarta: LAPAN, 2010); PH Sudiro, et al., *Sejarah Perkumpulan Roket Mahasiswa Indonesia (PRMI) dan Peluncuran Roket Buatan Indonesia yang Pertama di Pantai Selatan Yogyakarta* (Jakarta: 2007).
13. See Raden Jacob Salatun, *Lahirnya Lembaga Penerbangan dan Antariksa Nasional* (Jakarta: LAPAN, 1971); *Keputusan Presiden Republik Indonesia No. 242 Tahun 1963 Tentang Pembiayaan Pelaksanaan Proyek Roket Ionosfer/Angkasa Luar*.
14. Sukarno, "A Year of Living Dangerously" (Merdeka Palace, Jakarta, August 17, 1964).
15. See Robert M. Cornejo, "When Sukarno Sought the Bomb: Indonesian Nuclear Aspirations in the Mid-1960s," *The Nonproliferation Review* 7.2 (2000).

projects and nuclear initiative only became a "political bluff weapon" to intensify the nation's confrontation tension.[16]

Economic chaos became the second factor. The Guided Economy failed to bring stability that was required to create an ideal environment for Big Science projects to sustain. Economic assets mainly cashed in those which would generate some political leverage, such as financing the confrontation policy in West Irian and Malaysia, which then led to hyperinflation and impending famine. [17] It later obstructed research to survive continuously.

The last factor was Sukarno's failure to balance the political motion of military and Communist Party of Indonesia (*Partai Komunis Indonesia*, PKI). For example, in intellectual realm, Sukarno's inclination to the left-wing intellectual group, Lekra (supported by PKI) put the right-wing group, Manikebu (supported by military), into pressure and eventually banned in 1964, which heated up the tension between PKI and military.[18] Friction between them grew bigger in political front, marked by the September 30th 1965 Movement, in which the failed coup was blamed to the Communist group. Later on, the military political influence led by General Soeharto became stronger and ultimately overthrew Sukarno from power in 1967.

These three main factors subsided and brought Guided Democracy science initiative to an end as the New Order government began. President Suharto preferred regional security and friendlier approach to Western power, thus stopped the costly Sukarno large-research projects to prioritize the nation political and economic stability rehabilitation.[19]

Conclusion

Guided Democracy era showed us how Sukarno took advantage of Indonesian science potential to support his revolutionary authoritarian political rule. As a consequence, Indonesian science return to its dilemmatic bureaucratic roots like in Dutch colonial era, as the state always tried to control its intellectual assets with strict policies to maintain the nation ideology, such costume challenged

16. Ariel Ira Ahram, *Proxy Warriors: The Rise and Fall of State-Sponsored Militias* (California: Stanford University Press, 2011), 49.
17. Howard Dick, "Formation of the Nation-state, 1930s-1966", *The Emergence of a National Economy: An Economic History of Indonesia, 1800-2000*, edited by Howard Dick, et al. (Crows Nest: Allen & Unwin, 2002), pp. 191.
18. Tod Jones, *Culture, Power, and Authoritarianism in the Indonesia State: Cultural Policy across the Twentieth Century to the Reform Era* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), pp. 107-108.
19. Wernher von Braun, German-American leading rocket scientist, sent a plan to start a new Indonesian rocket programme in the mid-1970s, but it was declined. New Order government preferred to fund its aerospace industry, Nurtanio Aircraft Industry, which led by B.J. Habibie, see Sulfikar Amir, *The Technological State in Indonesia: The Co-constitution of High Technology and Authoritarian Politics* (New York: Routledge, 2013), pp. 49-50.

Indonesian scientist to pursue their pure science idealism.[20] On the other hand, in that time of guided science policy, Indonesian scientific experiment in fact flourished with its particular characteristics: state-oriented, self-sufficient, and politically motivated.

The Indonesian Big Science initiative during Guided Democracy era can serve as an example of how science and technology influenced the development of Third World country and the desire to reach for the future free from political influence of US and Soviet Bloc. But in Indonesia case, the attempt was not supported by ideal political and economic environments, thus made the large research initiatives, such as the rocket projects and nuclear aspiration, to be terminated before fully reached their main aims to deliver prosperity to Indonesian people.

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20. This class of scientist, in Goss term "the apostles of enlightenment," must compromise with the government policy because the colonial state was the only patron and source of funds. Through the time, the objective and universal value of science they produced never reached their pure intention to enlighten the colony. The apostles trapped in colonial influences, their idealism vanished, and forced to become *floracrats*, a scientist bureaucrat, to continue their scientific activities. Goss, *Belenggu Ilmuwan*, pp. 296.

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2nd Prize Winner

Reading Raden Saleh in Postcolonial Perspective

by **Zakiyah Derajat**

Electrical Engineering and Information Technology
Universitas Gadjah Mada, October 2010

Kajian Budaya dan Media
Universitas Gadjah Mada, 2015

"This provocative essay is a well-argued postcolonial reappraisal of Indonesia's first modern painter Raden Saleh, his ambiguous personalities, and how he resisted colonialism through his masterpiece "The Arrest of Pangeran Diponegoro.""

Didi Kwartanada

In 2012, precisely on the 3rd–17th June, Galeri Nasional Indonesia conducted an art exhibition titled *Raden Saleh and the Beginning of Modern Indonesia Painting*, in order to celebrate the 200 years of the painter. It was also the first time for Raden Saleh's works to be exhibited in the land of his birth. The maestro finally "arrived" at home, no matter how late it was. His name is more and more popular, and because of the event, broader audience from the same homeland could witness his magnificent works of art.

Big names tend to carry their own controversy. So is Raden Saleh. He is the pioneer *pribumi*[1] in terms of obtaining education in the west. Furthermore, Raden Saleh was also on the list of Indonesian National Heroes, along with other names. The occurring controversies try to question his identity as *pribumi*, or as 'nationalist' in nowadays context. Because the greatness of his name, most of the previous studies that I have found (so far) put a quite significant concern on Raden Saleh's nationalism. The works and other evidences of his life are analyzed in such a way that there is precise answer for his "Indonesianness".

Soekanto (1951) sees Raden Saleh as a revolutionary nationalist. Bachtiar rather describes the painter as "one traditional who accepted colonial structure operating in his homeland" (Bachtiar, Carey, and Onghokham 2009, pp. 71). Onghokham (pp. 163–183), using Said's Orientalism (2010), posits the idea that through art style Mooi Indië[2] (pioneered by Saleh), Dutch East Indies was not only represented in painting, but also congealed in its social life; Saleh is the pioneer of this static nationalism. Rizal (2009) agrees upon Ong's notion on how bad the concept of static nationalism is. Unlike Soekanto and Bachtiar, Carey (Bachtiar, Carey, and Onghokham 2009, pp. 85–162) does not give a clear statement whether or not Raden Saleh is a nationalist.

Kurnia (2002) painted *Ambivalensi* as a result of questioning the identity and the vision of Raden Saleh's, in a methaphorical way (Wisetrotomo 2002). Derajat's short article (2012) posits the idea that Saleh was turned to be a half man: "neither Javanese, nor Dutch" and was the "victim" of colonialism. Yet her argument is still incomplete.

This paper attempts to complete the argument. There is no intention to think about whether Raden Saleh is nationalist or not, nor to discuss the concept of "real Indonesian" or "not Indonesian." In addition, within the postcolonial perspective, this paper will elaborate the hybrid identity of Raden Saleh, along with his ambivalency. The main discussion will be explained in two parts coming after the painter's short history.

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1. Native Indonesians, or Nusantara, at that time.
2. Beautiful Indies.

Brief History

Raden Saleh Syarif Bustaman (circa 1811-1880)[3] is an aristocratic who received Dutch education, even among the first of *pribumi* who got the privilege (Poeze 2008, pp. 12). This was not just luck, because given that Bustaman as family name, he inherited the special "gene" that the big family possessed.[4] His great-grandfather was Sayid Abdullah Bustaman, more popular as Kyai Bustaman. Bustaman family was known to possess high self-esteem, capability, and knowledge, more than most people at that time. Kyai Bustaman's descendants also then became important figures. Some of them were the regent of Batang, Lasem, Demak, Cirebon, Majalengka, and Semarang (Algadri 1994, pp. 28–30).

The regent of Semarang, Saleh's well-known uncle Kyai Terboyo, raised Saleh when he was seven years old. Kyai Terboyo and his two sons, Raden Ario and Raden Sukur, were recognized by Dutch as Pangeran Diponegoro sympathizers and they had certain role in the Java war. It is not unexpected, since Kyai Terboyo was the son-in-law of Pangeran Mangkunegara I (29). In other words, Pangeran Diponegoro and Kyai Terboyo are still related, given the fact that Pangeran Diponegoro and Mangkunegara are still in one family[5].

Young Saleh studied in Priangan, West Java (Carey 2004, pp. 149). He turned out to have extraordinary ability in drawing.[6] With his high intelligence, young Saleh was able to "draw difficult map, had knowledge in geometry and sensitivity in perception, besides mastering calligraphy techniques" (Suchari 2007, pp. 88–89). During this period, he stayed at the house of Resident Priangan[7], jonkheer Robert L. S. Van der Capellen. AA. J. Payen. A painter who helped Prof. Reindwardt, founder of Bogor Botanical Garden,[8] he saw the incredible talent of Saleh's for the first time when Reindwardt's team had a journey to Priangan. Saleh took Payen

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3. There were debates about when Saleh was born. Some historians even questioned his date of birth in his own autobiography written by Saleh himself. In his newest biography written by Werner Krauss (2012), this Autobiography was lost in the flaming after the world war of 1945, in Maxen, Dresden, Germany.

4. "Gene" that is not only limited in scope of biologic protein of DNA, but also more than that, Bustaman family must have the tradition to educate and to maintain the quality of their descendant. The word gene in the quote unquote ("gene") is meant that it is not merely "biologic" that enable human to accomplish their life purposes. What "gene" means here is intelligence, which is a combination of heredity and *environment* (Sternberg and Grigorenko 1997, xi; italics added). The parenting style is included in the environment category and another key to remember is that intelligence is not only the intellectual one. In this case, I agree with Sternberg's definition of intelligence: "I define [intelligence] as your skill in achieving whatever it is you want to attain in your life within your sociocultural context by capitalizing on your strengths and compensating for, or correcting your weaknesses" (quoted in Plucker and Esping 2014).

5. Pangeran Diponegoro is the son of Sultan Hamengkubuwono III with one of his not-queen wives (Carey 2004, 15). Mangkunegaran and Mangkubumi (Yogyakarta Monarchy) and Kasunanan are biologically close.

6. This "level one" and special blood is the gene that will appear as someone's intelligence occurs. In psychology, what I meant by this special blood is called "giftedness". *The Munich Model of Giftedness* of Kurt A. Heller is a diagram that explains the relation of giftedness and the thorough intelligence and the influence factors (quoted in Sternberg and Davidson 2005, pp. 149).

7. In Dutch colonial era, Resident was a political position who maintained some regions. They helped the Regents, which were *pribumi*. They reported their duty to Governor General who was the first commander in the colony.

8. Who was also the Director of Agriculture, Art, and Science for Java and the Surrounding Island.

offer to study under his coach (Poeze 2008, pp. 12). In this period of becoming Payen's pupil, Saleh's talent also fascinated Reindwardt, and Van der Capellen.

Saleh obtained recommendation letters from Payen, Rendwardt, and Van der Capellen that brought him to get scholarship of 2000 guldens from Dutch East Indies government to study in Europe. In the first place, the scholarship was meant for two years. Saleh went to Dutch in 1829 on behalf of his intention to "study computation better, learn Dutch, and lithograph as well" (13).

The two-year plan did not satisfy Saleh, and the government agreed to fund all his needs in Europe. He learned a lot about painting, met his next "real coaches," had a good relation with Dutch important persons, painted some portrait of famous figures including Daendles, and did not favor to take the paid order. He liked to paint what he wanted. His main interest was in the rigor of animal world.

His sociability[9] took him to Germany. In 1839, Saleh went to Germany, and stayed there for five years, in Maxen, Dresden. He stayed at a castle owned by Friedrich Anton Serre. Blue Mosque was built to honor Saleh in this town (Geerken 2011, pp. 36). In 1844, Saleh returned to Dutch, and achieved Honorary Medal from King Willem II (Galeri Nasional Indonesia 2012a). [10]

He then witnessed his self-standing on Paris. King Louis Philippe intentionally welcomed him. Whether due to his close relation to Dutch royal family, or because of his skills in painting, or perhaps because of both, he was then appointed to be the court painter by King Willem III (Galeri Nasional Indonesia 2012b). In the same year (1851), he returned home to Nusantara.

Saleh the "Half" Man

Derajat (2012) argues that Raden Saleh is a "half" man and it is because of colonialism. Colonialism brings the mission to civilize—to enlighten the darkness. The colony is the dark, and the colonizer is the light. Through Macaulay article quoted in Varma (2010, pp. 30), she portrays how British imperialism in India wanted "Indians in blood and color, but English in taste, in opinions, in morals, and in intellect." Hence, there is no equality in colonialism. Colonialism turns someone to be a half man in order to ease the exploitation process. They need native communicator as the bridge to approach the people whose land they exploit. This very condition also applies to Saleh. The scholarship given to him was exactly the "civilizing mission" that turned Saleh into half man: "neither Javanese, nor Dutch" (Derajat 2012). It was intentional because "half person" was always useful. When Saleh returned to his homeland, he must work for Dutch colonial.

9. Saleh indeed had this sort of skills, as what Carey acknowledges: "If the goal is to have art patronage, it is no doubt that Saleh was a skillful diplomat and charmer" (2004, pp. 150).
10. I did not attend the exhibition, but the exhibition-verse chronology could be found on the photo posted by Flicker account (see the Bibliography for further details).

In 1853, he was appointed to be the conservator and restorer of colonial painting collections (Galeri Nasional Indonesia 2012b).

One key point of why colonialism gave opportunity to *pribumi* to "taste" (even to learn) their culture was because it would only affirm the inferiority of the colonized. As Loomba said in the context of Indian literary education by British imperialism, "far from bridging this gap, literary education would reinforce inferiority" (1998, pp. 86).[11]

Derajat (2012) shows how ambivalent Saleh by citing what he wrote in his autobiography. This is the translation:

> "Two opposing poles, but both bright and welcoming, like mighty magic that affects my soul. There is paradise of my childhood, under the sunshine and in the rumbling vast Indian Ocean, the place where people who I love live and where the ashes of my ancestors rest. Here, Europe, the most fortunate countries where arts, science and higher education are sparkling like jewels, lurking as I could find much more of my youth passion than dreams of my hometown, where I am so happy, among my best friends, to fill in the position of father, mother, brothers and sisters. My heart splits up for both".

It is a crystal ambivalency, and Saleh tried so hard to make peace upon it. It was indeed the right option. For such a high talented, Saleh had to let go of his desire to struggle in his homeland, for the sake of the soul craving for knowledge.

The Dilemmatic Space

Inside the ambivalent self, uncertainness is the only option. There will always be an inner conflict. The question of the self is a never-ending dilemma. Saleh's inner agitation was then manifested in his painting titled *The Arrest of Pangeran Diponegoro*.

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11. The mission to make "half" the colonized contents the strategy of mimicking. Colonizer intentionally submit itself to be imitated, because it will confirm the inferiority of "the other." This act of imitation is known as mimicry, which is similar but different. Yet in fact, colonialism always fails in underlining the black and white concept of "colonizer/colonized," or "civilized/uncivilized," or such, of them towards the other. As Bhabha says: "Produced through the strategy of disavowal, the reference of discrimination is always to a process of splitting as the condition of subjection: a discrimination between the mother culture and its bastards, the self and its doubles, where the trace of what is disavowed *is not repressed but repeated as something different—a mutation, a hybrid*" (1995, pp. 34; italics added). To borrow words from Loomba (1998, 177) when she discusses Bhabha: "Colonial authority, he [Bhabha] suggests, undermines itself by not being able to replicate its own self perfectly". Loomba then explains how colonial's ambivalency occurs in its effort to show itself as original and authoritative while as a matter of fact the articulation shows repetition and difference. This *gap*, is what Bhabha posits as space for resistance which produces various intercrossed identities which are known as "hybrid" and "ambivalent" (pp. 89).

Pangeran Diponegoro led the Java War towards Dutch colonial from 1825 to 1830. Java War ended when Lieutenant-General de Kock arrested Diponegoro on March 28, 1830.[12] Nicolaas Pieneman delegated by the Liuetenant-General then painted the event. Pieneman painted the event in his studio in Amsterdam from 1831 to 1835. The painting then named *De onderwerping van Diepo Negoro aan Luitenant-Generaal De Kock, 28 Maart 1830—The Submission of Diponegoro to Luitenant-General de Kock, 28 March 1830*. Saleh finished his own version, which then became his masterpiece. What he had done was rather "reproducing" Pieneman's painting. Saleh titled his painting in German, as Ein historisches Tableau, die Gefangennahme des Javanischen Häuptlings Diepo Negoro—A Historical oil painting, The Arrest of Javanese Leader Diponegoro.

Now the artwork becomes the arena of debate. Saleh seems to disagree with Pieneman's depiction of what happened in one morning in that March 1830. Needless to say, this is a dilemmatic space for him. He, who had spent some twenty years living in Europe, then became colonial ally, could not bear to turn away from his great desire to be loyal to his homeland. What he did was a smart purposive action. He intentionally replicated, but not plagiarized. He replicated as a form of resistance.[13]

Here is the interpretation done by Werner Kraus—Saleh's biographer—towards Pieneman's painting,[14] as portrayed in Carey (2008, pp. 695):

> "... Pieneman made Dipanegara and his retainers look dull and submissive. All seemed to understand that De Kock's stern action was for the best for the Javanese and that he had no choice but to send the prince away 'just like a loving father sending a misguided son away to teach him a valuable lesson'. Here was no 'monstrous colonizer' but 'an educated and civilized gentleman, respected leader of the freemasons in the Indies' [...] 'There is no resistance, no commotion and high above the pageant flies merrily the Dutch tricolor [...] Pieneman's painting is a tribute to the glory of the Dutch. The pain of the Javanese is nowhere to be seen"

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12. In this year, Saleh was not in Nusantara. When Java War took place, he was also not around Yogyakarta/ Central Java, because he was in West Java (Priangan), studying. His awareness of the war did not come from direct contact because he did not witness it himself (Carey 2004, pp. 149).
13. "But is mimicry an act of straightforward homage? In a series of essays, Homi Bhabha suggests that it is possible to think of it as a way of *eluding* control [...]. The process of replication is never complete or perfect, and what it produces is not simply a perfect image of the original but something changed because of the context in which it is being reproduced. Bhabha suggests that colonial authority is rendered 'hybrid' and 'ambivalent' by this process of replication, thus opening up spaces for the colonised to subvert the master-discourse" (Loomba 1998, pp. 89; italics added). Given that Loomba's reading of Bhabha, the "deviation" done by Saleh could be categorized as "a way of eluding control"—an effort to resist towards domination.
14. The digital reproduction of the painting could be seen in appendix Picture 2.

