ISRSF

Scholars • Research • Scholarship

BEST ESSAYS OF 2016

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OF 2016

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PREFACE

As a foundation committed to supporting the road to attain research excellence and scholarship endeavors for Indonesians, it is befitting for ISRSF to hold its Third National Essay Competition in 2016. It has always been our pleasure to appreciate the excitement and interest of many writers from various backgrounds throughout Indonesia for joining this competition. A spirit that we hope to maintain in the years ahead.

For 2016, we divided the Essay Competition into two Categories. One is focused on the writings of women authors on any topic, and the other was open to both men and women, centered on Indonesian history. This book contains the top prize winning essays in each category, as well as the honorable mention essays that also displayed excellence.

The centerpiece of ISRSF's current work is the Arryman Fellows program, which sends talented young Indonesians to Northwestern University in Chicago, USA, to pursue doctoral studies in social sciences and humanities. ISRSF sponsors essay competitions as a recruiting instrument to attract the attention of bright Indonesians who may not have heard of the Arryman program. Our foundation wants to find the most promising, talented, and committed young students who are inclined to pursue a life-long devotion to teaching, research, and scholarship.

The top essays in each category will receive a cash prize. But one of the greatest benefits of winning these competitions, which far exceeds the value of money, is a guaranteed interview in the Arryman Fellows selection process should the winners decide to apply. Looking at the winning essays, we are confident that most, if not all, of them will be strong candidates for the doctoral program.

The Essay Competition for Indonesian Women represents ISRSF's effort to make sure Indonesia's young intellectual women come forward and walk through the door we have opened to undertake their doctorate at Northwestern, one of the leading universities in the U.S. and the world. We believe higher education and the cultivation of new scholars is an important part of the struggle to give women a fair and equal voice in education and public life across Indonesia.

On behalf of ISRSF, I would like to thank the three Panel of Judges, who have carefully read and assessed all the essays we received. The judges for the women's essay competition were Dr. Dewi Chandraningrum, Dr. Ratna Noviani and Dr. Mildred Wagemann. The judges for the History Essay Competition were Dr. Baskara Wardaya, Dr. Peter Carey and Dr. Yosef Jakababa.

Thank you to everyone who wrote essays and participated in all aspects of these essay competitions. We hope you enjoy reading these short writings, and perhaps they will inspire some of you to join the essay competition later in 2017 and become an Arryman Fellow as well!

Dewi Puspasari
ISRSF Executive Director

WOMEN'S ESSAYS

INTRODUCTION

How do Women Laugh?

Like the Medusa

Dewi Candraningrum
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In The Laugh of the Medusa (1976), Hélène Cixous created a term famously called as l'ecriture feminine (means literally 'feminine writing'). Cixous celebrates the maternal bodies, in Arabic called as rahim, to speak against Freud's statement that women are dark, emotional, irrational, and incomprehensible—something that he called as dark continent. Within this array of concept Cixous realizes that women's voices have long been marginalized. She believed via this undefinable concept any disabled group could posit their voices via women's metaphor of womb, milk, water, and other feminine symbols that at the same time also rejected ideas of essentialism. She also ushered that any men and other group could enliven l'ecriture feminine to de-centers any forms of domination.

But I will not risk by overstating the universal vision of l'ecriture feminine, as women need to recognize too that the writing of women in plural culture need to be understood in their social context if women are to fill in an authentic and organic picture of engagement and act of voicing. When a woman reflects another particular woman's experience in her time and space, together the narratives offer an insight into the ways women creatively inscribe their difference. Language can be used to reconstruct the strong bond and alliance of womanhood and the minorities, making a connection between colonization and disempowerment of specific women within specific locus. Language via its tapestry in the narrative provides ample alternative of narrative techniques and thematic innovations to rewrite the stereotypical images of female agency and subjectivity, initiating the empowerment of women's voices. The narrative ability to elaborate reflection can counter histories that disrupts the homogeneity of mainstream historiography and that recovers previously subjugated women's and minorities' knowledge.

ISRSF has provided this platform of justice, specifically for women. Among 64 essays after plagiarism check, with fruitful collaboration with juries Mildred Wagemann and Ratna Noviani, it finally announced the following six winners as part of those who successfully narrate their voices excellently.

In Reveal the Tangled of Trade of Poverty behind Sumba 'Ikat' Fabric, as first winner, Selly Agustina discloses in a loud voice that the shift into an ecologically integrated paradigm in the production of Sumba Ikat fabric needs the integration between science and indigenous knowledge. She gives tone to the preservation of indigenous knowledge such as processing the natural color and spinning cotton, as one of the things that need to be quickly addressed before it is extinct. This paper found out that merely a few people know how to do it, thus there is a threat of this knowledge disappearing when not passed on or documented. It is suggested that conserving the knowledge of weaving based on natural and traditional process, which is more sustainable, requires more studies and possibilities to be integrated with formal education or as a curriculum in schools. The division of work between men and women can be reconstructed, for example the husband can help in spinning and coloring while the women are weaving, she closes her argument.

Winner two entitles her paper Violation of Women's Rights, Food Insecurity, and The Future of Indigenous Peoples. Nurbaya laments that deforestation does not only cause conflicts among indigenous people and the government, but also causes the violation of indigenous women's right. She unearths that it affects many aspects of life such as increasing workload, violence against women, both physical and psychological, food insecurity at household, as well as malnutrition among children as the real manifestation. This paper predicts that the future of indigenous people can be seen from the state of indigenous women today. She then suggests that the government must take actions to solve the forest conflict by considering the existence of indigenous people, particularly indigenous women and involving them in the decision making process.

In Suryaningsi Mila's Ijon System: a Poverty Circle and Injustice for Poor Farmers, as the third winner, the paper focuses on problems of poverty in the context of NTT, especially in the area of East Sumba. The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) of East Nusa Tenggara informed that East Nusa Tenggara is ranked third poorest area in Indonesia. Ijon system poses the same threat to poor farmers, because both bring harm. Ijon system appears as helpers who provide false assistance to the poor then ensnares them in a miserable poverty prison. She discloses that the farmers are obliged to return the loan with interest of 100% to owners of the capital. In the event of crop failure, then the interest multiples each year until the loan capital plus interest are paid off. Mila concludes boldly and loudly that ijon system is like 'poisonous honey', originally providing solution for farmers but gradually affects all aspects of the poor farmers' lives.

In Human Right Based Approach (HRBA): An Alternative to End Poverty in Aceh, Pocut Ismyati Vonda, as the first Honorable Mention, narrates that poverty is an assault on human dignity, but it can also reflect a violation of human rights. Aceh is well known as one of regions that has an abundant natural resource in Indonesia, namely oil, gas, and gold mine as, well as where one of the biggest rain-forests in the world, Leuser, is located. However, she argues that the data from BPS proves the other way around, that shockingly, more than 800 thousand poor people live in Aceh, or, 17,08% (2015) of the population in Aceh is considered poor, which is above national poverty rate at 11,13%. Similarly, unemployment rate in Aceh is also above the national rate, which means above 5.50%, and economic growth is also lower in comparison to the national rate. These facts illustrate that abundant natural and financial resources do not

necessary bring positive changes to the life of the people, she reported. She proposes that there are three main reasons why HRBA should be used as the main tool in development efforts, especially to end poverty in Aceh. First, this approach provides tools for understanding and addressing the multi-dimensional root causes of poverty and conflict, including discrimination, powerlessness, lack of political participation, and lack of access to basic resources and services, which leads to better sustained results of development efforts, which fits the situation in Aceh. Second, it strengthens the rights holders to claim their rights, which means that it advocates the interest of voiceless people to get their right. Third, it develops the voiceless people's capacity to influence policy and more importantly to participate meaningfully in development-related decisions and actions.

The second Honorable Mention, Robitatul Asna, entitles her paper Jilboobs vs Syar'i Hijab: The Sexual Objectification of Indonesian Muslim Women. In a loud voice, she opens her paper with the argument that aside from the notion of how Indonesian Muslim women can freely express themselves through what kind of veil they wear since the hijab fashion industry blossomed, the phenomenon of Jilboobs and Syar'i Hijab unfortunately has been positioned in such an unfortunate situation. The wearers of these two types of Hijabs often experience judgment, sexual objectification and even harassment without their consent. Jilboobs and Syar'i Hijab have been used to define the morality, religiosity, and even sexual purity of Indonesian Muslim women. Asna finds that apart from the strong patriarchal culture in Indonesia, the lack of awareness in gender issues among Indonesian Muslim women themselves also becomes one of the apparent reasons why such oppression still happens until today. She concludes that Indonesian Muslim women should realize and embrace the understanding that their morality, religiosity, and sexual purity cannot be defined solely based on a piece of veil or clothing. Instead of criticizing other women who have different preferences, Indonesian Muslim women should respect and empower each other.

The last Honorable Mention, Lunyka Adelina Pertiwi, in her important essay Understanding Anti Human Trafficking Commitments of Imamatul and Sandra Woworuntu with Martha Nussbaum's Concept of Cosmopolitanism narrates that Martha Nussbaum's concept has helped to form her belief that human trafficking is one of the contemporary complex issues which should be addressed by cosmopolitan individuals, communities and governments. She analyses that Ima and Sandra are Indonesian-born cosmopolitan women who struggled to flee human trafficking, and then transformed into human dignity agents abroad. Pertiwi finds that moral commitments of Ima and Sandra, rooted in natural moral concerns, are to help victims of human trafficking to wake up from trauma, rebuild their human capabilities and feel equal to normal people. She loudly proposes strong cosmopolitan attitudes so that wider cooperation and more effective measures can be implemented sustainably to combat human trafficking and to bring justice for victims and all humans.

Together, the six essays incorporate multiple voices and construct collective and dialogic selves, defying the conventional notion of monologist representation of the individual self in womanhood. This ISRSF Women's Essay Competition problematizes mainstream histories by highlighting women's own and living experiences and by revealing the often "unspeakable" repressed memories in a form that can be called as again l'ecriture feminine. In conclusion, I draw attention to future directions of women's narratives as a pivotal change for justice as a way to perform and to claim the dialogic forms of the selves, as well as to employ a very introspective writing style, which foregrounds multiple voices rather than an individual, monolithic voice. How do women laugh? Loud! Like the Medusa.

Solo, December 2016

1st
Prize Winner

Reveal
The Tangled Of Trade
Of Poverty Behind
Sumba 'Ikat' Fabric

*Despite some minor languge problems
the article clearly illustrates
the potential destructive effects of globalization
on societies and environments
not prepared for it. Changes in the production
of ikat seriously damaged the traditional
socio-economic base and impoverished
the traditional producers of the cloth.
The author's recommendations of locally run initiatives
to return the ikat to a secure position in
modern Sumbanese life appear somewhat half-hearted.
They seem unlikely to succeed in restoring prosperity
to the traditional producers whose plight is
exacerbated by competition from newcomers.*

Mildred Wagemann

Selly Agustina

Government Science
University of Padjadjaran,
June 2011

Development Studies
International Institute of Social Studies
Erasmus University Rotterdam,
The Netherlands, January 2016

Globalization makes the world interconnected by its products as the economic commodity. Some commodities were actually only cultural and traditional goods in the past, therefore have never been sold. In Sumba, a small island in eastern Indonesia, woven fabric or *kain tenun* has been used as cultural and religion tools for thousands years. It has changed to also become an economic commodity since Sumba people started to connect with the rest of the world. The impacts of this system bring some problems such as poverty, inequality, even indirectly, environmental degradation.

Most of Sumba people live in villages with the total population more than half million inhabitants[1]. The popular livelihood of Sumba people are respectively farmer for men and household including textile weaving for women[2]. Sumba people still strongly hold their culture and local belief called Marapu or Merapu. Furthermore, the Sumba *Ikat* fabric has a cultural value with its symbols and has a pivotal role with its rituals in customs ceremony. The skill of weaving is passed down for generations among women. Thus they have been producing their own clothes since thousands years ago by used their native plants (Melalatoa and Murni 1997, 52).

The *Ikat* fabric became an economic commodity after the Dutch came to Indonesia and exported it to Europe's market (Gittinger 1979, 157). Indonesians, in particular Sumba people, experienced the agrarian capitalist system since the colonial era (Bernstein 2010, 52). After the colonial period, Sumba *Ikat* fabric kept attracting many buyers to buy because of the complicated motives and method of weaving. The transition to the capitalist system has brought the introduction of many innovations in the production system which has left the traditional production system. The traditional spinning technique and natural coloring as the heritage and local knowledge had been changed into industrial threads purchased from factories in Java[3].

