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BEST ESSAYS OF **2017**

BEST ESSAYS OF 2018

Jakarta, June 2018

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PREFACE

It is the 4th of National Essay Competition that has been conducted by the ISRSF to date. We notice d enthusiasm of the young writers to contribute to this competition, in which we believe that is a something to be bolstered and be increased in regard to numbers of Indonesian young writers.

From this competition, we can attain good and competent Indonesians writers. We always appreciate the excitement and interest of many writers from various background throughout Indonesia for joining this competition. A spirit that we try to maintain in the years ahead.

The Essay Competition divided into two Categories, Woman Authors and History Topic. This book contains the top prize winning essays in each category, as well as the honorable mention essays that also displayed excellence.

ISRSF sponsors Essay Competitions as a recruiting instrument to attract the attention of bright Indone-sians who may not have heard of the Arryman program. The top essays in each category will receive a cash prize. Also greatest benefits of winning these competitions, which far exceeds the value of money, is a guaranteed interview in the Arryman Fellows selection process should the winners decide to apply. From this competition winner we had some become Arryman Fellows and Scholars now.

ISRSF believe higher education and the cultivation of new women scholars is an important part to give Indonesian women a fair and equal voice in education and public life across Indonesia. It's ISRSF's effort to make sure Indonesia's young intellectual women come forward and walk through the door we have opened to undertake their doctorate at Northwestern, one of the leading universities in the U.S. and the world.

On behalf of ISRSF, I would like to thank the three Panel of Judges, who have care-fully read and assessed all the essays and supported this Competition program since beginning 4 years ago. The judges for the women's essay competition were Dr. Dewi Chandraningrum, Dr. Ratna Noviani and Dr. Antarini Pratiwi. The judges for the History Essay Competition were Dr. Baskara Wardaya, Dr. Peter Carey and Dr. Yosef Jakababa.

Thank you to all Essay Competition participant. We hope everyone enjoy reading these short writings, and let it inspire you to write an essay.

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WOMEN'S ESSAYS

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

1st Prize Winner

Women's matter: In what ways prosper and healthy indigenous women influence development in Indonesia?

Every single word in this essay has immense value. It narrates not only female's body but also redirecting our blind eyes to indegeneity. The significance of women's role has been frequently overlooked under development agendas. This essay stands against this.

Dr. Phil. Dewi Candraningrum

Women matter: In what ways prosperous and healthy indigenous women influence development in Indonesia?

Women can contribute to the development of a country when they are healthy and have better knowledge by attaining sufficient formal education and exposure to health information[1]. At least, a healthy and well educated mother can increase the quality of their offspring by providing more nutritious food and childrearing pattern as well as monitoring the growth and development of their children[2]. These efforts will influence the quality of the children, the next generation of a nation who can contribute to the development[1]. Unfortunately, these circumstances do not occur in some regions of Papua Province, the most eastern part of Indonesia. The health of most indigenous female in Papua, particularly their reproductive health, is still poor compared to other provinces, due to their negative cultural perspectives[3]. Definitely, the striking point can be seen in Maternal Mortality Rates (MMR) of Papua Province, which is higher than the national number of MMR[3, 4]. According to the department of demographic and family planning of Papua (BKKBN), the ratio of mothers who dies during their pregnancy and postpartum accounted for 359/100,000 live births in 2012[4]. Meanwhile, the national MMR was around 305/100,000 live births[5]. This really indicates that the cultural gap plays a pivotal role that determines women's well-being.

Apparently, women's reproductive matters is dominantly distinguished as preventable and treatable issues[6, 7, 8]. Therefore, this indicator is associated with the development of a country, because women's matter is commonly given the least concern in the most third world countries because of their patriarchal pattern[9]. Thus, there is homework of the government and all elements of community in achieving sustainable development goals that every country should reduce maternal mortality ratio by at least 70 per 100,000 live births by 2030[10]. With regards to the issues facing Papua Province, the challenge is to straighten the ethnic minority's paradigm and their negative cultural behaviour associated with women's reproductive health, particularly during pregnancy and post-partum [3, 11, 12, 13]. However, linking the culture of indigenous women population particularly and its impacts on their health are crucial but challenging because of poor national data regarding indigenous people, whilst the classification can only be obtained from the researches that existed since reformation era in 1998[14]. In this essay, I will describe the challenge in reducing maternal morbidity through mortality issues that affect Papuan mothers' health during pregnancy through post-natal period related to the negative cultural behaviours. It aims to analyse factors of patriarchy paradigm that affects women's health, and I come up with some suggestions for the issues.

Socio-demography of Papua Province

Papua province has the largest ethnic group in Indonesia, accounting for more than 25 local ethnic groups and around 7 ethnic immigrant groups from other regions[14]. Dani tribe

community is the largest group in this province, with a total population of around 2,32% in 2010 [14, 15] . Most of Dani population dwell in six districts, namely the Regency of Puncak, the Regency of Tolikara (98,31%), Lanny Jaya (97,62%), Puncak Jaya (94,31%), Jaya Wijaya (82,02%), and Central Mamberamo (78,98%)[14]. In addition, the smallest percentage of this population group also live in the Regency of Jayapura, Nabire, Intan Jaya, Keerom, Yalimo, Ndgua, and Dogiyai, ranging around 5,70% to 0,33%, accordingly. Interestingly, some ethnic groups have sub-ethnic group communities that spread in some districts and regencies. For example, Mimika tribe has Amungme and Kamoro sub-ethnic groups. who live in Mimika districts, with total population of approximately 12,95% in 2010. Meanwhile, Biak Numfor tribe can be found in Biak Regency, Supiori and Biak Numfor districts, as well as in Raja Ampat District of West Papua Province. Most members of Biak inhabitants living in Supiori District in 2010 accounted for 94,89% while in the capital city of Papua, the population was around 69,89%. Furthermore, Biak people in West Papua Province accounted for almost 50% during that year.

In terms of demography, the total population of Papua Province in 2016 was estimated to be 3,207,444 people and placing men as the highest dwellers compared to their counterpart[16]. Unfortunately, the latest demographic data that can be accessed according to sex ratio was the Papua Statistics of 2014[16]. The data reveals that the proportion of men in this province is 52,80%[17]. Therefore, Papua province is named 'the land of men'[14]. With regards to the socio-economic aspect, the current data demonstrates that 28,54% of the population was in poverty line in 2016, and most of the Papuan worked in traditional agricultural sector (77,85%) in 2010[4]. Undoubtedly, this matter has contributed to the complex deprivation of the society. For example, the number of population who completed their junior school was less than 50% in 2012, whilst the marital age of women in 2013 was 16 year old[17]. In turn, the Human Development Index (HDI) of this province is recognised as the lowest rank of Indonesian HDI compared to other provinces[18]. It is noted that the HDI of Papua province was 58,05% in 2016 and the growth of the HDI was very low, at only 1,40%[18].

Some studies link the low socio-demographic pattern of the indigenous Papuan with the high prevalence on maternal mortality ratio in some regions of Papua province [3, 11, 12, 13]. For example, low level of educational background and occupation of amungme and kamoro people, the sub-ethnic of Mimika community, is associated with the cultural birth delivery methods[11]. Likewise, the negative cultural model, including patriarchal paradigm, has impacts on the minimum access of health service facilities during pregnancy through childbirth among Papuan indigenous women, even though they live in the capital city of Papua Province, where the infrastructure such as public transport and road access are available in accessing mother and child community health care in this province [3, 12, 13]. This issue really indicates that the complex deprivation experienced by Papuan women has a strong link with their cultural values, leading them to be the vulnerable group in their own homeland.

The culture of Papuan tribes in pregnancy through post-natal

Some evidence in qualitative studies has revealed that the Papuan ethnic minority groups are still engaging with negative cultural values nowadays, threatening women's vitality, even their lives. For example, Alwi et al. stated that Amungme women in Mimika tribes said that birth delivery is a disgusting situation and can transmit diseases to people who help the women[11]. Hence, no one will help the mothers during delivery process, even their husband or the closest relatives, leaving mothers to have labour in certain places around their homes, such as in the toilet or in the kitchen after they have lightened the wooden stove and collected banana leaves. In addition, Alwi et al. found slightly same traditional practices of the Kamoro tribe. They are also required to provide banana leaves as well as ignite the wooden stove. The smoke covers all sides of the house, and Kamoro women can inhale the smoke to improve their enthusiasm during delivery process. In contrast, Kamoro women can be assisted by an aged traditional birth attendance trusted by the community. All the cultural practices above are really harmful for Mimika women and their newborn babies, because they can suffer from infections related to the unclean and unsafe delivery model. Also, these mothers and the newborn babies can suffer from diseases related to the respiratory tract, such as tuberculosis, because the women and their newborn babies inhale the smoke and steam from the wooden stoves. Other sub-tribes with very primitive cultural behaviour has been founded by Indarto, a health expert concerned with the safe motherhood program in Papua Province[13]. According to Indarto, the sub-tribes, named rawa-rawa and nabire, have a 'blood taboo' method that keeps pregnant women across their village away in an isolated area during the waiting period until postpartum. In addition, pregnant women have to live in a small place that has been fenced to avoid the village population from unfortunate situations caused by the blood of the women during the childbirth. This cultural practice strays very far from a sense of humanity, and can affect the mothers' and the children's well-being, as they are vulnerable from diseases in that period.

Different issues associated with health service accessibility are demonstrated by Dani and Biak community. Munro asserted that for some Dani women, regardless of educational attainment and the area they live in, such as in rural or district areas. Dani women were likely to seek unskilled birth attendance who are elderly indigenous women rather than attaining antenatal care in community health services[3]. According to Munro, the reasons for this circumstance are diverse. but he highlighted that emotional bonding as fellow indigenous community is the main reason. Also, the traditional birth attendances have been gaining the respect of indigenous community due to their ages, and also has vast experience in natural labour. Moreover, since the traditional birth attendances approach the pregnant women by traditional treatments, such as massaging stomachs of pregnant women, and treating them with ritual ceremonies, the pregnant women and their family feel comfortable with the traditional birth attendance. In contrast, they feel embarrassed and shameful (taboo) to show their sensitive

areas to health providers, and having touched by midwives has caused them to abandon mother and children clinics[11]. Apparently, the traditional practice of massaging the stomach of a pregnant woman is really dangerous for both the mother and their foetus, because it can lead to the bleeding and premature death due to placenta abruption[19]. Otherwise, the issue regarding cultural sensitivity towards health providers needs to be concerned and addressed by increasing the soft skills of those skilled birth attendances by utilising cultural approaches. On top of that, some evidence demonstrated that emotional bonding of health providers and their cultural understanding are required to increase the motivation of indigenous people in accessing health facilities[20, 21]. Another study came up with cultural silence issue for some women with unintended pregnancy[3]. This pregnant women refer to the traditional birth attendances due to shame and fear of their parents and their partner, because cultural values forbid women to be pregnant before they are married[3]. In contrast, Rerey et al. found that the good behaviour of some Biak women accessing community health services for antenatal care and birth delivery is because their husband permitted them[12]. This reason is also true for some Mimika women[11].

However, issues related to the patriarchy have risen in the study by Rerey, et al in Biak population(12). They found that decisions made by husbands and their families determine the circumstances of women during pregnancy and childbirth. For example, the husband and parents in law of Biak women forbid them to obtain immunisation as well as certain foods and bathing in the sea during their pregnancy. Furthermore, the Biak women may receive penalty that affects their dowry when the baby they deliver is not as requested by their husband and their parents in law. In addition, the family is likely expecting a Biak woman to deliver a boy rather than a girl[12].

Discussion

Most of the impacts on negative cultural values above delineate a strong correlation between poor socio-demographic status, such as education attainment, poor health knowledge, and poverty problems experienced by some ethnic minority groups in Papua province. As such, the paternalistic issue is an obvious phenomenon, placing women in the second position, thus leading to the contested refrain circumstances of women. This situation is explained by Rerey, et al. who revealed that some Biak community in their study demonstrated good knowledge regarding the importance of health service accessibility and positive behaviour to maintain their health during pregnancy, but they did not deliver in health facilities, as their husband and parents in-law did not allowed them due to their cultural perspective[12]. Paternalistic pattern in the Papua Province has led to poor health condition of women and this may affect their mental health as well, since the women experience some restrictions and were discriminated during their pregnancy through post-partum. It can be imagined when young women who do not have experience to deliver their baby but have to stay in isolated areas until they are

postpartum. In addition, the situation can devastate a woman's health, since she is vulnerable to complication during their pregnancy until 42 months of their postpartum, when a husband, who is the sole decision maker, has poor knowledge and understanding regarding reproductive health whilst these husbands and their relatives and community engage with negative cultural practices[12]. Moreover, since some indigenous women reveal that they cannot come to health facilities to deliver their baby if their husband do not permit them, it is really obvious that the high prevalence of maternal mortality ratio in Papua has strong correlation with negative cultural practices. Sad but true, the magnitude of this problem has brought about devastating issue not only in household and community level, but also in the subnational and national levels. This is because in paternalistic population, women have pivotal role in childrearing their children that will be the next generation of a nation. In accordance with this situation, I would suggest the integration of public policy that links health sector with education sector as well as social sector. In this sense, the health and prosperity of the ethnic minority group is not merely the responsibility of health sector. Yet, the prosperity of indigenous groups, particularly women community, can be addressed by providing them high formal education, as well as health service accessibility. For the negative behavioural values, contribution of the community leader, particularly tribal leaders and religious leaders, is crucial to engage the community with health providers and changing the cultural values that can affect the health of mothers and the children.

Conclusion

Maternal mortality rates in Papua province is still high compared to the national number. Thus, to achieve sustainable goals, the government and community in all spheres should be concerned with the health of women, because the prosperity and well-being of women is crucial and determine the healthy status of their family, particularly their children. In addition, healthy women attaining high level of formal education as well as accessing health facilities can improve the quality of their children. In turn, the next generation of a nation can also increase and influence the development status of the nation. However, in Papua Province, the high prevalence in maternal deaths indicates a strong association with negative cultural behaviour of some ethnic minority groups that tend to discriminate women's right, particularly in decision making related to their health. This cyclical problem occurs since their adolescent as girls are marrying in young ages. Moreover, women's health is determined by the decision of their husband and parents in-law during pregnancy through postnatal. The tribal communities also influence the decision, putting indigenous women in harmful cultural practices. Meanwhile, an unskilled birth attendance believed to be able provide maternity care, may threaten the live of the mothers and their babies. Concerning the magnitude of this problem, a health system that is integrated with other sectors is important to increase the prosperity and well-being of these women. Also, cultural approach in the community level is seen to have pivotal roles to attract indigenous community to access health facilities and

reject negative cultural values. In this regard, involving tribal leaders in the community level would influence their community perspectives so that they will be concerned with the problem related to women's health. In turn, the health community will be attainable and sustainable development goals will be achievable.

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

2nd Prize Winner

The Long and Winding Road:Japanese Army's "Comfort Women" and the Fail to Redress

The Long and Winding Road: Japanese Army's "Comfort Women" and the Fail to Redress

Introduction

The first half of the 20th century was a series of frantic years for Japan: not only it had to deal with the Sino-Japanese War in 1937, but also the theater of World War II taking place in the Pacific in the mid-1940s forced Japan to face the pressure coming from the Allies. As if these were not enough, among the chain of raging wars, Japan still needed to give a share of its "attention" to its colonies in Indonesia as well as the surrounding Asian countries such as the Philippines, Taiwan, China and South Korea.

While the discourse of war has mainly been about the game of political chess of who won and lost, there is an overshadowed narrative that lies quiet beneath the masculine aspects of wartime: that is, the issues of women enslaved to wage the war. History has shown us how war has accelerated the violation of women's bodies near battlefields and military bases (Watanabe, 1999) and in this case, Japanese army is not out of exception. As many as 200.000 women (Griffiths, 2017), usually coming from poor rural neighborhood, were drafted from the colonized countries as sex slaves in many points of the Japan-occupied areas for sexual transmitted diseases control and leisure. These women were called jugun ianfu or the "comfort women" as the Japanese government euphemistically labeled them, although "comfort" probably is the least accurate word to describe their lives.

After 60 years in silence, victims finally started to come out and dared to speak of their horrible experiences of being sexually exploited, and this has gained momentum ever since. However, victims of Japanese wrongs are still far from attaining reconciliation and closure (Suzuki, 2011). In this essay, I will try to unravel why reparation in the case of "comfort women" has not attained closure by looking at cases from Japan, which is deemed to be the crime perpetrator, as well as various afflicted countries in Asia.

"Comfort Women" in History

It is never an easy task to give an exact answer to the question on when the sexual slavery by Japanese army was first institutionalized. In the essay by Chang (2009), it is said that the first brothels that exclusively served the Japanese army were established in 1932 during the Shanghai Incident, a military confrontation used by Japan as a pretext for China's further control. To this version of history, Soh (1996) also accorded. In the other hand, Watanabe (1999) wrote that sex slavery by the Japanese army had started as early as the Japanese invasion to Siberia in 1918, where the Japanese army took along Japanese prostitutes from poor farmer families.

In the early years, the Japanese army only recruited prostitutes to fill up the "comfort stations". It was not until 1937, the year where Nanjing Massacre happened, that the Japanese army drafted in full force non-prostitute women from outside of Japan (Soh, 1999). To prevent the spread of venereal diseases born by the prostitutes and the soldiers from raping more Chinese civilians during the raging war against China, the military leadership suggested that they recruit more women from colonial Korea who are presumed to be virgins and free of sexually transmitted diseases. This pledge was agreed by the Japanese government who later in 1939 enforced an all-out systematic mobilization of Korean from both sexes to wage the war as members of voluntary submitting-body, or Chongsindae (Soh, 1996).

Not only in Korea, this practice of women-taking also became institusionalized throughout Japan-colonized countries such as Indonesia and the Philippines. Contrary to the voluntary spirit, the process of recruitment for the "comfort women" was mostly done by coercion (as in abduction and taking by force) and persuasion (as in luring the women into believing false promises of employment in industrial and health sector). Aside of Asian women, several Dutch women were also forcibly abducted from its former colony, Indonesia. While most Asian women were put to serve low-class soldiers, European and Japanese were to serve high-ranking officers (Watanabe, 1999), both in a very brutal environment. As told by Sri Sukanti, who were taken away by the Japanese soldiers only when she was 9:
"(I was) caressed and kissed so many times... being forced to have sex three times a day, not every day. Hmm, of course I was crying, I was far from my parents, who would want to help me?" (Lestari, 2017)

A Tragedy Beyond Rape

Remembering that many wars have similar narratives of women's rights violation, an important question must be raised into the discussion: why is the practice of "comfort women" considered as sexual slavery?