Whereas this is the interpretation of Saleh's subversive painting, both by Carey and by Kraus, still elaborated in Carey[15]:

> "... this composition has an extraordinary emotional quality. A clearly furious Dipanegara stands at the center of the painting having just emerged onto the steps of the Residency House. Struggling to keep his feelings under control, his look is charged with fiery determination. His left hand clenched across his waist, he stretches out his right to console a weeping Javanese woman—perhaps his wife, Raden Ayu Retnaningsih, a piece of artistic license here—who is clutching distraughtly at his leg. As Kraus (2005: pp. 285-286) has vividly described, the faces of De Kock and the other Dutch officers are frozen as though staring into the middle distance" (pp. 698).

The biggest portion of Saleh's inner agitation was represented in the picture of himself that was obviously included in The Arrest of Pangeran Diponegoro. It was not enough for Saleh to just be the painter. It seemed that he wanted to be there, in the morning when the event took place. Even not only one, he put two of himself in the painting. This indicates how Saleh missed to be with his pribumi fellows struggling heroically against Dutch colonial. Saleh (in the painting) seems to honor Pangeran Diponegoro so much—probably due to the prince's valor, or for other certain reason. [16]

> "He also included himself in the painting: first standing bowed and in a respectful attitude before the prince, and second as one of Dipanegara's followers with his face turned anxiously towards the front [...] as if to reinforce his feelings of respect for Dipanegara, he portrayed the latter standing in a determined and defiant posture in the centre of the picture, an attitude which in fact accords ill with the prince's real emotion at the time..." (Carey 2004, pp. 153).

However, the following dilemmatic space from another dimension awoke. After the call from the feeling to love the homeland summoned, now Europe pulled him in. Being in Nusantara seemed to bring some memories that could disturb his night: the memories of living in Europe. Yet who could resist these memories while in fact his own land never satisfied his hunger for knowledge? Had been about twenty years in the civilization that praised and appreciated his artistic soul, then went

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15. The digital reproduction of the painting could be seen in appendix Picture 1.
16. There was an explanation before that his uncle, Kyai Terboyo, and his two cousins were Pangeran Diponegoro's collaborator in the Java War.

home to a place full of human beings who "did not care and did not value"[17] him, it is understandable that Saleh would always think of his "enlightener." To that end, he muted his inner conflict by conducting a sentimental visit of "enlightenment" that he had ever got. In 1875, he departed to Europe and spent three years there with his second wife and his two nieces. This confirms the notion that Raden Saleh was truly split into two: as someone who could not be seen as very loyal to his homeland, nor totally starving for Europe.

The Present Conclusion

Time has changed. It was not just Saleh who was turned into a half-man, but also most of Indonesian. People have never fully understood about the long impact of past colonialism, and now they must face the new version of it: globalization. Equality is definitely nowadays jargon. However the idea of who is superior and who is inferior is still spreading, in such subtler way that it needs greater effort in order to realize. Then again, the indicators appear everywhere. Perhaps the west do not speak loudly that they are still the most superior one, but *pribumi* seem to totally submit themselves to the idea that they are indeed inferior. It could be witnessed in everyday life. Those who relate to west will gain higher position. There is nothing wrong by becoming half man like Raden Saleh, because who could escape from being ambivalent? Nevertheless, to see own self as inferior, is the very first sickness that needs to be overcome immediately. The half Raden Saleh was able to proof to the world that the subaltern could ascend. Why can't we?

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17. This accusation is also pointed to the Dutch. Europe is Europe when it is in Europe, with the culture, ideology, and people. Europe in other place indicates a different culture because there will be an encounter between them and the non-Europe that they have to constitute their European identity correspondingly to what they think as "what European should be in the eyes of non-European." It is undeniable that Saleh missed the "real" Europe.

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Appendix

Picture 1. Saleh's Digital Painting Reproduction *The Arrest of Pangeran Diponegoro*. Taken from http://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/4/4f/Raden_Saleh_-_Diponegoro_arrest.jpg; accessed 18/11/2015.

Picture 2. Pieneman's Digital Painting Reproduction. Taken from https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/thumb/2/22/Nicolaas_Pieneman_-_The_Submission_of_Prince_Dipo_Negoro_to_General_De_Kock.jpg/800px-Nicolaas_Pieneman_-_The_Submission_of_Prince_Dipo_Negoro_to_General_De_Kock.jpg; accessed 18/11/2015.

Women Slaves Lament Under The Chain of Oppresion: A Struggle to Break The Social Stratification and Listen to The Crying of Women Slaves in East Sumba

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"The poignant essay is a fine example of how a good analysis can play the role of a strong advocacy if it is worked out according to the standards of social and historical research."

Dr. Ignas Kleden

Introduction

In the progress of world civilization, there are still people are who stuck under oppression. When most people are moving toward liberation and transformation, there are some people who are crying for justice. Many of them are women. In this paper, I will directly explain about women in Sumba who are repressed in the chain of powerlessness and helplessness because they were born in a lower caste.

Sumba is a small island and a part of the East Nusa Tenggara province. The island is administered into four regencies: *Sumba Barat* (West Sumba), *Sumba Barat Daya* (Southwest Sumba), *Sumba Tengah* (Central Sumba), and *Sumba Timur* (East Sumba).[1] One of regencies that deals with the caste system is East Sumba. Up to this day, many people in Sumba believe that caste system is given by God. But the critical question is does God agree with opression?

I am interested in raising this issue because I am angry at the system of social stratification that makes some people, especially women, lose their dignity because they were born in the family of the lowest caste. Some people feel that this issue does not need to be questioned because being born as a slave is a "destiny" that should be accepted gracefully. My feelings were mixed with restlessness, anger, sadness and wanting to fight against this system. How could I stay silent when I live among people who are suffered by this system. Mostly, women who were born in the slave caste are not educated and they would become perpetual unpaid maids in the homes of their master. In addition, those women are also a group susceptible to domestic violence.

Caste Stratification in East Sumba Society

According to the myths and traditions, East Sumba society is divided into four groups, namely the priests (*ratu*), the nobles (*maramba*), free people (*kabihu*) and the slave (*ata*). The first and second group are often incorporated into the "priests-nobles," which act as leaders in all areas of life. During its development, the prestige of the priests as the most honorable class has declined. Therefore, the priests are not included in the strata again but only function as priests and leaders of religious service of "Marapu" as the local religion. Until now, East Sumba society only recognizes three caste categories, namely:[2]

1. The Nobles (Maramba)

The nobles (*maramba*) class has power and privilege. They always maintain their social status through marriage among the noble families. The *Maramba*

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1. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sumba, accessed on 28 October 2015.
2. Oe. H. Capita, *Masyarakat Sumba dan Adat Istiadatnya*, (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 1963), pp. 40-54.

consists of *maramba bokulu* (great nobles) and maramba kudu (minor nobles). Classification is based on blood purity, wealth and influence in society.[3]

The nobles class wears a particular title in front of their name. A man wears the title *Tamu Umbu,* and a woman wears the title *Tamu Rambu*. However, their names are rarely called directly. Therefore, in daily life, their names are called by the name of the most loyal servant. This describes the ownership rights of the nobles on their servants. But, not all nobles use their special title in front of their name. The nobles class (very few) have released their status by freeing their slaves to live a life that is independent and free from their pressure.

The extraordinary aspect of the nobles is demonstrated through their origins. In the belief of Sumbanese local religion, the ancestor of the nobles is a woman who fell from the sky: in local languages is called "*padulurungu wangu kurumoki*" (extended with golden chain), or is derived from the middle of the ocean (*padua kuru ndu–padua libu muru*). The nobles were given a special title in so many words: "*ana wulangu-ana lodu*" (children of moon and sun), "*ana kara wulangu-ana wuya rara*" (children of sea turtles–red crocodilles), "*ana awangu-paliti*" (children horizon), "*majangga kadu umana na-na mabokulu kabihuna*" (high horn house and large clan) and many other expressions that describes the greatness of the nobles. These phrases are intended to portray their primacy in the social stratification of society and not assuming that noble was a descendant of the divine (god).[4]

The nobles have certain epithets which express their position, duties, powers and obligations in the village (*paraingu*). They are the founders and owners of the land (*mangu tanangu,* means the owner of the land), the lord and sustainer of the land. The nobles have a duty and obligation to protect and provide for the welfare of the village residents. Therefore, they are called as Father-Mother in the village (*ina la paraingu-ama la paraingu*), the parent of ducks and the father of chickens (*ina rendi-ama manu)* which should protect all citizens of the village (*paraingu*). However, the facts often speak otherwise. Currently there has been a shift in the function, that is, not all the nobles were able to build a relationship that is equivalent to the villagers, especially to the servant class. What precisely happened was the nobles considered themselves as the rightful and full ruler of the life of the servant class.

The nobles always have privilege in many ways. When the princess marry and move to the house of her husband's clan, she will bring a female servant in accordance with the amount of dowry received. The female servant called *ata ngandi* which means servant who is brought. The servant girl that was

3. Oe. H. Capita, *Masyarakat Sumba dan Adat Istiadatnya,* pp. 53.
4. F.D. Wellem, *Injil & Marapu : Suatu Studi Historis – Teologis tentang Perjumpaan Injil dengan Masyarakat Sumba pada periode 1876-1990*, (Jakarta: BPK Gunung Mulia, 2004), pp. 36.

brought together to her husband's house will become an eternal servant who served her family. Usually the female slave will be mated with the servant of the nobleman. Then, their children will be the servants to the children of their masters and mistresses. Furthermore, the caste system, which distinguishes the position of the nobles and the servant class, is not only in effect when they are still alive, but lasts until they are in the grave. When the faithful servant dies, he will be buried at the foot of the master/mistress. This phenomenon does not only tickle us, but also challenge us to do something.

2. Free People Class (Kabihu)

Free people/independent people class is referred to as a group of people with legal binding from the same ancestor that can be considered as clan or family tribe. *Kabihu* is a group of independent people who are not under the control of the nobles. *Kabihu* class is divided into two parts, namely *kabihu bokulu* (large clan) and *kabihu kudu* (small clan). *Kabihu bokulu* serves as an advocate for domestic and the owners of the field. They are great people who take care to the local situation with the nobles. *Kabihu* does not have a lot of members and its influence was not great.

3. Slave Class (Ata)

In the language of East Sumba, the word *ata* means servant/slaves. Another term to describe them is *tau ata papa lewa* which means the subordinate/ messengers. The ata is divided into two groups, namely *ata dai* and *ata bidi*. *Ata ndai* are the servants which hereditary have been living with the master-mistress from the beginning. They become eternal servant for master-mistress. According to myth, the *ata* came together with the *marapu* (ancestors) to Sumba. However, they specifically are presented as a maid/ servant of the ancestors. That is, the *ata* is not an ancestor. The descendants of those servants/slaves are then became a group of *ata ndai*. While *ata bidi* is the servant/slave who is not a family of the king or the nobles. They are called as "*ata pakei*" (purchased slaves), "*ata buta*" (the lowest slave), "*ata lindi lulu*" (slaves whose descendants will continue to be slave. The existence of *ata bidi* is caused by social issues, politics and economics that are less favorable for some people of Sumba. In the old days, many people who were helpless and poor became prisoners of war, then were later enslaved. Some were also victims of robbery, kidnapping and sold as a slave somewhere else. Therefore, the *ata bidi* was victims of a social, violence, economic, political and cultural conditions who are trapped in a prison of powerlessness.

Disclose the Social Stratification System as a Construction of Social Culture

In general, Sumba people understands that the social stratification in Sumba is a pride that must be maintained. Many have argued that caste division is a part of tradition that must be preserved. Therefore, until now no one openly and boldly questioned about the implementation of the caste system or sued this system. What has caused it? I suspect it might be due to an understanding that the caste system is regarded as an ancestral cultural heritage. On the other hand, an attempt to dismantle the caste system is the same as awakening the "sleeping lions," who are the nobles who has been lulled with their privileges. I am convinced that the nobles will be the main defenders of the caste system. Therefore, this system will continue to last and even ignore the aspects of human equality. The beneficiaries would have a million of reasons to maintain this system. While the people who suffered would feel "safe" in a condition that is actually far from feeling "safe and fair."

The caste system in Sumba has been showing how to degrade life of other human beings. The caste system has put other men in *ata* status as an oppressed group, although there is also an opinion that the *ata* (slave) are not treated arbitrarily by the nobles, but protected and loved. For me, for whatever reason, this system has made slaves chained in the prison of oppression. When the nobles got all the "special" epithets, then what about the servants/slaves? When the nobles were born as people who have power, then are being a servant/slave is a nightmare for some people of Sumba? These are the things that continue to plague my mind. Why is there a human caste division? Why is the system continuously perpetuated up to this day? Is there no possibility of dismantling the system for the sake of human equality in Sumba?

It should be recognized that efforts to dismantle the caste system in Sumba are not an easy task and can very completed in a short time. Why? This system has been deeply rooted like a taproot that is not easily removed. From the standpoint of religious and cultural aspects, the system is regarded as a divine gift that must be maintained. If this principle is adopted, the caste system can never be criticized, because doing this equals to criticizing the Divine. Does this belief can be received even it sacrifices other people? Those who receive benefits will say "yes" and the suffered would be forced to say "yes" or are muted.

Efforts to disclose the caste system in Sumba must begin with a critical analysis that the caste system is a socio-cultural construction that can be broken down. The servant was not destined to live in a slave caste. They are human beings who have the same rights as the nobles. Therefore, we must open our eyes and ears to understand that the presence of the slaves is a reflection of life that is characterized by discrimination and injustice.

The opinion that slaves came together with the ancestors[5] can not be taken for granted. This opinion needs to be citicized properly. Are the slaves the consigments of the divine to serve the nobles? I then wondered whether there is a worldview that considers being loyal to the nobles means being loyal to *Marapu? Marapu* is a genuine belief of Sumba people. *Marapu* is derived from the word *Ma* and *Rap-pu*. The double P letters were first removed so that the pronunciation does not sound rough, but instead sounds smooth like a greeting of respect, "ma-ra-pu." *Marapu* implies "that it has been completed and settled, meaning the human bodies that have been buried by the official under customary law. Spirit and soul returned to their Creator in an atmosphere of a new life. Therefore, M*arapu* can mean ancestors. [6] According to the local religion of Sumba, the nobles are derived from ancestors who first arrived in Sumba called as *Marapu*. This is the spirit of the ancestors deified and worshipped as mediators between man and the divine. This philosophy is embedded in minds, especially of the slaves. So, they committed themselves very strongly with their kings. Many of them did not protest of their status as slaves. Instead they understand that this is a gift and a sign of honor. Therefore equated with the opportunity to serve nobles is serving *Marapu*. How could the position as *ata ndai* or heritage's slave is seen as a sign of honor? This myth has been trapping the *ata ndai* to have a slave mentality. They are taught to be people who are loyal to their master. The process of indoctrination to the minds of *ata ndai* further strengthen the position of the nobles as a descendant of *Marapu* that must be served with full obedience and loyalty. That statement implies that the status of a slave is a fact that can not be changed. It is as if the Divine have sent the servants from his residence to serve for the ancestors and their descendants. This view can not be justified. How is it that some people are destined as servants/slaves who serve the ancestors?

The opinion of the *Ata ndai* about "who they are and whom they live for" has affected their existence. In this slave-master worldview, the *ata ndai* have never thought that they deserve to have freedom. Their views of themselves perpetuates the position of the nobles. The nobles got various special title and the servants helped perpetuate maintained for their greatness.

This doctrine was passed down for generations of *ata,* saying that they were born as *ata* and this status will be inherent in them along their life. This is what makes the *ata ndai* unable to move out from their masters' houses. Since birth, they have been taught to be loyal to their masters because they are the servants who had been there since the first time and sent as slaves by the ancestors. This view is built systematically as an attempt to weaken and destroy the dignity of those who were born in a slave family.

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5. The ancestors who first arrived on Sumba were highly respected by his children and grandchildren for generations. They are called 'Marapu,' namely the lordship or deified.
6. Nggodu Tonggul, *Etika dan Moralitas dalam Budaya Sumba*, (Waingapu: Promillenio Center & Bidang Penelitian dan Pengembangan Bappeda Sumba Timur 2003), pp. 21.

Women Slaves Trapped In False Consciousness

I need to underline that in the slaves' families, women and children are most vulnerable to various forms of discrimination and marginalization. They are the group who are most affected. Why? Because they are under the control of their husbands, their mistresses, the children of their masters and most importantly, under the control of their masters. When viewed from the pyramid of power, women slaves are at the bottom layer of the pyramid of power. They are in a very difficult position, because of their status as slaves and women. On one hand, they are confronted with the power of the oppressive system. While on the other hand, they have to crouch under the power of patriarchy.

The women slaves were created to be the powerless. They were forced to smile even if their hearts were wailing. In the midst of a slave family, they always become the object of violence and injustice. They also have to submit to male power in the family caste. While in the presence of the nobles, their existence is nothing more than production machines, in that they must work hard for the sake of happiness of their masters. I believe that these slave women are wailing everytime throughout their lives. However, their cries were never heard. Their voices were silenced. They are subjected to various forms of injustice both of the nobility and of his fellow servants, especially from the man in the family.

When I had a conversation with some of the women from the slaves family, some felt comfortable with their social status. It makes me feel more uncomfortable when they feel comfortable. I see that they have been caught up in a false consciousness. I am borrowing the term used by Marx to describe the state of the proletarians who fell asleep during oppression. Marx confronted it with the power of the capitalist system that makes the bourgeoisie enjoyed privileges by exploiting the proletariat. In situations like this, Marx found it difficult to awaken the proletariat from the oppressive system. The proletariat assumed that they were not suffering and in fact they experienced happiness. Therefore, they did not have any desire to rebel against the oppressive system. Of course this was an absurdity that could not be accepted by Marx. This situation made Marx fight for a classless society.[7] Starting from Marx, I conclude that female slaves had been sucked into false consciousness, as if they live in happiness. Their eyes and minds are closed to reflect and realize that they are suffering. Their mouths are silenced to not speak against oppression.

How can we speak out for their freedom if the women themselves are not aware that they are being oppressed? How do they know when they are being oppressed if nobody tells this to them? I am increasingly aware that this work can not be done alone. The caste system has paralyzed the legs and brains of the servants. I

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7. Doyle Paul Johnson, *Teori Sosiologi Klasik dan Modern : Jilid 1*, (Jakarta : Gramedia, 1988), pp. 135-136.

suspect that this doctrine has been embedded in the minds of the servants and make them learn to accept the fact that their destiny can not be changed. Once born as servants will remain a slave.