The global economy structure made the income of Sumba people dependent on market demand, which later lead to the need to increase productivity. There is a shift of weaving culture that was only for customs and everyday basic needs, to became a livelihood for earning money. This essay will try to explain the hidden social and environmental problems behind the beautiful Sumba *Ikat* fabric with the tools of commodity chain analysis by Hopkins and Wallerstein (1986, 159 in Bair 2005). Then as alternative solution, I offer the concept of local food sovereignty with people centered approach in order to raise the quality of life of Sumba people and to keep the environment healthy with their own resources.

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1. Wikipedia. 2016. Census 2010". Accessed November 8. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sumba
2. Hivos. 2013. "Socio-Economic-Gender Baseline Survey (Sumba Iconic Island) by JRI Research." Accessed May 4, 2015 https://hivos.org/sites/default/files/jri_socio_economic_gender_survey_-_sumba_iconic_island_round12_-_hivos_2013.pdf
3. Personal communication with local NGO in July 2014

Commodity Chain Analysis of Sumba Ikat Fabric

The increasing demand for textile in global market and the needs to get income motivated Sumba weavers to increase the productivity of this commodity. The weavers need to improve production in a short time with little efforts, so they began to buy industrial threads from other regions in Java Island. As a result, they no longer use natural materials like cotton and natural dyeing because the production process needs a very long time. One fabric, which is made from natural materials and dye, can take six months up to one year. This is because they need to cultivate the cotton, harvesting, spinning the threads, making dyes, coloring, and finally weaving. The revenue from selling the natural one is more expensive than the woven fabric made from industrial threads. But, since the process is too long and due to their urgent need for money, most of the weavers skip the process of cultivating until spinning cotton into threads, even coloring the threads. In consequence, the traditional knowledge of spinning cotton fiber and natural coloring are getting extinct. Moreover, the traditional weavers in Sumba are becoming more dependent to global economy because they need money to buy the raw materials then sell the product to the market.

Picture 1 The process of spinning cotton fiber (left) and weaving threads (right)

Source: personal documentation

The dependency of local Sumba weaver to global economy can be traced by the threads they bought from some markets or shops in Sumba. Threads in the market come from textile factories in Bandung or other places in Java. The transportation of threads from Java to Sumba Island uses fossil fuel that contributes to ecological footprint. William Reese (cited in Barndt 2007, 24) measured ecological footprint by summing energy consumption and carbon emission from any activity. The machine in the factories needs electricity supplied by coal, which is not a renewable energy. The carbon emission coming from transportation and manufacturing process represents another source of pollution. Moreover, the components of threads product in textile factories in Java consist of 38% cotton fiber imported from Australia, USA, and China; and 62% man-made fiber: rayon and polyester which is made from synthetic chemical or fossil fuel[4]. Generally, technologies that rely on non-renewable resources and produce toxic waste are not sustainable. These resources will be depleted and the waste cannot be deciphered by nature, so it will harm the environment. The imported cotton from other countries also brings many environmental problems in transportation, the cultivation in large scale monocultural fields in the origin country, and health issues for the farmers.

Indonesia is one of the largest cotton importer countries because there are many textile factories, thus creating very high demand for cotton. The textile factory is known as a labor intensive manufacture that hire women worker with low wages. Based on data from USDA[5] in post revises MY 2012/13 and MY 2013/14, Indonesia imported 3 million bales compared to the previous estimate of 2.6 million bales and 2.65 million bales respectively. During 2013-2014 cotton exports to Indonesia were led by the United States (31 percent), followed by Brazil (24 percent), and Australia (16 percent). In terms of quantity, cotton represents the second most imported product in Indonesia, after wheat (Faostat, 2015).

The high price and declining supply of cotton production in global market encourage Indonesian government to expand hundreds hectares of cotton field in Sumba. The government will also give subsides (seeds, fertilizers, pesticides) for cotton farmers. Indonesia imported 40 tons of hybrid cotton seeds from Hubei Provincial Seed Group of PRC to be planted in various areas including Sumba[6]. Then, PT. Ade Agro Industri as a farm company will buy the cotton from farmers in Sumba to deliver it to many textiles factories in Bandung. The threads product from Bandung will be sent again to Sumba as material for making Ikat textile. The final product of Ikat textiles is usually sold in international market. The long chains of Ikat production process connects the Sumba weavers to the global economy system; nonetheless, it still

4. Antique & Elly Setyo Rini. 2009. "MS Hidayat: Impor Kapas RI Capai 99,5%" Accessed May 5, 2015 <http://bisnis.news.viva.co.id/news/read/106735-ms_hidayat__impor_kapas_ri_capai_99_5_>
5. USDA. 2015. "Indonesia: Cotton and Products Update." Accessed June 5. <http://www.fas.usda.gov/data/indonesia-cotton-and-products-update>
6. Indonesian Ministry of Information and Communication. 2015. "RRC-Indonesia: Kerjasama Bidang Pengembangan Benih Kapas Hibrida" Accessed May 5. <http://hpt.unpad.ac.id/rrc-indonesia-kerjasama-bidang-pengembangan-benih-kapas-hibrida/>

cannot solve poverty in Sumba. Instead. it brings more social and environmental problems.

The necessity to increase profits and productivity in the name of the competitiveness in the international market may lead to social dumping policies in the labor market, such as reduction of social and labor protection, decreasing wages, increasing working time (overtime work), and exploitation of workforce (including child labor). Overexploiting resources and increasing pollution as well as adopting inappropriate practices (using pesticide or chemical dyeing) can damage of the environment with disastrous medium and long term consequences. Cotton fields need a large amount of water, in turn this will reduce water supply and make the areas dry. The conventional cotton fields also need enormous amount of chemical pesticides, insecticides, and herbicides that will pollute the soil, water and air, and also harm the health of farmers. The cultivation of genetically-modified (GM) cotton varieties has increased and became more resistant to some insect pests and/or tolerant of certain herbicides. In consequence, it will diminish other native plants as well.

The transformation of Ikat textile commodity chain after connecting to the global market has become longer and more complicated because of many actors involved in different phases. Every node of the chain can be processed in a different place and in a different country; this requires transportation to move from one place to another. For instance, the input of a cotton field is cotton seeds from China, cultivating and harvesting by farmers in Australia, manufacturing in Java Island, the weaving process in Sumba Island, the final products are distributed by retailers to be sold in Europe, bought by Americans and disposed as waste in Africa. Yet, this is not the end, because textile contains synthetic chemical or fossil fuel that will remain and pollute the environment.

The Social Relation in Production of Sumba Ikat Fabric

People consume or wear clothes for daily needs. This is what Collins (2003, 8) said as pervasive or everybody will spend certain amount of their income to buy them. But different than clothing that Gary Gereffi called as a buyer-driven commodity chain where retailers and merchandisers determine the production networks (Collin 2003, 7), Sumba Ikat fabric can be both a producer and buyer-driven commodity, since it is a traditionally handmade and niche product. However, the same actors may take the same roles because there are many small-scale family firms and entrepreneurs who work on it. The interested thing to be analysed is the fact that all the Sumba weavers are women and they come from lower class in social structure. Therefore, it will be more useful and focused to find the best alternative ways for women from low class to improve their environment and social relation.

Data from Hivos (2013) shows that the average time spent by Sumbanese men and women is approximately seven hours a day for doing domestic work. But the women still have additional work to weave about 5-10 hours per day. In total, the women have more than 10 hours working in a day, so that the motivation to increase productivity will increase the work hour and women's burden as well. Longer work hour of Sumbanese women as weaver than men is very close to inequality. Furthermore, a study by Hivos (2013) shows that the decisions are mostly taken by the men in the family. Women have an influence in the decision making of the household's budget only for daily expenditures, while men take decision concerning use of water and electricity and other features affecting the opportunity of women (Hivos 2013). The husband or the major son may take all the money obtained with the credit, spending it and creating even more dependence and debt.

The gender inequality that already exists as a cultural consequence then worsen with the inequality and gap in social class. The structural gap among Sumba people is caused by a traditional caste system, which divide people in different levels. There are four levels of indigenous caste system in Sumba existing until now: nobility (Maramba), commoners (Kabihu), and slave class (Ata). 'The Maramba caste still possesses extensive resources, especially in terms of land (tana) and livestock (banda luri or living wealth), and persists in demonstrating status through display (Forshee 2001, 16). Land ownership and access to resources determine the wealth or social status of the people. The weavers are all women and mostly come from the slave class (Ata).

Another problem concerns job opportunity, which also shows discrimination. The non-native inhabitants dominate the economy in Sumba by earning more income than natives. This condition happened after the colonial era when Indonesian government under the dictatorial regime imposed transmigration policy that moved people from high density islands to lower density islands like Sumba. Many immigrants from Java make it difficult for Sumba people to compete on skill in formal sectors. Most of Sumba men work as farmer, while for the great majority of women are weavers because the traditional custom only allows women to weave. The changing of subsistence society into capitalist-agriculture society also changed the dependency of Sumba people to money, although they were not able to enter the formal sector. They sell their labor too cheap in the shape of *Ikat* fabric in order to get income to buy basic needs. The high expenses and low income of the weaver tends to make them in debt problem. The poverty and inequality of Sumba weaver is getting worse when they are related to global market. The state and foreign corporation started to open access to foreign investment and free trade policy. Nevertheless, increasing the productivity and competitiveness did not change their status as the lowest class.

Local Sovereignty as the Solution

There are many economic projects from state and government or corporation agenda, trying to find the solution of social and environmental problem with

training to raise productivity and profits, but as I already explained before, it did not improve the quality of life of the Sumba people. There is also certification or eco-labelling programs due to environmental issues, but these kinds of projects tend to end up as the reproduction of neoliberal-capitalist system as Figue rio (2015, 12) said. The mainstream certification or labelling only creates more inequality because only some high-level producers can compete. Otherwise people-centered approach in food sovereignty can create more sustainable livelihood that support the community of the weavers (Figuerio 2015). The member of community can organise themselves to fulfill their basic needs by establishing cooperatives and innovating a local credit system. The use of local resources can reduce dependency to the global market and repair the environment.

The needs to scale up is only in term of multi-dimensional scales of sufficiency (cf. Princen 2005 cited in Iles and Montenegro de Wit 2014, 14) or often called as relational scale that links with the global network with the same vision to support each other. They can provide discussions, workshops, and trainings among them. But keep prioritizing to supply the local market so it can shorten the chain and keep the resources in one place close system. Recently the local government policy suggests the local civil servant wear Ikat textile as their uniform. This program can support the local economy and perpetuate their skill.

The shift into an ecologically integrated paradigm needs the integration between science and indigenous knowledge in the production of Ikat fabric. Preservation of indigenous knowledge such as processing the natural color and spinning cotton, is one of the things that needs to be quickly addressed before it is extinct. Nowadays, only few people know how to do it, thus there is a threat that this knowledge will disappear when it is not passed on or documented. To conserve the knowledge of weaving based on a more sustainable natural and traditional process, it requires more studies and possibility to be integrated with formal education or as a curriculum in schools. The division of work between men and women can be reconstructed, for example the husband can help in spinning and coloring while the women are weaving.

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2nd
Prize Winner

Violation of Women's Rights, Food Insecurity, and The Future of Indigenous Peoples

Nurbaya

Nutrition Science
University of Hasanuddin
June 2010

Community Nutrition
SEAMEO-RECFON
University of Indonesia
2015-present

"An impressive ecofeminist essay, which not only reveals the multi-layered damages of deforestation to the lives of indigenous women; but more importantly, it critically highlights the overlooked and neglected rights of indigenous women as the vanguard of food security for the communities."

Ratna Noviani, Ph.D
Universitas Gadjah Mada, Yogyakarta

Indigenous peoples are the original people who live in an indigenous way and have a close connection to their ancestral lands, customary laws, language, and social culture. Indonesia has many indigenous peoples, also known as *Masyarakat Adat* or *Masyarakat Hukum Adat[1], living mostly in remote area spread all over the country. Their exact number is still unknown. Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara* (AMAN)[2] estimates that at least there are 1,163 indigenous communities in the total population of about 50–70 million people.[3] Unfortunately, our government only recognizes 356 ethnics and sub-ethnics.[4]

Indigenous peoples live in remote, coastal, mountainous, and mostly in and around forest areas, depending their livelihood so much on resources available within their surroundings. Forests are not merely functioned as economic resources but also as the center of their belief system. The indigenous peoples perform rituals and live a life based on their local wisdom.[5] These indicate a strong relation between human and nature, especially with their customary forest. They believe that the traditional rituals have noble values to get closer to the Creator, sincerity, purity as well as gratuity.