Contextually speaking, I would like to firstly quote Barry (1981), a feminist scholar active in writing on sexual slavery and prostitution. She argued in her text that 'sexual slavery' is "...all situations where women or girls cannot change the immediate conditions of their existence; where regardless of how they got into those conditions they cannot get out; and where they are subject to sexual exploitation and physical abuse". If we look back into how these "comfort women" were "recruited" and given little to no choice about their bodies, the practice of institutionalizing "comfort women" would already suffice to be classified as sexual slavery. To add the aforementioned point, what made the case of "comfort women" different is its collective, long-standing, systematic, and institutionalized dimension of the practice (Watanabe, 1999; Yoko, 1999 - 2000; and Soh, 1996). These "comfort women" and prostituted women have no legal or psychological identity; they also lost their language and

culture, for the example by given Japanese names once they arrived in the hands of Japanese army (Watanabe, 1999). The harsh implication of the practice also did not stop since the time it happened: many former "comfort women" are prejudiced by the society, choose to live alone, are traumatized by romantic companionship, and are on the edge of poverty line. Also, today's practices of Japanese prostitution where the sex workers are mainly Southeast Asian women as well as the sex tourism of Japanese men to Southeast Asian countries are deemed to be the extended legacy of the Japanese imperialism on women's bodies (Watanabe, 1999). This is different to rape cases that are usually sporadic, unorganized, personal, and ahistorical in nature.

Many feminists and human rights activists have argued that "comfort women" should be conceived as slavery instead of prostitution, considering the terrible and inhumane environment under which the women had to work (Soh, 1996). In the report of Radhika Coomaraswamy, the U.N. special investigator into violence against women, for the U.N. Human Rights Comission, it concluded that Japan must admit its legal responsibility, identify, and punish those responsible for the sex slavery during the war, compensate the victims, apologize to the survivors in writing, and teach its students this hidden chapter in Japanese history (Soh, 1996).

Why Redress (Still) Fails

Despite years of attaining redress and closure, this case of "comfort women" still has a long way from reparations. There are intertwining factors, almost inseparable and interconnected, that help create a condition where justice seem a like a pipe dream for "comfort women". As a result of vast literature research, I group up the factors into three major groups, which are those coming from the 1) government of Japan and of the afflicted countries; 2) society of Japan and of the afflicted countries; and also 3) activists fighting for the "comfort women".

The Government

Japanese government has been notorious for its reluctance to admit their wrongs related to "comfort women". For years Japan argued that the "comfort stations" were run by private sectors and that there was no governmental involvement in it (Chang, 2009). It was not until 1992, when a Japanese historian Yoshiaki Yoshimi discovered government records in the Japanese Defense Agency library in 1992 proving a direct role of the Japanese government in managing the brothels or "comfort stations" (Chang, 2009), that Japan finally admitted their involvement in the cruel practice of sexual slavery. Even so, Japanese government still denied until 1993 any involvement of coercion by the state in the recruitment of "comfort women" and denied any possibility of material compensation to Japan (Soh, 1996). In 1993, a statement of apology was finally issued by the Chief Cabinet Secretary Yohei Kono regarding

the result of the study on the issue of "comfort women". However, many people deemed that Japan has not made any serious effort following the statement of apology by Kono in 1993.

In July 1995, Japanese government enacted a non-profit organization called National/Asian Women's Fund (AWF or the Fund, hereafter) that collected donations from Japan citizens to address the "moral responsibility" toward former "comfort women". This Fund, as expected, gained numerous criticisms; mainly about the source of the fund that did not come from the government, hinting a sense of reluctance of the government to give compensation. The male-dominated elite discourse as represented by the government officials, intellectuals, and opinion leaders seemed to regard the issue of "comfort women" as a mere issue of financial compensation, with very little humanistic approach used to look at the case (Soh, 1996). Even today, the reluctance lives on: it can still be seen from Tokyo's rage towards the enaction of the comfort women statue by Korean activists (Han and Griffiths, 2017) and Shinzo Abe, the current Prime Minister of Japan, critisizing a U.S. schoolbook as "skewing history" for writing about women being forced to work for Japanese military during the World War II (Fackler, 2015).

This reluctance of Japanese government to solve the "comfort women" case is also supplemented by the afflicted countries' government's lack of attempt to make this issue their attention. In the case of Indonesia, the urgency of "comfort women" case has been overshadowed, for example, by the '65 Tragedy warcrime. In Taiwan, the history of severe opression by Chinese Nationalist Party created an apologist and rather positive image of Japanese colonialism (Suzuki, 2011). This causes what is called as "competing memories" (Suzuki, 2011), where historical crimes are competing to mobilize societal attention in order to place it on top of political agenda and could very possibly result in forgetting, in this case of the "comfort women" tragedy.

The Society

How Japanese and the afflicted countries' society position the victims also affected the movement to redress. Conservative anti-apology groups as well as some former soldiers in Japan rationalized the atrocity as a natural part of warfare and pointed out that everybody suffered during the war (Soh, 1996), victim-blaming the former "comfort women". On the other hand, the patriarchal perspective on woman's virginity held high in some countries makes it hard for the victims to talk openly about their horrible experience without being frowned upon. In most East Asian countries where the Confucian ideology is embraced, a woman's dignity is determined by her state of being chaste. According to Watanabe (1999), "comfort women" only had two alternatives: either to submit and become "comfort women" or to kill themselves to protect their chastity that is deemed more valuable than their lives in Confucian ideas. The harsh social implication of losing chastity in such society is often even

more psychologically burdening than losing virginity itself (Zhou, 1991).

Similar narrative of patriarchal reaction to "comfort women" is also found in Indonesia. As told by an Indonesian ex-"comfort women" Mardiyem or Momoye (Japanese word for "the singer"), she had to face many harsh stigmas from society. Living in a patriarchal traditional Javanese society, people accused her of promiscuity regarding her past as a former Japanese "comfort woman". She was suspected as a "husband-snatcher" who was very "sex-thristy" (Jurnal Perempuan, 2016). Pramoedya Ananta Toer also pictured heart-achingly how survivors decided to live in exile than come home in his novel Perawan Remaja dalam Cengkeraman Militer (lit. Young Girls in the Palms of the Military Force). Published in 1999, this piece was managed to be written in his exile in Buru Island in Eastern Indonesia, where he met several old women that didn't look like native Buru. These women turned out to be former "comfort women" from Java who were abandoned in their "comfort stations" in Buru Island after Japan's retreat. These women didn't have the way to come back, nor they had the bravery to meet their family as non-virgins, hence the decision to stay.

In such patriarchal society where women's worth is only seen through whether or not their hymen is still intact, former "comfort women" have lived a hard life. It is then understandable how the survivors chose to keep their history unsaid instead of voicing their will for justice in such victim-blaming circumstances.

The "Comfort Women" Activism

Although sounding paradoxical, the "comfort women" activism can actually contribute some share to the hindrance in attaining closure. The "comfort women" activism is basically split into two diverging opinions in relation with the aforementioned AWF: those who accept the goodwill of Japan to make a reconciliative move and those who refuse it since the money did not purely come from government funding. Countries like Korea and Taiwan have taken hard-line dogmatic positions against AWF, while those from the Philippines and the Netherlands have chosen multiple and pragmatic positions (Soh, 2003). The split of positions towards AWF brings a gap in the solidarity towards justice for "comfort women". In the Philippines alone, the split created two factions of the activism: one is LILA-Pilipina that is against the Fund and Malaya Lolas that accepts the Fund (Soh, 2003). The politization of this issue by the anti-Fund activists such as those in Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, while well-intentioned, may have had the unfortunate effect of taking away the decision-making power of individual "comfort women" (Chang, 2009). In the Dutch case, for example, some women interviewed stated that they actually preferred the AWF money to state compensation, because the former comes from Japanese people who wanted to express their regret to war victims while the latter would be money that was forcibly generated from an unwilling government (Soh, 2003). It can be difficult to differ the real expectation of the "comfort women" about the ideal

form of reparations from the activists' political agenda. Education by the NGOs about the history and implication of the AWF or other reparatory movements by Japan is necessary to some extent. Nevertheless, in the end, the "comfort women" should be given their freedom to choose which decision is best for them.

Conclusions

Many still run around the idea that it is only the government who holds the key to reparation. The truth is, reparation should be supported by every single component of both the crime-perpetrating country and afflicted countries envisioning for a better future for the victimized. Although the decisions of the Japanese government are the key player in this game, we should also refrain that society's involvement as well as activists' less-politicized view would be necessary for the journey towards justice for "comfort women" on this already long and winding road.

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3rd Prize Winner

Belis: The Chain of Poverty Behind the Marriage Tradition of Southwest Sumba Society

"An insighful essay on the dilemma of preserving ancestral tradition of marriage and the impoverished conditions of the family in the Sumbanese society. The essay provides a strong argument for breaking the poverty chain and for preserving traditional customs without blindly submit to it."

Ratna Noviani Ph.D
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Belis: The Chain of Poverty Behind the Marriage Tradition of Southwest Sumba Society

Introduction

A marriage bond is built to form a new social institution, the family. In a family, there are various family functions that will ultimately bring happiness to all of its members. According to MacIver's theory of family, there are two functions of family. (1) Essential or primary, related to hereditary preservation and (2) non-essential or secondary, related to economic well-being and self-development. Therefore, the procession of marriage becomes a very important thing with various stages that must be passed.

In Indonesia, the marriage procession is still closely linked to different customs and cultural provisions in each region. Sumba, one of the small islands located in southern part of Indonesia, has a special tradition in the procession of marriage. The hallmark of the marriage procession stage in Sumbanese custom is to give belis or dowries to the bride's family by the bridegroom. Belis can be livestock like buffalo, horse, or pig, and gold jewelry, tenun ikat fabric, or some money. The determination of the size of the belis is formulated through customary meetings between the two extended families, and the size of the belis depends on the last education that the bride has completed, to the extent of the social status of the bride's parents. The size of the belis in general is not small, but it takes hundreds of livestock to constitute a belis, which is given to the bride family gradually, starting from the introductory stage between the two big families up to the stage of marriage. The bridegroom has an obligation to fulfill the demand of the bride's family concerning the magnitude and details of the belis, in which if unfulfilled, the marriage procession cannot be carried out.

Chain of Poverty

So, what is the problem of this belis? A groom will try in various ways to meet the demands of the belis. When the results are not sufficient to meet the demands of a very large belis, then they choose to owe. Taking official debt in the bank certainly requires collateral, and most of those who are subsistence farmers, do not have enough collateral to borrow money from the bank. This leads them to prefer to borrow from loan sharks, without the need for collateral, the loan is quickly liquefied, but the interest on the loan is more than 40 percent of the loan received. In addition to being owed to moneylenders, many are indebted to relatives by borrowing their livestock, which should the time comes for their relatives to need animals, the borrower is obligated to return the livestock they borrowed. Not infrequently they also commit criminal acts such as theft or seizure to get extra money, which leads into a high number of criminal case in Sumba.

In fact, the issue did not stop when all the belis had been paid off, and the problems that followed were much greater than that. After the marriage takes place and the bride and groom begin to live together and build a family, problems will arise. Starting from the debt of animals that cannot be paid, thus making the husband prioritize work to repay the debt of the belis. This certainly raises the big question, how about financing their daily lives? Effects that are so easily visible are the inability to meet decent living standards such as food, clothing, and decent shelter.

Data from Statistics Indonesia in the publication of economic indicators of Southwest Sumba Regency shows that, in 2016 there are 99.26 thousand poor people or about 30.63 percent of the population in Southwest Sumba Regency. Meanwhile, the percentage of poor people in East Nusa Tenggara Province is 22.19 percent. One of the aspects of the poverty is obviously in terms of housing. Most households still inhabit the house with conditions and sanitation that is still very far from feasible. Based on the results of the National Socioeconomic Survey 2016 in Southwest Sumba Regency, the following description of housing conditions can be obtained.

Table 1. Percentage of Households in Southwest Sumba Regency by Housing Indicators

No.	Households Indicators	Percentage of Households
(1)	(2)	(3)
1	Roof type, made of leaves	34,82
2	Wall type, made of bamboo	68,92
3	Floor type, made of bamboo and soil	67,56
4	House without water closet	36,57
5	Final disposal in the beach/garden	41,48

Source: People's Welfare Statistics for West Sumba in 2016

Besides affecting the fulfillment of physical needs, the fulfillment of non-physical needs also becomes a problem. They only give minimum attention to educational facilities, also parents are less motivating to tell their children to go to school. They tend to send their children to work to help their parents in the garden. Violence against women and children also often occurs, whether physical violence, or psychological violence. When their children reach the age of marriage, then this belis tradition must also be met, although often the debt belis from their parents have not been paid off. This is the chain of poverty that occurs in the Sumbanese society. The debt inherited from generation to generation binds the next offspring to settle the debt with various consequences that must be accepted, namely living in economic and social limitations.

Out of the Poverty Chain

Sumba is actually a potential island with unexplored nature and megalithic culture that is still very strongly embraced by the people. This natural wealth is actually very likely to be well managed with competent human resources, and it would be even better if its human resources are indigenous to Sumba. The courage to break the chain of poverty is a necessary thing to get rid of the restrained customs. This does not mean abandoning the noble values embodied in every custom procession, but adjusting to customs, not the life of the next generation. For three years as a civil servant of the Statistics Indonesia serving in Southwest Sumba District, I have seen firsthand the living conditions of people living in the poverty chain from various aspects.

Picture 1. Housing Condition in One of a Village in Southwest Sumba

Source: Personal Documentation

Better Future for Sumba

Then, does the Sumbanese people have to abandon the ancestral tradition in order to become a more advanced society? Of course not, tradition must be maintained as an ancestral heritage, but must be adapted to the current conditions. Based on discussions with local government, there is already a plan to restrict the belis using regent rule. However, it has not been followed up until now. One possible alternative solution is to empower youths entering marriage. Making youths busy with productive lives needs to be done, for example by moving them to activate the weaving industry, turning woven products into clothes, bags, ornaments, and so on. In addition, providing English training to youths can also be an empowerment effort, so they can work as tour guides for foreign tourists who come to various attractions in Southwest Sumba. Thus, they have a broader insight into the orientation of better family life.

In addition to local regulations and the empowerment of pre-married people, socialization efforts should also be undertaken through customary community groups and social gatherings, such as hamlets, villages, church associations, et cetera. The socialization needs to explain how to break the customs that curb. Keep preserving custom by giving belis, but must be adapted to the ability of the economy. In the socialization effort, the explanation given should be accompanied by a detailed and logical calculation, so the cost that would be spent to pay belis, can be used to meet the needs of daily living and savings after marriage. The explanation can be submitted by some families who have proven that they can get a better life and that it is worth it, because the cost for belis issued is not burdensome. Thus, it is hoped that the poverty chain can be cut without leaving behind ancestral heritage.

Keeping traditions inherent in future generations, while ensuring that all life needs after marriage remain fulfilled, must be done. This should be done in order for the Sumbanese society to be a developed society by maintaining its tradition, and passing it on to the next generation.

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Honorable Mention 1

Assalamualaikum: behind the hidden street harassment and the abused Islamic greeting

" A careful observation of sexual harassment on the street that has never been written by anyone. This essay describes the vulnerability of women confronted with the threat of sexual harassment using religious-based narratives that escape public scrutiny"

Dr. Antarini Pratiwi

Assalamualaikum: Behind the Hidden Street Harassment and the Abused Islamic Greeting

In recent years, the practice of street harassment is prevalent yet largely undiscussed in Indonesia, particularly to women in urban areas. The lack of empirical data on the scale of street harassment shows that the issue attracts very little serious attention. Women continue to express their concern of street harassment solely in women-only forums or discussions in private setting.

According to Stop Street Harassment, the 'conventional' mode of catcalling and street harassment are honking and whistling, calling out phrases like "hey baby", sexist comments, authoritative demand to smile or look at certain direction, persistent requests for a response, evaluative comments, both positive like "nice legs" and negative like "fat cow", vulgar gestures, and "pssst" sounds (Stop Street Harassment, 2016). Aside from the 'conventional' way as stated above, Indonesian women, particularly those with religious dress code where they cover the majority of their body parts (or hijab-wearing women), suffer a new way of street harassment using the familiar greeting assalamualaikum. The usage of assalamualaikum, a greeting widely used by Moslem meant to wish peace upon others, as street harassment in this country remains mostly an untapped issue due to the difficulty in validating assalamualaikum as a form of harassment. Despite the lack of discussion and attention towards this issue in public discourse, plenty accounts on Indonesian women's experience of feeling publicly harassed through this greeting can be found online[1].

This essay argues that street harassment is not limited to certain forms and is relative to the specific society context where it occurs, proven by how assalamualaikum has become a popular way to harass women, especially towards hijab-wearing women in Indonesia. This essay aims to show that adhering to religious dress code has little to do with reducing the risks to be targeted in street harassment, contrary to the persistently widespread belief in modern Indonesia that women are the one 'asking for it'.

Street Harassment in Indonesia

Street harassment is understood as a 'highly symbolic form' of violence experienced by someone in public spaces in verbal and non-verbal, physical and non-physical actions, ranging from a whistle, leer, suggestive noises, sexual remarks, suggestive stares, to touches in certain body parts (Peoples 2008). Sexual harassment, regardless of its form, has a universal effect of making the victim, mostly women, feel violated and humiliated. Street harassment as an issue is difficult to be addressed because the harassers can easily blend into anonymous masses. Hence, victims struggle to get confessions or proofs. Studies of street harassment from several renowned scholars suggest that street harassment is a symbolic practice and evidence of male perpetrators trying to reclaim their masculinity in public (Bowman 1993,

1 See Arif (2017), Kushardini (2015), and Mahita (2016)

Peoples 2008). This is done through enforcing their 'power' to rule the public space and indirectly repress victims to retreat into their private space by making them uncomfortable and humiliated. Benard and Schlaffer (1996) in their study of street harassment mention that the mostly encountered answers of why men harass are for entertainment among male groups, for boredom reliever, and for enjoyment.