Women Slaves Oppressed Experience:
A Starting Point for Feminist Theology in Sumba

Feminist theology are in the frame of liberation theology. As a liberation theology, feminist theology begins with the experiences of women who are struggling to free themselves from the patriarchal and called to remove oppression. In feminist theology, the main spotlight is not just for the poor but also all women, especially poor women who are oppressed.[8] I then put the slave women as victims of patriarchy in the form of a pyramid of social stratification. They suffer from the social, economic, political, cultural and religious aspects. Strength stratification and patriarchal system has jailed them at the bottom of the pyramid of power. If they appear and speak, then it is nothing more than a "whisper" that was soft and not heard. On this basis, I understand that the struggle of female servants is the basis for developing a feminist theology in Sumba.

The social stratification system is the formation of patriarchal society. About patriarchy, Elisabeth Fiorenza asserts:

> Patriarchy is defined as not just women as the "other" but also subjugated peoples and races as the "other" to be dominated. It defines women, moreover, not just as the other of men but also as subordinates to men in power insofar as it conceives of society as analogous to the patriarchal household, which was sustained by slave labor. Women of color and poor women are doubly and triply oppressed in such a patriarchal social system. A critical feminist theology of liberation, therefore, does not speak of male oppressors and female oppressed, of all men over all women, but rather of patriarchy as a pyramidal system and hierarchical structure of society and church in which women's oppression is specified not only in terms of race and class but also in terms of "marital" status. [9]

In line with Fiorenza, I understand that women slaves are living in the patriarchal household that requires oppression. Women slaves have been placed as "the other, or commonly referred to the other," to be oppressed. Women have not only been the "other" for men but also as subject to the male power. Women slaves experience the suffering where they are not only subject to the male power but

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8. Pamela Dicky Young, *Feminist Theology/Christian Theology : In Search of Method*, (Minneapolis : Fortress Press, 1990), pp. 24-25.
9. Elisabeth Schüssler Fiorenza, *Bread Not Stone : The Challenge of Feminist Biblical Interpretation* (Boston : Beacon Press, 1995), pp. 27.

also to womens' power who are in a position as the nobles. Furthermore, Fiorenza added that patriarchy is a system of pyramidal and hierarchical structure of society and the church, indicating that women oppression is not just about race and class but also on the status of marriage. This explanation conveys that women experience discrimination and oppression in many areas of life. From this I draw a simple conclusion that women's status as servants has also been placed at the edge of Sumba's history and world civilization. Their stories are shared with all the women who were wailing from the base of the pyramid system. They are lamenting and longing for a liberation.

The liberation of the female slaves may occur if the nobles and slaves, including women, have a feminist consciousness. That is, the nobles must have a new mindset about the theme of equality. When the nobles has a feminist consciousness, then one day they will removal of their status as nobles and slaves, and will dance together in the dance of life. In this context, there are no longer nobles and slaves; there is no longer a pyramid of power. On the other hand, the slaves also need to have a feminist consciousness about the awareness that they are being oppressed and living a life that is not fair. For that, they need to open themselves to be embraced in the dance of life.

Conclusion

The social stratification system that is still happening in Sumba have incised black spot in the history of the struggle for human rights. At a time when many people are struggling to raise the human dignity, there are also people who are struggling for humanity. Then, where is the justice? From the experiences of the oppression ofslaves, especially women and children, we are called to be the a fighter for their liberation. We found that women slaves and their daughters have experienced great suffering. They are victims of a system of social stratification that came in the form of a patriarchal system.

They need to be helped to speak about the persecution they experienced. They need to get out of false consciousness, which binds and curl them up under the oppression of the nobles. Therefore, the issue of oppression experienced by women slaves should be the standing point for the struggle for justice in Sumba. So, what to do? How can I make this social stratification system removed? Do the nobles want to free the slave and the slaves want to be out of the grasp of the nobles? The story of oppression experienced by women slaves is an urgent agenda to be finished. Women slaves have spoken and lament, therefore listen to them and fight with them!

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History of "The Pioneer" Raden Mas Tirto Adhi Soerjo

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Sekolah Tinggi Agama Islam Nahdatul Ulama,
September 2015

Preface

Two decades of the twentieth century was a period of the most convincing and crucial for the birth of Indonesia in colonialism history. Leadership patterns and movements within Indonesian society during this period shaped the social basis for political independence in the next few years. This period witnessed the emergence of the movement figures and their integrated organizations, growth of the ideas and concepts of nationality, which inherited the embryo for the advent of a type of Indonesian nationalism.[1]

Ricklef referred to this period as "a new colonial era" in the history of Dutch colonialism. Progressive ideas that developed in the West had begun to be sown in the colonies. At the beginning of the twentieth century, the Dutch government policy was moving towards the most significant change in its history. Exploitation had begun to be less used as the primary reason for Dutch rule, replaced by concern pronouncements and prosperity of Indonesia. A manifestation of such was 'the ethical policy.'[2]

Although the economic contribution of the ethical policy - which was passed by Queen Wilhelmina in 1901 - was very doubtful for increasing prosperity,[3] but its contribution could not be doubted for the emergence of the movement leader figures that were aware of the actual conditions of their people.

The western intellectuals who were born of ethical politics emerged as the modern ideas carrier. Although, there was a 'sense of the Western' in most of them, but their economic and social positions had prevents them from supporting the colonial's rule. Those closest to the Dutch culture were often the most persistent opponents. Education, which is one of the three principles of ethical policy, had dynamite effect on the colonial system. Western education had led to the emergence of new Indonesian elite with difference interests from the Dutch.[4]

One of the nationalist movement leaders born out of ethical policy was Tirto Adhi Soerjo (TAS), with his journalism activities and initiated organizations. TAS did not get much attention in the discourse of modern Indonesian history, although he was the crucial pioneer of nationalism movement in modern lines.

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1. Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite*, (The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1960), pp. 12.
2. Merle Calvin Riclefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200,* (California: Standford University Press, 2001), ed. 3, pp. 193-195.
3. W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society In Transition; A Study of Social Change,* (The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1956), pp. 30.
4. W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society In Transition; A Study of Social Change,* (The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1956), pp. 30.

The Movements of Tirto Adhi Soerjo (TAS)

TAS, who was personally progressive, was deeply convinced of the power of education and of new ideas.[5] He was the first modern nationalist figure, who admires modern culture critically. His educational background gave major influence on the gaze of the Dutch colonialism and the condition of the society. TAS had traveled from his small town of Blora to Madiun for education, but because he wanted to study medicine at the new tertiary institution for natives, he went to Batavia. He passed the test that allowed him to learn Dutch, a talent he used to write some articles subsequently published in newspapers.[6]

Being able to interact freely in Dutch put TAS ambiguously in the social position of Dutch colonialism. He was a native elite, who was both close to the Dutch and rebelled against the colonial order. TAS' social ambiguity might be his initial character, because he was born from the noble class, but he launched an excoriation against his own social class. TAS actually represented one part of the uncertain Indonesian society, whose education has moved him out of Indonesian life environment, and the sense of nationhood and dignity prevented him to receive security and satisfaction in the environment of colonial rule.[7]

In the early twentieth century, the Dutch government issued a policy that had made the Dutch language exclusive. The policy had prevented the Javanese people to speak Dutch, even for those who were fluent. In addition, the people of Java must practice a respectful high Javanese for the Dutch people as a tribute to the nobility of Java. Although, at the time of Governor General van Heutsz, such practices had been removed, it was so entrenched. TAS as a young aristocrat opposed these regulations strongly in his whole relations with the Dutch and the indigenous aristocracy. In the suburbs, away from the court and the influence of his father, who was a regent, TAS and colleagues could act in a democratic social manner.[8]

After graduating from OSVIA (Opleiding School voor Inlandsche Ambtenaren), he got a low position in the government and can be promoted regularly. However, TAS left the post to fight his fate in other field. TAS then entered in journalism.[9]

In journalism, TAS got an apprenticeship on one of the Dutch-language newspaper, where he quickly got a position as editor and made him famous in various regions.[10] TAS subsequently founded the Malay newspaper in 1903, namely *Soenda Berita,* printed in Cianjur. Although it did not survive, *Soenda Berita* was the first newspaper that was established, funded and operated by indigenous Indonesian people. In

5. R.E. Elson, *The Ideo of Indonesia: A History,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), ed. 1, pp. 12.
6. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 63.
7. Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite,* ((The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1960), pp. 136.
8. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 63.
9. Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite,* ((The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1960), pp. 136.
10. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 63.

1907, he built the weekly newspaper, *Medan Prijaji,* in Batavia. The newspaper gained glories, and in 1910, it turned into a daily newspaper, and became the first daily newspaper which was managed by the natives.[11]

TAS joined with some editors and writers from Minahasa, Sumatra and Central Java in creating a new awareness of daily life issues in Indies. Along his colleagues and through newspaper, TAS campaigned against corruption by the Dutch, the regents and other members of the civil service. TAS also sought to build consciousness among the citizen on their obligations towards the poor people.[12]

The Success of *Medan Prijaji* was inseparable from its language. *Medan Prijaji was* the first national newspaper for using the Malay language. When TAS wrote in Malay, he realized that only a few citizens could read in Latin script, but he also knew that newspapers and other publications in Malay were frequently spread in communal groups.[13]

In that period, besides newspapers, there was also a growing demand for popular novels. English detective novels like Sherlock Holmes, was very popular. There had been lending libraries in big cities such as Batavia and Palembang in the late nineteenth century. And with the advent of local printings, libraries were widespread throughout other major cities. TAS tried to attend to the people's enthusiastic of the popular novels by writing in dime novels, which have been popularized by writers of China-Indonesia. TAS dime novels were published and serialized in newspapers, one of them was "*Kisah Nyai Ratna: Betapa Seorang Istri Setia Telah Menjadi Jahat (Satu Cerita Yang Sungguh Sudah Terjadi di Jawa Barat*)" that was published in 1909. In the novel, Tirto tried to show a new twist on the characteristics of the early twentieth century, which came surprisingly.[14]

By publishing both of his newspapers and writings in Malay, TAS and his colleagues spread the language that became the dominant language in Indies. The language subsequently became a future Indonesia national language. The Dutch supported the use of Malay primarily because they realized it was easier to learn than the Dutch language, in addition to their arrogance to creating social segregation through their own exclusive language. While the Java language - although the majority of the population was Javanese – as well as difficult to learn, it was also difficult to be used as the language for administrative and bookkeeping.[15]

However, the Government tried to suppress the development of popular writings in ordinary Malay by promoting what they regarded as literary standards in the high form of the Malay by selecting the court Malay of the Riau Islands and by setting up an official publishing house in 1908. Newspapers and fiction published in

11. Merle Calvin Riclefs, *A History of Modern Indonesia Since C. 1200* (California: Standford University Press, 2001)*,* ed. 3*,* pp. 210.
12. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 64.
13. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 64.
14. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 63-64.
15. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 64.

common Malay by TAS and colleagues were automatically radical because of their own language. TAS and colleagues in turn called it the language of 'Indonesia.'[16]

The smoothness and sharpness of his writings and the glories of his movements had forced to fade by the Dutch Government. Severe criticisms against a controlled behavior have caused TAS to be removed from Java, dumped in Bacan Island, near Halmahera, North Maluku. After the completion of exile, TAS headed back to Batavia and succumbed to his tuberculosis. TAS died on August 17, 1918.

The Emergence of Movement Organization

TAS could be a practically complete figure in the struggle movement. In addition to pioneering a new era of resistance to colonialism and conservative ideologies through journalism, TAS was also one of the pioneers of modern national movements and simultaneously the economic movement in the history of Indonesian nationalism. In 1909 he founded the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* (the Union of Islamic Trade). The TAS formed organization was an institution born out of perceived necessity to establish the indigenous struggle in the path of modernization. The unrest had long experienced by the most oppressed natives in the colonial, previously resulted in xenophobia, and together with the various manifestations of semi-mystical, now channeled into more effectively social-political movement.[17]

Striking immediately, *Sarekat Dagang Islam* had suddenly emerged from the increasing number of disputes with foreign businessmen, especially those with the Chinese. *Sarekat Dagang Islam* tried to protect the last land of indigenous economy, i.e *batik* and *kretek*, which were then under pressure from Chinese entrepreneurs.[18]

The Chinese business activities had previously dominated the indigenous economy and had become increasingly aggressive due to the removal of all restrictions on travel and living regulations applied to them. The Dutch regulations initially restricted Chinese into tenant, retailers, lenders, and industrialists only in the coastal regions. They must obtain permission from the Dutch authorities to operating in hinterlands. The Dutch over the years also held a travel restriction except to the big cities and small towns for "Foreign Easterners." When the Chinese people would travel out of their assigned area, they had to get a pass (road license) from the civil authorities.[19]

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16. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 64.
17. W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society In Transition; A Study of Social Change,* (The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1956), pp. 33.
18. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nasionalisme dan Revolusi Di Indonesia; Refleksi Lahirnya Republik* (Surakarta: Sebelas Maret University Press, 1995), ed. 2, pp. 86.
19. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nasionalisme dan Revolusi Di Indonesia; Refleksi Lahirnya Republik* (Surakarta: Sebelas Maret University Press, 1995), ed. 2, pp. 35.

The pass system was an obstacle to the Chinese movement and braked on their economic activities. Dutch regulations were intended to protect Indonesian people from exploitation by Chinese entrepreneurs, although these efforts were fairly ambiguous because from the beginning, the Dutch favored the Chinese people and put them as liaisons between the government and natives. The Government also submitted various kinds of monopoly run by the Chinese, such as the right to appeal road tax, tax market, organizing the sale of salt, collects customs, business rents, leasing rights of the village.[20]

Between 1904-1910, because there was increasing pressure from the emergence of Chinese nationalist movements in Indonesia, the Dutch government granted the movements' demands and removing all restriction rules for Chinese group. The Chinese economic activity was increasingly aggressive and got a disproportionate economic influence in every corner of country, even in the most remote regions. Chinese considerable capital could be run in rural areas without interference.[21] Therefore, the Indonesian traders and industrialists that existed in the hinterland and previously were relatively safe, were getting serious blow due to competition with the Chinese. The same goes for successful indigenous businesses that were still running, such as Three Balls, - Nitisemito *kretek* company – had a tendency of being dimmed by Chinese merchants that came to dominated the kretek and batik industry. TAS felt there should be concrete actions done to prevent Chinese aggressive business expansion. In 1909, he founded *Sarekat Dagang Islam* in Batavia, and in 1911 established a branch in Bogor. Along with Haji Samanhoedi – a batik entrepreneur and prominent religious figure - TAS initiated the establishment of *Sarekat Dagang Islam* in Surakarta on 1911. Surakarta and Yogyakarta, which were the center of batik trade, were being subjected to pressure from Chinese business activities.[22]

Sarekat Dagang Islam had grown rapidly. Booming registration of new members and low dues flowed into the Sarekat Dagang Islam offices. This movement did uplifting and longing "the lost imaginary paradise," and then transformed into a dynamic struggle to obtain a better life, a character of the class struggle against the foreign employers and the middle class.[23] Exercised legal means in western law, TAS utilized the trade organizations to boost and intensify the Muslims to move for the sake of progress, emphasized brotherhood among members and helped one another to increase the life of the indigenous. "Sarekat Islam," TAS discussed first, although not using the name specifically, worked for the prosperity and greatness of whole country.[24] The most striking feature, and made it the most progressive

20. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nasionalisme dan Revolusi Di Indonesia; Refleksi Lahirnya Republik* (Surakarta: Sebelas Maret University Press, 1995), ed. 2, pp. 36.
21. Bernard H.M. Vlekke, Nusantara; Sejarah Indonesia, (Jakarta: PT Gramedia, 2008), ed. 4, pp. 393.
22. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nasionalisme dan Revolusi Di Indonesia; Refleksi Lahirnya Republik* (Surakarta: Sebelas Maret University Press, 1995), ed. 2, pp. 36.
23. W.F. Wertheim, *Indonesian Society In Transition; A Study of Social Change,* (The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1956), pp. 40.
24. Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite,* (The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1960), pp. 135-136.

movement, was the nationality concepts rooted in the society as well as offering the most advanced, namely the Indonesian nationalism.[25]

Regardless of its economic function, in general, Indonesians considered it as a religious symbol that united each Indonesian people. The essential aspect to help each other and promote the mutual interests of all Muslims was interpreted easily as a strong nationalism and its religious nature and nationalism covered immediately by the original economic pressures. Not only attracting new members, but the program was also encouraging the people.[26]

Formerly, something almost indicated differences between Tirto's previous organizations than in Surakarta. The nature of Solo perhaps gave the influencing factor. The strong bond with the tradition of Javanese life somewhat increased activities of Christian missions. In this region the Chinese entrepreneurs also seek to broken through the last bastion of native economic life. Membership growth forced *Sarekat Dagang Islam* out from the trade issues to enter the less controlled aspect. Something by merchants considered a business competition with the Chinese, by the militant younger members regarded as a racist movement that must be faced in violence. As a result, the Chinese were attacked in the streets, shops and warehouses were in disrepair, and in early 1912 culminated in an anti-Chinese uprising in Surakarta and Surabaya.[27]

However, the anti-Chinese riots were not a coincidence, but an accumulation of suffering experienced by the natives. Racism was also supported by the fact that most cash creditors were Chinese, and they took advantage for cash created by Dutch taxation. When farmers were unable to repay the loan, they were forced to plant their fields with specific crops, then forced to sell the results to the creditors at predetermined prices. Thus, the farmers were tenant of their own fields, and the results of these labors bagged the Chinese people as a creditor. The term for those was "*lintah darat*" (leeches of the land).[28]

Although the leadership of the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* was not entirely responsible for the riots and violence, but the organization was banned by the government a few months. In September 1912, the *Sarekat Dagang Islam* resurfaced as *Sarekat Islam* under the charismatic leadership of Haji Oemar Said Tjokroaminoto.

25. R.E. Elson, *The Ideo of Indonesia: A History,* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2008), pp. 13.
26. George McTurnan Kahin, *Nasionalisme dan Revolusi Di Indonesia; Refleksi Lahirnya Republik* (Surakarta: Sebelas Maret University Press, 1995), ed. 2, pp. 86.
27. Robert van Niel, *The Emergence of Modern Indonesian Elite,* (The Hague-Bandung: W. van Hoeve LTD, 1960), pp. 135-136.
28. Adrian Vickers, *The History of Modern Indonesian,* (Chicago: Cambridge University Press, 2012), ed. 2, pp. 69-70.

Conclusion

Both Tirto's life and his initiated organization were short-lived, but their roles in the rise of nationalism had grown in leaders of the movement afterwards. The transformed organization of *Sarekat Dagang Islam, Sarekat Islam* was the most decisive movement in the history of the rise of Indonesian nationalism. The Social-political struggle for justice and freedom, as well as uniting the Indonesian people from all regions strived in the most effective path.

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The Position of Farming in Indonesia from Colonialism to the Post-Colonial era (1806-2015)

by **Fitrilya Anjarsari**

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Jenderal Soedirman University, March 2014

Cultural Science
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Introduction

Since an era in which Christopher Bayly (2004) called as archaic globalization, Indonesia had been playing an important role in world's trade activity where China and India were having the most power at that time. Indonesia's strategic location made it as a transit place for many Chinese merchants and monks who were travelling to the west (to India) (Levathes, 1994: pp. 32). The harbour that became the transit was Sriwijaya Harbour. Since there were many ships coming from other parts of the world, the trading activity was also getting bigger.