Indonesia today is a country that has the highest rate of forest loss in the world.[6] Deforestation occurs mostly because of industrial activities such as logging, converting forest into oil palm plantations, and mining. Some of the forests are customary forests where indigenous peoples live for years. However, the government does not recognize the ownership of customary forest indigenous acclaimed.[7] Development aggression has deprived their rights on customary forest without any informed consent, prior approval, and compensation. Indonesian Indigenous Peoples have been impoverished systematically in the name of development.[8] They

1. S. De Royer et al.," Self-identification of Indigenous People in Post-independence Indonesia: A Historical Analysis in The Context of REDD+" *International Forestry Review*. (2015);17(3): pp. 1–16.
2. Aliansi Masyarakat Adat Nusantara (AMAN) or Indigenous Peoples' Alliance of the Arcipelago is an organization of indigenous peoples across Indonesia. www.aman.or.id
3. AMAN. "Republic of Indonesia" *in Country Technical Note on Indigenous Peoples' Issues.* IFAD, AIPP. 2012. p.2.
4. AIPP. *ASEAN's Indigenous Peoples*. 2010.
5. UNEP and FAO. *"The Relation between Indigenous Peoples and Forest" in Vital Forest Graphic*s. UNEP, FAO; 2009. 14-15 p
6. Rhett Butler, "Despite Moratorium, Indonesia Now Has World's Highest Deforestation Rate", *Mongabay*, June 29, 2014, accessed November 8, 2016, https://news.mongabay.com/2014/06/despite-moratorium-indonesia-now-has-worlds-highest-deforestation-rate/; BBC News, "Indonesia Surpasses Brazil in Deforestation Rate", *BBC News*, June 30, 2014, accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-asia-28084389.
7. Tim Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM, *Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM: Hak Masyarakat Hukum Adat atas Wilayahnya di Kawasan Hutan*. (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 2016), pp.59.
8. AMAN. *"Republic of Indonesia" in Country Technical Note on Indigenous Peoples' Issues.* IFAD, AIPP. 2012, pp.6.

have lack of access to health, education, and experience poverty.[9] They suffer from discrimination in many socio-economic aspects.

Not having a formal recognition of their land has caused the indigenous peoples to lose their rights of ownership on their land and lose the function of their customary forest where they usually do hunting and cultivating for their daily needs. This condition then rises conflicts among indigenous peoples, government as well as the industrial owner. They even experienced criminalization, arrested without an arrest warrant, and persecuted. One example happened to Bahtiar bin Sabang, one of Turungan Baji people, in Sinjai District, South Sulawesi in April 1, 2016.[10] Situation like this happened in many regions in Indonesia such as in indigenous people of Talonang (West Nusa Tenggara), Malamoi people (West Papua)[11] and Malind people (Papua).[12]

On March 16, 2016, Indonesian National Commission on Human Rights released 4 books of National Inquiry for the Rights of Indigenous Peoples on Their Customary Forest.[13] The books record some analysis and findings related to the conflicts of forest faced by indigenous peoples. One of the findings is the non-recognition from the government on the indigenous peoples' status as the root cause of the forest conflicts.[14]

In this paper, I will focus on discussing the violation of indigenous women's rights related to the forest conflicts. It is crucial to know because the purpose of this paper is to analyze the state of indigenous women as mentioned in the books by using nutritional point of view to assess the wider impact towards indigenous peoples.

9. Robyn Eversole and John-Andrew McNeish, *Indigenous People and Poverty, An International Perspective*, London: Zed Books, 2005.

10. Wahyu Chandra, "Kasus Penebangan Pohon Milik Sendiri, Petani di Sinjai Dijemput Paksa Polisi", *Mongabay Indonesia,* April 8, 2016, accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.mongabay.co.id/2016/04/08/kasus-penebangan-pohon-milik-sendiri-petani-di-sinjai-dijemput-paksa-polisi/

11. Wahyu Chandra, "Ketika Masyarakat Adat Talonang Terusir dari Tanah Sendiri", *Mongabay Indonesia,* May 10, 2016, accessed November 8, 2016, http://www.mongabay.co.id/2016/05/10/ketika-masyarakat-adat-talonang-terusir-dari-tanah-sendiri/

12. Dini Suryani, "Structural Violation of Indigenous Human Rights in Indonesia: A Case Study of Merauke Integrated Food and Energy Estate (MIFEE) in Papua", *Jurnal Masyarakat dan Budaya*, (2016); 18(1): pp. 97–108.

13. Komnas HAM RI, "Keterangan Pers Komnas HAM tentang Peluncuran Buku Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM RI", *Komnas HAM RI*, March 16, 2016, accessed November 8, 2016, https://www.komnasham.go.id/index.php/siaran-pers/2016/03/16/22/keterangan-pers-komnas-ham-tentang-peluncuran-buku-inkuiri-nasional-komnas-ham-ri.html

14. Tim Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM, *Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM: Hak Masyarakat Hukum Adat atas Wilayahnya di Kawasan Hutan*. (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 2016). pp.58.

The State of Indigenous Women in Indonesia

The second book of National Inquiry for Indigenous Peoples' Rights on Their Customary Forest notifies about the recent state of indigenous women in Indonesia regarding the violation of their rights. The book uncovers 40 selected cases of forest and natural resources conflicts that happened to indigenous peoples. It represents 7 regions in Indonesia (Sumatera, Java, Kalimantan, Sulawesi, Maluku and North Maluku, Bali and West Nusa Tenggara, and Papua).

From all over the cases, National Commission on Human Rights stated that there are 5 specific findings in relation with the indigenous women. The findings are 1) loss of indigenous women's role as food keeper at household, 2) lack of participation in decision making, 3) loss of traditional knowledge, 4) indigenous women as the agent of peace and 5) the role of indigenous women in customary rituals.[15]

In many countries, including in Indonesia, women play an important role in maintaining household food, children and family care. Unlike men, women have been socially constructed as people with the responsibility for preparing food and caring for children. But their capacity and autonomy at the household are frequently hampered by cultural and institutional aspects.[16] More likely, they are the first to blame as they are not able to bear the responsibility of preparing food and taking care of children. Finally, social construction becomes a burden for them both in household level and even their community.

Similar condition also experienced by Papuan women.[17] The National Commission on Violence Against Women captured two kinds of violence experienced by indigenous women in Papua. First, they are not recognized by their traditional custom in decision making, including in their household. The second is they are also vulnerable from physical and psychological abuse due to the conflicts in their society. These are the real violence and violation of human rights towards women.

Traditionally, women are in charge to collect foods from forest, cook, and serve it for all household members. This to ensure the food availability at household is still enough. They are also the heir of traditional knowledge. They could identify wild plants that could be utilized as traditional medicine, such as the kind of plants to stop hemorrhaging after childbirth. They have a skill to select the best seeds for cultivation. These activities are passed down from their ancestors to the next generations. But since the aggressive expansion of oil palm plantations and conflicts happened, it changes their way of life.

15. Tim Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM. *Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM: Pelanggaran Hak Perempuan Adat dalam Pengelolaan Kehutanan.* (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 2016). pp.17-22.

16. Sam Mannan. *Indigenous Peoples and Sustainable Development*. Rome: IFAD. 2014. pp.6.

17. National Commission on Violence Against Women. *Enough is Enough! Testimonies of Papuan Women Victims of Violence and Human Rights Violations 1963-2009*. Vol. 1, Women Commission. 2015.

Indigenous women are forbidden to enter the forest even just for collecting food. The exploitation of the forest also makes the availability of traditional food are scarce, even lost. Such condition happens among indigenous women in Papua and Maluku. They are no longer find sago, which is their main staple food. This forces them to do some coping strategies to survive. Some of them finally go far away from home to collect traditional food while caring their children. Others have to help their husband by becoming a daily laborer to earn money in order they could purchase market food quite expensive for them.[18] Coping strategy is a proxy indicator of food insecurity at the household level.[19] The different type and the higher frequency of coping they apply indicate the severity of food insecurity status of the household. In the end, women and children will suffer profound impact due to this condition.

Women's Role, Food Insecurity, and The Future of Indigenous Peoples

To answer the purpose of this paper, the conceptual framework of malnutrition developed by UNICEF[20] will be used to analyze the findings of National Commission on Human Rights as mentioned previously. Based on the framework, there are three factors as the underlying causes of malnutrition among children. The factors are food insecurity, unhealthy environment, as well as inadequate care for children.

Lack of traditional food availability and accessibility will make households tend to suffer food insecure. It will affect inadequate food intake of children. Moreover, unhealthy environment will cause children to be more vulnerable, suffering from infectious diseases such as diarrhea and acute respiratory infection. These two factors, food insecurity and unhealthy environment, are interconnected to determine the children's nutritional status, despite also depending on care practice by caregivers, which are typically women. Care practice manifests in some activities and practiced by women, such as feeding practice, hygiene food preparation, providing psychosocial care and home health practices overall.[21] The role of women is crucial in this part.

The findings of National Commission on Human Rights indicate the indigenous women's role is feeble. Since indigenous women were banned from entering the forest, since that violation of women's rights began. The exploitation of natural resources in their forest makes their food source scarce. Their access to traditional food is closed, making them lose their role as food keeper at their household. This

18. Tim Inkuiri Nasional Komnas HAM. *Konflik Agraria Masyarakat Hukum Adat atas Wilayahnya di Kawasan Hutan*. (Jakarta: Komnas HAM, 2016).
19. Daniel G. Maxwell and Richard Caldwell. *The Coping Strategies Index: Field Methods Manual*. 2nd edition, (USAID, CARE, 2008), pp.2.
20. Lioba Weingärtner. *The Concept of Food and Nutrition Security*. Vol. Augustus, (FAO, 2004) pp.1-28
21. Patrice Engle, "The Role of Caring Practices and Resources for Care in Child Survival, Growth, and Development: South and Southeast Asia". *Asian Development Review*. 1999;17(1973): pp.132–67.

condition will increase food insecurity among indigenous peoples. Indigenous women must go far for collecting food or working as labor with the lowest salary while they still need to take care their children.

Non-recognition on indigenous women's status from community is another problem that also influences the nutritional well-being. Indigenous women's status is still low. They are still not getting involved in decision making in all levels, even in their home. In fact, studies in developing countries had emphasized that the women's status strongly determines the nutritional status of the children.[22] The study also estimates the impact of equal status of both women and men can reduce the prevalence of underweight among children up to 13%. Empowering women is important to reduce their workload constrain and protecting them from any violence. There is positive evidence that empowering women may reduce the prevalence of underweight children.[23] This confirms that recognition of women's status to become equal with men will increase their self-esteem and mental health, increase their access to health service and information, therefore, will increase the quality care of children. Unfortunately, this state has not happened among indigenous women today. Violence towards indigenous women in the name of custom still happens as the impact of non-recognition from the community.

The situation happening towards indigenous women nowadays has formed a vicious circle that will contribute to the high poverty rate. The absence of recognition of women's rights often makes them suffer violence and harassment, both physically and psychologically. Indigenous women lose their rights on the forest where they usually collect food, causing their household to have a tendency of experiencing food insecurity. This case forces them to work outside to find a low-wages secondary occupation. It becomes multiple burdens for indigenous women and increases their workload.

High workload may lower their quality of care toward their children, let alone to themselves. Consequently, it is impossible for women to provide a high quality of care without sufficient resources, such as having sufficient quality time and good health status. In fact, food insecurity and inadequate care of the children, and low access to health facilities, will lead to malnutrition among children. As the consequences, the children will grow with lower academic performance, later will become unproductive manpower with lower income, and will contribute to the poverty at the end. The government must address this problem immediately, otherwise this vicious circle will never break up and will always repeat itself from generation to generation.

Children must have optimal nutritional status by having an adequate intake of nutritious food, high-quality care as well as proper health services, especially in

22. Lisa C Smith et al, *The Importance of Women's Status for Child Nutrition in Developing Countries.* (Washington DC: IFPRI, 2003).
23. Scaling Up Nutrition. *Empowering Women and Girls to Improve Nutrition: Building a Sisterhood of Success.* SUN Movement, 2016.

their first 1000 days of life, from pre-pregnancy until 2 years of their age. It is a crucial period of human life also known as "*the window of opportunity*". Having an optimal nutritional status in this period will optimize children's physical growth, brain and psychological development, as well as stronger immune systems that will contribute to healthy future life.

Conversely, Barker Hypothesis[24] emphasized that malnutrition in this period will lead to children suffering from overweight and other complications such as obesity, diabetes mellitus as well as cardiovascular disease in their adult age later. UNICEF also confirms that malnutrition children are more likely to experience impairment of brain development as the consequences of malnutrition[25] and will result in less educated generation in the future. That is why malnutrition is a big problem, because it determines the future of the next generation.

The role of indigenous women at household is principal. I argue that we cannot overcome malnutrition problem among children without empowering the women, giving their rights, and recognizing their status. If the government does not take proper actions to solve this problem, we will have low-quality generation. I argue that the state of indigenous women today is a description of the future of indigenous peoples in Indonesia. The future of indigenous people needs to be tend to today.