Despite growing concern among several organizations advocating women's right, street harassment remains an unpopular issue rarely taken seriously in Indonesia. It gained more publicity with the rise of popular-content-based media platform where youths are encouraged to write contemporary issues, such as Coconut and Magdalene; however, for the rest of Indonesian, street harassment is still an alien concept. The reluctance to bring this issue into the spotlight is mainly because of its close association with feminism, something that most Indonesian is suspicious of and unwilling to be associated with. The whole notion of feminism, notwithstanding the differing school of thoughts within the movement, is seen as a western product threatening the eastern way of living (Mulia, 2016). The absence of a local identity carrying the same mission as feminism makes it difficult for street harassment and catcalling to be a worthwhile issue. Indonesia does not even have a word for catcalling, which makes it even harder to mainstream and advocate this issue. Furthermore, Indonesian society is still struggling with more pressing issues under the same umbrella of advocating women's rights, such as domestic violence and rape. It is hard to mainstream street harassment to be a cross-cutting issue because the impact seems less tangible compared to the others, at least to a certain degree.

The importance to talk more about this issue is because the systemic thinking of objectifying women is still widespread in Indonesia, proven by recent events where important public figures such as former Governor of Jakarta Fauzi Bowo[2], West Aceh Regent Ramli Mansur[3], former Speaker of House of Representative Marzuki Alie[4], and recently National Police Chief Tito Karnavian[5] dismissing the lack of consent or blaming the dress code of rape victims. Indonesian netizens in various social media platforms still frequently call out women to 'cover themselves' in order to avoid 'arousing' men in their surroundings. There is a belief that promiscuous women who do not adhere to these religious practices and codes are degrading themselves and thus 'deserving' of such harassment. The focus of sexual harassment is then concentrated on glorifying hijab as 'solution' to armor women from possible harassment, instead of on addressing the objectification of women, which is rooted deep in our society.

Using *Assalamualaikum* to Street Harass

Expression of piety in Indonesia is gaining immense popularity and the number of Indonesian women who wear hijab in recent decades has also increased (Dewi 2017). Hijab has become

2 see Sidik (2011)

3 see Saputra, (2016)

4 see Gatra (2012)

5 see BBC Indonesia (2017)

more popular compared to 10 to 20 years ago, especially compared to the times when hijab still comes with stigmas and difficulty in job seeking (Rinaldo, 2008). Women wearing hijab, especially in urban areas, take up a significant portion of women we encountered on a daily basis. Despite the increase of women with more 'modest' dress code, verbal sexual harassment in Indonesia is still considerably high (Reuters, 2017). As mentioned in the earlier part of this writing, women with hijab receive persistent street harassment, not only by the conventional way of catcalling but also by shouting of assalamualaikum by a male on the street.

Why do men resort to using assalamualaikum as a way to street-harass women? As mentioned earlier, the common motive of street harassment is for masculine affirmation through exertion of dominance over public space. Peoples (2008) suggest that public space, where street harassment occurs, is a vital ground which provides men alternative forms to affirm their masculinity, especially when it is difficult to do so through work or other means. As women with religious dress code dominate public space, the expression of street harassment also takes form in religious expressions.

Assalamualaikum, an Islamic greeting universally used all around to world meant to wish peace upon people, is abused as a street harassment in Indonesia. Validation of the greeting as a blatant street harassment is difficult because unlike other forms of street harassment, assalamualaikum is attached to religious values. In fact, the religious values attached to it makes the greeting as a street harassment so widespread, because it tricks the harassed women to give the benefit of the doubt that the greeting is purely cordial greeting, while still effectively functions as oppressive expression towards women, particularly those with hijab.

It is important to distinguish which occasion of assalamualaikum falls under street harassment and which one serve its proper function as a harmless greeting. To be categorized as street harassment, the assalamualaikum greeting mimics the characterization of the 'conventional' street harassment: 1) that it is done by an unacquainted male to female, 2) that it is done in the absence of audience, and 3) that it meant to limit response from women (Bowman 1993). The type of derogatory assalamualaikum is those which are shouted loudly, often from across the street, said with certain suggestive tone, and followed by whistles or suggestive facial expression. These are hard to spot because they are subtle and often felt only by the targeted women. The lack of response will evoke the street harasser to give further harassment remarks that the women are 'cocky' for not replying the greeting, because in Islam assalamualaikum should always be replied. This will usually put the women in a very tough situation. In a way, they felt violated by the invasion of their space, but at the same time they are doubting or preventing themselves from thinking so.

It is also a form of street harassment because women do not seem to be free to return the same way of greeting to a male stranger in public spaces. Assalamualaikum, or any polite greeting meant for recognition of encounter, is meant to be said when the interaction is mutually consented (Firth 1972), such as when two people meet face to face and greet each other before conversing, or when it is intended to open a conversation. These are usually

done with good intention, such as when we are visiting other people's houses or greeting people on the phone. In Islamic teaching, the meaning of assalamualaikum is 'peace be upon you', where the content of the saying is also reflected in the way we greet other people; with politeness and sincerity. Shouting assalamualaikum, followed by whistles, laugh, and suggestive expression do not reflect politeness and sincerity and thus counterproductive to the actual purpose of the greeting itself.

In places around the world, there is already a growing movement where women are encouraged to stand up against street harassment, but this is easier to be done when the harassed victims are clear about the harasser's intention to oppress them. Obvious suggestive remarks such as "hey babe", or "nice legs" are easier to be identified; while assalamualaikum is not. On top of initial reluctance to confront the harasser, there is also self-doubt inflicted upon the victims that they should not be offended by religious remarks. Moreover, it is difficult to express discomfort with street harassment using assalamualaikum because the victim has trouble finding the right expression to fight back and reclaim their space. In the case of sexual remarks, several movements to fight street harassment such as 'ihollaback' encourage rebutting the remarks itself. For example, saying that her body part is not for them to comment on, or that she refuses to give him 'pleasure' that he asked. However, in the case of assalamualaikum, there is no alternative reply aside from waalaikumsalam (peace be upon you too). Women will either forcibly reply or just ignore it because they do not want to make a scene. Talking back will most likely unsatisfactory because the harasser will make an excuse only wanting to 'greet' the women. The women will be left with self-doubt, their feelings invalidated and they internalize the idea that women exaggerate and 'crazy' for claiming non-existent things (Kitzinger and Wilkinson, 1997).

As a result, victims continuously receive the psychological effects of street harassment, but with no space to validate their experience and fight back. Study shows that street harassment made women feel "…embarrassed, humiliated, furious, and helpless… vulnerable and defenseless", on top of being afraid to 'trigger' further sexual assault (Bowman 1993). Frederickson and Roberts (1997) also suggest that women who are aware of frequent sexual objectification by others tend to internalize it into self-objectification, which will result in lower self-esteem, more frequent fear and anger, and unhappiness with appearance (Lord 2009).

Furthermore, this will inflict the fear of occupying public spaces without a male companion, even when they are covering themselves to 'prevent arousing men'. This effectively disempowers women by limiting their presence and robs away their most fundamental liberty, which is the right to go anywhere in public as they please. The act of neglect towards this absence of liberty encourages us to go backward into patriarchal society. Fregoso (2003) suggests that a similar thing found in patriarchal societies is a tendency to keep women from leaving the putatively patriarchal 'guard' which is the private sphere--and to paint the public space as intrinsically unsafe for them.

It is an irony because hijab in Indonesian sociological perspective symbolizes resistance (Soekarba and Melati 2017). It is particularly associated with many women activists and

women-led organizations during New Order and Reformation era (El Guindi 1999). For modern Indonesian women, the reason behind the decision to wear hijab is to serve as identity, self-actualization, and a better sense of security (Budiastuti, 2012). Case studies of Smith-Hefner (2007) show that among the recent hijab user are the young, well-educated, and socially assertive members of the urban middle class. In contrary to those points, street harassment using assalamualaikum has quietly served to symbolize helplessness, invasion, and defenselessness of women with hijab.

It is also an irony for the assalamualaikum as a greeting itself; because it is meant to wish people peace, but in the case of street harassment, it has actually take away the peace of the victim. Instead, the use of religious greeting to street harass women serves to 'silence' women. Not only to limit their chance to speak but also to shape the way they talk, to allow them to speak yet restraining their authentic voices (Houston and Kramarae, 1991). As how the paragraph above shows, the target of this type of street harassment have less room to fight back and they are forced to step into the role that the harasser has ascribed to them; the obedient women who will reply the greeting, who will retreat back to her private space and undeserving of free public space. This practice of 'silencing' is dangerous because it affects how women respond to other, often more severe, forms of harassment. Reuters polls (2016) about sexual harassment in Indonesia shows that 1.636 of 25.213 respondents admit to having been raped and a triggering number of 93% of them said they keep it to themselves due to fear of repercussions. Among the respondents, 58% had experienced verbal sexual harassment. This shows that the act of 'silencing' women in the face of sexual harassment of any form risks further normalization and neglect of the urgency to address a bigger issue.

Conclusion

There is a misleading conception among Indonesian society that women dressing in 'provocative' manner results in higher incidence of sexual harassment and assaults. In fact, the number of women wearing hijab is higher compared to early 2000, and probably the highest ever in Indonesia history (Turmudi, 2016). This writing has explained that street harassment is still frequent despite the increased number of hijab-wearing women because the problem lies in the patriarchal thinking and women objectification, not in the way they dressed and behave in public space. The usage of assalamualaikum to harass women has accommodated the objectification of women in public space, even when they wear hijab. More women cover themselves, but generally, women do not feel any safer in public places and still encounter street harassment. Finally, a challenge remains for our society to open more room for discussion to advocate for the 'silenced' women who suffer street harassment.

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Honorable Mention 2

Dilemma of Family Planning Program: An Ethnography Study in East Aceh 2015

Dilemma of Family Planning Program: An Ethnography Study in East Aceh 2015

On a sunny morning while I was reading some data at the Peudawa Public Health Center, some health workers at the community health center called me and told me that "this is the record breaking mother who has the most children in Peudawa!". Then, I got acquainted with the mother, who, from the look on her face, was not the slightest visibly "tense", or "tired" because of taking care so many children as I had imagine in my head.

Mr. Salim (46 years old) and Mrs. Martini (41 years old) are married couples for 21 years. Currently they are blessed with 10 children. Actually Mrs. Martini had been pregnant 18 times, but had three miscarriages, and had five children died at birth or while still babies. The eldest child is named Muhamad, 20 years old, who is currently migrated to Banda Aceh to seek employment after graduating vocational school in 2013. The second child is named Nurjannah, 18 years old. Nurjannah has just graduated from high school in 2014 and now only lives at home helping her parents for almost any household chore. The next child is named Ismail, currently sitting in grade 2 Senior High School. Ismail seldom slept at home, he used to sleep in the house of one of his aunts who lived in the next village, but every morning he went home to his parents to change clothes and take school supplies. The next child is named Abdullah, grade 3 junior high school, followed by Sofi, 6th grade elementary school, Yusuf 5th grade

elementary school, Nanda 1st grade elementary school, and Syawal, who is in Early Education school or PAUD. Next there are four children who are still toddlers, each is Indah 4 years old, Dina 3 years, and the youngest Putri 8 months.
Having many children is common in Aceh. They call it "... a child is God's gift". So even if there is a child who died in a family, it is also considered normal, they call all these things as "... fate of God to be received with grace". A child is a gift of God that has certain values for the people of Aceh. This has an impact on the difficulty of running Family Planning (FP) program in Peudawa Subdistrict, East Aceh District.

Actually for Acehnese people, having many children is not a "problem". This relates to local cultural factors inherent to this day. The area of East Aceh was an area where there had been GAM (Free Aceh Movement) conflict. At that time many people died from the conflict, and the memory of the conflict is still firmly attached in the minds of the people. So, having many children is one way to anticipate "In case someday a similar conflict occurs". There are people who reject FP because they are afraid that conflict will happen again as before. They say: if we do FP, our children will run out, so if there is conflict again, we will not have enough troops", according to information presented by Mr. Mahlel, Head of Peudawa Community Health Center.

Then the memory of the tsunami is still embedded in the minds of the people of Aceh. East Aceh Regency, which is a coastal area that extends along the highway of Banda Aceh-Medan, at that time was hit by the tsunami, and many people died or lost their family. At that time a lot of aids came from abroad to help eliminate trauma after the tsunami and to assist in infrastructure development in the East Aceh region. The loss of many inhabitants has given the people perception that Aceh must have many generations of children in return for those who have died during the tsunami. They perceive that the area of Aceh is still very large, so it still needs a lot of additional local people to fill it. The opinions of the husbands are a little different. Pak Rohman, a man who is quite well in the village of Paya Bili Dua, said;

"Aceh is still wide. Unlike in Java, here the distance from one house to another is still far apart, so we still have enough room to add the population. When tsunami first hit, hundreds of thousands of Acehnese died. Before there is another conflict in Aceh that causes many casualties, we need to add to our generation ".

Using contraceptives is contrary to the perceptions that have been built in the minds of the people of Aceh, especially indigenous leaders, community leaders, and husbands. They argue that using contraceptives is the same as rejecting God's gift, as well as killing a child who wants to be born into this world. They also cling to the notion that life and death are the fate of God, so we need not prevent a new life from coming into our midst. Because a child born into this world is the will of God, it is God who will provide the fortune for the child. Such is the general view of society, as is also believed by Bu Martini and Pak Salim. "We are just trying to

find a fortune for the family by selling fish around the village", said Salim. Children have special value for the people of Aceh. Boys are expected to be able to help their parents to farm and girls are the solace and guardian of their parents at the age of twilight, such as expectations in the minds of parents who have many children.

From some, the local wisdom of Aceh people about keeping offspring is indeed wise and no need to be questioned. However, this is a problem for health workers in the region. They admitted that they often had pressure from the Provincial Health Office to immediately resolve some problems related to family planning programs that did not run smoothly, resulting in the emergence of new health problems and malnourished infants, who in some cases caused deaths from comorbidities such as unhealthy diarrhea. In some of these cases, health workers pay more attention to the family of Bu Martini, who almost every year donates infants and toddlers who are malnourished. Bu Martini indeed is pregnant and gives birth almost every year, with various methods of family planning have been used, but nothing works. Various studies have identified high risk factors that have an effect on the nutritional status of children. These factors are related to medical, social, economic, and educational conditions, some of which include low birth weight, many children in the family, and short birth spacing, and frequent infections.

"Life and Death are fate". That's what Mr. Salim says about his children who died while still a baby, and the five miscarriages that his wife experienced. Their previous child, Princess, died at the age of 8 months due to persistent diarrhea. At that time, they had asked for help to a Tengku, but the disease was not reduced. "This hospital was full, so we wanted to take her to the health center, but is was too late, the baby died at home. This is the destiny of Allah", recalled Pak Salim. As we observed constantly, Mrs. Martini did not pay enough attention to her children. Homework and child care are mostly imposed on her older daughters, so when the sister gets sick, all of her siblings are not taken care of. The oldest sister in the family is often sickly because of exhaustion, so typhus disease often relapses. The health condition of some of their malnourished children plus the cleanliness of Martini's children can indeed be drawn due to improper parenting patterns, making diarrhea a recurring experience suffered by the children of Martini, resulting in death. Related to the death of their child, the village midwife who had previously monitored the development of the child a few years back, stated that:

> "I forget it has been a long time since I became a village midwife in the village of paya bili two. It's a toddler child, diarrhea, beforehand had been taken to the mantri here and there, sprayed whatever, and finally referred to the hospital in Langsa prior to the area expansion. After two days at the hospital in Langsa, Mrs. Martini asked if she could take her child home, with the excuse that no one was taking care of the house. But after being brought home, the child did not recover, and sadly died. That is all I can remember".

The dilemma, perhaps that is the right word that represents my feelings as I continue to explore this problem, is also felt by health workers who deal with family planning issues and malnutrition in Peudawa Subdistrict. Both are interrelated, and this problem does not occur only in the Mrs. Martini's family, but also in other families in Peudawa Subdistrict.

It's hard to get rid of the shock, sadness, and other feelings while living together in society. I learned many things from their lives. I see the lives of peaceful people away from the "drama" of urban life. I was stunned to learn things that shocked me and the things that I think are crucial health "problems", but not for Aceh people. Maybe this is why some health programs do not run smoothly, because of differences in perception when defining a health problem.

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Reaching Heights, Yet Uneven grounds : THE POLITICS OF INDIGENOUS REPRESENTATION IN INDONESIA

REACHING HEIGHTS, YET UNEVEN GROUNDS: THE POLITICS OF INDIGENOUS REPRESENTATION IN INDONESIA

INTRODUCTION

Many indigenous groups in Indonesia reside in the political and economic margins of the country. The rights of indigenous groups have long been forsaken due to a lack of political will of the government in recognising indigeneity. An absence of recognition makes these groups vulnerable to human rights violations and discriminatory practices by both the state and the private sector. The results of 2014 presidential election brought a breath of fresh air for indigenous movement in Indonesia. The elected President Joko Widodo underlined his commitment to protect the rights of indigenous groups among the nine national priorities that serve as his campaign platform. This promise earned him an unprecedented political endorsement from indigenous communities. Post-election, indigenous society keeps pushing Jokowi to hold true on his promise, which resulted in landmark victories in customary land rights and religious freedom for indigenous groups in Indonesia.

Reflecting on the recent milestones of indigenous movements, I will examine in this paper the contemporary politics of Indigenous representation in Indonesia. I argue that the language of indigeneity starts to significantly gain traction in the centre of Indonesian political discourse. I will first begin the essay by reviewing the rhetoric of indigeneity in Indonesia. I will then briefly outline recent progression in indigenous political movement that leads to landmark victories in asserting indigenous rights to development and self-determination. Subsequently, I will offer some critical analyses of the opportunities and challenges of these recent development in indigenous movements. I conclude that while indigenous movement in the country has realised several landmark triumphs in asserting their cultural and economic rights, national policies may remain discriminatory to the interests of these minority groups as long as the government is still not recognising indigeneity. Recognising indigeneity should provide a strong stepping point for a stronger political representation of indigenous interests in Indonesian democratic system.

THE POLITICS OF INDIGENEITY

To examine indigeneity politics, it is imperative to understand how indigeneity is an obscure rhetoric in Indonesia's political sphere. First of all, the state itself does not legally recognise indigeneity, on the basis that all Indonesians are considered indigenous (Li, 2000; Persoon, 2000; Merlan, 2009). At the very least, the state recognition of indigeneity is merely tokenistic, to the extent that cultural diversity is not harmful to the spirit of nation-building (Anderson, 2006). Recognising the indigeneity of particular ethnic minorities would mean creating a threat to state sovereignty, because it would extend to them their 'right of self-determination and

a possible claim of sovereignty' (Robbins and Stamatopoulou, 2004). Moreover, indigeneity is also seen as endangering the country's strong sense of nationalism; dividing the nation into ethnic groups would recreate the colonial policies of 'divide and rule' (Tsing, 2007).