Chinese merchants usually brought porcelain and silk fabric while the Indonesian merchants itself mostly sold spices/herbs and crops. These Chinese merchants brought Indonesian's spices/herbs to Europe through the route taken by Mongolians; since that time, European people started to be familiar with Indonesian's spices/herbs. However, in 1433, when Ming Dinasty was ruling, the Chinese merchants were not allowed to trade overseas and this was what made the European started their journey to search for spices/herbs (Taylor, 2013: pp. 22).

In 1345, the Chinese monks who lived in Indonesia shared their knowledge about farming and cropping to Indonesians (Taylor, 2013: pp. 24). They taught Indonesian farmers how to plant rice in a better way, and since that time, rice became one of Indonesia's trading commodity. Thus, the Indonesian monarchy started to take control in the system of owning farmland in Indonesia. It was because the monarchy thought that anything related to owning farmland and was advantageous needed to be controlled by them (Eaton, 2005: pp. 50).

The growing of farming from time to time depends on how the ruling government considers farming as a part of the nation's economic growth. Therefore, this research is conducted to see how farming is positioned by the ruling government from the colonial era until now. The data that will be used in this research are taken from archives study, a direct observation in some agricultural villages (Cirebon, Magelang, Purwokerto and Serang), and some other related books.

Farming and Colonialism

The very first encounter between Indonesia and Netherland was in 1595 and it was even more intense, since in 1806 Netherland came back to Indonesia with its trading company, VOC. It is because they knew that trading herbs would benefit them a lot, they also came back with even greater ships. The huge VOC ships were able to load great amount of herbs they bought from Indonesia and then they would sell them with even higher price in Europe. This happened continously until Netherland decided to take over Indonesia by colonizing some areas that had big harbours. Later on, VOC took over the monarchy's role in controlling the farming taxes.

In 1795, Europe, which was ruled by Napoleon Bonaparte, infiltrated the power of Netherland in Indonesia. Napoleon's brother, Louis Bonaparte, chose Marshall Herman Daendels to be a general governor in Indonesia. Daendles was known for his role in building the Daendels high road and as the one who charged taxes out of Indonesian farmers. As a general governor, he ruled in a quite short time, started in 1808 and ended in 1811; he was replaced by J.W Janssens. However, Bonaparte lost in the Waterloo war and it meant that there was a vaccum of power in Indonesia. This made the Indonesian farmers feel free because they did not have to pay for taxes to Netherland. However, this condition did not last long because England sent his man, Sir Thomas Raffless, to Indonesia.

In 1825, a war that became one of the most well-known wars in Indonesia, the war of Diponegoro, exploded. In this war, Diponegoro spreaded out his propaganda to Moslem elite such as Moslem Saint and Haj and also the farmers. He wanted the farmers to fight againts the injustice in terms of taxes charge. He also wanted them to support him to fight againts the colonizers. He said that it was a great mistake for a moslem to pay taxes in order to benefit the non-moslems (Carrey, 1981: pp. xliv-xli).

The war of Diponegoro lasted for five years, it started in 1825 and ended in 1830. This affected the farming condition in Java itself. There were many abandoned farmlands because the farmers went to war. This was what made Netherland to take over those lands by starting their movement called as Land Cultivation (1830). This system was mostly known as "*tanam paksa*" by the Indonesians.

During this era, Netherland wanted the crops to be exported and sold with much higher price. They did not plant rice a lot, they mostly planted tea, tobacco, and coffee or indigo (Taylor, 2013: pp. 68). Beside deciding what should be planted, Netherland also decided the price from the farmers and charged 20% out of land owning tax. They did not pay the farmers' goods based on the market price but the price that was issued by the government. In order to make everything work well, they employed 190 people that were divided into two groups: 90 people as crop inspectors and 100 people as supervisors (Fasseur, 1992: pp. 240).

The land cultivation or "*tanam paksa*" had caused many Indonesians to suffer from hunger, and poverty was increasing. Netherland's self-benefiting farming system was eventually protested by many. One of the most famous protestors was Multatuli, who wrote a book entittled Max Havelaar (first published in Netherland in 1860). That novel had finally inspired a lawyer named Conrad Van Deventer to make an indictement toward the governement; it was written in Aan Der Koning (an indicment letter for the emperor). It said that the colonizers were in debt to their colonized people and they must return the favor to them (Taylor, 2013: pp. 93).

His three indictments, which were education, irigation, and emigration, were granted by Netherland monarchy. This condition, of course, had a good effect toward Indonesians; they started to get education. Indonesians' misery, which was caused by Netherland's cruelty in monopolizing the farmland, was one of the ways for the Indonesians to get education that later would take part in pursuing Indonesia's goal of being independent.

Farming and Development

As a newly independent country, Ganis Harsono, in his memoirs, wrote that this newly independent country, for Indonesians, was like a new toy given by the West without the instruction how to play it (1977:pp. 79). After being an independent country, there was a crisis in Indonesia's economy, especially in food supplies. This crisis was finally being solved when the new order was ruling. It could be seen that neat control in farming sector could prove that Indonesia was able to reach the highest peak of farming sector.

During the new order, a famous term of agriculture sector was called Agrarian Revolution. The main goal of this revolution was to fulfill the food supply for Indonesian people so that they did not have to import rice from other countries. It was mentioned in Soeharto's statement that was written in "*Pedoman Rancangan Pelita*." The biggest achievement of this Agrarian Revolution was "*swasembada beras*" or the ability of Indonesians to produce their own rice in 1980's.

It was a great effort from all Indonesian people, not just the farmers, to get that kind of achievement. In Pelita I, rice was the most important thing. In doing the Agrarian Revolution, Soeharto improved the irrigation system, gave some fund to the farmers, introduced the farmers to technology and good quality seeds.

All of this could happen succesfully because there was good coordination between the agriculture department, village chiefs, and the farmers themselves. There were many counselings done by the farming department; beside that, the government also decided which good seeds that should be planted and then distributed them to each village with the help of the village chief. The farmers were not allowed to plant any seed other than what had been given by the government. It was because the government thought that the farmers were not good enough in choosing which good seeds to plant, especially due to the weather and the soil condition.

In order to provide the farmers with better facilities, the government built "*Koperasi Unit Desa*" (KUD) or Village Cooperative Unit in every village in order to make it easier for them to get the seed and fertilizer. Furthermore, KUD would also be used to buy the crops from farmers. The buying price from the farmers was on its peak during 1980's. Farmers were living a good life because they had good

crops and the prices of daily needs were stable, too. Moreover, the farmers were still having extra income from selling their crops while harvesting.

This kind of economic welfare then caused no social gap between the laboring farmers and the land owners. It could be seen from the loyalty of the labors to their masters and the number of villagers who became farmers. Farmlands in the new order were sold in low prices, even in some areas in Cirebon, the right of owning farmlands could be exchanged with only some sacks of rice in which the rice would be sold with proper price to the KUD.

The Decreasing Farmlands, Labor Farmers Doing Other Jobs

When the New Order collapsed, Indonesia's economy got worse too. This affected almost all sectors in Indonesia, including the agriculture sector. Due to this crisis, KUD was being inactive and the prices of fertilizers and the other farmers' needs were getting higher. Moreover, the farmlands in Indonesia were getting less and less than before. It happened because the government had let foreign capital come in to Indonesia in order to solve the crisis.

Farming was not the central of Indonesia's economy anymore. The developments were taking over farmlands and malls, gas stations, housings, etc. were built. On the other hand, Indonesian people were starting to be more consumptive; thus, capital holders decided to build more malls or other shopping centers. They were built in big cities; however, the growing of technology such as TV and advertisements and the consumptive behavior were also getting into people in smaller cities in Indonesia. In order to fulfill their needs, mini markets were also built in smaller cities and of course they were built on the land that was once used for farming. Land owners were willing to give away their lands because the capital owners offered them a great amount of money. Furthermore, there was also an agreement between them; if the mini market was to face bankruptcy, the land owner would get his money back, along with the building built on it. I found this case in small villages in Cirebon, Serang, Magelang, and Purwokerto, and there were any other similar phenomena were found.

Based on the census done by BPS in 2010, it was said that there were more than 237 million people living in Indonesia, and it would reach 255 million people in 2015. Due to the great amount of people that lived in Indonesia, capital owners decided to build more housing, not only in big cities but also in small villages. Some farmlands found in Jamblang Regency, Plered Regency, and other places in Indramayu were now some clusters of houses.

This condition was still getting worse. In Cirebon itself, Pertamina monopolized and took a chance out of this situation. They tried to exploit the farmlands there in order to find out the source of oil. They took the sample of the farmlands and if

they found the source, they would try to negotiate with the land owners in order to let them buy the farmlands. They would offer a very considerable price that had 10 or more digits amount of money.

The buying price of rice was declining and considered insufficient in order to fulfill the needs of the labor farmers. Moreover, it also caused a bigger social gap each year between the labors and the land owners. The labors want a better life while the land owners considering about the price of rice itself in the market. The labors finally decided to find a solution because they needed to complete their daily needs. Male labors would choose to be workers in building constructions and female labors would go to work overseas as TKW. As for the younger generations, they would choose to be factory workers or shop-keepers than being farmers. Although there were still some farmlands, it was doubted that there would be people who were willing to work on them.

Conclusion

Farming in Indonesia had gone through a lot of ups and downs and also changes in its functions. In the colonial era, farming was the central of the colonizer's economy. Later on, farming was on its highest peak in the New Order era and then nowadays it almost ruins due to crisis. The government's solution for this farmlands' decreasing was deforestation in the land outside java. This is even dangerous to have even less number in forest.

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SOCIAL SCIENCES ESSAYS

Introduction

There are several customary standards on which to judge a good essay. It should be written in a clear and systematic fashion, it should connect key conceptual frameworks, and it should bring about a new understanding of our world. With regard to social essays, we need to add one additional element: it should manifest a certain degree of emancipatory motive. This year's Social Sciences essay competition involved around seventy essays with various topics such as diplomacy, enhancing the social science community, gender issues, language, political violence, state-religion relations, and social welfare issues.

The wide variety of topics indicates not only the diversity of educational backgrounds and disciplines of the participants, but also the complexity of Indonesia. It is very clear that most of the writers have woven important ideas and a deep social commitment into their work. There are a number of critiques and "advocative" intentions evident in all of the essays.

In Indonesia today there is an orthodox consensus among decision makers. This orthodoxy holds that a useful science is one that instantly affects the nation's industry and economy. The implication of this consensus is fatal in two ways: first, in practice it avoids or misunderstands the aspect of human dignity in science and economy. Second, it pushes social science (and humanity) into a marginal position. This year's essay competition gives us refreshing evidence that there is a distinct uniqueness in the social sciences: a passion to socially engage and to participate. We believe that the passion to engage is a basic modality of intellectual life, and a vibrant intellectual life is no less important than economy and industry.

This essay competition, hopefully, can be an instrument for the advancement of humanity and social sciences in Indonesia, and also a medium for young people to express their passion to engage in to the complexity of the problems in their society. The prize winning essays, as well as the ones receiving honorable mention, are excellently crafted, well researched, elegantly written, and display a tremendous amount of talent in our younger generation. It is a pleasure to present these important works to the reading audience.

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Sarcasm and Satire: Contesting Sharia Law in Aceh

by **Reza Idria**

Faculty of Sharia Law
UIN Ar-Raniry, June 2004

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Leiden University, 2010

"Three things made this essay fascinating: the choice of topic, the timeliness, and the approach used. This essay shows that Aceh is a vibrant, critical society that looks at the prevailing power structure with an ability to assess what alternate means are available to confront the power holders when direct challenges are impossible."

Toenggoel P. Siagian

Sharia (*syariat*), an administrative system and rules based on Islamic law, has been implemented throughout the Aceh Province since 2001. At the beginning, adopting Sharia law was an experiment based on political compromise connected to the Free Aceh Movement (GAM) rebellion. The central Government of Indonesia, in an effort to quell the local separatist movements, granted right to implement Sharia law to the Aceh province as a significant number of literature has explored (see for example Amal & Panggabean 2003; Feener & Cammack 2007; Salim 2008; Aspinall 2009; Grayman 2009; Ramly 2010; Basri 2011; Ichwan 2011; Feener 2011& 2013; Kloos 2014). However, these studies have mostly focused on enforcement, that is the way in which the implementation of Islamic law has been conceived of by its architects and agents, as Michael Feener has termed it "a modern project of social engineering" (2013: pp. 15).

With the establishment of the Office of Islamic Sharia (*Dinas Syariat Islam*), Sharia Courts (*Mahkamah Syariat*) and the Sharia Police (*Wilayat al-Hisbah*), Sharia in contemporary Aceh, in many ways, has transformed into a complex and uncoordinated ensemble of legal practices, institutions, and forces of power. The result has been a number of bylaws (officially called *qanun*) promoting 'correct' Islamic behaviour, forbidding non-Sunni practices and beliefs, making acts like gambling (*maisir*), the consumption of alcoholic beverages (*khamr*), illicit sexual relations (*khalwat*) punishable through introducing public corporal punishment (Dijk 2013: pp. 134-135). However, it was not until after the tsunami and the end of the political conflict in 2005 that the new laws and institutions the government created became active and visible.

Recently, a number of new controversial Sharia regulations have been imposed. In 2010, the local government of West Aceh issued a *qanun* forbidding women to wear jeans and 'tight' clothing. In 2012, the regent of South Aceh, Husein Yusuf, prohibited male civil servants from having moustaches, and then the mayor of Lhokseumawe, Suaidi Yahya, created his own Sharia law banning woman from straddling on motorcycles. Thus Sharia bylaws vary arbitrarily from region to region within the Aceh province. Broadly speaking, more than a decade since its official implementation, there has still been no consensus on which type of "appropriate" Sharia should be adopted while public life in Aceh has changed significantly.

Today, there is considerable resistance and opposition to the implementation of that religious law. What forms of resistance are emerging? Why and how do Acehnese Muslims come to vocalize these forms of resistance? Since 2009 I have been investigating what anti-Sharia mobilization looks on the ground and how it is enacted. Above all, none of the resistance efforts I will expand upon further below have been considered in detail in most contemporary studies on Islam in Aceh.

Epistemologically, resistance has become a ubiquitous trope and no consensus on what the term actually means has been reached (see for example: Foucault 1978,

2003; De Certeau 980; Castell 1983; Hollander & Einwohner 2004; Seymour 2006; Duncome 2008, Medina 2013). In anthropology, theorizing resistance has been problematic and the concept of resistance itself has become controversial since there are many forms of articulations, practices and significations that fit "into a fixed box called resistance" (Ortner 1995: pp. 175). However, Comaroff (1985), Abu Lughod (1986), Scott (1986 & 1990), Ong (1987), Cooper (1992), Ortner (1995), Brown (1996), Guha (1997), Hoffman (1999), have shown that although resistance is a complex and heterogeneous phenomenon, it can be observed in mundane everyday practices. This is why an ethnographic study is needed and participant observation would be particularly important and powerful to understand what is going on. James C. Scott's concept of 'weapons of the weak' (Scott 1986) was a major breakthrough and has been foundational in theorizing resistance in the discipline of anthropology, but this work did not touch upon ritual sensitivity in relation to practices of resistance that my study has been focused on. I choose to look at resistance against Sharia in Aceh from the stand point of ritual sites and performances, because in these domains one can understand how people become subversive, through the use of signification and practices against the law, while still purporting to obey it. I argue that this opens up the field of contestation and redefines what constitutes politics in everyday practices of resistance.

The first example of Sharia "counter-performativity" (Butler 1997: pp. 16, 105-116) came from the public profile of Aceh's punk community that has evolved considerably over the past years. Around 2011, the youngsters begun gathering in the city park next to the Grand Mosque of Baiturrahman, which is the iconic and religious landmark of the city of Banda Aceh. As the community grew and became increasingly visible, the authorities firmly declared the phenomenon as deviant (Serambi Indonesia 2011). The punk members, most of them practicing Muslims, responded by joining the prayers at the Grand Mosque, many of them still wearing their punk clothing. This placed them in direct confrontation with the more conservative members of the mosque. The authority felt more uneasy with such an appearance and subsequently situated the "problem" of the punks squarely in the context of the new implemented Islamic law. The government of Banda Aceh established a moral project "to re-educate" (*pembinaan*) the punks and bring them back to the path of Islam. Led by the vice mayor of Banda Aceh at that time, Illiza Saaduddin Djamal, the state Sharia apparatus started to crack down and this was reported upon widely in the local and international media (Simanjuntak 2011; Hansen 2011; Brown 2012). They made mass attests at music concerts and repeatedly stormed the city park where the youngsters usually gathered, rounding up anyone wearing punk dress styles, mohawk hair, tattoos and chains. On many occasions the Acehnese punks fought back against the Sharia police, sparking open clashes.

However, in many occasions resistance to Sharia appeared to be very much embedded in sarcasm and satire against the state-sponsored Sharia. For instance, in 2010, Putroe Sejati, a transvestite community in Banda Aceh, hosted the "Aceh Transvestite Queen Festival" (*Pemilihan Ratu Waria Aceh*). Though the contestants wore proper Muslim dress codes as instructed by Sharia law, it was naturally a highly controversial event. The organizers also followed the official protocol of including Quranic recitations and prayers for the opening and closing of the event which was open to the Banda Aceh public (Azhari 2010). Islamist groups were predictably outraged and demanded the dissolution of the festival. However, the Sharia police could not take any legal action against the members because the organizers were able to show the letter of approval from the Aceh Ulama Council and none of the participants attending the event were wearing "inappropriate" dress. Pushed by angered Islamist groups, the Council accused Putroe Sejati of hiding their agenda and falsifying the event permit. According to Muslim Ibrahim, the official that signed the letter of approval for the event, Putroe Sejati had only asked for permission to organize a charity concert, and did not specify the real purpose (Hasan 2011).

Last year, on December 31, 2014, the Aceh Ulama Council (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Ulama*) and the mayor of Banda Aceh, Illiza Saaduddin Djamal, released a joint announcement in the front page of *Serambi Indonesia,* a local newspaper, prohibiting people from celebrating New Year's Eve, on religious grounds. The authorities ordered the Sharia Police (*Wilayat al-Hisbah*) to seal off Ulee Lheu, the popular beach nearby Banda Aceh, to prevent the unlawful acts of those celebrating the event. Fireworks and trumpets being sold for the New Year's Eve celebration were seized. However, at midnight, trumpets were sounded everywhere. Thousands of people walked, drove cars and rode their motorcycles through the provincial capital. Fireworks exploded in the sky over the city. There was no central planning for the activities. People spontaneously flooded on to the street. I witnessed the moment when the Sharia Police patrolling the city "lost" their power and were not able to prevent the crowds from disobeying their restrictions, and my research will document future such acts of resistance.