Conclusion

Deforestation does not only cause conflicts among indigenous peoples and the government, but also cause violation of indigenous women's right. It affects many aspects of life such as increasing workload, violence against women, both physically and psychologically, food insecurity at household, as well as malnutrition among children as the real manifestation. We could predict the future of indigenous peoples from the state of indigenous women today. The government must take actions to solve the forest conflict by considering the existence of indigenous peoples, particularly indigenous women and involving them in decision-making process.

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24. Douglas Almond and Janet Currie. "Killing Me Softly: The Fetal Origins Hypothesis". *National Institutes of Health Public Access*. 2012;100(2):130–4; Manuel Ramirez-zea et al., "The Double Burden of Malnutrition in Indigenous and Nonindigenous Guatemalan Populations". *The American Journal of Clinical Nutrition*. 2014;100:1644–51 accessed October 12, 2016, doi:10.3945/ajcn.114.083857.1

25. Nutrition Health and Development, *Turning the Tide of Malnutrition, Responding to the Challenge of the 21st Century*, (Geneva, World Health Organisation, 2001) accessed October 12, 2016: http://www.who.int/mip2001/files/2232/NHDbrochure.pdf.; Robert E. Black et al., "Maternal and Child Undernutrition: Global and Regional Exposures and Health Consequences", *The Lancet*, *Maternal and Child Undernutrition Series*, (2008).

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3rd
Prize Winner

Ijon System: A Poverty Circle And Injustice For The Poor Farmers

Suryaningsi Mila

Theology
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Sociology and Religion
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Ijon System: a Poverty Circle and Injustice for the Poor Farmers, as third winner, eloquently narrated that ijon system is like 'honey poisonous' which originally provided as solution for farmers but gradually affect all aspects of life in poor farmers which thus made them more vulnerable.

Dewi Candraningrum
Feminist, Jejer Wadon, Solo

Introduction

Justice issue has become a never-ending discourse for a long time. Justice is just a concept without real action. The implementation of justice's values in the society is hardly noticeable. Nowadays, we always find many cases of injustice which bring misery to the poor and powerless people.

When a lot of people are screaming under the yoke of oppression and injustice, some people are celebrating their victory of grabbing justice for their own interests. Then, what is the meaning of justice? Where is justice can be obtained? Apparently, everybody has their the own standard about justice. Many people experience justice when they have power over other people. For them, justice is when they take advantage as much as possible and when they see other people screaming and crying in poverty and powerlessness. In this case, we can find another perspective of justice according to the victims of injustice. They have experienced justice in poverty and underdevelopment reality. Actually, they never got the experience of justice because they were trapped in false consciousness. They are running their life without asking and complaining. For them, poverty is a given. So, they always grateful with their situation. They do not refuse the fact of being poor because they were formed to be passive, mute and submit to the oppressive system. This situation arises my sensitivity to have concern on those poor people and to explore the system behind this reality.

In line with the previous description, I would like to explain more detail about one form of economic injustice, which is usually called "ijon system", that grows in many rural areas. Particularly, I will describe about "ijon system", which ensnares poor farmers in East Sumba District, East Nusa Tenggara Province. Actually, ijon system is a manifestation of bad economic system in this country. Ijon means purchasing rice and any others crops before and after harvest time by the middlemen. It means, those people who have money and who control the policy of economic system are the rulers of the poor farmers. I present this issue based on my experience of living among those poor farmers who are repressed in the ijon system.

Capitalism Economic System in The Frame of Structural Injustice

The Ijon system is the embodiment of the new form of capitalism economic system. This system emerges to weaken the poor farmers. As a form of capitalism, the ijon system works sistematically to control poor farmers by giving loans (money, rice plant seeds, rice) with the highest interest and advantage**.** In fact, the middlemen are the owners of capital who oriented to the accumulation of capital and wealth. The ideology of capitalism has moved the industrialists or capitalists to seek maximum profit by ignoring social, humanity and environmental aspects. In connection with this, Walzer said "*for in capitalist society, capital is dominant and is readily convertible into prestige and power. It is precisely the dominance of money 'outside its sphere' that enables the wealthy to purchase offices, to corrupt the courts and to exercise political power*".[1]

1. Michael Walzer, *Spheres of Justice* (Oxford: Martin Robertson, 1983) in John Girling,

This description confirms that in the capitalism system, capital has an important role and access to hold the economic system and policy. It means, those who have money can control the policy makers. We have to realize that economic system of capitalism is under the umbrella of legal protection and unfair political structures. Parallel with this, John Girling argues:

> For capitalism structures society, dictating how people work and what they have to live on according to the assets they have (or do not have) to exchange in the 'free market'. The political system also structures society - but indirectly and intermittently. Indeed, political equality (in a democratic society) is contrasted with economic inequality. It is the inequality of economic assets combined with the requirement for any political system to sustain itself materially that form the basis for capitalist penetration of ostensibly autonomous spheres. The interaction of political and economic spheres results in collusion, that is, the 're-confusion' of public and private.[2]

In his explanation, John Girling tells that the structures of capitalist society encourages people to work and live according to theirs assets in order to exist in a economic global market. In this context, the political system and the structure of society indirectly have an important role to the issue of economic inequality. Basically, political equality in a democratic society is opposed to economic inequality. However, the fact is there has been a conspiracy between the political system and economic system, then it spawns an economic injustice reality. That is, the capitalism system still perpetuated, because it is supported by a corrupt political system. As a result, those poor people who are not able to compete in a capitalist economic system become powerless and weakness.

In connection with the economic system of capitalism, Max Weber also explained that the teachings of Protestant ethics is one the foundation of the growth of capitalism in various parts of the world. The spirit of capitalism has created people who are not only focused on the accumulation of capital and to produce money, but also on the struggle to avoid violations of ethical and moral. Basically, everyone is directed to have ethical values based on the Protestant ethic as a power to reach prosperity.[3] However, in practice, the ethical principles no longer serve as a basis for the development of capitalism. Therefore, the capitalist system has created human beings who pursue a lot of capital and who conquer other people to gain their own interests.

Injustice is the result of social and cultural construct that may occured through the process of socialization and it is strengthened structurally and culturally. The forms of injustice can be mentioned as stereotyping, marginalization, subordination and domination. The implementation of injustice, such as exploitation, violence and

discrimination, is still happening in various aspects of life. This phenomenon creates the social order configuration that places the group who does not have special quality as part of the subordinated and discriminated.[4] Therefore, ijon system is closely related to the structural injustice that has been crystalized and have an impact on the attitude of people who think the practice of injustice as an accepted reality. The socialization of injustice is very systematic and impacts the social and legal systems.

This oppresive structure works very smooth and sistematic from the big cities to the remote areas. In this structure of power, there are capital owners and political leaders who bound each other and engaged in economical activities and policies that weakened those people who are living in the grass root. Al. Purwa Hadiwardoyo said that the vision of social justice is still a long journey. According to him, social justice can be realized when there are structures and systems that support social justice in the various fields of society. He adds that social justice includes legal, political, economic, ideological and cultural.[5] In fact, social justice is hardly found. On the contrary, injustice is marked by a poor legal system, politics and economics. The struggle to achieve justice is contradictory with the corrupt system.

Ijon System and the Circle of Poverty

The impact of injustice, such as poverty, as a social reality cannot be denied. Poverty has become a fact that is rarely questioned. It is also considered as a grace that should be accepted by those who are disadvantaged economically and politically. Injustice and poverty becomes more perpetuate by various regulations and policies. In this context, the poor people are taught, even forced, to accept all the unjust policies without critical thinking.

Poverty is one indicator of structural injustice system. The unfair structure is one of the root of poverty, which is happening in this country. Poverty has become a social disease that is difficult to cure. In fact, the number of poor people is still increasing every year as much as the number of poverty alleviation programs handled by the government and by various NGOs. However, the struggle against poverty almost never totally succeeds because of various factors, among those is due to the poor that is often used as the deceived object.

In this paper, I will focus on the problem of poverty in the context of NTT, especially in the area of East Sumba. The Central Statistics Agency (BPS) of East Nusa Tenggara province launched the number of poor in this region until March 2016, which reached 1.149 million or 22.19 percent. It means East Nusa Tenggara is on the third rank as the poorest areas in Indonesia.[6] In the context of NTT, the statistical data at the beginning

Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy (London & New York : Routledge, 1997), pp. 154.

2. John Girling, *Corruption, Capitalism and Democracy* (London & New York : Routledge, 1997), pp. 154.

3. Max Weber, *The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism* (London & New York : Routledge, 1992), pp. 46.

4. Tommy F. Awuy, *Wacana,Tragedi dan Dekonstruksi Kebudayaan* (Jakarta : Jantera, 1995), pp. 11.

5. Al. Purwa Hadiwadoyo, "Keadilan Sosial dan Sistem Ekonomi," dalam *Aspek-Aspek Teologi Sosial, ed. J.B. Banawiratma* (Yogyakarta : Kanisius, 1998), pp. 40-41.

6. https://nasional.tempo.co/read/news/2016/07/19/058788624/nusa-tenggara-timur-provinsi-

of 2016 showed that there has been a decreased number of poor people in each district, including East Sumba district. However, this data needs to be scrutinized and analyzed comprehensively. In fact, NTT has not finished with the problem of poverty. This data cannot be used as an indicator that the poor had been reduced. I understand that the data in the form of numbers has covered the reality of poverty.

In principle, poverty in many local areas becomes an indicator of the corrupt system. Information of the decreasing number of poor people in NTT is considered as good news for the policy makers. However, the actual data is filled with falsehood. The problem of poverty in this area is very complex, so the decrease in the number of poor people cannot be an indicator that NTT has achieved prosperity.

Poverty is closely related to the structural injustice in various fields, especially in the economic field. The oppressive system has spawned the economic injustice. One form of economic injustice that is the focus of this paper is ijon system that took place in Lewa District. I choose Lewa area because I live and serve in the region. I see that poor farmers in this area are living in poverty. Those people do not expect to become prosper because they are trapped in the ijon system. Ijon system as one form of structural inequality has a direct impact on poverty, backwardness and ignorance. The ijon system creates reliance of poor farmers on the middlemen.

Ijon System: Solution or Disaster?

The ijon system is the same as "plant disease", because both bring harm to the poor farmers. The ijon system has created poverty and misery without end. The ijon system is rooted in the poor farmers' life. Therefore, they cannot go against this system. The ijon system appears as a helper who provides false assistance to the poor then ensnares them in the miserable poverty prison.

Many people in East Sumba district are subsist as farmers. Each family has a rice field which can fulfill their daily needs, educational needs for children and health care needs, and also to finance the custom party. Supposedly, the fields are available to fulfill all their needs and can also be used to improve their lives. However, the fact says otherwise. People in this areas can not reach the high level of well-being. They are prisoned in a deadly circle of ijon system. Most of them are not able to fulfill their daily needs and sustain their basic needs.

In addition, the practice of ijon system that involve farmers and the middlemen is also increasing. Ijon system has created dependency lifestyle that causes poverty and powerlessness. Those people tends to owe to the middlemen when they are entangled with economic problems.

Ijon or loans with the highest interest seemed to have taken root and become a chain of power that repress poor farmers. Through my research, I find that the poor ketiga-termiskin-indonesia, accessed on August 8, 2016.

farmers are not able to breakthrough the ijon system. This is shown by the fact that farmers are always indebted to the middlemen to fulfill their daily needs, financing the custom's celebrations and also for land preparation before planting rice. Before planting begin,s the farmers have taken loans from the middlemans. They did not care about the interest on the loan, because they need money to fulfill their urgent needs. Loans can be money, rice, and other basic needs and also rice seeds.

Besides as a solution of economic problems, ijon system is always an option to resolve culture problems, especially if it relates to traditional parties such as marriage and death. Although ijon system provides loans with a very high interest, but poor farmers will still choose this system because there is no other choice. They consider ijon system very helpful, especially when they get financial difficulties. From my research, I also found that people prefer to holding traditional parties in order to maintain kinship and family prestige. They would be willing to owe tens millions rupiah to buy pigs, buffaloes, cows, horses and other needs which will be donated in the traditional party. There are also some who owe for financing their children's education in college, but the amount of debt is relatively less compared to custom's party financing. The surprising thing is some of them owe to buy liquor and gamble.

The repayment on ijon system occurs at harvest time. The farmers are obliged to return the loan with interest of 100% to the middlemen. In the event of crop failure, then the interest multiplier will increase each year until the loan plus interest is paid off. Therefore, ijon system is like 'poisonous honey', which originally provides a solution for the farmers, but gradually affect the whole aspects of poor farmers. The happiness lasted only during harvest season because after that they will go back to being trapped in the ijon system circle. If the harvest occurs in June, starting in July, people were back in debt to middlemen because grain stocks are up. Thus this deadly circle.