Secondly, in contrast, the government's perception of indigenous peoples is a definition of a colonial heritage (Tsing, 2007). The phrase komunitas adat terpencil, or remote traditional societies, as officially used by the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs to categorise indigenous groups, endorses an economic and geographical separation where indigenous peoples are placed in the periphery of the structure of modern society (Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs, 2017). The term derives from a colonial perspective in which Java became the imagined centre of administration and development, and people in the outer zones are marginalised 'exotica' (Tsing, 2007, p. 36; Haug, Rössler, and Grumblies, 2016).

Thirdly, the language of indigeneity has not been widely used by ethnic groups as a vehicle for their political movements. The grounding of their movements is based instead on the narratives of independent sovereignty, resource stewardship, and environmental justice (Tsing, 2007). In West Papua, for example, the secessionist movement uses the discourse of resource exploitation and unequal development, demanding for independence and freedom from the co-optation of the nation-state (Kirksey, 2012). Acehnese insurgency founded its political movement on historical, economic, and religious issues; however, it is Acehnese sense of nationalism – not indigeneity – that fuelled their aspirations for independence (Aspinall, 2002). Many other indigenous groups challenge the oppression of the state and the corporate sector because of the destructive forces of capitalist economies on their land and environment.

Lastly, the directive of national policies on indigeneity is largely paternalistic and assimilative (Sager, 2010). The state still regards indigenous groups as in need to be civilised to construct 'a single image of a modern Indonesian citizen' (Persoon, 2000, p. 168). In the New Order regime, communities in remote areas outside Java are nationally invisible and existed only as a subject to resource exploitation (Li, 2000). Moreover, Jokowi's nine priority agenda offers conflicting directions on indigenous development. While the agenda mandates the development of Indonesia from the remote peripheral areas, the programs of the Indonesian Ministry of Social Affairs disregard the rights of self-determination and development of indigenous peoples. The Ministry still focuses on resettlement programs, social re-integration and re-unification of indigenous peoples to modern society (Tambak, 2015).

THE CONTEMPORARY PROGRESS OF INDIGENOUS POLITICS IN INDONESIA

Taking the above idiosyncrasy of indigeneity rhetoric into account, the recent progression of Indonesian indigenous politics sees the reconceptualisation of the language of indigeneity as gaining tractions in contemporary political debate. Indigeneity offers a new and controversial political tool to assert the claims of indigenous peoples to the rights of self-determination and

development (De La Cadena and Starn, 2007).

The role of civil society actors and institutions is crucial in the resurgence of indigenous voices in a political centre stage (Li, 2000). Spearheading indigenous movements in Indonesia is the NGO Indigenous Peoples Alliances of the Archipelago (Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara/ AMAN). The organisation advocates for the collective rights of the many minority ethnic groups in Indonesia, including endorsing political participation, providing legal assistance, and facilitating conflict resolutions between indigenous peoples vis-à-vis the state and transnational corporations (AMAN, 2017). The NGO also represents the interests of indigenous peoples in international platforms (AMAN, 2017). The works of AMAN has sparked a debate about the significance of indigenous organising; nonetheless, the organisation has contributed to formations of alliances, collaborations, and networks central to contemporary indigenous politics in Indonesia (Tsing, 2005; Arizona and Cahyadi, 2013). Moreover, the NGO also serves as both symbolic centre in opposition to the nation-state, and local centres to challenge hegemonic structures and discriminatory practices set upon communities in the periphery (Grumblies, 2016). Furthermore, AMAN serves as a tool of political empowerment of indigenous peoples in Indonesia by allowing them to embrace their indigeneity and to pressure the government from the margins (Grumblies, 2016).

Customary land rights

The recent milestones in customary land rights of Indonesian indigenous peoples are strongly linked with AMAN's indigenous organising. A landmark 2013 Indonesian Constitutional Court decision announced that customary forest no longer bears the status of state forest (Indonesian Constitutional Court, 2013). The decision was based on a petition brought forward by the alliances of AMAN and two indigenous communities from Kenegerian Kuntu in Riau Province) and Kasepuhan Cisitu in Banten Province (Arizona and Cahyadi, 2013; Indonesian Constitutional Court, 2013). The petition challenges the state concessions of natural resources to commercial enterprises and pushes for the granting of customary land rights to local communities (Grumblies, 2016). AMAN then coordinates a public petition for the government to follow up the court ruling by implementing fundamental policy change in national and local levels, and to adopt the Draft Law on the Recognition and the Protection of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (RUU PPHMHA) (AMAN, 2015). The first act towards the realisation of customary land rights occurred in December 2016 when the elected President Joko Widodo grants first-ever customary land rights to nine indigenous communities in Indonesia (Mongabay, 2017). The total area handed out encompasses 13,100 hectares of land. This is a small step considering there are 8.2 million hectares of land mapped out by AMAN as indigenous customary territory (Mongabay, 2017).

Social forestry schemes

The coalition of indigenous activists through AMAN to assert the rights of indigenous peoples

to control, access, and manage customary land faces one fundamental obstacle of the 1999 Forestry Law that limits a forest tenure reform. The 2013 court ruling changes this by allowing a social forestry program to take place. President Joko Widodo marshalled a forest tenure reform in 2015 by enacting social forest schemes (Setyowati, 2017). He set targets to allocate 12.7 million hectares to local communities by 2019 (MCA Indonesia, 2017). Local communities will be able to manage previously-owned state forest through various schemes. Among the schemes is customary forest scheme where indigenous communities are also given the extension of the rights of collective ownership of the forest, not only access to manage (Setyowati, 2017). The government has strengthened the legality of this social forestry schemes through the Minister of Environment and Forestry regulation on social forestry. Until August 2017, the government has granted 1,053,477 hectares of social forest, with another 700,000 hectares in the pipeline (MCA Indonesia, 2017). This forest reform has the potential to empower local constituency, particularly indigenous peoples, as their political tool to gain recognition in national and global stage (Astuti and McGregor, 2017).

Freedom for indigenous faith

Another historical triumph for indigenous movement is the granting of the rights to express indigenous faith. Through another landmark ruling by the Constitutional Court in November 2017, the government finally allows minority groups to identify with their native faiths in the national identification card (Indonesian Constitutional Court, 2017). This recognition of indigenous faith is a part of AMAN's agenda for the protection of indigenous rights (The Jakarta Post, 2017a). The ruling itself is as a response to the petition by four indigenous faith groups, Marapu from Sumba island, Sapto Darmo from the island of Java, as well as Parmalim and Ugamo Bangsa Batak from North Sumatera (BBC Indonesia, 2017). Indonesian constitutions officially acknowledge only six major religions: Islam, Catholicism, Protestantism, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Confucianism. Before the Court's ruling, believers of other faiths were compelled to identify with either of these six religions, or by leaving blank the religion column in their ID cards. This arrangement then leads to discriminatory practices in many aspects of their civic life. Following the Court's ruling, the House of Representative will revise the 2013 Civil Administration Law to accommodate indigenous faith in civil administration system (The Jakarta Post, 2017b). This move is expected to improve legal status and protection, by allowing access to civil and legal documentations of many minority faith groups, including indigenous peoples.

Opportunities and Challenges

The recent progression of indigenous movement in Indonesia presents not only opportunities, but also challenges for the broad agenda of indigenous rights to self-determination and determination. Opportunities arise from the assertion of the political rights that empowers indigenous peoples (De La Cadena and Starn, 2007). Firstly, the rise of indigenous activisms through legal channel illustrates a new political conjecture that sets indigenous agenda into

motion and ultimately facilitates a formal recognition of collective rights (Astuti and McGregor, 2017). As in the above cases of court rulings on customary land rights and religious freedom, it is the alliances and collaborations between different indigenous groups which initiated the court petitions (Tsing, 2007). Secondly, the recognition of indigenous legal status in the civil administration system allows indigenous peoples to access political route for their activisms. Freedom to identify and express indigenous faiths opens a gateway for indigenous peoples to obtain legal documentations, such as identity cards and family cards. Not only that legal documentations allow access to the social welfare system, but having proper legal documentations would also endorse indigenous peoples' rights to vote, to be elected, and to be part of Indonesian democratic system. Thirdly, Indonesian indigenous politics cannot be separated from the discourse of international indigenous movement. The national movement borrows the conception of indigeneity from the international forum to be translated locally (Li, 2000). Thus, legal and political rights would allow indigenous peoples to represent themselves in the centre of political arena.

In contrast, the resurgence of indigenous politics through the vessel of civil society movements reveals significant challenges for further indigenous rights agenda, where indigenous politics lacks formal political representation in the state's democratic system. Firstly, while indigenous politics are seemingly effective to question the oppressions from the state and the corporate sector, current indigenous politics may not adequately address the cases of vertical tensions with the state and the horizontal tensions between and within ethnic groups. For example, the granting of customary land rights may create conflicts from competing interests between two neighbouring indigenous groups regarding land borders. Moreover, recognising indigenous faiths may exclude, rather than include, certain adherents of indigenous faiths, because they will be more readily categorised and separated based on the expression of their indigeneity.

And lastly, the challenge is to establish a stronger political presence for indigenous groups in Indonesia. The assertion of political rights may not be realised without a formal political representation of indigenous peoples in the democratic system. Political representation can be safeguarded by ensuring indigenous voices are heard inside the state's democratic and bureaucratic bodies. Indigenous groups' endorsement of President Joko Widodo during his election provides evidence that indigenous voice has the agency and capacity to drive political agenda for the interests of indigenous groups (AMAN, 2015). This movement, however, is directed from the periphery into the centre of political discourses, where indigenous politics hold an uneven ground (Grumblies, 2016). Strengthening indigenous representation in the core of the political structure may require an institutionalisation of a national task force or an ad-hoc committee on indigenous issues in the body of government. Institutionalisation cannot be done without recognising the different conceptions of indigeneity in the first place.

CONCLUSION

Indigenous groups inhabit the periphery of social, economic, and political structure of the society. Indigenous groups are unable to fully express their indigeneity because the state does not formally recognise the notion of indigeneity. The state also adopts a colonial legacy in defining and managing indigenous peoples, putting them in the margin of societies and subjecting them to assimilative policies. Moreover, in the past, indigenous groups did not fully utilise the language of indigeneity to fuel their political and social movements. Allied and collaborative legal lobbies of different indigenous groups resulted in unprecedented milestones of the recognition of customary land rights and religious freedom rights. These advancements towards indigenous peoples' rights to self-determination and development present both opportunities and challenges for indigenous politics. On one hand, economic and religious rights affirm indigenous political and legal rights to better represent themselves in the democratic system. On the other hand, these rights may not be realised without a more robust political institution to serve as the chamber for indigenous voice. To sum up, indigenous politics in Indonesia require a stronger political representation of indigenous interests in the state system, and this would call for a better recognition of indigeneity by the state.

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

1st Prize Winner

Ambivalent Identities of Chinese Indonesian Artists in the 1950s-1960s: The Case of Yin Hua Art Organization

"An excellent essay on cultural political identity during the height of Cold War period. A work that utilizes good primary sources to provide the base of analysis in looking on the development of Chinese Indonesian identity, and foreign relations between the two countries within the context of a new independent post-colonial state."

Dr. Yosef Djakababa

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Introduction

Writings on the development of arts and culture in Indonesia during the period of 1950s-1960s have tendencies to focus only on two thematic strands. The first theme is related to the making of national identity during the early post-colonial period and efforts by artists and intellectuals to define what Indonesian national culture should be.[1] The second theme is related to the ideological polarization between the left-wing group Lekra and the right-wing, military-backed group, Manikebu; framed with the necessary lens of Cold War politics.[2] Both themes are significant to enrich discussions about the construction of Indonesian national identity, yet there is one subject that has been long neglected by them; that is the existence of Chinese Indonesian artists during this period.

In the first thematic strand, the question of "who Indonesian artists are," has virtually never been posed before the question of "how should Indonesian art be." In the period of 1950s-1960s, debates about national identity were a shared-concern amongst artists and writers from different localities, since Indonesia has always been a nation consisting of a multitude of cultures. However, while artists from Java, Bali or Sumatra could articulate and claim their identity as "Indonesians" and "nationalists" relatively without a doubt, Chinese Indonesian artists had to deal with certain discomfort in claiming their national identity, due to the precarious position they held when there were at least two waves of anti-Chinese movements in that period.[3] Chinese Indonesian artists had to oscillate between Indonesian and Chinese cultural identities. Apparently, their dubious position towards Indonesian nationalism has been deemed unfit under the nationalistic framework of Indonesian art historiography.[4] In the second thematic strand, the portrayal of intellectual and cultural life under the lens of Cold War has been generally narrated as one of the polarized conflicts of Left versus Right, and little attention is paid to other cultural movements outside these competing

1 Henk Schulte Nordholt, "Indonesia in the 1950s Nation, modernity, and the post-colonial state," in *Bijdragen tot de Taal-, Land-en Volkenkunde* Vol. 167, no.4 (2011), pp. 386-404.

2 Jennifer Lindsay and Maya Hian Ting Liem (eds), *Heirs to World Culture*, KITLV Press, Leiden, 2012.

3 Charless A. Coppel, *Tionghoa Indonesia dalam Krisis*, Pustaka Sinar, Jakarta, 1994[1983], pp.112-123.

4 On the limitation of nationalist historiography framework, see Henk Schulte Nordholt, et.al, "*Memikir ulang historiografi Indonesia*," in Henk Schulte Nordholt, et.al (eds), *Perspektif Baru Penulisan Sejarah Indonesia, Yayasan Obor Indonesia*, Jakarta, 2008, pp. 1-33.

blocks. Moreover, the complex role of China has often been forgotten when discussing about Indonesia's Cold War experience, although new scholarships have increased in recent years after the Chinese Foreign Ministry archives during the years of 1961-1965 were declassified in 2008.[5] By exploring the activities of Chinese Indonesian artists in 1950s-1960s, we may also shed a light on the interactions between Indonesia and China from the perspectives of culture and political identity.

This article attempts to fill in the gaps in these two thematic mainstreams by discussing the Yin Hua Meishu Xiehui (, Lembaga Seniman Indonesia Tionghoa [Yin Hua Art Organisation]), an art organization of Chinese Indonesian artists, which claimed to have hundreds of members from Jakarta, Surabaya, Semarang, Solo, Cirebon, Pekalongan, Malang, Bandung, and Tanjung Pinang. This possibly makes YHAO the biggest art organization in Indonesia at that time, yet surprisingly it has not received a proper attention in the existing scholarship of Indonesian art history. This article will position YHAO's activities and its artistic articulation of identity in the context of discriminative policy and nationalist sentiment towards Chinese Indonesians during Sukarno's era. It will also look at the cultural relations between Indonesia and China in the sphere of Cold War to provide a more nuanced picture of national identity politics in that period.

Yin Hua Art Organization in Sino-Indonesian Political Conjuncture

Yin Hua Art Organization, YHAO, was formed in Jakarta in April 1955. The leader of YHAO, a prominent painter Lee Man Fong, who attended the Bandung Conference (18-24 April 1955), made a sketch [Image 1] depicting Prime Minister Zhou En Lai and other Chinese delegations in the conference, as if emphasizing the significance of China in that historic moment. The month of the Bandung Conference was indeed a significant moment for the Sino-Indonesia relationship. On April 24, immediately after the Conference, China and Indonesia signed the Sino-Indonesia Dual Nationality to end the Chinese Indonesian's dual nationality problem. A few days before the Conference, on April 13, Lembaga Persahabatan Indonesia-Tiongkok (Indonesia-China Friendship Organization), led by Prijono, a politician from Partai Murba who served as a minister in all cabinets in Sukarno's government,[6] was launched and introduced to the public in Jakarta.

5 Taomo Zhou, "Ambivalent Alliance: Chinese Policy towards Indonesia, 1960–1965," *The China Quarterly*, 221 (2015), p. 3.

6 More on Prijono's academic and political backgrounds, see Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia,* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2007, pp. 146-147.

Image 1 Lee Man Fong, Delegasi R.R.T dalam Konferensi AA di Bandung (PRC Delegation in AA Conference in Bandung), size unknown, 1955. Source: YHAO first exhibition catalogue, 1956.

A book published by the friendship organization in 1956 shows that it had established branches in many Indonesian cities and organized several artists' exchanges and exhibitions both in China and Indonesia, with the intention to "foster an intimate relationship and cultural understanding between the people of both countries." Support from the friendship organization for the establishment of YHAO was not mentioned at all in the book, although the book reported a one-time funding assistance for the exhibition of one of YHAO's member, Lee Sian Yun in December 1955. Therefore, whether the formation of YHAO was part of supporting the official Sino-Indonesian 'friendship' enforcement or purely an independent initiative is still unclear.

Nevertheless, YHAO was certainly used to become one of the symbolic bridges for Sino-Indonesian relationship--not to mention the background of Sukarno's famously known passion for art that China must had already been aware of. In December 1955, a number YHAO's members were invited to Sukarno's presidential palace in Bogor [Image 2]. Less than a month afterwards, on January 7-14, 1956, YHAO held its first exhibition at Hotel Des Indes, Jakarta, where Sukarno attended the opening. The China ambassador to Indonesia, Huang Zhen (in office from November 1954 - June 1961), who was apparently a graduate of Shanghai Art College, was also present at the exhibition opening.[7]

7 Henk Ngantung, "*Pameran Lukisan2 Lembaga Seniman Yin Hua*," *Harian Rakjat*, January 14 1956, p.3.

Image 2 Members of Yin Hua Artists Organization with Sukarno in front of the presidential palace in Bogor, 18 December 1955. Source: YHAO first exhibition catalogue, 1956.

One of the main sources for this article is the catalogue of YHAO's first exhibition. The catalogue is thick and filled with a lot of images. It can be considered as a luxurious publication compared to the standard format of exhibition catalogues at that time. From the catalogue we can learn that YHAO received a support from China or at the very least, was noticed by the Chinese government. The first pages of YHAO's exhibition catalogue show a congratulatory inscription in Chinese that reads, "Create more and better artworks, for greater overseas Chinese patriotic solidarity" signed by the Chinese political figure, He Xiangning. There is also a New Year greetings cum advertisement from Bank of China and China Insurance Company.