As recently as June 14, 2015, *Koran Tempo* newspaper reported that a woman arrested for having sexual intercourse out of wedlock took a selfie and danced on the stage during a public caning ceremony. This happened just moments before she was caned. Her intention, as reported to journalists, was to mock the idea of public shaming by the Sharia authority (Warsidi 2015). I consider such events, either spontaneous or planned, to be examples of resistance against Sharia law. While many scholars are focusing on the ways that global Islamism is fostering jihadism (for example: Hegghammer 2006; Gerges 2009), my study shows how some Acehnese Muslims challenge that radical trend.

Concluding Remark

The implementation of Sharia in Aceh creates significant space for resistance since it came to be implemented through the machinery of an inefficient and unprofessional state with a long legacy of corruption, manipulation, and authoritarianism. Furthermore, with the increasing openness of public discourse in post-disaster and post-conflict Aceh, critiques of the Sharia authority's 'arrogance' and 'hypocrisy' spread beyond coffee house conversations to take a prominent position in popular media discourse.

Opposition to Sharia has come from various segments of society. They may vary by education, political views, region, gender and personal disposition. However, in many cases critical voices of less powerful Acehnese are silenced, or hidden by resistors for various reasons, mostly due to the fear of being labelled anti-Islamic that is why resistance to Sharia in Aceh can take many forms and is often performed in an unconventional manner.

Above all, my work is timely and challenges dominant narratives in popular media that portray Aceh as the most conservative region in Indonesia. Every time there is an incident relating to Sharia law, it becomes magnified in the media, contributing to an un-nuanced view of the region's politics. I argue that Aceh is in fact a vibrant open society with a complex arrangement of internal political divergences. Drawing upon advances in the anthropology of resistance, this study speaks to a larger audience interested in religion, politics and popular culture and presents a picture of experiential diversity in Acehnese Muslim culture today that has never appeared in any literature on Aceh.

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2nd Prize Winner

Violence as Commitment: The Symbolic Significance of Communist Purging and Reproduction of Indonesian Identity

by **Geger Riyanto**

Sociology
University of Indonesia, February 2008

Anthropology
University of Indonesia, 2015

"This essay engages a new understanding of how to comprehend the role of violence in Indonesia's darkest social history. It concisely and clearly reveals that societal acts of violence were largely pushed by the state actors."

Robertus Robet
Universitas Negeri Jakarta

The long lasting and deeply pervading violence against communists in Indonesia is one case of violence that is unlikely would ever get a single explanation. Despite its simultaneity and the fact it commonly directed toward people affiliated with an emerging political bloc, its eruptions upon various local contexts were incessantly contingent. The complexity of the case always escapes attempts to elucidate the purging in a grand explanation as it prompts us with particular facts which deny any easy conclusion of the event.

Let us, firstly, address common explanations of the aforementioned violence. Did the violence sprung from the strife of world great powers? Perhaps, in a sense, yes. Yet, such explanation did not explain the actual, brutal reality of the occurring manhunt against communists. As convincing as one could explain it stemmed from the free world interest to keep Indonesia from becoming a lost cause to them, the massive outbreak was only possible because the interest was intermingling with a long-standing rife between actors in the local circumstances. Was it a state sponsored violence? Although the military was playing a great part in both orchestrating the mass purging and, later, systematically constructed communism as a bane for the country, it was obviously not responsible for every non-state actors' resentment against communists which made the military instigation of the violence itself so successful.

Was it fueled by conflict for resource and access? Though certain faction in military indeed enjoyed the privilege of long lasting rule and landlords' possession in myriad rural settings secured after a more than successful purge of the biggest communist base outside China and Soviet, any thorough examination, yet again, would find that indiscriminate hatred fostered by religious and ethnocentric sentiment play a considerable part in justifying it. Even when we try to compensate the political-economic explanation by assuming the contestation led into ideological antagonism which bred intergroup hatred, it had to be considered that not everybody participated in the violence voluntarily and some of the other, such as Anwar Kongo made famous by the documentary *Act of Killing*, were being hired to do it.

As a rapidly spreading phenomenon, the violence against communists perhaps had to be eclectically rooted from every of the variables mentioned above and other factors we have yet to identify. But, what I am exactly trying to argue is that it is likely to be more fruitful for us to put a critical distance from what Mills (1959) famously addressed as grand theory in making sense of the violence. There is a clear tendency among efforts to theorize violence in Indonesia (Bertrand 2004; Klinken 2007; Sopar 2015) to explain the phenomenon stemmed from general structural dynamic. The problem with this line of thinking, at least in our case, is that it is prone to explicate a certain objective social force as the cause of the event and disregards the intersubjective meaning attributed by the actors to their act which actually driven the violence.

This point is intricately intertwined with the second problem. In line with what Christopher Duncan (2004) has addressed in his analysis of violence in Halmahera, studies of violence in Indonesia hold an inclination of causation thinking. Understanding of violence, it means, predominated by the explanation of what inciting it in the first place. The shift in social structure, significant demographic change, elite's agendas indeed may serve as the background to the series of events taking place. However, it should be noted that most of the time it is not explaining why one distinct violence developed into a great purge of one particular group. The violence toward communists would never disperse in such haste and institutionalized to become a long standing routine of symbolic violence given the actors' moral code never gave a way to it.

This essay, therefore, intends not to argue for the causation of the violence toward communists but elucidate a factor which plays a significant role in bolstering its dispersion and it is, I argue, the symbolic meaning of the violent act across certain actual settings as a commitment toward particular identity. It may be our habit to think of violence as one act purposed to eliminate the enemy or purge the antagonistic group considered as a threat to the ego's own group. However, as an act to negate the different group whether by harming, purging, annihilating them, it also implies an expression of allegiance or loyalty to ego's own group and, in practice, this semiotic excess of violence is more often being the one that contributes to the vast reproduction of the act among wider actors. By showing signs of violence toward the enemy, therefore, one may enter, being accepted, or secure his or her presence among his or her group, and I think few cases describe this situation so vividly other than the pervasive violence conducted toward communists in Indonesia.

Since PKI was successfully defined as a betrayer following an attempted coup in September 30th, 1965, an unspoken moral code was introduced that one must not be a communist to be an Indonesian. What contributed to the successful imposing of the label is the circumstance that was hanging in a fragile balance before the coup. On the national level, PKI was involved in a fierce fight for influence with the military, and in daily rural life they often engaged in a confrontation to seize the land with local power holders and to delegitimize their religious or cultural authority. The coup, then, one could say, was a chance being exploited by its many enemy to finally get rid of the incessant threat to their very existence.

When the definition that PKI is an astute traitor being erected, however, it became not only a pervasive norm compelling one to condemn communism as a hazard to the country but also enforcing an accepted definition of the self. Within this semiotic framework, then, the reproduction of Indonesian identity will always went along with the reproduction of negation of communism and vice versa. The admittance of one as an Indonesian requires him or her to participate, in some way, in negating the communists through the means of physical or symbolic

violence. The violence therefore, as Eugene Vance makes it clear, is "[a] generative force in the production of its own discourse" (Vance 1979, pp. 383).

In further advancing my point, I will resort to ethnographical works which provide us both close witnesses' account of the communists purging on the mid 1960s. I expect the insights will serve as striking depictions of communism purging symbolic significance across lived contexts of the actors.

To Be Committed to Violence

Depiction of the erupted violence toward communists by civilians usually describe the purge to be acted by group or actors whom involved in a long standing rife with the communist party (Sundharssin 1982). Such depiction may led us to think that the violence was motivated by intergroup antagonism. Although it is far from false to say that the violence prompted by abhorrence, a closer examination will find that one particular excess of the outbreak is cleaved primary relationships in places. Stories from involved actors (Aleida 2009) testified that manhunts occurred among relatives, whether one being prompted to so or acted according to their own interest.

A glimpse to such accounts should gave us a hint regarding the logic of the violence, which is not only concerned with the removal of one's political enemy but also about exhibiting the sign of loyalty. One had to display himself or herself opposed to the communists in order not to be alleged sympathizing with it, even though it means allowing harm or something even more dreadful to come to one's own kin. One of the vivid description of this irony, now let me get into my case, come from the oral story of the Dayak Iban collected by Iwan Meulia Pirous (2004) in his fieldwork. The Iban lived on the interior upland of Sarawak and their settlements scattered around Indonesia-Malaysia border. It is, unsurprisingly, not hard to think why they rarely had a contact with the government. Even reports written by Dutch administrator about them is notably scant.

Their first intensive contact with Indonesian government occurred in 1963. Due to the confrontation policy initiated by Sukarno, the Ibanese were forced to assist Indonesian Army Forces (ABRI) as scouts tasked to prevent territorial threat from their fellow Ibanese in Malaysia. Many were hindering to join the cause because it will put them into a direct conflict with their own kin. When mass purging of PKI members and sympathizers erupted two years later, however, they were once again tasked to hunt their own relative and this time any hesitation to give their hand to the military would stake their own safety.

The traumatized Ucing anak Lungan shared his story with Pirous that in the critical period his family longhouse was bombed by the army. All of their livestock died.

Lots of Ibanese were tortured. They had to come through such suffering due to providing food for fleeing Paraku (*Pasukan Rakyat Kalimantan Utara* – guerilla force affiliated with the North Kalimantan Communist Party) whom they had no knowledge was the enemy to the army. "We were stupid... stupid!" Ucing felt could not blame anyone but himself. "The army was not wrong because in fact we had made friends with the enemy."

Ucing's family was one of the many Ibanese who were the victim of the army's ruthless punishment. At the time, ABRI commanders were targeting inhabitants indiscriminately because many were suspected hiding and supplying food to the Paraku. Such inclination to protect the Ibanese communists should be understandable because, after all, in a territory where common identity were built through kinship and marriage, they never consider them to be anything other than their own people.

Lingong anak Sandom, an Ibanese paratrooper recruited by the army, confessed that he went through a profound emotional pain when he had to execute Paraku members. There was a time when he had the opportunities to finish a Paraku soldier with lethal shot from his hiding, but in the evening he chose not to kill him. "I decided not to fire since he looked very hungry and helpless," Lingong said. He, furthermore, seems to be glad knowing that today the man is still alive and well in Sarawak. But, on other occasions where he had no other options but to kill the Paraku soldier, Lingong often asked his victim more than two times if the man was a member of Paraku. "Are you a Paraku?" It was as if Lingong had to convince himself he got a full sense of his action before being able to execute anyone.

Although political rationale of the punishment for Ibanese who were refusing to participate in the violence to Paraku is something which is not too hard to be thought, in our case attention rather has to be given to the implication of the disciplinary conduct. Disciplinary conduct is something which is commonly used to establish a new sense of identity (see Foucault 1977). Through it, the subject of the punishment came into an awareness of who is the enemy but, along with it, also their identification of themselves. It was pretty evident in the case of Ucing who felt the suffering they underwent was his people's mistake for not being able to identify the enemy.

To come back to my initial argument, the punishment is a powerful reminder that one's commitment to his or her new primary group has to be done through volunteering oneself in performing violence to the other. The emergence of the new category of the self and the other, however, came with a great moral torment due to the newfound allegiance could only be shown by dismissing their significant old relationship. The pain an Ibanese paratrooper experienced when executing their own kin was, to put it in a way, the pain of "becoming an Indonesian citizen."

Let me close this elaboration by citing one particularly dramatic case collected by Gede Indra Pramana (2015) study of 1965 massacre survivor. A son from the victim of PKI killing in Dawan Village, Bali, told that his father's death, in contrast to the general imagery of the victim's death, happened with his own permission. A certain people came like proper guests to his home and asked his father to be killed. His father, seeing there is no other way for his family to live safely, agreed to the request but asking for a time to prepare. After holding a feast with his relatives, writing letter to his children, making a spiritual peace, he was prepared and calmly went to the agreed execution place accompanied by his family. He was executed in a hole in a graveyard and his waiting family on the other side of the graveyard was told afterwards.

This compelling sacrifice indicates that the exhibition of violence could be conducted not only by one person to another but also by one person to himself. It sent an expression of profound submission to the predominated norm which dictates that communism has to be purged from Indonesia. Even though it did not save his family from public stigma, by allowing his very existence as communist party member to be purged, the man's family could continue to life as an Indonesian citizen.

Here to Stay

In the beginning of this essay, I made a quick highlight to the common explanations on the emergence of communists purging in Indonesia. Five decades later after the mass purging started, much of the social situation have already changed. Many of the variables of the social structure which incited the violence has already inexistent. The symbolic significance of the violence toward communist, however, still contributes remarkably to the reproduction of the violence to this day. The act of negating communism still holds as a statement of being a proper Indonesian citizen in contemporary social life.

The practice is seemingly even more apparent in the present than in the past. One of the worst thing that could befall to a public official is being associated with communism. Labelling one's political rival as communists' sympathizer is arguably the most effective black campaign strategy in elections. And, recently, after being discussed seriously by the government, the plan of national reconciliation with the family of 1965 killing victim was acquitted by President Joko Widodo. As insensitive as the move may be, the dismissal was a wise political maneuver as the plan already being misunderstood among the public to be a plan to beg for forgiveness from the communists. Moving forward with the plan would provide Joko Widodo's political enemy with the ammunitions to delegitimize his presidency.

As much as I like to state something needs to be done about this situation, we could see that the complexity of the circumstances is much more than meets the eye. The symbolic violence, in particular, will be continually reproduced as long as people had the interest to distinguish himself or herself as a good Indonesian citizen and also from communism. Our indiscriminate violent inclination toward the imaginary enemy is nothing that would end in the near future.

Perhaps, the bottom line is, we still have not found a way to build our identity without waging unreasonable war to the other. The cruel irony is here to stay.

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3rd Prize Winner

3rd
Prize
Winner

Advancing Indonesian Social Science: a Proposal

by **Anton Novenanto**

Sociology
Universitas Gadjah Mada, January 2013

Cultural Anthropology and Development Sociology
Universiteit Leiden, 2009

"This essay is beautifully written and provides an important reminder that we need to have more work published by Indonesian female scholars and give more space to young and emerging scholars who are not based in universities or research centers. Very well argued!"

Dr. Yosef Jakababa

Ten years ago, two prominent books on social science, and social scientists, in Indonesia, were published. A leading Indonesian senior scholar, Taufik Abdullah, edited the first book entitled *Ilmu Sosial dan Tantangan Zaman* (Social Science and Challenges of the Times.)[1] The second book, *Social Science and Power in Indonesia,* was edited by perhaps two of the most promising Indonesian scholars today, Vedi Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae.[2] Both publications offer two different perspectives on the development of social sciences in Indonesia and how they are socially and politically situated.

Except Ben White, contributors of both publications are Indonesian leading scholars coming from various institutions, mostly from universities and some from research institutes. Yet, what is exactly their input into the development of social sciences in Indonesia? And, to what extent is such input still relevant today, after ten years of its publication?

I will begin with a brief review of both publications and explicate some important contributions they try to submit into the discussion. Afterwards, I will try to answer the latter question by showing some structural changes based on those contributions and as a conclusion, I will suggest a small proposal of how to improve social sciences in Indonesia.

The Indonesian Institute of Science (LIPI) publishes the first book. As a governmental organization, LIPI has an interest to search the usability of science for the Indonesian government to develop the nation,[3] and this exists in the entire book, explicitly and implicitly. In the introduction, Abdullah brings up again into the discussion the three faces of social science. The first is social science that tells the social world *as it is*, or I would call it the positivistic view. The second face is social science that tries to change society into *it should have been*, or I would call it the critical view. The distinction between these faces mainly deals with the issue of objectivity in constructing so-called "scientific knowledge" of social phenomena, problems or realities, which is a huge epistemological issue in social sciences since the beginning of their existence.[4]

Intriguingly, instead of addressing the debate and coming out with a solution, Abdullah offers a third face of *applied social science*, of which idea he gets from our founding father, Mohammad Hatta. In this sense, social sciences are "needed to get or gain practical and functional factors to achieve desirable situations (such as 'development'), obviate unwanted situations (such as 'poverty'), or resolve

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1. Taufik Abdullah, ed., *Ilmu Sosial Dan Tantangan Zaman* (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006).
2. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, eds., *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, Celebrating Indonesia (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005).
3. See also: Paschalis Maria Laksono, "Social Science Associations," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), pp. 221–246; Alexander Irwan, "Institutions, Discourses, and Conflicts in Economic Thought," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), pp. 31–56.
4. Taufik Abdullah, "Pendahuluan," in *Ilmu Sosial Dan Tantangan Zaman*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006), pp. 9–12.

undesirable situations (such as 'conflicts')."[5] Abdullah views that there is a need of social sciences in Indonesia to hold a responsibility for the nation's development since they are believed to be one leading factor in triggering and developing the idea of freedom from colonialism and our independence as a nation in triumph.[6]

The message Abdullah tries to deliver is framed within functionalism logic. It suggests for Indonesian social sciences as a part of the nation so they should benefit for its development. Indeed, the sustainability of particular knowledge, science and technology depends on its usability to the society, or at least the régime of power in a certain time and place.[7] Among others, Mestika Zed's chapter discusses clearly of focus adjustments of social sciences in Indonesia as the political régime changes, since the colonial until New Order era.[8] For Zed, social sciences in Indonesia should become both "a mirror and a light; [the means of both] legitimation and critics" in our society.[9]

The crisis of social sciences in Indonesia is also the main topic discussed in the second book, yet the discussion arrives from an opposite direction. It consists of chapters addressing more on how social structures, especially in New Order era, fashioned Indonesian social sciences and less on how social sciences should benefit the nation.

The editorial introduction begins with the problem of low acceptance of Indonesian social scientists in global academia, of which is a result of "the lack of resources and institutional and/or infrastructure support for long-term, serious social science research and training."[10] The existence of social sciences in Indonesia should be then understood by using the notion of power and power relations between prominent actors in their development. Power, according to Hadiz and Dhakidae, is not only of hierarchical relations between the "power holder" and "powerless" actors, but also of power relations that may trigger resistances.[11] In this sense,

5. Ibid., 11; see also chapters by I Ketut Ardhana, "Sejarah Dan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial: Peranannya Di Indonesia Masa Kini," in *Ilmu Sosial Dan Tantangan Zaman*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006), pp. 129–154 on history; Aswatini Raharto, "Demografi Dalam Perkembangan Ilmu Sosial Di Indonesia," in *Ilmu Sosial Dan Tantangan Zaman*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006), pp. 195–226 on demography; J. R. Mansoben, "Perkembangan Dan Peranan Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial Di Provinsi Papua, Indonesia," in *Ilmu Sosial Dan Tantangan Zaman*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006), pp. 227–242 on development in Papua; Thung Ju Lan, "Penelitian Ilmu-Ilmu Sosial Dan Masalah Konflik Sosial," in *Ilmu Sosial Dan Tantangan Zaman*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006), pp. 243–262 on conflict resolutions.
6. Abdullah, "Pendahuluan," pp. 17–18.
7. See: Norbert Elias, *The Civilizing Process: Sociogenetic and Psychogenetic Investigations*, ed. Eric Dunning, Johan Goudsblom, and Stephen Mennell, trans. Edmund Jephcott, Revised Ed (Malden, Oxford, & Victoria: Blackwell Publishing, 2000); Michel Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*, trans. Robert Hurley (New York: Pantheon Books, 1978).
8. Mestika Zed, "Ilmu Sosial Indonesia Dalam Wacana 'Methodenstreit,'" in *Ilmu Sosial Dan Tantangan Zaman*, ed. Taufik Abdullah (Jakarta: PT RajaGrafindo Persada, 2006), 55–109; for a recent discussion on the foundation and development of sociology in Indonesia, see Hanneman Samuel, "The Development of Sociology in Indonesia: The Production of Knowledge, State Formation and Economic Change" (Unpublished Dissertation, 1999).
9. Zed, "Ilmu Sosial Indonesia Dalam Wacana 'Methodenstreit,'" 102.
10. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, "Introduction," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), 1.
11. Ibid., 3.; cf. Foucault, *The History of Sexuality. Volume I: An Introduction*; Steven Lukes, *Power: A Radical View*, Second Edi (Hampshire & New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2005).

to get a comprehensive understanding of how Indonesian social sciences exist, one should include into the discussion structural power institutions that have fashioned social sciences and social scientists in Indonesia.