Conclusion

The ijon system as a part of injustice and poverty circle has brought suffering for poor farmers. They are still struggling with this hard situation. Therefore, this situation must be faced seriously by political leaders, policy makers and the poor farmers. In this context, every institution who concentrate on the poor farmers situation must work hard and with a strong commitment to empower and to transform the mentality of poor farmers. The government should think and have solutions and also alternative programs to farmers, such as economic empowerment programs.

Human Right Based Approach: An alternative to End Poverty in Aceh

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"Poverty is an assault on human dignity, but it can also reflect a violation of human rights when it is the direct consequence of government policy or is caused by the failure of government to act" according to Human Right Insight No.1 published by Center for Economic and Social Right, Social Justice Through Human Rights.[1]

Rich yet poor describes the situation in Aceh at the moment. Aceh is well known as one of regions that has abundant natural resource in Indonesia, namely oil, gas, and gold mine, as well as where one of the biggest rain-forests in the world, Leuser, is located. In addition to its rich natural resources, since 2008, Aceh province has received huge amount of financial resources from the central government as a part of its special autonomy status. The data from Bappeda Aceh (Regional Development Planning Agency of Aceh) shows that since 2008 to 2016 from special autonomy alone; Aceh has received more than 48 billion rupiah.[2]

However, the data from Badan Pusat Statistik (Indonesia Statistic Agency, hereafter BPS) proves the other way around, which shows that, shockingly, more than 800 thousand poor people or equal to 17.08% (2015) of the population in Aceh are poor, which is above national poverty rate at 11.13% (this data is gathered using the basic needs approach as the measurement tool). Similarly, unemployment rate of Aceh is also above the national rate, which means above 5.50%, and economic growth is also lower in comparison to the national rate. These facts illustrate that abundant natural and financial resources do not necessarily bring positive change to the life of the people.

A number of legal documents, for instance Laws on Aceh Governance (hereafter UUPA) and Medium Development Plan of Aceh province place the welfare of people as the priority of development in Aceh, and this obligation lies on the government of Aceh to fulfill it. Take for example, the local regulation on Medium Term Development Plan of Aceh Province 2012 to 2017, as one of legal documents of the province, sets the priority to achieve social welfare through some important targets such as the decrease in Aceh's poverty rate from 19.57 percent in 2012 to 9.50 percent by 2017 and the decline of unemployment rate from 7.43 percent to 5 percent.

In response to that, various policies and programs have been implemented by the government of Aceh, yet the development results are still far from the expected target. The fact that there is no significant change in the people's life, especially vulnerable groups, marginalized people and poor people since 2008, indicates something went wrong in the government. The method that is used by the Aceh government might be ineffective or there might be mismanagement in the government. Lack of capacity of the government apparatus and high rate of corruption and nepotism definitely add the complexity of development problem in Aceh.

1. "Poverty and Human Rights - Is Poverty a Violation of Human Rights?," Center for Economic and Social Rights, Social Justice to Human Rights, accessed November 14, 2016, http://www.cesr.org/article.php?id=277
2. "Dana Otsus belum Mampu Sejahterakan Rakyat," Serambi Indonesia, September 25, 2016, accessed November 14, 2016 http://www.aceh.tribunnews.com/2016/09/25/dana-otsus-belum-mampu-sejahterakan-rakyat

To be able to get out from this unfortunate complex situation, the government needs to adopt a human rights-based approach (hereafter HRBA) into Aceh's development policies and actions. Why? It is because HRBA is more likely to elevate the outcomes of human development efforts and more than that, it brings sustainability.[3] Also, it attempts to respond to all aspect of human rights as a unity that can not be separated from one another. It is because poverty in Aceh is not a single problem that can be solved separately from the others; there is strong political issue that directly contributes to it.

Tracking back the root causes of Aceh's unfortunate situation brings us to the long conflict that lasted from 1976 to 2005 in Aceh, which clearly contributes to today's condition. "The long conflict between the government of Indonesia (GoI) and Free Aceh Movement Group (Gerakan Aceh Merdeka, hereafter GAM)"[4] causes not only moral but also material destructions. Flashback to more than 30 years ago, this conflict actually occurred as a result of long period of discrimination in economy, political and social aspect of Aceh people, while at the same time Aceh natural resources were exploited by the central government, whereas Aceh was left without any significant development.

Taking into account the complexity of Aceh condition, Aceh needs to adopt HRBA into its development policies and practices in order to improve the outcome of its development efforts, especially in combating poverty. HRBA is a tool that is used by international organizations, donors, and civil society to integrate human rights into development efforts. It is "a conceptual framework that is normatively based on international human rights standard; and operationally directed to promoting and protecting human rights."[5]

There are 3 main reasons why HRBA should be used as the main tool in development efforts especially to end poverty in Aceh. First, this approach "provides tools for understanding and addressing the multi-dimensional root causes of poverty and conflict, including discrimination, powerlessness, lack of political participation, lack of access to basic resources and service, which leads to better sustained results of development efforts"[6], which fit the situation in Aceh.

Secondly, it strengthens "the rights holders to claim their rights"[7], which means that it advocates the interest of voiceless people to get their rights as well as develop the voiceless people capacity to influence the policy and more importantly to participate meaningfully in development related decisions and actions.

3. "Frequently Asked Questions on a Human Rights-Based Approach," United Nations, accessed November 14, 2016, http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/Publications/FAQen.pdf, p.15
4. Nazara, Suahasil and Budy P. Resosudarmo. "Aceh-Nias Reconstruction and Rehabilitation: Progress and Challenges at the End of 2006". Tokyo: Asian Development Bank Institute, 2007. Accessed November 14, 2016, http://www.adbi.org/discussionpaper/2007/06/26/2288.acehnias. reconstruction.rehabilitation/
5. United Nations *op.cit.,* pp.15
6. Ibid., pp. 18
7. Ibid., pp. 24

Last main reason why HRBA should be utilized in development efforts is because it focuses on improving the capacity of government apparatus and other stakeholders along the process; it strengthens the capacity of duty bearers (Aceh Government) to fulfill the obligations as expressed in local, national and international laws, policies and programs. It can't be denied that government apparatus is the primary stakeholder in planning, implementing, and evaluation of development efforts. Therefore, their capacity is the key to achieve better development outcome.[8]

To conclude, there are some challenges in implementing HRBA that should be taken into account, i.e. HRBA takes time, as in most cases it entails the adoption of long term strategies as a result of the focus in the root or structural causes of the problem, and this long term strategy means an increase in the cost.[9]

8. Ibid, pp. 29
9. Ibid, pp. 4

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Jilboobs vs Syar'i Hijab: The Sexual Objectification of Indonesian Muslim Women

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Abstract

The controversial phenomenon of Jilboobs emerging in 2014 has been responded with numerous criticisms and disapprovals concerning Jilbab. The majority of Indonesian people argue that Jilboobs is immoral and an inappropriate kind of veil a Muslim woman can wear. Indonesian Muslim woman who wears Jilboobs is seen as a bad Muslim, wild, seductive, sinful and does not have a good religion understanding. Not long after the pros and cons of Jilboobs, the fashion trends in Indonesia has been also marked by what is called Syar'i Hijab, which later becomes more prevalent and promptly adopted by many Indonesian Muslim women. Contradictory to Jilboobs wearer, a woman who wears Syar'i Hijab has been regarded as a good Muslim and has a high religiosity. These two different assessments led to a dichotomy between Jilboobs wearer and Syar'i Hijab wearer. This essay aims to examine this binary phenomenon through the lens of gender studies. Using the theory of objectification, this analysis seeks to uncover the position of Indonesian Muslim women in the discourse of Jilboobs vs Syar'i Hijab. Moreover, this article reveals what factors have been influencing the emergence of this dichotomy. The results of this study indicates that the position of Indonesian Muslim women in this case is nothing more than an object. Indonesian Muslim women are often sexually objectified based on what kind of veil and clothes they wear. In consequence, they often percieve themselves and other woman as an object. This self-objectification is influenced by the social and cultural construction of Indonesian society, which still tends to adhere to the patriarchal system.

Keyword: *Jilbab, Hijab, Jilboobs, Syar'i Hijab, Gender Studies, Objectification*.

The Unnecessary Binary Opposition of Jilboobs and Syar'i Hijab

The discourse of jilbab among Indonesian Muslim community continues to evolve as it is influenced by the changes in the social, cultural, political, and economic sectors in Indonesia. The word 'jilbab' in Islam is derived from the Arabic word '*jalaba*' which means "*to collect or to bring*"[1]. The term 'jilbab' in Indonesia usually refers to a piece of veil which "*covers the hair and neck tightly, leaving no skin unconcealed*"[2]. Jilbab phenomenon emerged and became more familiar among Indonesian Muslim women since the beginning of 1990. It is influenced by the political conditions at that time when the former President Soeharto begins to show his interest and close relationship with several Islamic groups and organizations in order to gain political support. One of his daughters (Tutut) even started to wear jilbab as a part of her daily dress. After the fall of Soeharto regime in 1998, jilbab becomes more increasingly flourished because of the influence of the media and the development in fashion industry[3]. But according

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1..Adlin, Alfatri. *Menggeledah Hasrat: Sebuah Pendekatan Multi Perspektif*. (Yogyakarta: Jalassutra, 2006). pp 343

2. Candraningrum, Dewi. 2013. *Negotiating Women's Veiling Politic and Sexuality in Contemporary Indonesia*. (Bangkok: IRASEC, 2013). Pp. 11

3. Raleigh, Elizabeth. *Busana Muslim dan Kebudayaan Populer di Indonesia: Pengaruh dan Persepsi*. (Malang: Tugas Studi Lapangan diajukan untuk menemuhi persyaratan dalam program

to Candraningrum, this increasing number of Indonesian woman who wears jilbab is mostly affected by the emergence of novelist like Ayu Utami or Helvy Tiana Rosa who promotes the notion of independent woman againsts pathriarcal culture. "*It is novelists such as Ayu Utami and Helvy Tiana Rosa, not political scientists, who best articulate the mood of 1998. Like the documentary films readily available in the streets then, their novels gave a voice to the rebelling woman, defending her rights against patriarchy, be it Ayu breaking taboos with her partially naked body or Helvy, fully clothed, claiming independence against the repressive military regime*"[4].

Nowadays, we can see the majority of Muslim women in Indonesia wear jilbab for their daily appearance. There are many different reasons and motives that encourage Indonesian Muslim woman to wear jilbab, the mainstream one is of course, because wearing jilbab is considered as the symbol of Muslim woman's observance toward religion's command. But along with the alteration of social and cultural condition in Indonesia, jilbab also becomes a fashion commodity and sometimes even used as a symbol of social class or even political strategy. There are so many kind of jilbabs which surface and even create their own sub-culture. One of them is hijab which arises along with the development of fashion industry, especially since the emergence of the Hijabers Community in 2010. The word 'hijab' comes from the word '*hajaba*' which means "*to cover, conceal, hide, is a complex notion encompassing action and apparel*"[5]. The term hijab has been becoming more popular than jilbab because the word 'hijab' is often regarded as a representation of the middle class Indonesian Muslim Woman. Today, many youngster prefer to use the word 'hijab' instead of 'jilbab' to describe their veil because it sounds more modern.

In the development of jilbab and hijab discourse, one of the most controversial issues is jilboobs which is an acronym of the word '*jilbab and boobs*'. The term Jilboobs becomes popular because of the emergence of a facebook account named Jilboobs Community in December 2014. The account contains many photographs of young Indonesian Muslim women who wear jilbab combined with a tight jeans and a long sleeve t-shirts, which rather show their body curves. Because of this jilboobs phenomenon, the majority of Indonesian Muslim women who wear jilbab with that kind of style are often associated with some negative assumptions such as wild, seductive, and do not have a good understanding in islamic laws. In fact, the majority of young Indonesian Muslim women usually wear this kind of jilbab and clothes as their daily outfit. We can find most of female students at universities in Indonesia wear this kind of outfit because it is considered as the simplest one. On the other hand, another trend called Syar'i Hijab has emerged not long after the jilboobs phenomenon. Syar'i Hijab even grows quite fertile among Indonesian Muslim women until today. Unlike the jilboobs, the concept of Syar'i Hijab tends to be regarded as the right and proper style in wearing hijab. Syar'i Hijab usually consists of a loose veil combined with a long dress. Syar'i Hijab became increasingly booming after some

ACICIS Studi Lapangan, 2004). pp 8

4. Op. Cit. Candraningrum. 2013. pp 22

5. Bullock, Katherine. *Rethinking Muslim Women and The Veil: Challenging Historical & Modern Stereotype*. (London: The Internation Institute of Islamic Thought, 2002). Pp. xli

actress started their business and promoting this kind of hijab. There were Lyra Virna, Oki Setiana Dewi, Risty Tagor and some other names who participated in popularizing Syar'i Hijab. According to the majority of people, a Muslim woman who wears Syar'i Hijab is the epitome of a good Muslim woman who has high morality and religiosity.