Not so long after YHAO's first exhibition, 10 members of YHAO visited China for five months in 1956. The travel was supported by the friendship organization, which was also assisting many non-Chinese artists and writers in Indonesia to visit China. An exhibition after YHAO's member trip to China was held in Hotel Des Indes, June 1957. This time, the exhibition was officiated by Jakarta's Mayor Sudiro. Harian Rakjat, a left-wing newspaper, reported that Sukarno attended the exhibition and praised how, '[T]he exhibition has a high value'.[8] Such official state endorsement confirms YHAO's position as a bridge for fostering Sino-Indonesian relationship. The vice leader of YHAO, Ling Nan-Lung, recalled that after their trip to China, YHAO received an offer from the Soviet government to visit Russia. The invitation was rejected; signaling that YHAO was politically committed to China.[9]

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8 "*Pameran Seni Rupa Persahabatan Indonesia – RRT*," *Harian Rakjat,* June 24, 1957, p.2.
9 Interview with Agus Dermawan, 2016. Researcher and curator Agus Dermawan talked with Ling Nan-Lung, the vice le ader of YHAO whom he met in Jakarta in the mid-1990s. A record-

interest in politics. However, Dermawan acknowledges that given the negative fabrication of China and communism during the New Order era, some artists who lived with the trauma of that interest in politics. However, Dermawan acknowledges that given the negative fabrication of China and communism during the New Order era, some artists who lived with the trauma of that era might refused to be associated with any politically charged issues. Dermawan also mentioned that most of Chinese artists destroyed their archives out of fear upon the anti-Chinese hysteria in Indonesia post-1965.

The policy of China towards Chinese Indonesians was two-fold. On the one hand, China was showing interest in the ethnic Chinese community in Indonesia by providing channels of political and cultural solidarity amongst overseas Chinese community.[10] In the case of YHAO, it can be seen through the official endorsement and travel support to the artists' group. On the other hand, China was also signaling its attempt to end its claim to all overseas nationals' unity and patriotism in order to lower potential risks from the common negative association of Chinese with communism in Indonesia.[11] Moreover, China restrained the overseas Chinese from interfering in local politics, but as Hong Liu (2006) exposed, China's cultural diplomacy was trying hard to influence Indonesian artists and intellectuals to follow China's version of revolution.[12] Clearly it was rather hard for YHAO to play down the negative association of Chinese with communism, as on the state-diplomatic level, the China government was very aggressive in propagating its ideology.

Indonesian government was also taking part in advocating a close cultural tie with China. Sukarno even employed Lee Man Fong as his palace painter in 1960 and commissioned him to decorate the walls of the newly built Hotel Indonesia.[13] However, due to the deteriorating economic situation, Indonesian domestic policy was unsympathetic to the rights of Chinese in Indonesia. On paper, after 1955 the Chinese in Indonesia could freely choose either Indonesian or Chinese nationality. But, throughout the 1950s-1960s, the government established many discriminative policies that made most Chinese in Indonesia felt alienated and unwanted—not only in Indonesia but also when they were forced to return to China.[14] When the national forces from both Chinese and Indonesian governments showed an ambivalent attitude towards the Chinese Indonesian, the articulation of identity in the works for YHAO's artists were also pulled in ambivalent directions.

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ing of his conversation with Ling Nan-Lung is not available. In my interview with Dermawan, he recounts that most of the Chinese artists that he interviewed said that YHAO had no

10 Zhou, p.12.

11 Zhou, p.13.

12 See Hong Liu, *China and the Shaping of Indonesia 1949–1965*, NUS Press, Singapore, 2011, for a thorough overview of China–Indonesia cultural diplomacy.

13 Agus Dermawan, *Melipat Air: Jurus Budaya Pendekar Tionghoa*, Penerbit KPG, Jakarta, 2016, p.57

14 Coppel, pp.57-58.

The Articulation of Ambivalent Identities in YHAO's Artworks

A contemporary and prominent scholar of Chinese studies, Indonesian-born Wang Gungwu (2001), addresses multiple attachment in relation with the history and identity of overseas Chinese: which history should they follow to articulate the present existence of their identity?[15] The Chinese in Indonesia were not only forced to choose Chinese or Indonesian nationality, but also faced with another two options: the history of their ancestors in China or the history of the place where they currently live. Unlike the option of national citizenship, the option of history that Chinese in Indonesia must choose could not be decided through an exclusive either/or basis.

This dilemma, interestingly, creates a distinctive character that contributes to the unfinished visual vocabulary of Indonesian modern art. For example, it strikingly appears in the works of Lee Sian Yun, who painted Indonesian daily life scenes in Chinese scrolls format. Lee Sian Yun, like Lee Man Fong and many YHAO members, reproduced the character of Chinese painting with oil on hardboard, not Chinese ink on handscroll as it was traditionally made. A Chinese Indonesian art critic, C.M. Hsu, deemed Lee Sian Yun's works "Tandjidor" (1955) [Image 3] as a social realist painting[16], but it is certainly not the kind of social realist art which can be traced to China or Soviet's socialist realism. Tanjidor as a subject of painting is also a clever choice. Tanjidor is part of the Betawi ethnic music, which is highly influenced by Portuguese music culture. Tandjidor is often played during Chinese celebration of Cap Go Meh in Jakarta and Cirebon. On the surface, Tandjidor seems like an Indonesian indigenous culture, but eventually it is a mixture of foreign influences, which makes Indonesian culture unique.

Image 3 Lee Sian Yun, Tandjidor, size unknown, oil on hardboard, 1955. Photo from Claire Holt's archive, New York Public Library digital collection.

15 Wang Gungwu, "*Orang Etnis Cina Mencari Sejarah*" in I. Wibowo (ed.), *Harga yang Harus Dibayar: Sketsa Pergulatan Etnis Cina di Indonesia*, Gramedia, Jakarta, p.16.

16 C.M. Hsu, "*Pameran Seni Lukis Lee Sian Yun*", *Harian Rakjat,* December 17, 1955, p.3.

However, within the precarious political circumstances that Chinese Indonesians had to face in their daily life, there is a sense that YHAO was trying hard to seek for Sukarno's patronage. This can be seen in artworks in the 1956 exhibition that polished the image of Sukarno, as represented by the works of Ling Nan-Lung [Image 4] and Tjio Tek Djin [Image 5], both entitled "P.J.M. Presiden Dr. Ir. Soekarno." Oey Sian Yok, a regular art contributor to the weekly magazine, Star Weekly, criticized these works as "merely a competition to get attention from the authority, not to mention the quality of the portrait is not that high".[17] Sian Yok's argument was probably right, but more importantly, her view attests to the fact that Chinese communities in Indonesia did not have homogenous political and cultural orientations.[18]

Image 4 (left) Ling Nan-Lung, Patung P.J.M Presiden Dr. Ir. Soekarno, size unknown, 1955.
Image 5 (right) Tjio Tek Djin, P.J.M Dr. Ir. Soekarno, oil on canvas, 208x147cm, 1955.

Source: YHAO first exhibition catalogue, 1956.

In another occasion, Sian Yok also criticized the homogenous tendency of YHAO's artists in their choice of subjects, which is their likings for local landscapes and naked Balinese women [Image 6 & 7]. To note, the depiction of naked women in paintings is hardly a traditional Chinese aesthetic. These objects, according to Sian Yok, were merely depicting touristic impressions of Indonesia. Besides debunking the image of beautiful Indonesia, Sian Yok also considered that individual character could not be invented through copying Western abstract art without careful understanding. Sian Yok's view on aesthetic identity is in a similar train of thoughts with the prominent painter S. Sudjojono, who is known for orientating the kepribadian (character/personality) of Indonesian art through the concept of

17 "*Pameran Lukisan Seniman Yin Hua*," *Star Weekly*, No. 524 1956, p.33.
18 On the heterogeneity of Chinese Indonesians' political orientation, see Leo Suryadinata, *Political thinking of the Indonesian Chinese, 1900-1995*, Singapore University Press, Singapore, 1997.

jiwa ketok (visible soul).[19] Sian Yok's view represents that the search for a collective identity was also a main concern for Chinese Indonesian artists amidst their ambivalent cultural status as Chinese, Indonesian, as well as a part of the global community of artists influenced by Western aesthetic.


Image 6 (left) Lim Kwi Bing, Up and Down, Oil on hardboard, size unknown, 1956.
Image 7 (right) Thung Kiat-Goan, Market Day, Oil on hardboard, size unknown, 1956
Source: YHAO first exhibition catalogue, 1956.

Closing Statement

The visual heterogeneity of artworks by YHAO members demonstrates the search for identity amongst the Chinese Indonesian artists, and it was conveyed in their ambivalent articulation of identities. It is marked by the tension of dual attachment with Chinese and Indonesian nationalism, the intertwining notions of home and elsewhere, and the creative integration of Chinese and Western painting techniques in depicting (or problematizing) the image of Indonesian peoples and landscapes. This double discourse unsettles the totalizing concept of Indonesia as a nation-state, which was produced as a large scale, all-encompassing unified collective identities that were obsessed with a guarantee of authenticity. Disturbing the stable and continuous identity of a nation would raise inner differences, contradictions and segmentations—histories of difference, which a nation like Indonesia always has. Nevertheless, Chinese Indonesians community has long been the subject of suspicion

19 On Sudjojono's conception of *jiwa ketok*, see S. Sudjojono, *Kami Tahu Kemana Seni Lukis Indonesia Akan Kami Bawa,* Penerbit Indonesia Sekarang, Yogyakarta, 1948.

and ethnic violence given the blurred status of insider and outsider that is embedded in their identity. This sentiment is a part of economic competition and political instability in Indonesia. After the catastrophe of 1965, Chinese Indonesians received negative status as comrades of communists and consequently betrayers, whose patriotism was constantly put into question. Their transnational network made Chinese people appeared conspiratorial.[20] Such negative images hence discouraged most of Chinese in Indonesia from participating in public politics or cultural activism for a long time. When the New Order government led the country in 1967, all Chinese-related cultural expressions, from family name to language, were strictly banned. YHAO then disappeared and many of Chinese artists in Indonesia had to live in exile with stateless status. Their part of history in the histories of Indonesian art could not be freely spoken until the Reformasi era. The absence of their narratives can now be spoken, and it raises an important issue for us to think of an identity which is not sealed in the closed totality of Indonesian nationalism.

20 Coppel, pp. 286-292.

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Sugar Economy and Loss of Opportunity to Take Off: Failure of Industrialization in Surabaya in the Mid-19th and Early 20th Century

Sugar Economy and Loss of Opportunity to Take Off: Failure of Industrialization in Surabaya in the Mid-19th and Early 20th Century

Introduction

In general, the implementation of Cultivation System in 1830 by Governor General van den Bosch had important effects for the economic development of Indonesia from the mid-19th to the beginning of the 20th century. At that time, the economic condition of Indonesia was at the preconditions for take-off stage. Indonesia's economic growth and per capita income levels were the same as those achieved by Japan. This amazing economic development could also be seen at the regional level, such as in Surabaya Residency.

For the Dutch colonial government, Surabaya Residency was one of the important economic areas, both as a producer of export commodities, industry, and trade. Surabaya had its own privileges as a modern port city. Since the 9th century, the port of Surabaya, which was named Hujung Galuh at the time, had developed into the most important trading port at the mouth of Brantas River.[1] Many merchant vessels from islands in Indonesia and abroad stopped to load and discharge trade goods. In fact, in the 15th century, when Malacca became the center of world trade traffic, Surabaya succeeded in taking over Tuban's position as an international port, as spices from Eastern Indonesia and rice from Java were transported directly from Surabaya to Malacca.

When liberalism practice was applied in Indonesia, which was marked by the implementation of sugar act (suiker wet) and agrarian law (agrarische wet) of 1870, Surabaya entered a new era in its economic history. At this time Surabaya was wide open for private capital entry, and the Dutch colonial government offered an attractive business climate for foreign investors. In the 1880s, foreign capitalists had made extensive business expansions by investing in plantation and other sectors that support the industry. With the increasing number of foreign investment entering this region, Surabaya experienced rapid economic development. At that time, the area of Surabaya and its surroundings was known as one of the largest sugar producing centers in Dutch East Indies.

Thanks to the sugar economy, Surabaya developed into an international industrial and trading area. Surabaya became the center of the eastern Indonesian archipelago's trade and navigation network. In fact, Surabaya succeeded in surpassing Batavia as a trading center, both in economic terms and size scale. By the end of the 19th century, Surabaya had become one of the most advanced industrial areas in Dutch East Indies, equaling to that achieved by Calcutta, Bombay, and Osaka.[2] This paper analyzes the development sugar economy

1 Sartono Kartodirdjo, et al., (eds.), *700 Tahun Majapahit (1293-1993): Suatu Bunga Rampai* (Surabaya: C.V. Tiga Dara, 1993), pp. 180-181.

2 H.W. Dick, "Nineteenth-century Industrialization, A Miss Opportunity?",

in Surabaya and its effects on industrialization. Finally, this paper explains why the sugar economy and industrialization in Surabaya failed.

Sweet Sugar Economy

The adoption of Cultivation System and liberalism had made Surabaya an important economic base for the Dutch colonial government. The remarkable success of the policy was marked by the increase in the volume of sugar production and export from year to year. In 1830, the entire Surabaya Residency only produced 15,000 piculs of sugar. This number increased 5-times, amounting to 144,000 piculs in 1840, and then in 1845, 17 factories operating in Surabaya Residency, had produced as many as 182.000 piculs of sugar.[3] Sugar production in this region continued to increase in the following years. In 1885, sugar production in Surabaya Residency was 904,905 picul and then increased to 1,093,760 piculs in 1890.[4] Subsequently, on January 1, 1895, the Dutch colonial government also established Suikersyndicaat in Surabaya. This institution was in charge of helping sugar industry to increase the production of sugarcane by conducting scientific research.

With the increase of sugar production, sugar exports from Surabaya also increased. During the 1850s, the average of Surabaya's foreign trade balance showed a surplus of 0.54%. Furthermore, in 1920, Surabaya's foreign trade surplus showed the highest rate of 0.96%, when sugar prices increased sharply by 69 Cent per kilogram.[5] The sweetness of the sugar industry profit led to the expansion of sugarcane plantations in Surabaya Residency. By the end of 19th century, there was 15,160 Ha of sugarcane plantations in Surabaya Residency. This number continued to increase in the early 20th century. In 1905, the area of sugarcane plantation had expanded to 23,763 Ha, and then in 1915 grew to 26,103 Ha and 29,045 Ha in 1929.[6]

The development of sugar economy provided positive effects on shipping and trading progress in Surabaya. This shipping progress was indicated by the increasing number of businesses in the field of shipping and development of ship size tonnage entering the port of Surabaya. In 1852, the number of ship tonnage coming out of the Surabaya port reached 60,790 tons,

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in: J. Thomas Lindbland (ed.), *New Challenges in The Modern Economic History of Indonesia* (Leiden: Program of Indonesian Studies, 1993), pp. 125-126.

3 *T.v.N.I.,* 1850, Issue I, p. 105

4 *Kolonial Verslag*, 1886 and 1891

5 G.H. von Faber, *Oud Soerabaia, De Geschiedenis van Indie's Eerste Koopstad van de Oudste Tijden tot de Instelling van Gemeenteraad 1906*. (Soerabaia, 1931), p. 147.

6 William J. O'Malley, "Perkebunan 1830-1940: Ikhtisar", in: Anne Booth et. al. (eds.), *Sejarah Ekonomi Indonesia* (Jakarta: LP3ES, 1988), pp. 206-207.

and then grew to 93,139 tons in 1856.[7] Along with the opening of Suez Canal in 1986 and the expansion of the port of Surabaya development in 1910, the number and size of tonnage ships coming in and out the port of Surabaya had increased rapidly. During 1912-1914, the average steamboats and sailboats arrived at the port of Surabaya amounted to 1464, with a content cargo by 7,283,000 m3.[8] As there was a lot of international trade and shipping, there were many shipping companies in Surabaya, such as Tjuniaveer, Klein Prauwenveer, Prauw Mij, Nieuwe Prauwenveer, Nieuwe Soerabaiasche Prauwenveer, Soerabaiasche Prauw Mij, and Oost Java Prauw Mij.

To support the economy and encourage the development of industrialization in Surabaya, the colonial government decided to build a railway transport network. Railway innovation was closely related to the development of industrialization. As tight market competition was increasing, the mobility of goods became a crucial issue. Raw materials must be faster, while commodities should be distributed quickly to far markets.[9] Therefore, the existence of a more efficient means of transportation, which effectively suppress "space and time", was needed. In addition, the mass-oriented nature of industrialization also demanded new means of transportation able to accommodate larger quantities of goods simultaneously. Therefore, the train was the perfect solution to solve all these problems. The train was able to move the necessary means of production to facilitate industrialization in Java, as well as in Surabaya. In 1875, through the state railway company (Staatsspoorweg), the Dutch colonial government built the first railroad in Surabaya, connecting Surabaya-Pasuruan and Surabaya-Malang lines. Subsequently, in 1894, Staatsspoorweg succeeded in constructing Surabaya-Batavia railroad. In addition to the state railway companies, private railway companies also participate actively, such as Nederlandsch Indische Spoorweg Maatschapij and Oost Java Stoomtram Maatschapij.[10] With the support of advancement in the field of transportation technology, economic activities and industrialization of Surabaya showed a rapid increase.

Failure of Industrialization in Surabaya

The development of sugar industry in the mid-19th century to early 20th century had major effects on the development of industrialization in Surabaya. At that time, a variety of modern sugar mill equipments that used many steam power engines were imported from Europe. These equipments were first used in a factory near Probolinggo in 1836 and later in a factory near Waru (Surabaya) in 1853. In 1855, nearly 60% of Surabaya's sugar mill had already

7 *T.v.N.I.*, 1859, Issue I, p. 122.

8 *Kolonial Verslag*, 1917.

9 Devisari Tunas, "Colonial Railway and The Trend of Jakarta Urban Development", in Freek Colombijn (*eds.*), *Kota Lama Kota Baru: Sejarah Kota-kota di Indonesia Sebelum dan Setelah Kemerdekaan* (Yogyakarta: Ombak, 2005), p. 385.

10 G.H. von Faber, *loc. cit*.

used steam power engine.[11] Along with the lifetime, the condition of machines used in sugar mills from time to time needed to be repaired. This condition became an opportunity for the development of metal casting industry and workshop of industrial machine repair.