This theme is a focal in most chapters, especially Irwan on Indonesian economic associations,[12] Heryanto on Indonesian schooling,[13] Ananta on Indonesian bureau of statistics,[14] White on agrarian activisms in Indonesia,[15] Nugroho on Indonesian universities,[16] Farid on social class in Indonesia,[17] Ganie-Rochman and Achwan on NGOs in Indonesia,[18] and Laksono on social science associations.[19] Considering the power to identify actors who have been involved in power relations to shape social sciences in Indonesia, one can also distinguish particular historical contexts that underlie particular modes of existence.

Focusing on New Order era, Hadiz and Dhakidae critically address the maturing of Indonesian social sciences as legitimation for the foundation of social stability in the era of "Developmentalism."[20] On one hand, this creates "technocratism with a Javanese militaristic accent"[21] with which one can easily identify which actors are the "power holder" and the "powerless," and how actors of each role are engaged in ongoing power relations in shaping Indonesian social sciences. On the other, according to Hadiz and Dhakidae, developmentalism increases new contradictions of "anti-state discourses," either from Marxian or non-Marxian frameworks.[22] The intention of the second book is then totally different from the previously discussed above.

The context of the first book, which was published (and funded) by LIPI, is of how to find practical applicability of social sciences in Indonesia and how they benefit the nation's development. This is not the big issue for the second book. As Ford Foundation funds the publication, its contents can be more critical than

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12. Irwan, "Institutions, Discourses, and Conflicts in Economic Thought."
13. Ariel Heryanto, "Ideological Baggage and Orientations of the Social Sciences in Indonesia," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), pp. 57–90.
14. Aris Ananta, "The Negative and Positive Uses of Socio-Economic Statistics," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), pp. 91–106.
15. Ben White, "Between Apologia and Critical Discourse: Agrarian Transitions and Scholarly Engagement in Indonesia," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), pp. 107–142.
16. Heru Nugroho, "The Political Economy of Higher Education: The University as an Arena for the Struggle for Power," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing (Asia), 2005), pp. 143–163.
17. Hilmar Farid, "The Class Question in Indonesian Social Sciences," in Social Science and Power in Indonesia, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), pp. 167–196.
18. Meuthia Ganie-Rochman and Rochman Achwan, "Inclusion and Exclusion: NGOs and Critical Social Knowledge," in *Social Science and Power in Indonesia*, ed. Vedi R. Hadiz and Daniel Dhakidae, trans. Max Lane (Jakarta & Singapore: Equinox Publishing (Asia) & Institute of Southeast Asian Studies (ISEAS), 2005), pp. 197–220.
19. Laksono, "Social Science Associations."
20. cf. Zed, "Ilmu Sosial Indonesia Dalam Wacana 'Methodenstreit'"; Samuel, "The Development of Sociology in Indonesia: The Production of Knowledge, State Formation and Economic Change."
21. Heryanto, "Ideological Baggage and Orientations of the Social Sciences in Indonesia," pp. 65.
22. Hadiz and Dhakidae, "Introduction," pp. 22.

the first one, especially in bringing the "non-state discourses" into the discussion (something that LIPI as a governmental body would try to avoid). In this context, one can level up the discussion of the relation between social sciences and the nation-state in which they are developed from linear, deterministic relation to reciprocal, dynamic relation of both. Our inquiry should go beyond just asking the function of social sciences and begin to critically address structures and infrastructures the state provides for their development. *Reformasi* has opened the door for these contradictors to emerge in and prevail on public spheres in Indonesia, yet the core problem is less about establishing a critical mass and more about providing "a conducive set of social, political and economic circumstances" for Indonesian social sciences to grow.[23]

Ten years ago two inspiring books on Indonesian social sciences were published. Within these years there have been many structural changes in the country, yet there has been no new, inspiring study addressing these changes to the progress of Indonesian social sciences. Both books have indeed colored the recent development of social sciences in post-authoritarian Indonesia, but one may and should ask: to what extent are they still relevant today?

The main debate in constructing social theories is always circulating in answering a question of *what is really generating the society, culture or structure?* In the last ten years, there have been many structural changes, which may have benefited the growth of social sciences in Indonesia. Among them is the government's policy to allocate a lot of money for Indonesian young scholars to study abroad and get a better higher education. Although there are still many complications with the implementation of the policy, we can sense a good intention of the government to improve (social) science in Indonesia. Another structural innovation is the flourishing discussions, conferences, or journals on social sciences, many are held by universities and some by private stakeholders. Apart from economic resources, there is a new system of assessing university lectures with a requirement to publish academic papers, which has compelled university's managers to provide their employees and lectures from other institutions with many facilities, such as giving incentive for publications in international journals, and providing grants for research and conferences. The media revolution, especially the emergence of the so-called "new media," does not help much. Instead of enlivening the public sphere with academic, logic discussions, many scholars cannot resist to reproduce hoax and unverified rumors and make comments on them. As a result, social activisms are still far from their ideal purpose, "to change the world."[24]

The problems are coming from the persons' *habitus*.[25] "Opportunity is only for they who are ready," says one dean faculty of one state-university, arguing that many Indonesian scholars are not ready yet to grab the chance the government offers. This is also the problem within many of my colleagues. There are many

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23. Ibid., 25.
24. See Merlyna Lim, "Many Clicks but Little Sticks: Social Media Activism in Indonesia," *Journal of Contemporary Asia* (February 11, 2013): pp. 1–22, doi:10.1080/00472336.2013.769386; Yanuar Nugroho and Sofie Shinta Syarief, *Beyond Click-Activism? New Media and Political Processes* (Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, 2012).
25. Cf. Loic J. D. Wacquant, "Sociology as Socioanalysis: Tales of 'Homo Academicus' [by Pierre Bourdieu]," *Sociological Forum* 5, no. 4 (December 1990): pp. 677–689.

mental structure issues, such as English competence and post-colonial inferiority complex, which may harden these scholars in following a high standard of academic atmosphere. These are some unresolved problems of improving *homo academicus'* habitus in Indonesia, although structures have been changed and keep on changing.

As a conclusion, let me offer a proposal to Indonesian scholars to do a comprehensive study in reflexing the changes and recent conditions of Indonesia social sciences. The study should address some issues. First is gender issue. Male domination is visible in both publications, which only gives one female author in the first book and one female co-author in the second book. Secondly, the study should give a bigger room for authors who are not affiliated to universities. There are social scientists working directly with communities as individuals and/or exponents of non-governmental organizations. The role of non-university actors is excluded in the first book and included in some chapters in the second book, which mainly is represented by university-based actors. Another crucial issue is generational perspective in the sense that the study should provide young, potential scholars more space to discuss challenges, opportunities, and obstacles they face in learning and developing social sciences in Indonesia. This is very important because these people are who will be in power to drive the progress of Indonesian social sciences. (*)

Empower Local Citizen through Law to Develop Sustainable Ecotourism of Wakatobi in the Globalization Era

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Abstract

Globalization is signed by openness in various areas of life, including the legal system, because law cannot be separated from the society. Globalization runs fast because it is supported by four factors: science and technology, the opening of the economic system of countries in the world, globalizaton of the financial markets, and the magnitude of the desire to travel abroad. The desire to travel overseas arises because there is no difficult limitation boundaries in the world right now (borderless), which resulted in an active creative economy industry and tourism community. Tourism as an entrance to globalization incorporates various forms of entities, culture, and indigenous culture, so it will bring a change.

Indonesia is a tropical paradise of exotic tourist destination that has many wonderful tourism assets. One of them is Wakatobi National Marine Park, located in Buton, Southeast Sulawesi, with approximately 1.3 acres of conservation area of coral reef ecosystem, recognized as underwater paradise. Visitors also served to culture and arts, which are expressed in the form of dances and crafts. The approach used in this study was analytical descriptive, which explains and analyzes why it is necessary to empower local people through tourism law to develop sustainable ecotourism of Wakatobi in globalization era.

Business tourism is a complex business, not only covering economic aspects but also social, cultural, legal and environmental conservation tourist destinations. Development of Wakatobi marine national park also had two side impacts. The positive impact is foreign exchange's contribution to employment and economic growth. On the other hand, the impact of the lack of involvement of local communities are: (1) control of an unbalanced economy, (2) the limited local added values, (3) environmental impact, wisdom erosion of social and cultural values as well as increasing living costs and expenses for the local population in the global era. Because of that, it is necessary to develop tourism law, which empowers local people in order to create sustainable ecotourism in Wakatobi.

Background

Indonesia as one of the countries with a strategic geographical position, flanked by two continents and two oceans, certainly cannot avoid the influence of globalization from the international community. Globalization is marked by openness in a variety of fields of life, including the legal system, because the law is inseparable from the community, so the law is expected to bring social change. It takes the term under the name 'turning point', i.e. when someone can no longer focus on a single object separated from its environment, rather letting the object to be united with its environment (Capra, 1983). Similarly, as mentioned by Muladi, Indonesia is automatically inseparable from the influence of globalization. In order to deal with it, a reliable legal must be contained (Muladi, 1997).

The definitions related to globalization may also vary. Scholte categorized the definition of globalization in five major categories as follows: Firstly, globalization is internationalization. From this perspective, global is an adjective to describe the cross-border relations between countries. The term of globalization as large and growing flows of trade and capital investment between countries (Hirst and Thomson, 1996). Secondly, globalization as liberalization. In this regard, globalization is intended as a process of removing government-imposed restrictions on movements between countries in order to create an open, borderless world economy.

Thirdly, globalization is universalization. On its use, global means worldwide, while globalization is the process of spreading goods and knowledge throughout the world. Fourthly, globalization is westernization or modernization or even Americanization. Globalization means a dynamic, in which social structures of modernity (capitalism, rationalism, industrialism, etc.) spread throughout the world. Fifthly, globalization is super teritorializaton. Globalization causes geographical reconfiguration, so as to social spaces can no longer map intactness in the territorial region, territorial range, and territorial boundaries. Nieminen states in a fully globalized world, all social subsystems are tied into a comprehensive global social system. So, the fully globalized world consists of one closed system (Nieminen, 1997).

Globalization runs fast because it is being supported by four factors, namely: science and technology. The more open economic system are in countries in the world, whether in trade, production, and investment / finance, the globalized financial markets, and the growing desire of people to travel abroad. The desire to travel abroad emerges because state borders which is currently unlimited (borderless), resulting in the activeness of creative economy industry of the tourism and community which are includes various forms of entities, culture, and cultural customs.

A well-managed tourism asset will bring many benefits toward a country. The legal sector of tourism in Indonesia is indeed being underestimated for not being managed seriously, whereas the tourism sector and the law ensuring fairness, security and certainty are the key supporting factors, which are the reflection of the country's competence in policy management (Antariksa, 2010). As the proverb that echoed; tourism is like fire, it can cook your food or burn your house down (Elliot and Bickersteth).

Not only rich in culture and local wisdom, Indonesia is also a tropical paradise, abundant of exotic places, luxurious through its pure natural scenery, one of which is Wakatobi. Wakatobi is resultant area expansion of Buton Regency, Southeast Sulawesi in 2003. Located in marine waters, once known as Tukang Besi waters, the underwater beauty is an acronym of the name of its four major islands, i.e. Wangi Wangi, Kaledupa, Tomia and Binongko, which invite admiration. Wakatobi, since the 1990s, has been designated as the National Marine Park with the

conservation area of approximately 1.3 hectares. The conservation area is a coral reef ecosystem. With the diversity of preserved marine life and various types of coral, Wakaktobi becomes one of places dreamt by underwater explorers and the main tourism of Southeast Sulawesi.

Each year, hundreds of European researchers, especially England, observe birds, possums, and tarsiers on the mainland of Buton Island and Kabaena Island, and coral reefs in the Wakatobi National Marine Park. In Wakatobi National Marine Park, visitors are expected not only to enjoy the beauty of the coral reef ecosystem in the slopes, valleys and caves under the sea, but also the community culture expressed in the form of dance, crafts, and so on.

The development of Wakatobi marine national park also had an impact, in accordance with Article 4 of Law No. 10 of 2009 on tourism that should have been be able to increase the economic growth and welfare of the people, however, there is a growing negative impact together with the development of tourism are as the following:

(1) unbalanced economic control,
(2) the limited local added value, the lack of involvement of the local indigenous people, the environmental impact of tourism, the eroded social wisdom and cultural values as well as the increasing the cost of living and burdens for the local population in the global era (Hadi, 2007).

Tourism business is a complex business because it does not only cover the economic aspects, but also social, cultural, legal and environmental ecosystem conservation of tourist destinations. Certainly, it does not only result in positive impact, such as producing foreign exchange, opening employment and economic growth, beside that also have negative impacts, such as pollution of the physical and biotic environment so as leading to less local fishermen fish catchment, wearing thin social and cultural values due to differences in cultural values of the tourists and local community, local community become consumptive and hedonistic, the purchasing of sara (indigenous) lands, sold by individuals to tourism entrepreneurs results in the loss of community's access to their public space. Some of the land sold are customary land that used to be managed by the head of the District or Lakina governing at the time of the Buton Sultanate (Udu, 2012).

These lands will certainly affect customary rights related to common law or living law, in relation to the national agrarian law arrangements because foreigners should not have possessed lands, but what is happening now in Wakatobi? We can see many indigenous lands, including motika, kaindea, pedangkuku are sold privately and foreign-owned resorts are established, which is managed not for the purpose of the public interest, rather for the private benefits of the capitalists. Therefore, natural resources at the present are no longer under the possession of the indigenous community.

Problem Formulation

Based on the above, the writer is interested to have an in-depth understanding; why is the development of tourism law that empowers indigenous community (local natives) required in order to develop sustainable ecotourism of Wakatobi, which is now aggressively attracting foreign investment in the era of globalization?

Discussion

Indonesian tourism law embraces a holistic perspective as closely associated with a variety of other scientific fields, such as economics, community sociology, and politics. Multi faceted law as the community handled is plural society, thus it has effects of legal system set that becomes plural or multifaceted

With the direction and objectives of tourism based on Law No. 10 of 2009, the implementation of tourism should no longer introduce, utilize, preserve and improve quality of objects and tourist attraction, rather to: (1) promote economic growth (2) remove poverty and (3) handle unemployment. Meanwhile, other purposes are to preserve the nature, the environment, and resources; promote culture; raise the image of the nation; foster patriotism; strengthen the identity and unity of the nation; and strengthen the friendship between nations. The sustainable development through ecotourism policy by the empowerment of indigenous people (locals) that should have been applied in Indonesia in accordance with Article 5 of Law No. 10 of 2009 is the principle of human rights, cultural diversity and local wisdom, especially in Wakatobi that has been the center of attention of foreign investors due to the luxury of heaven of Wakatobi's underwater paradise located in the heart of World Coral Triangle.

Wakatobi has been dreamed by many divers. The survey results and the distribution of questionnaires conducted by NGTI (National Geographic Traveler Indonesia) puts Wakatobi in the seventh place out of 16 best diving spots in Indonesia. The ecotourism formulation enhanced in The International Ecotourism Society (TIES) in 1990 is as follows: Ecotourism is responsible travel to natural areas conserved the environment and improves the welfare of local people. Ecotourism as one of the mechanisms of sustainable development combining conservation and tourism because of the income earned from tourism should be returned to the regions in need for conservation for the sake of protection and preservation of biodiversity as well as socio-economic improvement (maintaining the local culture) through five key principles, i.e. nature-based, ecologically sustainable, environmentally educative, locally benefits (management of protected areas in ways that meet the needs of local rural populations), generates tourist satisfaction. The destinations wanted by eco-tour tourists are national parks, nature preserves, conservation areas, wildlife reserve, etc.

Wakatobi National Maritime Park and Endangered Local Wisdom Indigenous community of Wakatobi is Bajo Ethnic, spread in the communal region of Wakatobi. Bajo Mola keeps the natural balance in Wangi-Wangi, Bajo Sampela, Lohoa and Mantigola embrace Kaledupa and Bajo Lamanggau who is the natural conquerors of the Tomia Island. Bajo Ethnic in Wakatobi has a livelihood as fishermen, which is hereditary since their ancestors. Bajo Ethnic in Wakatobi is a Same Tribe or Marine Tribe which now still living in many locations spread throughout the archipelago. Where there are capes, there will be Bajo Ethnic developing their lives. The traditional advice frequently heard among the Bajo Ethnic is lao'denakangku, which means the sea is my relative.

For Bajo Ethnic, the sea is the mother presenting the lives for their children, not only economically viable but also magical-religious viable. The surrounding nature is deemed as the body of a mother providing and guaranteeing lives, so as to the every part of the body has its own meaning and significance that must be preserved and maintained. They believe, Gods, who as the creator of the nature and those contained in it, have assigned tasks to Grandma Baliang to guard the sea. Therefore, human, in performing their activities at sea must first ask permission from its guard. When someone is experiencing disaster at the sea, then he should ask for help to the sea guard by mentioning her name.

Besides Grandma Baliang, there are also marine ghosts which are the embodiment of the spirits of people who died in the sea. If a person drowned and died at the sea, thus their spirit will take the form of a ghost. The sea ghosts may change forms, those resemble human, fish or octopus, and it is believed that in case encountering the spirits at the surface of the sea, it is not allowed to continue the journey. In case the prohibition or restrictions are ignored, the person will encounter a disaster, both while at sea and on land. Bajo and Bugis People in Sulaho Village realize that by complying with all restrictions/ prohibitions, it would cause the balance of the marine environment.

Various restrictions taught by their ancestors for generations, among others:
a. It is prohibited to dispose the remains of firewood into the sea;
b. It is prohibited to take or steal the property or possession of others in the sea;
c. It is prohibited to utter obscenities while at the sea;
d. It is forbidden to touch or pick up floating objects, because these objects are believed to be boarded or inhabited by spirits; (Suyuti, 2012).