Picture courtesy of romzialkimi.wordpress.com

This different appraisal creates binary opposition between those who wear jilboobs with those who wear Syar'i Hijab. Even in the academic sphere, there have been some studies concerning the discourse of Jilboobs and Syar'i Hijab with almost similar findings. These research tend to stigmatize Indonesian Muslim woman through what kind of veil or clothes they wear. One of the analysis is *Berjilbab Tanpa Syariah: Interaksi Pasar dengan Fesyen Kelas Menengah di Yogyakarta* written by Sucipto. This analysis suggests that what is considered as a good hijab is Syar'i Hijab, meanwhile jilboobs is viewed only as fashion comodification which violates Islamic rule[6]. Another research entitled *Dampak Grup Jilboobs di Facebook Pada Gaya Berpakaian Muslimah di Kota Samarinda* conducted by Maria Silfia Safriani also suggests a rather parallel idea. She argues that because of the emergence of Jilboobs on facebook, many Muslim women in Samarinda have been adopting Jilboobs style as their daily outfit, thus it is considered as negative because it is hostile to the Islamic laws[7]. Bayu Tria Firwansyah Putra through his analysis entitled *Fenomena Jilboobs di Media Social (Analisis Semiologi Tentang Makna Visual Pada Fenomena Busana Hijab Jilboobs di Media*

6. Sucipto. *Berjilbab Tanpa Syariah: Interaksi Pasar Dengan Fesyen Kelas Menengah di Yogyakarta*. *Jurnal Penelitian Sosial Keagamaan Kontekstualita* Vol. 30, No. 2, 2015. (Jambi: IAIN Sulthan Thaha Saifuddin, 2005)

7. Safriani, Maria Silfia. *Dampak Grup Jilboobs di Facebook Pada Gaya Berpakaian Muslimah di Kota Samarinda*. (Minithesis. Universitas Mulawarman, 2015).

Sosial Instagram) claims that jilboobs is not the symbol of religion but rather the symbol of fashion. He also states that Jilboobs is a proof of women's submissiveness toward the beauty myth[8]. Meanwhile Ariane Utomo's journal entitled *Who wears the Hijab? Predictors of Veiling in Greater Jakarta* implies that there has been increasing demands for the adoption of the Syar'i Hijab in Indonesia because it is believed as the 'proper' Islamic way to cover up woman's body[9]. These studies show that even in the academic scope, Indonesian Muslim women are merely defined and compared to each other based on their choice of veil.

In everyday life, this practice is more apparent as jilboobs wearers and Syar'i Hijab wearers are often unconsciously positioned into two different groups which are usually encouraged to critisize and stigmatize each other. In short, they are not only judged by men, but there are also ironically also justifications and debates among Muslim women themselves. This unnecessary dichotomy between two groups shows that the existence, morality, and even religiosity of Indonesian Muslim women has been usually evaluated based on a piece of veil. And what makes the situation worse is that sometimes Indonesian Muslim women are not aware that they are actually being confronted. Instead of focusing on the effort against the ignorant and intolerant judgments, which mostly come from men, Indonesian Muslim women are busy criticizing each other, insisting that one is better compared to the other.

Jilboobs: The Hyper-sexual Objectification of Indonesian Muslim Women

The phenomenon of Jilboobs apparently also obtains reaction from various circles. One of the strong responses comes from the Indonesian Ulema Council (MUI), which explicitly has issued haram fatwa regarding jilboobs. According to the chairman of MUI, Jilboobs is banned because it accentuates woman's sensuality and it does not meet the Islamic laws[10]. This kind of reaction shows how the Indonesian Muslim women has been assessed and evaluated through their appearance. To choose what kind of jilbab or hijab to wear for everyday life is basically an individual right as human being. But it is reduced into something that should be determined and controlled by an institutions such as MUI. This is what Fredickson calls as the practice of objectification: "*To objectify is to make into and treat something that is not an object as an object, the which can be used, manipulated, controlled, and known through its physical properties"[11]*. A woman, who is actually a living human being who has logical

8. Putra, Bayu Tria Firwansyah. *Fenomena Jilboobs di Media Sosial: Analisis Semiologi tentang Makna Visual Pada Fenomena Busana Hijab Jilboobs di Media Sosial Instagram.* (Minithesis. Surakarta: Universitas Sebelas Maret, 2016).

9. Utomo, Ariane and Utomo, Iwu. *Who Wears The Hijab? Predictors of Veiling in Greater Jakarta.* Paper presented at Session 93 – Population and Geopolitics, Population Association of America Annual Meeting, San Diego, April 20 – May 2, 2015.

10. Anonym. *Dressing Down for 'Jilboobs' as Ulema Council Issues Fatwa.* Accessed November 10, 2016. http://jakartaglobe.id/news/dressing-jilboobs-ulema-council-issues-fatwa/.

11. RM, Calogero. *Objectification Theory, Self Objectification, and Body Image* on *Encyclopedia of Body Image and Human Appearance.* (Virginia: Elsevier.Inc, 2012). Pp. 574

thinking and is capable to decide what is good or bad for her is treated as an object and considered incapable to determine what kind of jilbab or hijab she should wear, therefore she has to be given a warning. In a patriarchal culture like Indonesia, women are often seen as objects, so their body and appearance are always seen, assessed, and objectified. This is in accordance with Fredickson's statement that *"women's body are looked at, evaluated, and always potentially objectified"[12]*.

What is more ironic is how this debate about a piece of veil causes the practice of sexual objectification toward Indonesian Muslim women, which usually occurs in the media, especially in the internet. There are tons of active accounts on facebook, twitter, and instagram that expose the pictures of Indonesian Muslim women which are considered sexy and sensual. Just type the word 'jilboobs' on the search bar and you will see there are many jilboobs accounts which are still active until today. These accounts are always flooded by such dirty and inappropriate comments directed to the women whose pictures have been uploaded. Quite a few comments contain sexual harassment, which mostly come from men. Through these accounts, Indonesian Muslim women have been scrutinized based on their physical appearance. Every so often a Muslim woman is positioned as an object of men's discussion about how big her breast is or how her jilbab makes her looks more desirable and sexy. This is the example of how sexual objectification towards Indonesian Muslim woman takes place. As Fredickson claims that "*sexual objectification occurs whenever a woman's body, body parts, or sexual functions are separated out from her person, reduced to the status of mere instruments, or regarded as if they were capable of representing her. In other words, when objectified, women are treated as bodies, and in particular, as bodies that exist for the use and pleasure of others"[13]*. This phenomenon also shows us what Candraningrum describes as the hyper-sexualized image in the media[14]. Million of Indonesian Muslim women's pictures have been sexually objectified for male's pleasures through online media. A simple picture of a Muslim woman wearing jilbab and casual outfit can attract lots of nasty and dirty comments.

Unfortunately these women usually do not have any idea if their pictures were taken without permission and used by such accounts. Most of them simply upload their picture to their personal accounts without thinking twice that it can be easily used as an object of hyper-sexual objectification. These women have no control nor power to prevent such treatment because even a picture which does not shows any body curve will still be judged as too provocative, sexy, or sensual and will be used in some of jilboobs accounts. As Calogero argues: "*It is important to note that these experiences of sexual objectification occur outside of women's personal control"[15]*. Suggesting Indonesian Muslim women to just stop uploading their pictures in social media is absolutely not the best solution.

12. Fredickson, Barbara. L and Robert, Tomi-Ann. *Objectification Theory Toward Understanding Women's Lived Experiences and Mental Health Risks.* (The United States of America: Cambirdge University Press, 1997). pp. 175.

13. Ibid. 1997. pp. 175.

14. Op. Cit. Candraningrum. 2013. pp. 82

15. Op. Cit. RM. 2012. pp. 574.

The most dangerous effect a woman can obtain after being sexually objectified is what Fredickson calls as self objectification. "*At a psycholigical level, perhaps the most profound effect of objectifying treatment is that it coaxes girls and women to adopt a peculiar view of self. Objectification theory posists that the cultural milieu of objectification functions to socialize girls and women to, at some level, treat themselves as objects to be looked at and evaluated. In other words, as numerous feminist theorists have argued, women often adopt an observer's perspective on their physical selves*"[16]. This is what happened among Indonesian Muslim women all this time. Because they are accustomed to be defined and evaluated by men's perspective, they unconsciously adopt it to see and judge themselves. Many Indonesian Muslim women tolerate and even approve the majority of male's opinion that claims if a Muslim woman wore jilboobs, she deserves to be sexually objectified and harrased. Indonesian Muslim women assume that in order to avoid sexual harassment, they should cover their body properly according to the norms (in this case, they are suggested to wear Syar'i Hijab). This shows that Indonesian Muslim woman affirms the stereotype of woman as an object who always attarcts men's sexual desire. They position themselves as the guilty one and have been unknowingly performing self-objectification toward themselves.

Syar'i Hijab: Guarding Muslim Women's Sexual Purity?

In Indonesia, veil is deemed as a guard of women's sexual purity. "*The veil is often linked to the notion of sexual purity and is therefore seen to serve as a physical as well as a symbolic barrier between the two sexes*"[17]. In relation to the discourse of fashion hijab in Indonesia, many Indonesian Muslim women believe that the concept of Syar'i Hijab is the best and right style of covering their body in order to maintain their sexual purity. Syar'i Hijab has been thought as a symbol of Indonesian Muslim women's purity. In a country which sees woman's virginity as the standard of high morality, presenting sexual purity becomes such an important thing, especially for Muslim women. Thus, Syar'i Hijab is percieved as something which can be used to signify their purity. On the contrary, many people assume that Jilboobs does not really represent sexual purity, it is seen as rebellion and violation of Islamic Syari'a. Hence, Syar'i Hijab wearer is considered more pure and religious than Jilboobs' wearer. Quite often, when a Muslim woman wears Syar'i Hijab, she is regarded as a Muslim who has reached the highest level of religiosity. Conversely, a Muslim woman who still wears jilboobs is defined as a Muslim who does not have enough sense of religiosity. In this case, Syar'i Hijab and Jilboobs are equally used as a measurement of purity and religiosity among Indonesian Muslim women.

According to Candraningrum, behind the desire of a woman who wants to look religious, there is an implicit understanding that her natural body is dirty[18]. In other words, the desire to wear Syar'i Hijab usually arises from self-objectification that her body appeals to men's sexual desire and therefore must be covered. The question that arises is why does Indonesian Muslim woman want to look religious and pure? The answer is because the culture of the religious life in Indonesia tends to define woman's worth based on their sexual purity. The more a woman cover her body up the more she will be identified as angelic, the more woman shows their body off the more she will be judged as demonic. It is not really surprising since Indonesian people tend to see a woman's body as the cause of many terrible occurences. As Candraningrum states: "Girls' bodies are seen as moral corruption incarnate, likely to flame the revolution of free sex and cause the downfall of Indonesian values. In order to maintain these so-called values, it is girls' sexuality rather than boys' that must be curbed"[19]. Instead of educating men to respect and appreciate women by not sexually objectifying them, it is the women who are commanded to cover their body so it will not attract men's sexual desire. It explains well why the dichotomy of Jilboobs and Syar'i Hijab has become very obvious among Indonesian Muslim women themselves.

Concluding Remark

Aside from the notion of how Indonesian Muslim women can freely express themselves through what kind of veil they wear since the hijab fashion industry has blossomed, the phenomenon of Jilboobs and Syar'i Hijab unfortunately have been positioned in such unfortunate situation. The wearer of these two veil types often experience judgements, sexual objectification, and even harassment without their consent. Jilboobs and Syar'i Hijab have been used to define the morality, religiosity, and even sexual purity of Indonesian Muslim women. Apart from the strong patriarchal culture in Indonesia, the lack of awareness in gender issues among Indonesian Muslim women themselves has also become one of the apparent reasons why uch oppression still happens until today. Indonesian Muslim women should realize and embrace the understanding that their morality, religiosity, and sexual purity can not be defined solely based on a piece of veil or clothes. Instead of criticizing other women who have different preference, Indonesian Muslim women should respect and empower each other.

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16. Op. Cit. Fredickson. 1997. pp. 177.
17. Nef-Saluz, Claudia. *Islamic Pop Culture in Indonesia: An Anthropological Field Study on Veiling Practices Among Students of Gadjah Mada University of Yogyakarta*. (Bern: Institut für Sozialanthropologie Universität Bern, 2007). pp. 55.