In 1841, Frans Jacob Hubert Bayer, a Dutch metal expert, founded Stoomfabriek van F.J.H. Bayer company in Surabaya. The company focused on making and repairing factory machine. Based on Surabaya Residency resident report at the time, this factory was considered very beneficial to sugar factories located in Surabaya Residency and other sugar factories in the East End.[12] With the increasing need for repairing sugar mill machinery, in Surabaya, there were several new companies specializing in sugar mill machinery, such as N.V. Machine Fabriek Dapoen and De Volharding.[13] Both companies were equipped with complete and expensive equipment imported directly from Europe. In fact, in 1868 De Volharding factory was visited by Governor-General. P. Mijer.

In the mid-19th century, shipyard industry in Surabaya also showed rapid progress. At that time in Surabaya, shipbuilding companies such as Deacon en Co., Tromp de Haas Schey en Co., Steenvelt en Co., and L.G. van Lakerveld en Co emerged. Those workshops were equipped with metal casting facilities to make ship engine spare parts. All the workshops that specialized in shipping were located in Kali Mas harbor. Therefore, the Dutch colonial government dredged the canal of Kali Mas harbor several times so that the activities of steamboats in the harbor could run smoothly. In addition to the workshop industry of sugar mill machines and shipyard, in Surabaya, small and medium industries, such as Zanthuis en Co. sawmills, Levert's arrack and liquor refinery, and ice factory owned by G.H. Kuneman also grew.

By the end of 19th century, Surabaya had become one of the most advanced industrial areas in the Indies. Until the year 1900, in Surabaya, more than 100 large factories that produced various industrial equipment had been built.[14]The industrialization developing in Surabaya at that time was equal to that achieved by Calcutta, Bombay, and Osaka, and was one level above Singapore, Bangkok, Hongkong, Shanghai, and Tokyo. However, ironically after entering the 20th century, the development of industrialization in Surabaya could not be as fast as in the 19th century, leaving behind the previously mentioned areas. Howard Dick deplored the failure of this industrial development and declared it as missed an opportunity to "take off".[15]

Efforts to improve the economic and industrial conditions in Surabaya failed because of three main factors. The first factor was the unstable political and security conditions of the world. At the beginning of the 20th century, the world's security was torn apart by World War I that hit

11 H.W. Dick, *op. cit*. pp. 125-126.

12 G.H. von Faber, *op. cit*. p. 171

13 Bisuk Siahan, *Industrialisasi Di Indonesia, Sejak Hutang Kehormatan sampai Banting Stir* (Jakarta: Departemen Perindustrian, 1996), p. 11.

14 *Kolonial Verslag*, 1899/1900.

15 H.W. Dick, *loc. cit*.

Europe and America, as well as fears of the emergence of World War II. Under these conditions, the products of plantation industries such as sugar and coffee could not enter Europe, the main market of export destination. The global economic crisis or world recession became the second factor. The 1930 world recession due to the collapse of the Wall Street stock market in the United States had widely affected the world economy. Many industries also suffered losses due to the lack of trust in money transactions. The last factor was overproduction due to the declining world community purchasing power, resulting in a lot of industrial products that were piled up and unsold. This condition ultimately led to a number of companies going bankrupt and must be liquidated to prevent further losses.

Conclusion

The production of export crops in the mid-19th century to early 20th century had played an important role in the economic development and industrialization in Surabaya. All thanks to Surabaya's sugar economy that could grow rapidly. Surabaya had enjoyed the sweetness of profits from the sugar economy several times, marked by the surplus of foreign trade balance. The economic development of sugar provided positive effects on the progress of shipping, trade, and industrialization in Surabaya. Along with the progress of export crops and the profits derived from the crop, many foreign capitalists or private enterprises then invested their capital in the industrial sectors that support the development of sugar economy. In addition to the plantation industry, the investors also invested in metal casting industry, shipyard, and workshop of industrial machine repair.

By the end of 19th century, the sugar economy had succeeded in encouraging industrialization in Surabaya to grow rapidly. Ironically, the success of the sugar economy did not last long. Along with the drop in sugar prices due to over production and global economic crisis caused by war and fall of world stock market, sugar economic condition in Surabaya began to shake. Then this event affected other industrial sectors. Therefore, the development of industrialization in Surabaya also slowed down and eventually collapsed. Industrialization in Surabaya, which was previously equivalent to that achieved by Calcutta, Bombay, and Osaka, now, had lagged far behind. In fact, the industrialization in Surabaya which had previously achieved one level above had been surpassed by Singapore, Bangkok, Hongkong, Shanghai, and Tokyo.

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3rd Prize Winner

Gender Diversity at Stake: On the Pervasiveness of Political Heteronormativity in Post-New Order Indonesia, 1966-1999

"The author has attempted an interesting and important subject, providing an insight into the dehumanising and denaturing politics of the New Order Government and the way Indonesia turned its back on centuries of tolerance and the celebration of its rich LGBT culture as evidenced in the Serat Centhini and Serat Cabolang (1815) and the transvestite traditions of the Bissu in South Sulawesi. This challenging essay is a monument to the mean-minded fascism of the Soeharto regime and its present-day resonances."

Dr. Peter B. Carey

Gender Diversity at Stake: On the Pervasiveness of Political Heteronormativity in Post-New Order Indonesia, 1966-1999

Introduction

In the beginning, it was started by a personal emotion: Fear. As a queer person myself, I felt an enormous fear that Indonesia would became a heteronormative country. My fear did not come out of nowhere. Since the beginning of 2016, violence towards LGBTQ+ community was more frequent than ever, or so I thought.[1] According to Arus Pelangi research report (2017:47), discrimination towards LGBTI community was escalated since SGRC (Support Group and Resource Center on Gender and Sexuality Studies) polemic. At that time, there were a lot of hatred-nuanced speeches from the public regarding LGBTQ+ community. Indeed, one might said that so-called hate speech could do nothing on people's lives: it could be hateful, but it was harmless. However, LGBTQ+ community was facing more serious problem than hate speech. According to research conducted by Arus Pelangi to 185 respondents (2017:29), there were various forms of discrimination that occured to LGBTI community. For instance, there were 88 cases of verbal violence, 78 cases of physical violence, 41 cases of violent threat, 13 cases of sexual violence, and one case of forced marriage, just to name a few. Furthermore, LGBTQ+ issues' coverage in mass media has escalated quickly since the SGRC polemic as well. According to media mapping that was conducted by Kemitraan (in Arus Pelangi, 2017:48), oppositional news on LGBTQ+ had increased in February 2016, from 15 oppositional news to 186 oppositional news.

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1 In this essay, I used some terms that refer to queer community interchangeably. For instance, 'LGBTI' term was used in Arus Pelangi and Kemitraan research report. *Lesbi* and *gay* was used by Boellstorff (2005, 2007) in italic writing because he found that *lesbi* and *gay* in Indonesia has different subjectivity from lesbian and gay in the 'West'. In this essay the main term that I chose was 'LGBTQ+' that could be understood as Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender, Queer, and Others. According to Boellstorff (2007:18), anthropology was using 'lesbian/gay' term at first in its studies by Kath Weston in 1993. However, the term could be problematic because the term tend to abject the variation of gender variation in cross-cultural analysis. Boellstorff himself used 'queer' term due to it was a parsimonious terminological handle that situates his essay in relation with Weston while indexing the impact of the growing body of work known as 'queer studies' (see Boellstorff, 2007:18). Personally, I chose the 'LGBTQ+' term in this essay because it could highlight other forms of subjectivity that could not be associated as those letters in the acronyms, but still existed as Others with regards to the heteronormative point of view.

The increasing prevalence of discrimination and other forms of violence towards LGBTQ+ community brought me to a confusion on paradoxical reality regarding gender diversity in Indonesia. Some years ago, a lecturer in my anthropology of gender and sexuality class said that homosexuality and gender transgression is a part of 'Indonesian culture'. What he meant by Indonesian culture at that time was culture of some ethnic groups that resided in Indonesia. Indeed, his statement was supported by some ethnographic evidences. For instance, Davies ethnographic account (2007) shows that there were categorization of gender identity in Bugis society that consists of five gender identities, including women, men, calalai (masculine females), calabai (feminine males), and bissu (gender transgressive ritual practicioner). Another form of gender diversity in Indonesia could be understood in warok-gemblak relationship (see Boellstroff, 2005:40). According to Boellstroff (2005:40), warok-gemblak relationship was found in the Ponorogo region of Eastern Java, where contemporary persons occupy the warok subject position as male actors in a Javanese drama genre known as reog. While warok is usually positioned as a male subject, warok could be women with masculine characteristics as well (Boellstroff, 2005:41). Furthermore, there were hunters and lines in Makkasar, Sulawesi (Idrus, 2006), tombois and femmes in Padang, West Sumatra (Blackwood, 2011), sentul and kantil in Yogyakarta (Blackwood, 2015), just to name a few.

Some ethnographic accounts that I presented before show that homosexuality and gender transgression were embodied in ethnolocalized knowledges in Indonesia. Therefore, this essay explores the historical construction of political heteronormativity in the context of Post-New Order Indonesia. The main reason behind my selection of this historical phase was driven by my thought that Post-New Order Indonesia could be understood as historical regime with a rich cultural repertoire regarding gender and sexuality. The New Order era, for instance, was started with demonization of Gerwani (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia), a women's organization in Indonesia who were accused of having stimulated their young members to have sexually abused and castrated the generals who had been murdered during the 1 October 1965 military coup (see Wieringa, 2000:441). Thirty-two years later, New Order regime has fallen and it was marked by May Rapes Tragedy, which occured in mid-May 1998 and involved the mass-organized rape, torture, and murder of Chinese Indonesian women and girls in the context of ethnic conflict (see Davies and Bennett, 2015:5). Furthermore, the New Order regime has actively involved in governing sexuality of Indonesian people with various forms of governance, including governance practices that interrelate with homosexuality and gender transgression. However, violence against gender diversity was not only performed by the state. In this essay, I argue that the governance of sexuality performed pervasively could be understood as a practice driven by heteronormative values.

The Emergence of Political Heteronormativity in Post-New Order Indonesia

First of all, I want to clarify my standpoint: It would be an anachronistic statement if I said

that Indonesia just became a heteronormative state since the beginning of 2016. Although I acknowledge that there were a lot of violent cases towards LGBTQ+ community since 2016, heteronormative-based violence has its own historical roots in Indonesia. According to Davies and Bennett (2015:12), Indonesia is a clear example of a heteronormative state due to the ideal family defined as a heterosexual partnership solidified by offsprings. Davies and Bennett's argument was then supported by the existence of familial heteronormativity in Indonesia, with the President being a symbolic parent overseeing the care of children who are filled with filial piety (Davies and Bennett, 2015:12). However, heteronormativity in Indonesia was not only performed as familial heteronormativity in the cultural and political arena.

According to Green (2002:542), heteronormativity refers to the set of institutionalized norms and practices that supports and compels private heterosexuality, marriage, family, monogamous dyadic commitment, and traditional gender roles. Therefore, heteronormativity could be understood as a sociocultural phenomenon. Using Green's argument on heteronormativity (2002), it not only refers to familial heteronormativity, but also has its own political-cum-ideological basis intertwined between one and another. In this essay, there are three historical events that I propose as empirical proofs regarding the existence of political heteronormativity in the context of Post-New Order Indonesia, including Repent Operation in 1966, Marriage Act 1974, and violence towards lesbi and gay in Solo at 1999. Although these historical events might not have interwoven relation between one another, I argue that these historical events contributed to reproduction of heteronormativity in Indonesia society, as I am going to present in this essay.

As I presented before, gender-binary system was not the only gender categorization system that was embodied in the local knowledge of some ethnic groups residing in Indonesia. It was showed clearly in ethnographic accounts on Bugis society that pointed the existence of five gender identities in Bugis society. According to Blackwood (2005:854), the earliest accounts from 1500s showed that bissu was already a well-established institution and they merged masculine and feminine principles in rituals. Furthermore, in La Galigo, an epic creation myth of the Bugis that was written down in manuscript form, bissu has been frequently mentioned as important social category (see Davies, 2010). However, the condition changed when Islam was adopted in Bugis at the early 1600s (Peletz in Davies, 2010). Moreover, Davies (2010) stated that Islam has provided a basis and justification for anti-bissu sentiment. Broadly speaking, while Islam could provide anti-bissu sentiment in the cultural area for hundreds of years, the sentiment finally reached its peak at 1966 when Kahar Muzakkar initiated Repent Operation or Operasi Tobat. Repent Operation took place in Sulawesi and consisted of several violences acts towards bissu and their practices, such the killing and decapitation of Sanro Makgangke (the head bissu of the Bone region) and the burning of bissu's sacred regalia (see Boellstorff, 2005:39). According to Boellstorff (2005:39), the head of Sanro Makgangke was publicly displayed in the public sphere and many other bissus were killed as well. Another interesting highlight in this obnoxious event was that the bissus were accused of being in

league with the Communist Party of Indonesia that was persecuted by the government at that time (see Boellstorff, 2005:39).

The second event that I propose as empirical proof of the pervasiveness of political heteronormativity in the context of Post-New Order Indonesia is Marriage Act 1974. According to this act, marriage is a bond that could be legalize by the State within a man and a woman. Therefore, this Act excluded a relationship between woman and woman, man and man, and others in the definition of marriage, and there could be no choice for solemnization if the couple was LGBTQ+. While this Act received many critiques from the activist in women and children issues, the critiques tend to aim at the power relation between husband and wife regarding role of husband as breadwinner and wife as housewife (see Irianto, 2012:82), the capability of husband to do a polygyny (see Nurhasanah, 2013), and the problem regarding child marriage.[2] However, while I agree that there were patriarchal values that constituted the Act, we need to acknowledge that the Act also abjected LGBTQ+ subjectivity in terms of marriage, particularly in the context of national law.

The last event that I propose in this essay as an empirical proof of the continuity of political heteronormativity in the context of Post-New Order Indonesia is a violence towards lesbi and gay at Solo, Yogyakarta, in 1999. Indeed, this event took place after the New Order regime era has fallen. However, this particular event contained its own uniqueness. Broadly speaking, the violence towards lesbi and gay in Solo was perpetrated by several Muslim organizations. Those lesbi and gay were planning to do a national congress at Solo and they got responded by those repugnant acts of violences. In this act of violence, what I want to highlight is it was the fourth national congress that was held in Indonesia and the three before it never got any violences.[3]

Towards Queer Historiography in Indonesia: Some Concluding Remarks

In the context of Indonesia at this very moment, there is a lack of historical discussion on violence against the queer community. Indeed, several scholars already pitched their

2 According to Marriage Act 1974, marriage could be performed if the husband has already reached 19 years old and the wife has already reached 16 years old. However, Child Protection Act 2014 stated that marriage only could be performed if both husband and wife have already reached the minimum age, which is 18 years old.

3 The first National Gay and Lesbian Congress was held at Kaliurang, Yogyakarta, in 1993, the second National Gay and Lesbian Congress was held at Bandung, West Java, in 1995, and the third National Gay and Lesbian Congress was held at Denpasar, Bali, in 1997; Those Congress' were held by *Jaringan Lesbi dan Gay Indonesia* and they never got responded by violence (see Boellstorff, 2004: pp. 466-467).

academic writings onto this subject, particularly sociologist and anthropologist. However, the main narrative on history of the queer community in Indonesia tend to glorify the sexual and gender diversity in the past per se and absent in the talk on the pervasiveness of the violence towards these communities. Therefore, there are several conclusions that I want to underline in this essay regarding violence towards LGBTQ+ and the emergence of political heteronormativity in Indonesia.

First, there is a necessity to understand political heteronormativity as pervasive acts of governance. There are two arguments that I want to highlight in this statement: (1) What I meant by political heteronormativity is an interwoven relationship between sociocultural and political-economy aspects of heterosexuality. It was a concept that I formulated by pitching my critique towards Boellstorff's 'political homophobia' concept as it tend to exclude other forms of violence towards other gender categories that do not fit into heterosexual/homosexual dichotomy. Moreover, I draw the heteronormativity concept from Green (2002) on heteronormativity as I presented before; and (2) As it has already been pointed out by Ortner (1995:175), power should be understood as pervasive and is not always institutionalized. In this context of political heteronormativity, I think that political heteronormativity has its own relationship with power and power itself is embodied in political heteronormativity.

Second, despite historical events consisted of grotesque form of violence (Repent Operation, for example), these events tend to be absent in the historiography regarding Islamic and separatist movement in Indonesia. Solahudin (2011), for instance, could be the best example of this case. While he described a comprehensive historical description of Islamist-separatist movement in Indonesia, Kahar Muzakkar's movement included, Solahudin (2011) did not discuss the horrid killings towards bissus in Bone region by Kahar Muzakkar's movement. Therefore, I think we are not only facing the pervasive acts of violence, but we are facing hegemony of heteronormativity in the realm of Indonesia's historiography as well.

Third, statement regarding heterosexual marriage in Marriage Act 1974 could strengthen our understanding of the State. In this case, the State could not be understood as abnegation institution, but it could be a moral-based entity. According to Fassin (2015:6), while the State as an institution has its actions framed by legislation, the allocation of resources, and the organization of the means which is determined at least in part of its modalities, agents of the State also work in reference with a certain professional ethos, the principles of justice or of order, the attention to social or psychological realities, and it was all the product of their professional habitus. Hence, when we talk about laws formulated by the State, there is also a necessity to understand the cultural basis of the agents involved in the process of the law formulation. When we posited agents of state as agents of culture as well, we could understood that those agents' actions might be constituted by their own ideological basis,

that is heteronormativity in this very case.

In the end, I think that there is a necessity to do a more elaborate historical study on violence towards LGBTQ+ in Indonesia (whether as a physical violence, structural violence, or cultural violence, as it was explained by Galtung, 1990) in order to understand the sociocultural and political-economy basis that could be constituted as pervasive acts of violence towards LGBTQ+ in the context of Indonesia.

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Honorable Mention 1

The Unbroken Gallows: The Failure of Capital Punishment Abolition Movement in Colonial Indonesia

The Unbroken Gallows:

The Failure of Capital Punishment Abolition Movement in Colonial Indonesia

Introduction

Capital punishment gains another fame in Indonesia lately, as the renown The Commission for "the Disappeared" and Victims of Violence (KONTRAS) released Novum, a documentary film following efforts of a falsely accused death row inmate, Yusman Talembanua, to gain his freedom. Meanwhile, from colonial era to this day, official government data regarding capital punishment in Indonesia is unavailable.[1] In recent years, there are growing number of individuals and organizations who wage campaign to abolish capital punishment in Indonesia, or at least publicly stated themselves supporting the capital punishment abolition movement. However, there are very little to none, knowledge toward the capital punishment abolition movement in colonial Indonesia.