The maintenance of ecosystems in the national park area provides an attraction for the tourists because of the diversity and unique varieties of the flora and fauna spread. The national park as a conservation area is the most productive ecosystem. Wakatobi National Marine Park is currently a mainstay commodity

of Southeast Sulawesi Province in the field of tourism. The Wakatobi National Park zonation was issued in mid-2007 to establish zoning maps in order border the areas that can be used and those cannot. The zoning maps of the Wakatobi National

The Wakatobi Park is divided into six zones, i.e. the key zone, marine preservation, tourism, local use, general use, and land or special zones. Besides, in order to encourage the community to participate in tourism activities in the national park, the local government of South East Sulawesi builds bungalows and resorts in the Hoga Island (Hoga Resort, Wakatobi Dive Resort and Patuno Resort), since several years ago, in the context of regional autonomy, in cooperation   with foreign investors sets seven days-staying of $ 1.940, while the package for 11 days of 2.840 dollars. The rate is not included rent for diving or snorkling equipment. However, apparently only a handful of people who still perceive the benefits related to the applied zoning system of National Marine Park of Wakatobi.

The development of the maritime potential is apparently still in favor of the local fishermen (indigenous community). Fishermen are no longer allowed to catch fish around the Wakatobi region (esp. Resort area) so the places allowed to catch fish are limited, the fish catchment is stagnant and unsatisfying, so as to the community choice falls on bombing activities. Moreover, the nature of foreign resort exclusivity tends to be rigid and puts a distance from the local community. In the coastal areas "owned" by resorts, fishermen are prohibited from fishing. The security guard will be very much ready to banish them (Hamid, 2010).

Wakatobi Islands have 97% of seas and 3% inland seas (Tim, 2008). For indigenous people of Wakatobi, the land (beach and sea) of which benefits is for public interest and should not be controlled privately. Land means the symbol of kinship, but when there is a development of the airport and foreign resorts are constructed, the price of the surrounding land increases so that the customary land becomes the private property, so as to puts impacts on the loss of kinship systems as the binding symbol has been sold and replaced with jealousy due to the lack of fair division of land sales. (Udu, 2012)

Land has been used as a medium of exchange to get money quickly, thus the globalization also affects the lifestyle of the people, who begin to develop consumerism. The indigenous peoples have also sold cramped land because of the high bid prices without considering their future and the possibility of long-term poverty in later days (farmers can no longer grow crops, even when resorts have been constructed, the fishermen are no longer allowed to fish surrounding the resort (Udu, 2012)).

It needs a good management, but due to the influence of the culture of consumerism capitalism through foreign investors who have invested much, indigenous community chooses to sell it to settlers or those having money (although in customary law, in maintaining the communal land, they should be willing to die when taken by others because the land is a symbol of self-esteem which is the bond of kinship or region of the existence of sara), thus the indigenous people of Wakatobi have lost the meaning of their symbol of culture.

Investment in tourism and marine should be the pillar of economic dynamics, but leasing island to this foreigner visiting Wakatobi is detrimental to the local citizens and indigenous people for fishermen are prohibited to come to Tomia District nearing One Mobaa Island leased by Lorens Moders, a foreigner from Switzerland. He leased it from the local citizen named Haji Baharuddin for 75 years (Media Indonesia, 2012). The fishing ground is narrower for the fishermen, the security issue also becomes a consideration for the resort guests are all foreigners who directly use air transportation to the resort, so that the local government encounters some difficulties to collect data. The administrator of the island never reports or provides data concerning the guests visiting to Wakatobi Local Government.

The issue of AMDAL (Environmental Impact Assessment) is also highlighted, because the government of Wakatobi regency deliberately does not comply with AMDAL of Bandara

Matahora establishment which cost up to 22 billion rupiahs. In this case, AMDAL should be done holistically involving the analysis of natural environment and human being (Suka, 2011).

Basically, the society does not agree with the concept of marine zoning defined solely for legal certainty through The Ministry of Forestry Decree (The Decree No. 765/ Kpts -II/202). The allocation of 1.390.000 hectares has given the major authority to the foreigner investor. Indigenous people of Wakatobi have conducted an environmental conservation through oral tradition. Through folklore, the people view that the particular area as having magic power and cannot be disturbed or damaged; it is done through telling the myth Untu Wa Ode. A story of a family having the blood relationship with imbu staying in the sea and protecting the coral in Untu Wa Ode Cape. Through the story, the people have collective awareness not to disturb the conservation area, for the story is accompanied by a curse or salah piara. Even when a rowboat is passing Untu Wa Ode area, they may not hide the oar in and they also may not fight each other (Udu, 2013).

A sacred and mythologized area based on the law of the local tradition as well as the area in hereditary through local the heritage of local wisdom as imbu or octopus, if it is disturbed, it will cause some damages of the balance of the nature. The place now even becomes a tourism and diving area as well as swimming and fishing, frequently done by the foreigners. There are a lot of fish found dead floating for the guests secretly anesthetize the fish. Nevertheless, they are not disrupted by a 'creature' believed staying in Untu Wa Ode area as socialized in the myth of Untu Wa Ode. Therefore, many of the indigenous people have a shift in their thinking. The myth believed by the local wisdom now has been destroyed. The myth has been shifted by rationalism which impacted the loss of Wakatobi people' confidence towards magic power. They believe that it can punish them when they are breaking the rules of the conservation areas established by the myth, but the newcomers fishermen from Madura, Sinjai, Kadhatua, and Kendari do not believe in those things, so that they perform various bombing, anesthesia in several custom conservation areas, and collectively shift the Wakatobi indigenous people' awareness. Carsten and Greertz called it 'amnesia.' (Udu, 2013)

The need of tourism law accommodating sustainable ecotourism is based on the above description, the enforcement and the development of tourism law, which is based on community tourism, in order to develop marine sustainable ecotourism of the splendor of the underwater paradise of Wakatobi in the heart of the world's coral triangle, is absolutely needed. The indigenous people's involvement again becomes a decisive element in the success of tourism business. The culture basically has sales value, but a culture will be defeated by modernity brought concomitantly with the investment. In order to create allure for the culture of indigenous people, the indigenous people should create the sustainability of the wisdom possessed.

In the implementation, ecotourism activities should involve the local society starting from planning, managing, and monitoring. The society should be treated as the subject of the development for if there is no conflict between the society and the government, it will be sustainable. The probable steps taken in the development of ecotourism-based and community based tourism law on the issues occurred from the indigenous people of Wakatobi is as follow:

1. Conduct an analysis on hermeneutics in accordance with progressive law on the local government's policies in Wakatobi. Besides that, the policies of central government concerning tourism zoning which does not represent the society's justice. The government prioritizes the analysis of positivism law assuming that the law is neutral, objective, and emphasizing on legal certainty, through the zoning regulation by the Ministry of Forestry Decree (only by identifying law using legislation). This thought implies the strong separation between law and moral. The law is obeyed not for they are good or fair, but for it has been

defined by the authority. (Putro, 2012) In fact, the law has harmed the society's justice.

Based on the perspective of the custom law, it is clearly impossible to be neutral for the indigenous people' interest, the belief which has been held from generation to generation concerning the law of the nature, the sociology obviously impacts on the Wakatobi society's perspective concerning the law of the nature which has made the society prosperous so far. However, it is distracted by the government who uses foreign investment. It is certainly a must to shift the paradigm from positivism to progressivism in regulating the policies before the damage is increasing.

2. The need of ADR (Alternative Dispute Resolution) space through negotiation, mediation and continuous discussion between local government, national park, and traditional institution in entire Wakatobi areas to discuss sustainable ecotourism in order to create a concrete solution through local living law realizing three kinds of interest equitably, productively, and can ensure the legal certainty related to zoning, customary land management, and environmentally sound and sustainable tourism development in establishing facilities and infrastructure of tourism which should pay attention to AMDAL (environment impact analysis).

3. Concerning the foreign investment, a win-win solution contract has been made in order to prosper the society through ecotourism and community based tourism (by using business philosophy by the people and for the people) because the indigenous people know more how to take care and preserve the nature. For exclusive resort who does not give any caution to foreigners to preserve the environment, they need to be strictly sanctioned for breaking the commitment in the contract which should meet several international standards.

There must be a win-win solution between the investor and fishermen. When the fishermen are not allowed to fish in the resort area, there needs to be a negotiation and alternative proposition such as compensation, providing job vacancy, education, technology shift, and the proper guidance concerning tourism awareness. Moreover, the foreigners should give caution, there even should be sanction given by the traditional institution for tourists who damage the environment for it can cause imbalance in the ecosystem.

In the attempt of win-win solution between the investor, local government, and traditional institution, it should create a harmony. The investor will not run away because there is legal certainty through obliteration of any bureaucracy obstacle by simplifying and shortening permission process (eliminating various taxes burdening the investor), the local government also get the benefits by the increased own-source revenue. The society gets advantages due to the prospering tourism law.

4. The central and local government carries out environment-based tourism events and engages the empowerment of indigenous people. Moreover, the quality of tourism infrastructure should be improved, especially in which has relation to health, cleanness, security, and comfort. The foreign investor should carry out the corporate social responsibility program as well toward the local citizens and natural environment. Beside it is as an industry, tourism is an event to introduce the uniqueness of the local arts and the cultures, and the exotic landscapes of a country, in the honest and natural credibility. Various special treats, starting from the hospitality of the local people, the beauty of its scenery which is well-organized, and also the arts and the cultures must give natural sensation and distinguishing element for the tourist visiting. Hence, the involvement of the society in the tourism is absolutely necessary.

According to Boaventura de Santos, the people' view of the world or is commonly called as paradigmatic transition has shifted. There are three scientists who have three different point of views, which are (1) skeptical group is a group stating that they cannot do anything for they have been influenced until death, is helples against the globalization so that it causes the change of values due to the technology development, (2) a group who is against technology, liberalism, and individualism, (3) post modern group is an auspicious group, there is no worry about globalization.

We should be in post modern group, because globalization, free trade area, is going on and continuously open among leading countries due to the help of science and technology. There is something we can do, that is just to go with that and get the positive benefits through self adjustment to the values held by our country in order not to be left behind or the other country may adopt our culture. Indonesia as the part of and is in the free trade area should adjust the policies, and the priority of the establishment should be in accordance with the changes due to the globalization by the taking several anticipative and wise steps (Turangan, 2008).

We should maintain the living laws and local wisdom from generation to generation. We hope the local wisdom will not just change into solely symbolic rituals through dances, used to welcome and please the foreign tourists without any effort to maintain the local culture to be still meaningful for the people. Thus, it needs sustainable preservation through the role of the entire local people and both central and local government, which is done simultaneously for the better Indonesia.

Closing

Conclusions

It is necessary to establish tourism laws which proper the local citizens in order to develop sustainable ecotourism because:

1). There are a lot of conflicts and problems occurred between the traditional institution, the government, and the local citizens (most people are fishermen), which may cause the tourism, which has been built and promoted, ends in vain and probably even closed for the lack of security and comfort from any parties, for example there is an imbalance in the prosperity for the foreign investor get a lot of exclusive facilities from central and local government through the zoning of Wakatobi national park, which is basically a sacred place for the local people. Actually, the place should be preserved, but due to the zoning map, the place becomes the foreigners' diving and swimming area. Hence, the fishermen encounter some difficulties in getting more fish since the foreigners frequently swim in the area and even there are a lot of dead fish due to the anesthesia.

Moreover, the foreign investor does not cooperate with the local people, so that the fishermen working in the area around the resort are arrested due to illegal fishing. In fact, the fishing area becomes narrower and limited for the shore area around the resort claimed is so wide. The conflict related to the local people's rights and the prosperity gap occurred for the foreigner gets more income than the local people, so that one who is negatively affected is actually the local people.

2). The policies which are detrimental to the society and the problematical AMDAL (environment impact analysis) are causing some issues in tourism development which is not ecotourism-based and community based tourism.

3). The differences of the paradigm used in implementing law-based policies, that are the government prioritizes positivism paradigm which is law certainly-based. One of them is the zoning issued from Ministry of Forestry Decree. Basically, regulating some policies should not only rest on the law certainty, but also concern the benefits and the justice which should be obtained by the society (since the society has their own way to protect the marine by using myth of shark and octopus), so that the positivism paradigm must be changed into constructivism paradigm which rests on the development of progressive law, the Wakatobi living law, the pluralism of the law, and encourages more traditional institutions protecting the marine area.

Suggestions

In the development of ecotourism-based and community based tourism laws, it needs hermeneutics and progressive law analysis on the policies made by the Wakatobi local government as well as the central government related to the zoning of national park which is not in accordance with the justice of the society as the principles of tourism management complied in the Laws No. 10 in 2009 about tourism.

It is necessary to have marine tourism management which still concerns the fishermen' rights to re-analyze the utilization of the area, so that wise and prudent policies will be realized. The prioritized programs planned must be done immediately and needs an actual implementation in the future as the local government program arranged in Local Government Work Unit Annual Work Plan and General Policies of Provincial and District Government Budget regulated to ensure the connection between planning, budgeting, implementing, and monitoring the implementation of the vision and mission of the local government contained in Wakatobi Medium Term Development Plan, and the elaboration of the policy of local development related to National Budget, and Provincial and District Government Budget. The need of ADR space through negotiation and continuous discussion between local government, national park, and sara or traditional institution in entire Wakatobi areas to discuss sustainable ecotourism and community based tourism in order to create a concrete solution through local living law, and the establishment of facilities and infrastructure of tourism which should pay attention to AMDAL (environment impact analysis), cleanness, security, and comfort.

Related to the foreign investor, a win-win contract solution should be made although it is more dominant how to create prospering society through ecotourism and community based tourism (through business philosophy by people and for people) with a commitment in the contract which is should meet several international standards, such as meeting the quality standards, good faith and fair dealing, fair play, good corporate governance, fair competition, and consumer protection.

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Rethinking Populist-Developmentalism in Indonesia

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Abstract

The bottom-up paradigm in development, or as Chambers (1983) put it "people first," has emerged as a central point of discussion among development planners as well as academics in Indonesia. Such discussions have manifested themselves in the implementation of community-driven development approaches, often framed as the antithesis of the previous top-down development paradigm that prevailed under the New Order regime. This essay provides a critical interpretation of the implementation of bottom-up development schemes by focusing on the implication of two important practices: (1) the formation of community trusteeships conceived as peoples' representatives, and (2) the introduction of the act of writing in the production of development strategies (programs proposals, paperwork, financial reports, etc.) as an integral part in the empowerment effort.

Introduction

Since the fall of President Soeharto's authoritarian regime in 1998, many Indonesians have praised the changes in development strategy that have taken place. Critiques of the New Order's centrist style of development formed a point of departure from which what anthropologist Jean-Paul Olivier de Sardan (2005) called "populist developmentalism" could emerge. In the populist spirit of the new paradigm, those who remained silent and invisible within the former development agendas (such as minority groups, the autochthone communities, and urban and rural poor) have been thrust into the center stage of development. The main conception of this trend is that such people are not merely the objects of development, but should be treated as the *active subjects* of development agendas. In order to emphasize the discourse of treating the people within the agenda of development as subjects, activists, NGOs, and (social) scientists started to endorse an alternative approach to replace the former regime's 'top-down'/centrist policies. The past approach was widely discredited as having been fundamentally misleading, and a primary cause of huge failures in the former development agenda.

The antithesis of the approach under the New Order, the 'bottom-up' approach and its jargon suddenly became the most widely circulated development cliché promoted by development planners and agencies, as well as by academics. In the academic camp (in the social sciences, especially in anthropology which mostly work with and write about "the invisible and neglected people,") the collaborative and participatory approaches in doing research have been widely utilized (see for example Winarto, 2011). These practices lead the social scientist to broadening their audience, i.e. not only for academic community but also for "the people." NGOs and activists have managed to use such a participatory approach in order to produce an alternative representation to the problems as a basis for their activism.

The state that was formerly perceived as the opposition of the populist developmentalism somehow has taken a similar path and joined the populist parade. As reflected in National Long-term Development Plan mandated by Law No. 17/2007 about National Long-term Development Plan (RPJPN), Indonesia also put what is referred to as "human-centered development" in its national development paradigm, in order to be prepared for the future global competition (see Tumenggung, 2014). Supported by financial injection from international agencies—such as the World Bank, the Asian Development Bank (ADB), and the Australian Agency for International Development (AUSAID)—several intervention programs with populist approaches were introduced and adopted on a national scale. Social and cultural aspects, which were previously considered to be of secondary interest, now appeared as paramount concerns that had to be taken seriously in development agendas from the stages of planning, implementation, and evaluation. Hence, the discussions about the importance of local wisdom/ knowledge system for programs would become central in the current development trend.

This essay is written neither to contribute to the 'instrumental discussions' about the effectiveness of current populist approach in achieving its development goals, nor to provide 'instrumental critiques' in order to propose another alternative approach in development. Rather, my goal is to analyze contemporary development practice with critical description to reveal potential implication to people's lives. This essay is a result of my contemplation after engaging in a monitoring and evaluation research on Indonesian development program that utilizes 'community-driven development approaches' in 2012. When Indonesia shifted its development orientation from economic-growth-centered projects with top-down apparatuses to bottom-up social empowerment, the question was: what makes current development trend different in practice? Furthermore, with such 'alternative approach in development,' what kind of difference did they make?

People Know Best: Instrumentalization of Community

My first impression of the 'community driven development approach' was that it seemed to be the opposite of the former development practice under the New Order regime. Rather than directly introducing development-packages designed by the state and 'targeting' the population, it gave the community an opportunity to decide what kind improvement they might want. The notion 'community' used in such approach, however, has triggered another question in my mind: what exactly do they meant by community? Is it the same community that Cohen (1985) refers to as related to the notion of a 'sense of belonging?' If development in its practice tends to render every problem into a purely technical issue (see Li 2012), it would follow that such a 'sense of belonging' concept of community should be converted into something technical in order to make it widely applicable within

'community-driven development' scheme. As I observed, the will to enhance the participation of the community within development schemes departs from the implementation of specific techniques to create the community itself. Hence, community in this context serves as 'means' to achieve specific goal in development and to legitimate its results.

PNPM (*Program Nasional Pemberdayaan Masyarakat* / National Program for Community Empowerment) is one well-known populist development program in Indonesia that applies the community-driven development approach in its scheme. Guggenheim (2010) confidently argues that PNPM is a good program because it "…helps poor villagers across the country to become direct actors in development." The primary approach of PNPM is to provide block grants at the *kelurahan* level and let the targeted communities identify plan and implement activities to improve their settlements and support the poverty alleviation effort. The implementation of such an approach began with the formation of community trusts at the *kelurahan* level called BKM (*Badan Keswadayaan Mayarakat*/People Empowerment Bodies). The formation of such institutions, however, is based on the populist notion that the local people or insiders know better about their own problem than the outsiders (see Chambers, 1983). Arguably, the existence of body of trustee itself serves as legitimate manifestation of the "[local] people's participation" within current development scheme.