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18. Op. Cit. Candraningrum. 2013. pp. 73
19. Op. Cit. Candraningrum. 2013. pp. 83

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Understanding Anti human Trafficking Commitments of Imamatul and Shandra Woworuntu with Martha Nussbaum's concept of Cosmopolitanism

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Approximately 20.9 million people are trafficked in this world (more than 80% of them are trafficked for sex slavery), and over $32 billion of profits are reaped by traffickers at the full expense of the dignity and innocence of countless children, women, and men (International Stem Society for Human Rights 2013). To combat human trafficking and to provide survivors with assistances, it requires awareness and support from each element in international community. We, perhaps, have heard the names of Ima Matul Maisaroh and Shandra Woworuntu. They are Indonesian-born women who used to experience being trafficked to the United States—and thereupon could present anti-human trafficking speeches in United States' Democratic Party Convention Committee, July 2016 and United States' Senate Foreign Relations Committee Hearing on Ending Slavery, February 2015, respectively. Notwithstanding the foregoing, I have found two questions; "how serious are their anti-human trafficking commitments?" Should we take account of their choices to live in United States in gauging their commitments? Ok, in this essay I will draw upon Martha Nussbaum's concept of cosmopolitanism to elucidate analytically the profiles and doings of Ima Matul and Shandra Woworuntu—before notable remarks are stringed together on conclusion.

Profiling Anti-Human Trafficking Activists: Ima Matul and Shandra Woworuntu

Ima departed from Malang for Los Angeles in 1997 after a recruiter (a trafficker) promised her to work legally as a nanny in Los Angeles, to earn $150/ a month and to get one day-off/ a week. However, upon arrival, a trafficker brought Ima to the owner of the house employing her to be a maid. This job was different from her recruiter's previous promise (National Geographic 2016). She cooked, cleaned, laundered, cared for the children, gardened, and washed the car within minimum 18 hours/ a day, but never enjoyed salaries and a day-off. Her boss and trafficker used verbal threats in order for her not to talk to anyone or to report to the police (CAST 2012)**.** At the time, Ima had no choice because she could not speak good English and held no money to linger outside. In 2000, Ima's neighbour obtained her a written-letter request to help save and take her to CAST (Coalition to Abolish Slavery and Trafficking). She was accommodated and taught with English, computer and life-soft skills therein. Five years later, Ima joined a CAST-managed Survivor Advisory Caucus program where she discovered her hidden potential of leadership and advocate skills.

Nowadays Ima works as a CAST's Survivor Organizer. She is responsible for connecting to and organizing survivors under the Survivor Advisory Caucus, providing them communities, and enhancing their knowledge about government, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and public (Nichols 2016). As Ima's statement, "every victim of human trafficking deserves to receive the comprehensive services I did from CAST. These services have made me the person I am today-a survivor and an advocate. Too many survivors struggle without access to this life-saving support" (CAST 2012).

In addition, Ima actively gives speeches in several conferences, conventions and meetings. Below is an example of her powerful words on the Annual Meeting of the President's Inter-Agency Task Force to Monitor and Combat Trafficking in Persons,

January 2016:

"Together, we are changing perception, fighting for justice, and ultimately, over the years, we are contributing to one shared goal: to end modern slavery everywhere it exists. We are a diverse group. Our individual experience as survivor will add a rich expertise to the council. And we will act proudly as unified group of leaders who will speak up for what we needed to address to many issue that contribute to the long standing existence of human trafficking in the United States and around the world" (U.S Department of State 2016).

On the other hand, in 2001, Shandra came to United States for an employment opportunity in the hospitality industry after she was faced with hardship to retrieve her career at finance due to 1997's Indonesian economic crisis impacts. After landing at John F Kennedy airport, her passport was taken by her recruiter and she was illegally sold, forced into prostitution and handed over among traffickers on some areas, i.e. Manhattan, Chinatown, Queens, Brooklyn, Bay Side, New London, and Foxwoods (Antara News 2014). One day she escaped from one trafficker's apartment and spent her days in court. Safe Horizon in New York helped her to legally remain in the U.S. and healed her trauma (Mentari 2016). Shandra, fortunately, has been motivated to support victims' psychological healing process, to educate and to empower them under Safe Horizon's program—Voice Of Hope. On several annual international summits such as Global Nexus Summit, which attempts to produce global solutions and works together with United Nations and 20 countries from around the world—she also promotes the need for appropriate livings and education for victims and vulnerable people to end human trafficking (Kronfeld 2015, 62).

Shandra and Ima are colleagues on National Survivor Network and Mentari Organization where they try reaching domestic and foreign survivors of human trafficking in the U.S. Barrack Obama also involved both of them, along with other nine survivors and activists, on White House's Advisory Council on Human Trafficking (White House 2015).

The Reflection of Martha Nussbaum's Cosmopolitanism on Activities of Ima Matul and Shandra Woworuntu

The term of cosmopolitan originated from 'kosmopolitiĕs' ('kosmo': the world and 'politiĕs' or 'polis': the state) which was used initially by Diogenes to reply "where are you from?" when he came to Athens from Sinope in 4th century BC. Afterwards, in 3rd century BC, the Stoics's point about cosmopolitanism said, "a person might be a citizen of the whole world, and hence that her concern and responsibilities might extend to everyone irrespective of whether they were compatriots or strangers" (Van Hooft 2014, 15). Then, Kant's cosmopolitanism on essay "Perpetual Peace" (1795) implied "all rational beings, irrespective of their race, should be regarded as ends of themselves, and as lawgiving members of the universal kingdom of ends" (Cavallar 2012, 98). Since then, there have been actually two strands of cosmopolitanism i.e. in the contexts of moral and politics.

One of modern American philosophers, Martha Nussbaum interprets, "Diogenes knew that invitation to think as a world citizen was in sense, an invitation to be exiled from comfort of patriotism and it's an easy sentiment to see our own ways from the point of view of justice and the good" (Van Hooft 2014, 15). By evolving ideas of Stoic and Kant, she defines cosmopolitanism contemporaneously, "as the ability to 'recognize humanity wherever it occurs, and give its fundamental ingredients, reason and moral capacity, our first allegiance and respect" (in Cohen 2002, 7).

Moral cosmopolitanism by Nussbaum encompasses individual openness to diversity—and respect to human dignity and equality. Human dignity requires agency / agents that can focus on what they can do, not on passive satisfaction (Skrbis & Woodward 2013; Claassen 2014). According to Nussbaum, there are ten capabilities as core human entitlements which are embodiment of human dignity, i.e. (1) life; (2) bodily health; (3) bodily integrity; (4) sense, imagination, thought; (5) emotions; (6) practical reason; (7) affiliation comprising friendship, and respect; (8) other species; (9) play; (10) control over environment including political and material environment (in De Greiff & Cronin 2002, 128-130). Furthermore, institutional (political) cosmopolitanism by Nussbaum is a condition when political institutions at domestic and international levels are tied with moral values and can complement for individuals' plausible limitations in running moral duty and securing prosperity (Helmken 2011, 160-162).

Her concept enables us to see to what extent certain individuals or institutions are cosmopolitan. It is also beneficial for me to build some arguments. On my lens, cosmopolitan characters are required to resolve today's sophisticated global issues, particularly human trafficking issue. However, kind of division such as 'we vs they', 'us vs them' or 'superior vs inferior' sometimes produced by nationalism and patriotism may be detrimental for the discourse to comprehend cosmopolitanism. Because of that, I should exclude any prejudice about Ima and Shandra options for inhabiting in United States rather than Indonesia to work as activists. I precisely argue that their powerful anti-human trafficking actions reflect their boldness as world citizens to take off for something larger and more exquisite—humanity. Both of them have developed their natural moral concerns chiefly towards 'people on the same boat' into robust moral commitment by supports from their organizations respectively. The first spearhead to make justice remain available for survivors is reposed on individuals—like both of them—who dedicate themselves to be human dignity agents.

I argue surely that cruel practices in human trafficking are the most dreadful enemy for human dignity because these all violate human capabilities. In further details, first, either sex or working exploitation of trafficked persons creates degradation on pivotal parts and normal functions of healthy bodies which they should have control for doing sustainably future life activities. Second, threats and isolation constructed by traffickers or employers are also psychological scrapers over the victim's sense and thought of deciding certain things they want outside employer's authority, indulging weekend recreations, trusting other people and having valuable interactions with

friends and nature. Third, traffickers or employers devastate victims' rights to possess some material goods and to ask protection from the embassy, local governments and police—by withholding their salaries and/or legal documents—in order to shield the trafficking syndicates. These kinds of circumstances automatically enable victims/survivors to feel like they are not fully-worthy and respected humans.

Thus it is not sufficient to give safety and protection to those who successfully get rid of human trafficking. The openness of Ima and Shandra is indeed a requisite to engage and calm human trafficking victims or survivors coming from distinguished nationalities, backgrounds, genders and conditions. Nonetheless, if both were doing it with merely openness, there would be a lot of victims not escaping from trauma. Luckily, Ima and Shandra have been doing well by totally supporting and accompanying survivors to rebuild their human capabilities and to maximize their potentialities. Survivors are encouraged to be able to run capacity for self-determination, to get into novel cohort of people and governmental and organizational elites—and to contribute their works or inputs to society. After all bitterness, survivors deserve standing equally as individual, social and political beings.

Lastly, due to imperfection and lack of capacity in some matters—for example setting specific official regulations, Ima and Shandra are unable to work solely. Not only to raise attention towards human trafficking, campaigns for which Ima and Shandra are echoing are also done to encourage institutions at domestic and international scopes to be more and more cosmopolitan. In further detail, both of them smoothly attempt to force the public, governments and their elites to eliminate communal boundaries and dogmatic presumptions that victims are strangers and contemptible people, to be tied with shared-moral reasons—and to strengthen multi-agencies and multinational co-operations, and global patterns in law enforcement implementation, victims assistance and essential needs distribution for society. If governments and their elites to do so, it will not be impossible to achieve effectiveness in countering human trafficking and (re)victimization—and prosecuting traffickers and employers related to them.

Concluding Remarks

Martha Nussbaum's concept has helped to form my belief that human trafficking is one of contemporary complex issues which should be addressed by cosmopolitan individuals, communities and governments. Ima and Sandra are Indonesian-born cosmopolitan women who had struggled to flee human trafficking, and then have transformed into human dignity agents aboard. Moral commitments of Ima and Sandra, rooted in natural moral concerns, are to help victims of human trafficking to wake up from trauma, rebuild their human capabilities and feel equal to normal people. Besides that, Ima and Sandra are trying to push governmental institutions and their elites to have strong cosmopolitan attitudes so wider co-operations and more effective measures can be implemented sustainably to combat human trafficking and to bring justice for victims and all humans. Hopefully, this essay is not seen as

a suggestion for readers to be anti-nationalist or anti-patriotic. It is aimed purely for communicating a message that salient works of two Indonesian women being far away from home can be good role models for inspiring us to uphold and to contribute to humanity more seriously, wherever we are, regardless of all differences, though in the middle of more anarchic surroundings.

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HISTORY ESSAYS

INTRODUCTION

The Diverse Aspects of Indonesian History

Indonesian history has many dimensions and themes that are still waiting to be written. With its diversity, Indonesia has a very unique and interesting themes that one can explore to have a better understanding about its complex past. These variety of topics are well reflected in the essays that were submitted for the 2016 ISRSF history essay competition.

The annual ISRSF history essay competition has become a stimulating event where original ideas and topics on Indonesian history being written and emerge from public. In the 2016 competition there are more than fifty essays submitted to the committee with subjects ranging from biographical profiles of famous and not so famous (but nonetheless important) individuals, to subjects related to religion, ethnic and ideological struggle in Indonesia. There are also essays that discusses subjects rarely discussed in Indonesian history such as arts, music, cartoon and even radio drama.

For years, many writings on Indonesian history tend to focus on events and dynamics that happened in the island of Java. That fact was not coincidental because since the colonial time, Java has become the center of power and politics of Indonesia. Recently, we see a surge of historical writing on location or about events that happened outside of Java. This particular development is important because it expanded the scholarly attention to other places in Indonesia. Furthermore, these new writings can provide deeper context, more nuanced and more balanced understanding about history of Indonesia through the dynamics that happened outside of Java.

The winners and honorable mentions awardee of this historical essay competitions reflect the diversity that were previously discussed. These essays were selected from a pool of more than fifty essays by a panel of judges who find their topic and writing both original and provide a fascinating glimpse on Indonesia's past.

For the first prize winner, the panel of judges have selected Aditia Muara Padiatra's essay on the role and effect of editorial cartoon in newspaper publication in Indonesia. His essay titled, *From Colonial to Reform Period: Editorial Cartoon Track History in Indonesia 1940-1998*, demonstrates the importance and influence of editorial cartoon in tracking the history of Indonesia. He argues that the published cartoons served the purpose for the editor of the publication to portray the underlying attitude and public emotion at the time the cartoon was published. Cartoon became a powerful tool for these often hidden public emotion expressions of anxieties, jubilant, and anger to find its way out, something that a historian often did not capture in their writing.