The Penal Code of Indonesia today is a legacy from Dutch East Indies colonial state. It is practically a translated copy, with minor addition and alteration, of Dutch East Indies Unified Penal Code of 1918, of which contains capital punishment as one of its main punishments. Receiving penal code as legacy would mean receiving capital punishment as legacy as well. [2] Even though there is almost no evidence to disprove that Indonesia received her penal code as legacy from Dutch East Indies, but in the end, they didn't share the same consensus regarding capital punishment. This paper aimd to give insight on the matter stated above. Why has the abolition movement failed, and the punishment continued?

Capital punishment abolition movement has existed since the Dutch East Indies Era. Through this essay, the history of the movement will briefly explained. This essay analyzes the failure of abolitionist movement on the capital punishment implementation in Colonial Indonesia by examining the polemic caused by the implementation of capital punishment in Dutch East Indies. By examining this, this paper will also discuss the ideas and political movement tangled in the polemic.

Waging War on the Invincible

1 KontraS Working Body, "Capital Punishment in Indonesia: Update 2012-2013" (Jakarta: Commission for the Disappeared and Victims of Violence (KontraS), June 2013).

2 Sanne Ravensbergen, "Nederland hield doodstraf in Indië in stand," historiek.net, accessed September 19, 2017, http://historiek.net/nederland-hield-doodstraf-in-in-die-in-stand/47503/.

Capital punishment had been implemented in Indonesia since the pre-colonial era. Then, it had many methods; ranged from decapitating, head crushing, stoning, to stabbing.[3] Capital punishment in VOC era was not milder. There was a notorious story of Peter Elberveld who was accused of treason and cold-bloodedly executed by the Governor General.[4] After VOC era, the Dutch East Indies colonial government officially used two methods of capital punishment: hanging for civilians and shooting for military.[5] These execution methods prevailed until the fall of the Colonial State in 1942. In other words, by the time William Kemmler became the first person to be electrocuted in New York, in 1890, Dutch East Indies was still hanging her gallow birds.

At that time, capital punishment was common and was considered the ultimate punishment. It was implemented to maintain state authority and ensure people's safety. However, capital punishment had been abolished for all ordinary crimes in Dutch since 1870.[6] In spite of this, capital punishment was still implemented in her colonies, which included Dutch East Indies. The Dutch East Indies penal code that contained capital punishment, was applicable for both Europeans and Indonesians, but in practice there was a clear discrimination, of which no European was publicly hanged.[7] The dualistic law enacted in Dutch East Indies was mainly driven by the colonial government's interest to control and repress her subjects, and also to plant fear. In addition to capital punishment's nature that goes against human rights, the dualistic nature of the colonial law triggered a debate on the implementation of capital punishment in Dutch East Indies. The debate occurred both in Dutch and Dutch East Indies,

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3 See Robertus Robet and Todung Mulya Lubis, *Politik Hukuman Mati Di Indonesia* (Tangerang Selatan: Marjin Kiri, 2016).

4 See William Bradley Horton, "Pieter Elberveld: The Modern Adventure of an Eighteenth-Century Indonesian Hero," *Indonesia*, no. 76 (October 2003): pp. 147-198; and Robert Cribb, "Legal Pluralism and Criminal Law in the Dutch Colonial Order," *Indonesia*, 2010, p. 51.

5 T. H. Der Kinderen, *Wetboek Van Strafregt Voor Inlanders In Nederlandsch-Indie* (Batavia: Ogilvie & Co, 1872); A. A. De Pinto, *Wetboek Van Strafregt Voor Nederlandsch-Indie Wetboek Voor De Europeanen* (Gravenhage: Gebroeders Belinfante, 1866); *Wetboek Van Strafregt Voor Nederlandsch-Indie Wetboek Voor De Europeanen* (Batavia: Ter Lands-Drukkerij, 1866).

6 *Handelingen van Tweede Kamer 1926 - 1927 64ste Vergadering*, 1927; Roger Hood, "Capital Punishment : A Global Perspective," *Punishment & Society* 3, no. 3 (2001): pp. 331–354, https://doi.org/10.1177/1462474501003003001.

7 There is one case in particular, the murder of Fientje de Feniks, of which a European was sentenced to death for murder, although, he commited suicide in prison just before execution. About this case, see Rosihan Anwar, *Sejarah Kecil "'Petite Histoire"' Indonesia* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2010); Ravensbergen, "Nederland hield doodstraf in Indië in stand."

among both Europeans and Indonesians.

By the end of 1870s, a focused assessment in Dutch East Indies conducted by expert advisor of the colony state resulted in two recommendations regarding capital punishment in Dutch East Indies: 1. Abolishment for both Europeans and Indonesians; and, 2. Intramural execution.[8] Eventually, the parliament decided that the Dutch East Indies' condition was still in a great need of open capital punishment execution, as it was fully ridden with criminals. Capital punishment yet still seemed invincible while abolition seemed impossible.

Harry J. Benda indicated that in the last four decades before her decline, Dutch East Indies was full of changes.[9] The Ethical Policy that begun in 1901 sparked enthusiasm and changes in many areas, including human rights and law. In the era of Ethical Policy, capital punishment was imposed for both ordinary crimes and crimes against the state, such as insurgency and rebellion. In 1904, a Tweede Kamer[10] member named Peter Jelles Troelstra watched an open execution of two murderers that was carried out in a field near Yogyakarta.[11] The sight shook him deeply, and he brought the matter to the parliament assembly a year later, in 1905. He filed an interpellation to abolish capital punishment in Dutch East Indies. He argued that such punishment was an act of uncivilized country, whereas Dutch was a civilized country.[12] However, the interpellation was quickly rejected. The majority of Tweede Kamer members saw that Dutch East Indies was still full of criminals and was not ready to reform, thus the need of capital punishment.

In spite of the rejection, Troelstra continued to wage the campaign against capital punishment. In 1905, he wrote in numerous newspapers regarding the cruelty of capital punishment he saw in 1904.[13] In 1906, Troelstra repeated his interpellation in the same assembly.[14] His effort finally paid off when the government issued the intramural execution in 1907. After the government issued intramural execution, Frederik Willem Nicolaas Hugenholtz, a Tweede Kamer member, plead to abolish capital punishment in Dutch East Indies.

Hugenholtz argued that, at that time, Dutch East Indies people, both Indonesians and Europeans, were demanding the abolition. He said that it was the right time to abolish capital punishment. He stated that in practice, Dutch East Indies' legal system was full of errors. There were language difficulties in court, of which the judge was only speaking Dutch, whereas the

8 "Kolonial Verslag" ('s Gravenhage, 1874), p. 63; "Kolonial Verslag" ('s Gravenhage, 1873), p. 74.

9 Harry J. Benda, "The Pattern of Administrative Reforms in the Closing Years of Dutch Rule in Indonesia," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, 1966, pp. 589–605.

10 Dutch lower house parliament.

11 "Het Nieuws Van Den Dag," October 1905.

12 *Handelingen van Tweede Kamer 1905-1906 11de Vergadering*, 1905, p. 178.

13 "Het Nieuws Van Den Dag."

14 *Handelingen van Tweede Kamer 1906 - 1907 18de Vergadering*, 1906.

witness was only speaking his native tongue. Another problem was false witnesses that were incredibly common in Dutch East Indies. The combination of these problems resulted in many innocent people sentenced to death. In addition to that, he argued that capital punishment had no deterrent effect to criminals, especially Indonesian people, as initially intended. On the contrary, he showed that executing Indonesian people would just brought forth martyrs and heroes for Indonesian people. Furthermore, he proposed to send criminals to islands in outer rim to serve the government.[15]

In Tweede Kamer assembly in 1908, Theodor van Deventer questioned about the implementation of capital punishment in colonial state. He questioned the capital punishment imposed by the District Court on 12 robbers in Pati, Central Java. He argued that the penalty was unnecessary and had many legal defects. After a protest by van Deventer in 1908, there were several attempts to persuade government to abolish capital punishment, but eventually all were rejected.[16] At this first round of the debate, the argument used by abolitionist was that capital punishment was an act of uncivilized country and the high number of miscarriage of justice in court.

The Communist, the Insurgency, and the Failure

The last round of the debate on capital punishment abolition in Tweede Kamer started in 1927, a year after the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) launched an ill prepared revolution. The insurgence was destroyed mercilessly by the colonial government. Throughout Dutch East Indies, 31 people executed for this crime.[17]

As pointed out by Ravensbergen, after the insurgence, liberal democrat and SDAP communist party was the one who shouted the loudest regarding abolition of capital punishment.[18] This action might have been the last effort to save fellow Communists who were sentenced to death. The argument used by Dutch abolitionist in the second round was that capital punishment was ultimate and irreversible while the court and the trial were unreliable and often mistaken. It caused many innocents going to gallows.

However, the abolitionist movement was not necessarily dominated by Dutch parliament member. The debate regarding the abolition didn't only occur in the fatherland, it also occurred in colony state parliament, the Volksraad. As indicated by Kleerekoper, an SDAP party member, in his speech in Tweede Kamer, there were at least three Indonesians who stood

15 *Handelingen van Tweede Kamer 1907-1908 17de Vergadering*, 1907, p. 267.

16 C Fasseur, *De Weg Naar Het Paradijs En Andere Indische Geschiedenissen* (Amsterdam: Uitgeverij Bert Bakker, 1995).

17 Robertus Robet and Todung Mulya Lubis, *Politik Hukuman Mati Di Indonesia*, pp. 34–35.

18 Ravensbergen, "Nederland hield doodstraf in Indië in stand."

by the abolitionist side in Volksraad, Raden Pandji Soeroso, Koesoemo Oetojo, and Wiranata Koesoema. Wiranata Koesoema said that in Islam doctrine, it is not obliged to punish one's crime with capital punishment. Compensation for crimes is also known in Islam. Kleerekoper found mosaic law that resonated in the argument provided by Wiranata Koesoema. As an alternative of capital punishment, Kleerekoper proposed the amercement that would be done according to law and fairness.[19]

The sharpest, and maybe cruelest, argument came from Raden Pandji Soeroso. Being a well-educated and religious Muslim, he argued that capital punishment was sparing criminals from hellish punishment in after life. It is known in Islam doctrine that the sin of killing a man could only be erased by capital punishment. He further stated that it is crueler to let the criminals burnt in hell for their crime rather than spare them with capital punishment. A religious Muslim would fear after life punishment more than colonial capital punishment. So, in order to give more effective deterrent effect, the government should abolish capital punishment.[20]

In spite of those argument, the movement was indeed in unfavorable situation. The last round of debate between abolitionist and retentionist ended in 1928. The majority of government official and parliament member rejected the idea of capital punishment abolition. The movement failed as the Indonesian Communist Party's ill prepared attempted revolution failed. The insurgency gave another reason for colonial government to preserve capital punishment, as it raised "Red" paranoia.[21] The insurgency undeniably brought an early end to the promising movement prepared by Troelstra, Van Deventer, and Hugenholtz.

Conclusion

Undoubtedly, the capital punishment implemented in Indonesia today has a root in colonial legal practice. Moreover, the failure of the capital punishment abolition movement in the colonial era also shaped the capital punishment today. The intramural execution today is a fruit of abolitionist efforts in the past. The failure is mainly caused by a chain reaction that started with PKI insurgency in 1926. The insurgence caused the "Red" paranoia, which in the end became the main argument of retentionist.

The failure of capital punishment abolition movement in Dutch East Indies can be seen as a reflection to Indonesia's condition today. It is an example of how the reluctance of colonial government in 1910s and "Red" paranoia in 1920s tackled capital punishment abolition movement. Today, it is the "Drug" and "Terrorism" paranoia that drives the government's

19 *Handelingen van Tweede Kamer 1927 - 1928 60ste Vergadering*, 1928, p. 149.

20 *Handelingen van Tweede Kamer 1927 - 1928 60ste Vergadering*, p. 151.

21 The term "Red" paranoia is taken from Bloembergen's book about police in colonial Indonesia. See Marieke Bloembergen, *Polisi Zaman Hindia Belanda Dari Kepedulian Dan Ketakutan* (Jakarta: Kompas, 2011).

reluctance to abolish capital punishment. To say that Indonesia has no history in abolishing capital punishment is not entirely true, however, as the movement in the colonial era met an eventual defeat. One can only hope that the modern movement will not meet the same end.

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Honorable Mention 2

In the Making of History: Reconstructing West Papua History Based on Korowai Society as The Last Frontier of Foraging Economy

In the Making of History: Reconstructing West Papua History Based on Korowai Society as The Last Frontier of Foraging Economy

Introduction

In popular discourse, the history of contemporary West Papua tends to be dominated by the state-centric writing paradigm, in which most of it takes the phase of pre-colonialization, colonization, and decolonization as a pivotal moment that drives and further impacts the socio-political condition of contemporary Papua afterwards. Thus, in this dominant mode of writing, the cause of social problems happening in Papua was framed as a consequence of political inequality produced by the state.

Ironically, this mode of writing reproduced a somewhat pragmatic explanation on which the problems could only be solved by either deliberating the political rights of the Papuan people or by further extending the act of "caring' by Indonesian government. This perspective, I argue, has set forth a methodological problem in the writings of Papuan history.

Based on my ethnographic research in Korowai, - a society which encountered the 'outer-world' in 1979 - in late 2017, it would be better if the history was perceived as a means of recording a series of experiences when the society encountered modernity. However, the interpretation of modernity by Korowai is lacking the state-centric historical discourse, but directly addresses a series of humanitarian and developmental program.

In the latter scenario, Indonesian government at that time was not seen as seemingly political leviathan in its contribution to the social and political marginalization of Papua. Despite considering their marginalized position as historical destiny because Papua area was integrated with Indonesia, and international community acknowledged this, Korowai, subjectively, considered their position in the face of history as a surviving traditional tribal in modern time, but paradoxically trying to negotiate modernity, emitting a sensitive political matter.

My research on Korowai society therefore suggests that by understanding Korowai perception on history as "in the making", it would be possible to later on understand the political conjuncture in Papua, while at the same time reconstruct the mode of writing of Papua's history. Korowai as my research subject and is globally known as "treehouse people"

embraces these contradiction in the grand narrative of contemporary Papua history.

Contemporary Papua and Its 'Grand History Narrative'

The popular perspective on Papua's history is mostly framed in colonization and decolonization epoch, see Jan Pouwer (1999), Lijphart (1966). The colonization and decolonization would then help the reader to imagine certain historical contexts of contemporary Papua. Each phase was seen to have a particular historical event that traced what kind of dominant regiment and power impacting the Papua situation.

This historical framework led to establishing Papuan political imagination as "terra incognita" that should be exploited in other means. Pouwer (1999) recorded that since the modern form of governmentality – Dutch-colonialized Papua was only perceived as the unexplored "terra incognita", as can be seen in initial plans for Papua by the Dutch, which was to turn it into a European settlement.

The reason why Papua was not rendered as geopolitically strategic could be understood as "geographies of ignorance" that was suggested by Willem van Schendel (2002). Compared with other territories of Dutch Indies, Papua in that era failed to emerge as a geographical metaphor and thus did not represent what the regime needed from their colony. What was significant was the 141ST meridian east, namely "one of the colonial cartography's more arbitrary yet effective boundaries" between Dutch New Guinea and British New Guinea. Papua was then understood as an unexplored area, except that its territory contributed to show the extension of Dutch colonial control.

This is why the description of Papua in past literatures only described it as a vast inhabitant area contributing only in timber and hydro-energy (Ljiphart, 1966). As an insignificant geographical imagination, this situation affected later shifting perspective of the Dutch on Papua, from European settlement discussed above, to the acknowledgement of independent future for West Papua (Pouwer, 1999).

In political matters, after Indonesia's independence, Papua's history focused on the theme of post-colonial dynamics. Papua was starting to be perceived symbolically as an integral part of the new post-colonial state, while on the other hand the Dutch was trying to make a political transition by suggesting independence for Papua. As recorded by Poulgrain (2014),

based on his intensive Dutch, Indonesia, and even USA official documents study, the dispute over West New Guinea's sovereignty between the Dutch and Indonesia was a part of de-colonialization agenda and Cold-war politics, not resources contestation.

Indonesia and the Dutch, also other major countries in Cold War era, did not know that Papua had rich mineral resources, as a result of Jean Jacques Dozy's expedition in Cartenz in 1939. Poulgrain (1999) described the delaying on oil discovery ousted the Dutch from New Guinea. The complex problem occurred later after "Act of People's Choice, 1969" when Soeharto's regime failed to fulfil his promise in making "serious efforts to improve the economic condition" whilst also managing corruption, economic hardship and general maladministration, which resulted in the alienation of the Papuans (Kroef, 1968).

Furthermore, the transition of power only made "the cultural arrogance and abuse of power" present at the local level in the Indonesian colonial intermediate stratum, both during and before Dutch rule was still manifested openly and unreservedly (Pouwer, 1999). As we all know, intensifying resources exploitation in Papua afterwards not only made political problems more complex, but also as I described, made the historical epoch, which was established and represented in the discourse arena, from scientific to daily conversation.

From what I described in the introduction, the history epoch of contemporary Papua has the tendency to conceptualize "Papua" in the term of geo-political sphere, projected then as an uncultivated area. What is missing in my perspective is the position of Papuan as a "subject" in all conceptual formation, either as a political subject, ethnicity or even as human itself.

If we could apply that "grand history narrative" as episteme in Foucault term in history context that "any given culture and at any given moment that defines the conditions of possibility of all knowledge," my finding in Korowai shows that there is an internal contradiction in contemporary Papuan history when considering Korowai's social history as a part of it. Korowai's social history history seems to be a mere juxtaposition.

Korowai: First Contact and Its History Context

"We had enough with Orang Barat and government. Orang Barat have stolen our indigenous knowledge and they are the only ones reaping the benefits. The government also did the same. They categorized us as Suku Terasing, but look with your eyes. Is there any life progress?

Our condition was similar to the time we first moved to this village. Undeveloped, poor, and stupid," Nate (Sir) Bael (foster name), 2017 (Researcher interview).

How the Korowai, subjectively, understand their social history? As we can see from Nate Bael's speech, the social history of Korowai started from their first contact with outer world, - Orang Barat -, in 1979, and the government in the form of a series humanitarian program, not in the juggernaut form. Their encounter experience with Orang Barat and government is a moment for history in the making.