The intentional design of BKM as body of trustees for a targeted population is somehow inspired by the romantic and classical image of community, i.e. 'to rebuild social cohesion and solidarity among members of society.' In order to achieve the desired goals in such a social engineering mission, the government spread trained facilitators to *kelurahan* level with several tasks. Their missions are to initiate the formation of BKM, introduce the 'rules of the game' or SOP (Standard of Procedure), and to train the community members through BKM as the representative body responsible for implementing activities within PNPM's development scheme.

Beforehand, to initiate the formation of BKM, facilitators work with local volunteers to encourage local leaders to choose their best representatives to be elected as members of BKM. In such process, the facilitators provide them with criteria to be used as a guide to choose each neighborhood's representatives. Interestingly, the criteria provided in the SOP were intentionally open for interpretation, i.e. the candidates should have 'universal values of goodness' such as honesty (*jujur*), fairness (*adil*), caring (*peduli*), and sincerity (*ikhlas*). One facilitator in Banjarmasin who was engaged in such a process told me that by applying such general criteria, the program gives opportunity for the community to use their 'local wisdom' (*kearifan lokal*) in the selection process. By using 'local wisdom' in the selection process, the facilitators believe that this system will lead to the selection of the locally acknowledged 'good person' in each neighborhood group. "Because they know best! Hence, we should give them opportunity to choose what is best for them," he said convincingly at the end of conversation. In this formulation,

community is the best option for the achievement of a development goal, and is thus 'maximized' and 'instrumentalized' through a social engineering project.

The problematic issue in the instrumentalization of community processes, however, is the notion of community used in the development scheme. While stressing the value of communities and their 'local wisdom,' development planners assume that they bear positive associations with harmony, equality, solidarity, and tradition in a noble sense that will benefit expected outcome. This assumption has put aside the political dimension attached to the notion of community. Since their formation, contestations and negotiations in BKM are inevitable and have been the integral aspects of its dynamic as body of trustee. As I observed in my own neighborhood, Depok City West Java, BKM serves as a vehicle for the exercise and articulation of the politics of identity. Certain people who are considered to be authentically local people have more privilege to be elected as BKM members as well as to get access to social assistance programs. In microfinancing programs, for instance, a member of BKM told me that poor repayment rates had forced them to be more selective in choosing the beneficiaries for such program. In his case, the idea of being "more selective" is manifested by excluding the migrants from the microfinance program's beneficiary candidates. However, not all migrants in the neighborhood were excluded. Migrants who have good reputation by maintaining their social relationship with the people within their neighborhood have more opportunity to be selected as beneficiaries compared to those who do not.[1] My observation at a *kelurahan* in Banjarmasin shows that the poor migrant community from Madura tends to be excluded from social assistance programs due to their lack of social interaction with the locals, and because they are legally unregistered at the local government office (and therefore lack administrative documents.) In addition, without administrative and social recognition, they suffer from negative stereotype as well as criminalization. With such condition, community-driven development approach like PNPM hardly reaches those who are excluded from the society.

Let the People Decide: The Production of Inscriptions

The consequence of various training programs by PNPM facilitators is the emergence of development skill-brokers at the grassroot level. These skill-brokers 'help' the community in translating their problems into activities and programs with a powerful device known as a program proposal. In fact, development in practice is a production and circulation of certain form of inscriptions, which are believed to have direct relationship with the reality. In translating the problem into a set of activities, specific techniques and knowledge of specific discourses is needed. For these very specific needs, the role of facilitator is central. The

1. Such inclusion-exclusion mechanisms reflect the nature of community itself, i.e. always in state of influx depending on how each person act to maintain their social ties and hence their membership in the community (Prahara, 2014).

facilitator's role is to transmit certain knowledge and techniques to enable people to participate in the production and circulation of certain forms of inscription such as proposals, activities reports, financial reports, etc. As writing is central within development practice, illiterate populations are the first people who are excluded from such mechanisms. Even worse, they now risk being targeted as subjects of exploitation in the hands of bureaucrats (Gupta, 2012: pp. 14).

In the case of PNPM, BKM is the center where all the proposals coming from the community in each neighborhood are submitted. The proposals vary, ranging from infrastructure improvement, to microfinance and several training programs to improve the skills of the poor. Having the capacity to write a proposal, however, is not enough to be able to participate in the production of development inscriptions. Each neighborhood must form a group called *Kelompok Keswadayaan Masyarakat* (KSM/Community Empowerment Group) and register this group with the BKM. While the proposals represent the community voice related to the kinds of improvement that they need, KSM is a representative of the community from each neighborhood. Once a proposal is accepted, KSM will receive the grants. Thus, it is their responsibility to ensure those activities' implementation, write activity reports, and provide financial reports at the end of the project. In the process, BKM members—often with facilitators' help—assist KSM in the production of inscription. In many cases, there are several people who are recognized as 'experts' in the field of production of inscription due to their experience in similar activities and their links to bureaucrats (to whom the proposals will be addressed and assessed). As I observed, these experts not only 'help' in writing the proposals but also in deciding what kind of activities or programs that KSM should or should not include in their proposals. This group of community experts, however, is often accused by research consultants in their monitoring-evaluation research reports of being the real beneficiaries of such process, shaping proposals in their own interests. With regards to this phenomenon, Li (2012: pp. 9) has argued that the claim of expertise is basically a claim of power. As the act of writing is central within such development process, it is obvious that having specific expertise in the production of inscription inevitably opens potential path to 'elite capture.'[2] However, by describing the centrality of the production of inscription, I argue that: because the 'audience' of the proposals is the bureaucrats, the practice of producing inscriptions and their mode of circulation inevitably reflects the bureaucratic logic.

2. Elite capture is a phenomenon wherein resources designed for a targeted population or programs beneficiaries are usurped by a few individual or group of superior status—be it economic, political, educational, political or otherwise.

Concluding Remarks

Using PNPM as an example of a community-driven development mechanism, I argue that not only were several techniques implemented in order to enhance the participation from community, but also that the "community" itself is a category that is manufactured through the implementation of specific development techniques. Within such process, the complexity of social (as well as political) life of targeted populations is simplified into something of a merely technical nature. At this point, understanding 'to what extent such technical simplification of social life structured the dynamics of social relationship (e.g. social inclusion and exclusion) among targeted populations' is more important in social science's investigations than evaluating its effectiveness.

Furthermore, as writing is central in such development practice, the mechanism is inevitably bureaucratic, i.e. producing and assessing documents. What the community-driven development approach has introduced is not merely a participative mechanism in development but also a specific form of social order, i.e. the extension of bureaucratic power at the grassroots level. This phenomenon, in my opinion, could be explained by investigating the system of production and circulation of development inscription in order to acquire a clearer understanding of how the world is framed, categorized, and ordered within development practices.

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Forgetting the Past: The (Il)Legality of Amnesty for Gross Violation of Human Rights

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Introduction

Since the *reformasi* (reformation) era began in 1998, Indonesia appeared to have failed in taking a comprehensive measure in dealing with gross violations of human rights occurring in the past. Admittedly, it should be understood that such historical burdens, or some might refer as 'historical injustices' (Teitel 2002: pp. 69-75), involve the intersection between two values of peace and justice. On one hand, the seemingly 'politically hand-off' by the state implies a preservation of a rather peaceful society, while on the other, this situation may also obstruct justice amongst the fellow-citizens; particularly to those whose rights were violated. Consequently, any efforts to compromise, in terms of political, social, and legal, are highly unavoidable in order for the state to find *equilibrium* of both values.

To date, the country's policy to resolve cases of alleged serious human rights violations, either through judicial or non-judicial mechanism, may actually find its legal basis under the Human Rights Court Law Number 26 Year 2000. For the former mechanism, any legal measures could be undertaken through the prosecution under the Human Rights Ad Hoc Court.[1] As for the latter, Article 47 of the Human Rights Court Law stipulates "the possibility of settlement of any gross human rights violation cases before the enactment of the law through the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC)"; which later was evidently established under the TRC Law No. 27 Year 2004.

However, these legal instruments appear to be ineffective in fulfilling their objectives to accomplish justice and national reconciliation. One particular evidence that signifies the argument is when the Constitutional Court declared the TRC Law in 2006 unconstitutional. The Court claimed that confusion and contradiction in the Law, which combines the victims' right for compensation conditional to the criminal responsibility of the perpetrators, make reconciliation between the two parties impossible to achieve. Moreover, as the Court seemed to be aware that the burden to prove past offenses is not an easy task, it indicates impliedly the legitimacy of undertaking the cases through a sole non-judicial mechanism.

At this point, the problem arises as to whether or not such a non-judicial mechanism, posited as a measure substitutive to the Ad Hoc Human Rights Court, is to be deemed as a policy of impunity. The Court seemed to be practical in dealing with this issue, by stating:

> The closure of proceedings under the Ad Hoc Court having obtained a settlement under the TRC is a logical consequence of an alternative dispute resolution mechanism; thus could not to be seen as a justification of impunity [. . .] The TRC under the TRC Law, aims to uphold justice as far as possible in an alternative dispute resolution mechanism.

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1. Attempts to resolve past human rights violations have been taken through Ad Hoc Human Rights Court for crimes against humanity in *East Timor Case*, *Abepura Case*, and *Tanjung Priok Case*.

This substitutive nature implies a broader implication on whether such a measure could deny or even abolish legal consequences that shall occur against human rights violations in the past. To be more practical, a question may arise on whether it is legal or not for a non-judicial body to grant amnesty for the human rights violators. Related to this, still in the TRC judicial review case, the Constitutional Court apparently did not consider in elaborative manner the question of the constitutionality of amnesty, as the Court, while giving weight to the human rights practices at the United Nations, failed to contextualize international practices from the national constitution point of view.

In my view, amnesty for past human rights violators is problematic. in the sense that such a policy could endorse the creation of peace, whilst at the same time it ought to be regarded as "a legal concept minus legal substance that paradoxically annuls any legal norms in the process of transition to a rule of law state." (Gusti 2015) Thus in principle, I would argue that the clarity of amnesty policy is actually a decisive step in formulating national reconciliation.

Admittedly, the national reconciliation process in various countries shows that amnesty is problematic, especially when faced with the need to fulfilling justice for the victims of gross human rights violations in the past. (Schabas 2011: pp. 3-5) However, we could not deny that amnesty at the same time contributes to social cohesion in a post-conflict society, and could possibly be a useful policy. (Freeman 2009: pp. 4)

Dealing with the Past: Weighing the Two Interests

Based on states' practices, transitional justice framework is in principle derived from criminal justice models that explain the crime as a deviation from the norms and common practices. In addition, such a framework is also applied to reduce the fear associated with the memory of past political violence through the analysis of the role and experience of both victims and perpetrators. From a conceptual point of view, Leebaw furthermore identifies that, "in contrast with the legalistic emphasis on enforcing rules, restorative justice aspires to repair injuries or damages caused by crime and violence. This not only requires a response to the harms experienced by victims of crime, but also strategies for rehabilitating or reintegrating those who are responsible for crime by outlining ways that they can make amends." (Leebaw 2011:11) Thus, the actual construction of transitional justice in Indonesia, based on the normative element enshrined under national laws, is not solely attributable to the retributive policy of the state against the past, but also on the restorative one.

At the beginning of the *reformasi* period, one may identify the momentum of transition through a legal product enacted by the People's Consultative Assembly (*Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat*) in its Decree No. V Year 2000 concerning

the Stabilization of National Unity and Integrity. The Decree expressly aims to "generally identify existing problems, to determine the conditions which must be created in order to lead to the national reconciliation, and to set policy direction as a guide to carry out the consolidation of national unity." The Assembly's Decree also outlines a variety of multi-sector conditions required in the process of reconciliation in order to create national unity and stability. In the rule of law sector, "the establishment of a legal system based on value-oriented philosophy of truth and justice" is deemed as a necessary condition in a transition situation. Moreover, this condition needs to be "accompanied by the willingness and ability to reveal the truth about the events of the past, in accordance with the provisions of the laws and regulations in force, and recognition of the past-wrongs that have been made, as well as developing forgiveness from each other in order to create a national reconciliation." It is therefore departing from this legal product, the transitional period in Indonesia has been commencing since 2000 up to unfortunately an indefinite period of time.

In the national context, discourse over the rule of law during the transition could not escape from the constitutionalism paradigm; which has become a significant turning-point in a transitional period. (Collins 2010: pp. 16-20) In the *Human Rights Court Law* judicial review case (2007), the Constitutional Court affirmed the constitutionality of applying the law retroactively against any gross violations of human rights that occurred prior to the enactment of the law. The Court argued that the process of achieving the rule of law in the transitional justice context has to be placed under an axiomatic view; which implies the existence of a waiver from the principles of law. To put it simply, transitional justice is not an ordinary justice. (*vide* Posner 2003) Such a view from the Court signaled two requirements in enforcing the law retroactively, namely: *first*, the amount of public interest to be protected the law; and *second*, the weight and nature of the rights violated due to the enforcement of such laws is smaller than the public interest violated.

Therefore, state always calculates any contending interests in achieving national reconciliation within the framework of transitional justice. (Skaar 2011: pp. 29-32) Such a situation affirms that a balance between human rights legalism and restorative justice requires a deep consideration of public legitimacy as whole, as enshrined under the National Development Plan 2015-2019: "responsibility of state protection in processing cases of the past human rights violations requires a national consensus of all stakeholders."

Amnesty without Amnesia: Applying "Smart Amnesty" in Indonesia

Having discussed the two contending values as the basis for a paradigmatic approach in resolving past human rights abuses, any proposal 'to forgive and to forget' through amnesty for the past wrongdoings shall therefore not be detached

from state's calculation on the rule of law. (Kushleyko 2015: pp. 35-39) In order to resolve the national historical problems, amnesty, as a 'political judgment,' ought to be capable in filling the gap between perpetrators and victims. Some ethic theorists call this paradigm as 'enlarged mentality.'[2] (Arrendt 1969: pp. 220). Such a mentality shall arguably encourage the so-called 'amnesty without amnesia.' Thus, in the context of the seven alleged human rights violations cases investigated by the National Commission on Human Rights (NCHR),[3] as a form of executive discretion, the President under the constitution has the legal authority to promulgate amnesty against these cases.

Nevertheless, in line with the national commitment to democracy, amnesty ought to be 'democracy-based,' which specifically requires public participation in creating the policy. In this sense, public participation should be a determinant factor for the legitimacy of the proposed amnesty policy. In this context, as the embodiment of transitional justice, de-politicization should be regarded as necessary, an amnesty proceeding need to be mandated upon an independent mechanism - such as truth and reconciliation commission (TRC). Given the quasi-judicial work flexibility, the commission is to be expected to answer the gap between victims and perpetrators, and, as Leebaw argued, to broaden "debates on political responsibility by investigating the question of why people failed to resist or withdraw their support from a regime engaged in systematic atrocities or oppression." (Leebaw 2011: pp. 170)

Holistically, in granting amnesty for perpetrators of serious human rights violations, the President should consider the development and dynamics of international criminal law that currently leads to an absolute individual responsibility for international crimes. (O'Shea 2012) Consequently, the conspicuous disparity of legal paradigm between international criminal law accountability and national legal policy should be narrowed in order to increase the legitimacy of the amnesty law.

In a practical level in 2013, a study on amnesty conducted by several experts from across locations, approaches, and disciplines successfully concluded *The Belfast Guidelines on Amnesty and Accountability*. This guideline could become a practical tool for the state to prepare a so-called "smart amnesty" for past gross human rights violations. There are four aspects that could be addressed regarding this preparation: *first* is the temporal and geographical coverage of the amnesty for past serious human rights violations. Departing from the investigation on seven cases of gross violations of human rights, it is thus necessary to consider the periodization and location of amnesty, which evidently varied in each case.

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2. Enlarged mentality could be characterized as a way of thinking that being able to think in place of everyone else. (see Arendt 1969).

3. These cases investigated including: *The 1965-1966 massacre case, The extrajudicial killings 1982-1985, The Tanjung Priuk case 1984-1985, The Talangsari case 1989, The enforced disappearance case 1997-1998, The May riot case 1998, and The Trisakti, Semanggi I, and Semanggi II case.*

Second aspect is the method of enactment and public consultation of amnesty proposals shall determine its legality and legitimacy. One particular enactment method could be taken is through legal instrument. Based on the constitution, and state practices since independence era, amnesty can be enacted in the form of presidential decree. Another feasible method of public consultation including: "public meetings, surveys, or focused discussion." However, it should be noted that self-amnesty should be clearly avoided as it could be considered *prima facie* illegitimate for the public. (Freeman *Id*) Therefore, a combination of legal instruments and public consultation appears to be feasible for the government to design a legal and legitimate amnesty in Indonesia.

Third aspect is that substantially there must be a clear qualification over offenses that can be granted forgiveness. Based on state practices, South Africa in particular, the state needs to calculate between the offences granted amnesty (or any exclusions applied) with the aim to publish the amnesty itself. (Mallinder 2008:130) *The Belfast Guideline* stipulates that amnesty shall increase its legitimacy when the policy excludes: "serious international crimes, crimes against humanity that does not reach the level of international crime, and acts or offenses motivated by personal gain or malice." Furthermore, in this regard the determination of criteria of the parties benefited from amnesty should be spelled out in a detailed manner. Any distinctions or categorizations for any individuals qualified in obtaining forgiveness, referring to *the Guidelines*, can be based on: "(i) allegiance or membership in a particular state institution or a non-state body; or (ii) rank within the institution or body, or perceived level of responsibility therein."

Final aspect would be the legal consequences that may result from a policy of amnesty. Against the seven cases at hand, some legal consequences that can be applied including: abolition or termination of all (ongoing or future) legal proceedings, as well as closure to civil liability. From the victim's side, an amnesty should also aim to eliminate all legal consequences imposed to the victim during the period of injustices.

Departing from *the Guideline*, in order to defend a legal and legitimate amnesty for past human rights violation, we could sort two preconditions, namely *procedural matters*, covering: method on enactment and public consultation; and *substantial matters*, covering: eligible offenses, eligible beneficiaries, and legal effects of amnesty. Both categories, although certainly not an exhaustive list, may become a minimum threshold for the state in formulating an amnesty decision.

Conclusion: Towards A Paradigmatic Forgiveness

The logic of legal and ethical arguments and various preconditions outlined in *the Belfast Guideline* mentioned above indicate that the past gross human rights violation cases must be resolved paradigmatically. Arguably, amnesty proceedings through an independent ad hoc committee shall be able to answer two challenges in transitional framework: to work as historian and as a jurist. Through this proceeding, the country could delineate the degree of complicity in past human rights violations; which may answer not only whether a person had committed a crime, but why would someone commit such a crime? And why a person failed to refuse to do the crime? As a political judgment, amnesty also needs to consider the legitimacy in society. This suggests that the elements of amnesty, both procedural and substantial, need to work in the area of deliberative democracy that calls for public participation and the protection of human rights. (Uprimny & Saffon 2006)

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