Thus it means that the change after their contact with the outer-world has shifted not only their settlement culture from patri-clan household in the jungle into centralized and administrative Kampung, but also their interpretation about the past.

The axiom that the past is history, was different in Korowai. Korowai tends to interpret their past **as a** mythological narrative. For example, if we are talking about the past of some traditional communities, we generally find stories about their ancestor, descendant, and also the past mobility. However, Korowai took a resettlement after their contact with outer-world as the first chapter of their local history.

Korowai people described the time resettlement – the ancestral era (zaman nenek moyang) – as a frozen time when their ancestral in demi-human form (setengah dewa) lived in their bolup – foraging and dwelling in territories across the jungle. They imagine that time the ancestral only did what was taught by reibofu, god of creation, about life on earth. It is also a subjective interpretation as to why Korowai seems to be "found" by outer-world and has a limited area of mobility.

Because the past was perceived as a mythological narrative, they say that "as the fourth generation", namely the present Korowai people, or grand-grandchildren of their first settler in Kampung, they have only just beginning to live as humans. Their experience as "humans" could be seen as a moment that is being politicized as a subject of power – as described by Stasch (2009), as they start to be involved in a new "cultural forms, which include Christianity, Indonesian state institution, monetized trade, in factory-made exogenous commodities", that creates the pattern of "people's endogenous cultural is seized from what is marked as exogenous and is engaging closely with it in modes of hostility, embrace, or ambivalent crossover and return" when the moment of intercultural engagement with new historical

presences across the past three decades happened.

If we elaborate the conception of the past with the grand narrative of contemporary of Papua[1], one of Korowais described their position in this written narrative as "jumping from stone-age to the development era." They acknowledge Papua as a contested political arena and its history from school or daily conversation, but the narrative seems to captured in a distance with their daily experience.

As they have lived in permanent settlement for almost three decades, they consider their community life as a result of "undeveloped" categorization by Indonesian state and humanitarian agency. The general perception in their reflective thinking about their life journey is that "after we leave and sacrifice ourselves to our ancestral lifestyle in the forest by living in village, the government should be developing our village just like other villages in other Papua areas, or even in Java."

They always say changing their way of living to settlement is more difficult than forest life they once adapt. The basic problem lies in the fact that the village could not provide substantial amount of food, contributing to another problem, namely the need for money as currency, either for getting commodities that can not be produced in village, or pay public facilitation, such as medical help or education.

That problem then contributes to how Korowai project their future. Despite knowing that the preservation of foraging economy is essential for their daily survival or even for the symbol of pride because it has become a tourist attraction. They thought that the key to survive and compete in local region in the future is to follow a development principle. in other words, preparing themselves to adapt through labor market principle, while enhancing their labor skill.

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1 Korowai subjectively consider them as Papuans, yet when discussing about Korowai and Papuan politics, most of Korowai took a cautious speech. As quoted from one old man in Korowai, "we have only recently learned that there is Indonesia, *Amerika*, and other nations. We don't know politics, and don't talk about it, because we don't have a comprehensive knowledge about it. Oh, yes, we also know there is aspiration for Papua's independence, but honestly, as I said before, we have just been "found" by the outside world."

What is interesting in their projection on their rejection for all-kinds of industrialized or plantation in their area. They thought the industry or plantation-style only brings social problem, and also contradicts with their effort to preserve their traditional way of life, one of factor who made Korowai is well-known globally.

In brief, the particular case of Korowai brought different interpretation and also practice in the making of history that has contradicted the "grand history narrative" of Papua. Because Korowai have a different social history than most of the other ethnic community in Papua, Korowai knows history is not about the description about past, but how they negotiate and contest the making of history – about their present life and future trajectory.

Conclusion and Further Discussion: Korowai as 'People without History'

Based on my research on Korowai, we can see that this particular case have the possibility to extend what history is all about. If we take a speculative assumption, we can conclude the history of Korowai in Papua as one of the surviving foraging community, which sooner or later would be vanished by the state or even global development agenda. It is seen to justify the prophecy of destiny of uncivilized people all around the world. Their existence in history books is an example that a long time ago, our ancestors were hunters and gatherers.

However, the reason why I suggested that the Korowai case would have the possibility of reconstructing the mode of history writing on Papua, is because what I describe as "grand history narrative" do not explicitly address the real problem happening in the social-cultural level in our daily lives. As Erich Wolf (1982) in his book, "Europe and People without History," demonstrates, societies typically have continuously been changed by global political-economic force. His argument is based on the assumption that no society is completely self-contained, and the societal linkages and transformations driven by the material processes in which all social groups are involved – the production, circulation, and consumption of wealth."

Change is always a part of human life, but the problem with "primitive" societies around the world is that only their capitalism progressed. He analyzed that "capitalist accumulation has endangered new working classes in widely dispersed areas of the world. It recruits these working classes from a wide variety of social and cultural backgrounds, and inserts them into variable political and economic hierarchies… The diffusion of capitalist mode creates ... the constant reconstitution of its characteristic capital-labor relationship."

In other words, Korowai case could reconstruct the history of contemporary Papua, not only

the history of political contestation, but also the history of capitalism progress. However, the consciousness of Korowai that realizes history as progress could be a possibility to create an alternative in the sense of politics and economy equality in Papua; they not only become the state projection to cultivating the Korowai as a part of future national and global supply-chain.

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Honorable Mention 3

Reflections on Jakarta's History through Tourism Perspective during the Dutch Ethical Policy (1901 – 1942)

"This essay aptly describes the close connection between state policy, tourism and national revenue, by using historical perspective. An essay like this could be a source of ideas for today's government in fostering turism industry by making the best of important historical events. History-based turism could benefit both the nation's economy and people's familiarity with their nation's history."

Dr. Baskara T. Wardaya

Reflections on Jakarta's History through Tourism Perspective during the Dutch Ethical Policy (1901 – 1942)

Introduction

The role of government is critical for tourism industry as a source of directive guidelines and vanguard for a better living for the citizenz. In Jakarta's case, the city has long inherited vast touristic commodities from heritage buildings, centrum of cultural diversity, and maritime-based tourist destinations. To comprehend the historical and contemporary dimensions of tourism, one is inclined to fathom the role that the government carries out. This research intends to present the impact of the state policy, specifically during the Dutch Ethical Policy, to the social welfare of its citizens using the perspective of tourism. Through this paper, the effort of a city to achieve greater good aspect of state development will be shown with regards to moral responsibility.

The Tale of Complaint

To derive contemplation from tourism, one must look to history, because in a way, tourism is a conduct to profit from the history. According to Merrillees, during the early twentieth century, the Dutch Queen Wilhelmina declared that the Government of Nederlandsch Indie – the colonial name of Indonesia – must prioritise the welfare of both European population as well as the indigenous Indonesians.[1] In 1901, Queen Wilhelmina announced the Ethical Policy was to be implemented effective immediately. It wasdesigned to give something back to the people of Indonesia after long periods of exploitations. The government determined education and healthcare as the initial top priorities.[2] But one thing happened before it was decided that these two were the sole priorities that government should pursue with from thereafter. A few years before the Ethical Policy was in effect, Eliza R. Scidmore published a book about her travel experience to the Island of Java that caught people's attention regarding the tourism situation in Batavia – the colonial name of Jakarta.

In 1897, Scidmore wrote that the Government of Nederlandsch Indie was indifferent towards any form of visit from people of foreign origin. Arrived in Batavia, she wrote that "The Dutch do not welcome tourists, nor encourage one to visit their paradise of the Indies."[3] Tourists were treated without an effort of genuine hospitality as if these tourists were agent of espionage.

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1 See Scott Merrillees, *Greetings from Jakarta: Postcards of a Capital 1900 – 1950 (Second Edition)*. (Singapore: Equinox, 2014) p. 59.

2 *Ibid.*

3 Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore, *Java: the Garden of the East.* (New York: Century, 1987) p. 22.

The colonial authorities must know within twenty four hours why one visited the Nederlandsch Indie, they demand one's name, age, religion, nationality, place of nativity, and occupation, the name of the ship that brought the tourists to Java and the name of its captain – failure to do so caused one to face live-threatening consequences. Another permit called Toelatings-kaart, or "Admission Ticket" – must be obtained if one wishes to travel farther than Buitenzorg (now Bogor). Their passports usually accredited them as travelling the interior for "scientific purpose."[4] With her capacity as the member of prestigious National Geographic Society and being the first woman to do so,[5] her remarks were well acknowledged as a testimonial to the life in Batavia from a tourist's perspective and a strong message to the government that the tourism was slow to develop.

The business community in Batavia was well aware of the economic impact that tourism could provide and pushed the idea of managing better tourism industry to the city's stakeholders. This led to the establishment of Vereeniging Toeristen Verkeer – the first Official Tourist Bureau, which the colonial government agreed to partly fund in 1908. The Bureau was initially based at the Famous Hotel des Indes in Batavia, because the general manager of the hotel at that time, J. M. Gantvoort, was instrumental in the Bureau's establishment, although it soon had its own building located at the western end of Rijswijk (now Jalan Veteran).[6] This recognition was a gesture that first marked the city's willingness to apply tourism policy into the whole process of state development and in line to meet the mandate of the queen accordingly at the same time.

Tourism in Effect

The origin of the favoured tourism policy in 1908 onwards was marked with the opening of Suez Canal in 1869. This exposed the Nederlandsch Indie Government to a critical problem. According to Abeyasekere, this was due to increasing number of ships – large sized ships that were unable to dock in the Port of Batavia. These ships could not dock at the port and directly unload or load their cargo due to the mouth of Ciliwung River silting up. Large ships had to anchor even further from the land and needed the services of lighter ships in Batavia to transport their cargo into the city through river canals. Keeping the entrance passage to the river free from harm was a lot work to do and involved continual fight against sandbanks. Add the combination of dredges and the ongoing construction of canal walls out into the sea,

4 *Ibid*.

5 See Patas.id, *Sejarah Lampegan: Catatan Perjalanan Eliza Ruhamah Scidmore.* (August 25, 2017).
From: https://www.patas.id/2017/08/25/sejarah-lampegan-catatan-perjalanan-eliza-ruhamah-scidmore/ Accessed on November 14, 2017, at 8.20 pm.

6 Merrillees, *Op.Cit.* pp. 78-79.

it was overall a time-consuming, inefficient, and very dangerous work.[7]

The urgent matter of properly building the port in Batavia to ease shipment errands in order to operate efficiently and to rival Singapore as the major port in Southeast Asia was inevitable. With that in mind, the government responded with a decision to make a blueprint of a new port, nine kilometres to the east of the old port of Batavia. The construction of this new port began in 1877 and finished in 1886. Dispute between Batavia's political powers was imminent throughout the years; the Batavia Chamber of Commerce boldly opposed the decision to build a new port because they knew it would result in the rapid decline of the profitable lighter ships business in the old port of Batavia.[8] The new Harbour of Batavia was then named Tandjong Priok Port (now Tanjung Priok) and still in operation to this day. The new port was also being integrated through railway network with the Batavia Zuid (South Batavia) railway station in Batavia (now Jakarta Kota Station). Scidmore described the train scenery from Tandjong Priok Port to the Batavia Zuid station as "Source of life and of every economical blessing of native existence."[9] Scidmore's description in her book verified the evidence of tourism activity that took place in the city in a form of transportation.

During the span of 1900 – 1930, Indonesia's economy were mainly comprised of three major sectors; Agriculture, Industry, and Services. Agriculture was the single most important sector until 1970s.[10] During that time, tourism as a sector of industry was not yet being defined as a separate entity in Indonesia's economics map. Tourism is based on service interaction between many industries involved in one's travelling activities. The transportation sector in this case was represented by Scidmore as a travelling passenger on board the ship, which was in line with the definition of tourism in general. Goeldner and Richie stated that tourism as an industry encompasses all providers that deliver travel experience: transportation, accommodations, eating and drinking establishments, shops, entertainment, outdoor activity facilities, and other available services dedicated for individuals or groups that are travelling away from home.[11]

According to Van der Eng, the services sector was based on the shipping activity that reflected

7 Susan Abeyasekere. *Jakarta: A History (Revised Edition)*. Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1989. pp. 48-49.

8 *Ibid*. p.49.

9 Scidmore, *Op.Cit.,* p.18.

10 See Pierre Van der Eng. *Indonesia's Growth Experience in the 20th Century: Evidence, Queries, Guesses*. (Canberra: The Australian National University, 2002) p.1. Downloaded: November 14, 2017 at 5.01 pm. From:https://socialhistory.org/sites/default/files/docs/ecgrowtheng.pdf accessed: November 14, 2017 at 04.59 pm.

11 Charles R. Goeldner, J. R. Brent Richie. *Tourism: Principles, Practices, Philosophies (Eleventh Edition)*. (New Jersey: John Wiley & Sons, Inc. 2009) p. 6

from the fact that Indonesia's exports exceed import of goods by an average of 36%. At that span of time, the services sector slightly overlapped agriculture due to Indonesian Economy increased faster in size that its population.[12] Although the data did not directly show the correlation between tourism and services sector in 1900-1930, there's evident that tourism activity was happening in Batavia because of the inbound tourists[13] coming in and out. According to Merrillees, besides shipping goods such as mail and cargo – a shipment business in Nederlandsch Indie usually also provided transport for inter-island passengers. One of the most famous and important companies in Indonesia during the last half of colonial rule was Koninklijke Paketvaart Maatschappij (Royal Dutch Packet Company) or better known as the KPM. The company ran services to Singapore, Penang, and Australia.[14]

Visit *Weltevreden*

Established way south as a living quarter and later on developed as a main tourist destination of the city, Weltevreden or the "uptown", served as a marketing tool to lure the European tourist market to visit Batavia during the nineteenth century to the early half of twentieth century. It left the northern part – known as Benedenstad or lower town (Now Pasar Ikan)[15] socially decayed in a colonial sense, for it then only served as the commercial and banking hub for Batavia.[16] Weltevreden was marketed as "the queen of the east" to romanticise the long lost term glorified by the Dutch ruler around 1730s. Tanu Trh stated that during that time, the situation in Batavia was deteriorating fast due to the infamous Batavia Plague that turned the city into a hostile environment for civilization with the spreading of fatal diseases as a result of the city's poor sanitation.[17] The citizen of Batavia then moved south and under the colonial government authorisation established a new town in order to escape the vain caused by the disease.

Weltevreden was developed in order to facilitate its European settlers, in which government and military administration built the entertainment and shopping environment at the heart of

12 Van der Eng. *Op.Cit.*, pp. 2-3.

13 Inbound tourist involving non-resident travelling in another country of their origin. for more details, see UNWTO. *Frequently Asked Questions.* (No Published Date) From: http://statistics.unwto.org/content/faqs Accessed on Novermber 15, 2017 at 9.49 am.

14 Merrillees, *Op.Cit.* pp. 50-51.

15 Alwi Shahab. *Betawi: Queen of the East*. Edited by Yayan Supriatna and RA Gunadi, Jakarta: Republika, 2002. p. 12.

16 Abeyasekere. *Op.Cit.,* p. 48.

17 See Tanu Trh. "*Orang Belanda Dulu Minum Air Ciliwung." Batavia: Kisah Jakarta Tempo Doeloe.* Edited by Threes Susilawati, Jakarta: Intisari, 1988. pp. 162-165.

the city. According to Merrillees, visitors of Batavia often regarded Weltevreden as a European town in a tropical setting.[18] Famous hotels were built to provide its tourists with an option to spend their leisure time in the capital, among those hotels; The Hotel der Nederlanden, Hotel des Indes, and The Grand Hotel Java were very much well known to tourists in Batavia. Many of those tourists departed to Batavia from Singapore using steamships. Many individuals in Singapore worked as the Liaison – a profession of what is now known as travel agents for everyone who wished to travel or successfully being convinced to visit Batavia. These agents were appointed by the Official Tourist Bureau of Batavia. Besides Singapore, the Bureau also hired agents in strategic and busy ports such as Port Said (Suez Canal), Hong Kong, Shanghai, and Sydney. Merrillees described that the duty of these agents was to point out to travellers the manifold attractions of Java and to offer them every possible inducement for extending their tour to Nederlandsch Indie.[19]

An ample of tourist attractions was available and being centralised in a region called Noordwijk (now Jalan Juanda) and Rijswijk (now Jalan Veteran). According to Merrillees in the early 1900s, Noordwijk and Risjwijk were developed to be elite residential as well as fashionable shopping district areas. The Eerste Bataviasche Bierhal or first Batavia Beer Hall was located in Noordwijk, along with Maison Versteeg – one of the famous restaurants equipped with a dance hall upstairs and an open air café, along with a bar downstairs facing the street where the band played every morning. French culture was a big hit in Batavia during that time. Batavia's beautiful theatre, the Schouwburg (now Gedung Kesenian Jakarta) was a place where the beginning of French wave took place – visiting French theatre was very popular during mid-1830s. The strong influence of French culture in Batavia was also felt with the establishment of Frans Buurt or French Neighbourhood – this was also the location of the most prestigious club in Batavia called Societeit de Harmonie or the Harmonie Society. Astonishing public gardens such as The Prince Hendrik Citadel and Wilhelmina Park were complimenting the huge square of Koningsplein – one that was being regarded proudly by the Batavians as one of the largest square in the world.[20]

Conclusion

Governments may come and go – so does the policy which represents them to govern as the ruler of a state. What remains is the legacy of bygone days waiting to be utilised in a form of heritage. Batavia during the Dutch Ethical Policy was trying to utilise a form of City Tourism to profit from the civic development that had been carried out for centuries during the European Colonial period. The impact of development in which tourism industry was also a part of, was well-received throughout the European community as more people wanted to

18 Merrillees, *Op.Cit.* p. 57.
19 *Ibid.,* p. 78
20 *Ibid.,* pp. 50-92

live in Batavia. The number of European population doubled between 1905 and 1917, from 13,805 to 29,228, and then climbed further to 35,260 by 1927.[21] This was coherently in line with the Ethical Policy, although the same cannot be said to the Indigenous Indonesian, as the policy still favoured European greatly. Whether a government is representing one group of community or not, the state policy should represent the greater good of all parties involved. Tourism is well received in many countries as one of the most driving economic factors due to the fact that it can bring sustainable income to the nation, creating more jobs for its citizens, and transmit modern thinking through the cultural exchange based upon the foundation of equal rights and freedom. On the latter, the effect will be an integral part for it will be: it is pointless to have vast resources without knowing how to use them.

21 *Ibid.*, p. 57

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