On the other hand, the second prize winner Endi Aulia Garadian, highlights a popular radio drama that was aired during the repressive New Order regime. Endi brought a fascinating original work of analyzing the idea of revolution embedded in a radio drama *Saur Sepuh*. In his essay, *Bringing the 'legend' Back in: Revolution ideas in Saur Sepuh under New Order Regime,* Endi argues that despite the tight state censorship of the New Order regime, a popular radio drama series *Saur Sepuh* succeeded to place in its storyline certain ideas that at that time were considered sensitive and provocative. Ideas such as revolution, freedom fighters and tyrannical regime were some of the examples. All of these ideas managed to be in the drama and Endi argues it is an evidence in how the creator of the drama, Niki Kosasih, managed to outsmart the regime's tight censorship while voicing the idea of freedom in the popular radio drama.

The third prize winner is Samsul Maarif's essay, *Act of Writing: Pramoedya Ananta Toer in Buru Island (1969-1979).* The essay focuses on the unfailing determination behind one of the most famous Indonesian writers who struggled to keep writing while seeing the activity as means of surviving and fighting injustice. Samsul's essay began by briefly tracing Pramoedya's background as a writer and his experience as a political prisoner of the New Order regime in the island prison of Buru Island. His essay highlighted not only Pramoedya's iron will in facing harsh reality of living as a political prisoner, but most importantly he showed Pramoedya Ananta Toer's tenacity in using writing as a weapon to fight and to survive from the brutal repression he experienced throughout his time at the remote Buru island.

Along with these three superb essays, the panel of judges also selected three essays as honorable mentions, these essays are as follows: Fakhrido Susrahadiansyah Bagus Pratama Susilo (*The Changing Landscape of Rural Governance in Indonesia and Its Socio-Political Implications: From Post-Independence to Post-Reformasi.")*, Maretta Kartika (*Indonesian Messianic Figures Historicized:* Manseren Manggundi *of Biak & Javanese* Ratu Adil"), and Ravando (*Anti-Chinese Violence in Time of Revolution: Re-Examining the Historiography of Indonesian Revolution.)*

All of these essays selected in the competition were judged based on their originality, arguments and depth in showing the diverse aspects within Indonesian history. However, these essays in some ways also suggest the turbulent nature of Indonesia's past. While we agree that one of the factors that makes Indonesia unique is its diversity, on the other hand these essays have shown that to maintain its strength in diversity, Indonesian throughout its history must go through many turbulent and difficult times. Indonesian history is full with those sort of narratives about continuous struggle and negotiation among its people to sustain the unity of the nation. Let these past struggles be reminder for everyone that maintaining the diversity of Indonesia does not come easy and it is always have to be fight for.

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1st
Prize Winner

From Colonial Period to Reform: Editorial Cartoon Track History in Indonesia 1940-1998

'A path-breaking essay which combines original research and insightful understanding of a hitherto neglected subject.'

Dr Peter Carey
Fellow Emeritus Trinity College,
and Adjunct (Visiting) Professor FIB-UI

Aditia Muara Padiatra

History
University of Indonesia
July 2012

History
University of Indonesia
2016

Introduction

Editorial cartoons have an important role as editorial and news pages, where they function as tools for giving information to the community. Editorial cartoons as visualization of the editorial also reflect the policy and political line of the media on which they appear. Through this research, the development of editorial cartoons that were published throughout Indonesia's history can be seen. This paper wants to reveal patterns surrounding editorial cartoons published in Indonesia from time to time, so that we get a common thread, which is expected to reveal the role of editorial cartoons as a source of history that can be used to assemble the nation's past.

Editorial Cartoon Development in Indonesia from Time to Time

According to Sibarani, the development of cartoons and caricatures in Indonesia began in the colonial period, where a newspaper Indies named *Bataviaasche Nieuwsblad* often put images of satire related to the political situation in the world, taking four (4) or five (5) columns.[1] At that time, illustrations and photographs were rarely found on a newspaper page. This was because the cost of expensive tin cliche for printing images. To anticipate this, existing newspapers usually used *vignette* provided letters dealer (Type - Foundry) when buying letters.[2] Sunarto describes it as follows:

> " …….. The average newspaper in Java (Jakarta, Semarang, Surabaya) in the twenties that used clichés lead to illustrations for printing were relatively more advanced. Advertisement was generally made of tin cliche because of high fees charged to advertisers, and the cliche can be used continuously in recent times in order to be efficient." [3]

Kick Hofer, a popular cartoonist during World War II, was known as a caricaturist whose work was widely touted for at the moment.[4] Cartoons from Indonesian cartoonists themselves have evolved around 1932 in the newspaper *Fikiran Ra'jat*. The images were created by Soemini, which was the pseudonym of Ir Soekarno, who was a prominent figure of the Indonesian independence movement. At that time, there were 9 editorial cartoons from Soekarno recorded in the book "Under the Flag of the Revolution"[5]. Sibarani said if the pictures were painted better and more

1. See Augustin Sibarani, *Karikatur dan Politik* (Jakarta : ISAI – Garda Budaya, 2001) pp. 61
2. Priyanto Sunarto, "*Metafora Visual Kartun Editorial pada Surat Kabar Jakarta 1950-1957*" (PhD Diss., ITB Bandung, 2005) pp. 104
3. *Ibid.,*
4. One of his greatest work is a collection of caricatures in the newspaper "Nieuwsblad Bataviasache", which contains the initial state of the outbreak of World War II, which was later recorded and published under the title *Wij strijden met de teekenstift* in 1942.
5. *Ibid.,*

accurate, then Soekarno can also be called as the first caricaturists Indonesia in the colonial era.[6]

Figure 1: Editorial Cartoon *Fikiran Ra'jat* 1932[7]

 Indonesian political cartoons start to bloom during the Japanese occupation (1942-1945). At that time, cartoons were not used as means of reacting to circumstances at the national level, but were more focused on international issues. The newspapers, among others, were *Asia Raja, Soeara Asia, Djawa Shinbun*, as well as *Djawa Baroe* Magazine, with all of these publications full of propaganda.[8] Due to strict supervision and censorship by the occupation government, the cartoons at the time were more mobilized as effective means of propaganda to support the Japanese and creating a common enemy, which is the United Kingdom and the United States.[9]

Figure 2: Editorial Cartoon *Djawa Baroe* Magazine in 1943[10]

Moving to the revolutionary period (1945-1949), cartoons and caricatures were used as means to struggle for independence and tools to unify the resistance in the regions.[11] Suwirta illustrates that the caricatures in that period have the nature of being assertive, forthright and anti-colonialism, even particularly suggestive and rough.[12] In general, the publication of the press at that time was used to fight for Indonesian sovereignty and the pursuit of efforts to break away from the Dutch. This was in line with who published editorial cartoons in newspapers at the time, where they were mostly used as means of encouragement and support for the struggle towards the government of the Republic Indonesia. One of the leading cartoonists during the revolution was Abdul Salam, who did many daily drawings for *Kedaulatan Rakjat* in Yogyakarta.[13]

6. Augustin Sibarani, *Op.Cit,* pp. 82
7. Editorial Cartoon *Fikiran Rakjat* 1932
8. Tribuana Said, *Sejarah Pers Nasional dan Pembangunan Pers Pancasila* (Jakarta : CV Masagung, 1980) pp. 49, See also Wagiono Sunarto, *Perang Karikatur : Mengangkat dan Menjatuhkan Soekarno Tinjauan Sejarah 1959-1967* (Jakarta : Pascasarjana IKJ, 2013) pp. 16.
9. T. Susanto, "Pamflet Politik Sulit Dihindari" in *Prisma* Edition January 1, 1996. pp. 39.

10. Editorial Cartoon *Djawa Baroe* Magazines No. 10 2603 / 1943.
11. Wagiono Sunarto, Perang Karikatur, *Op.Cit.,* pp. 17.
12. To know more about cartoons and caricatures in this period, See Andi Suwirta*, Suara dari Dua Kota : Revolusi Indonesia dalam Pandangan Surat Kabar Merdeka (Jakarta) dan Kedaulatan Rakjat (Yogyakarta) 1945-1947* (MA Thess., UI Depok, 1996)
13. Priyanto Sunarto*, Opini Tempo : Kumpulan Karikatur Prijanto S di Majalah Tempo 1972-1994 (*Jakarta : Tempo Inti Media, 2001) pp. introductory, see also Wagiono Sunarto, *Op.Cit.,* pp. 19.

Figure 3: Editorial Cartoon *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, July 1, 1947[14]

Later during the reign of Sukarno, about 1950 until the 1960s, cartoons as the part of a newspaper, had an affiliation to a political party, which was used as a tool to bring down the opponent and strengthen the unity of the party it supported. In this case, cartoons served as the realization of the attitude and position of the editor with the same vision and mission of the newspaper who published them. Alex Dinuth mentions this phenomenon as the "cartoon war", when the cartoons are fighting with each other to win the hearts and reinforce the ideology of the readers of each newspaper.[15]

Cartoonists usually created cartoons for newspapers to voice the interests of the party whom they brought. Some well-known cartoonists at the time were Augustin Sibarani, who made many cartoons for *Bintang Timur* and *Harian Rakjat,* who sympathized with the Communist Party of Indonesia (PKI), Ramelan who drew for the daily *Pedoman,* which was sympathetic towards the Indonesian Socialist Party (PSI) and *Suluh Indonesia* affiliated to the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), and Sam Suharto, who was a cartoonist of the Independent newspaper close to military circles at the time, namely *Indonesia Raya*. Here are some visualization of editorial cartoons in the period:

14. Editorial Cartoon *Kedaulatan Rakjat*, July 1, 1947.
15. Alex Dinuth, "*Kartun sebagai Cermin Intelektualitas*", in *Prisma* Edition January 1, 1996. pp. 63.

Figure 4: Editorial Cartoon *Indonesia Raya* Daily, January 15, 1955[16]

Figure 5: Editorial Cartoon *Harian Rakjat*, October 10, 1955[17]

However, this was later changed after Sukarno's rise to power, the period popularly known as Guided Democracy (1959-1965) in the history of Indonesia. The press at the time was required to sign a 19 article declaration, which contained "revolutionary" promises to the ruler at that time, if they were to be given the license issue (SIT). Abar said that it was very effective in taming the press at the time, because the managers and leaders of newspapers and magazines that still wanted to retain their idealism and opposition were not willing to sign the 19 chapters of the statement and preferred to shut down their publication.[18] After the reign of Sukarno collapsed, a new era appeared under the leadership of Suharto, known as the New Order. At this

16. Editorial Cartoon *Indonesia Raya* Daily, January 15, 1955.
17. Editorial Cartoon *Harian Rakjat*, October 10 1955.
18. Akhmad Zaini Abar, *1966-1974 : Kisah Pers Indonesia* (Yogyakarta : Lkis, 1995) pp. 64. An example was Suardi Tasrif, who was the leader of the *Abadi* daily, organ of the Islamic party Masjumi, who preferred to shut down his newspaper himself than signed 19 passages.

time caricatures and cartoons still thrived, but some of the differences include images that were loaded no longer containing the "war of ideas" as in the past, and more emphasis on the spirit of nationalism and critical attitude towards the policies taken by the government at the time.


Figure 6: Editorial Cartoon *Sinar Harapan,* June 18, 1970[19]

In that period, especially in the early years of New Order, the press could freely express their opinions, either through news, editorials, or cartoon. At this time also, many newspapers which previously had been banned, were given permission to rise again, including the Daily *Nusantara* (March 1967), *Indonesia Raya* (October 1968), *Pedoman* (November 1968), and *Abadi* (December 1968).[20] Through editorial cartoons and other visual works they contained, some newspapers at that time tried to dismantle the phenomena of corruption and fraud that occurred in the early years of the New Order. This is done gradually until finally the paper exposed the bans after the events of January 15, 1974, better known by the name of Malari.

Figure 7: Editorial Cartoon *Indonesia Raya*, January 11, 1974[21]

19. Editorial Cartoon *Sinar Harapan,* June 18, 1970.
20. Akhmad Zaini Abar, *Op.Cit*., pp. 10.
21. Editorial Cartoon *Indonesia Raya*, January 11, 1974.

This incident became a turning point for the development of the press that existed at the time, freedom of the press returned to being curbed, editorial cartoons published were also changed in their way of delivery into a more subtle rhetoric and did not dare to overtly and aggressively go against the ruling.[22] Cartoons no longer dare to openly and were more likely to follow the directives of the authorities that existed at the time, plus later the government also created a narrow corridor in the delivery of the expression, thus making characteristics of editorial cartoon satire and satirical rulers could hardly be found at the time.


Figure 8 : Editorial Cartoon *Kompas* Daily, January 19, 1974[24]

However, this did not mean a step backward for the cartoonists to be able to work. Some even considered this a challenge that just made them more creative. At this moment, a lot of cartoons started to use implicit terms in the newspaper so as not to offend the authorities that existed at the time.[25] Reform was a turning point in the world of editorial cartoons in Indonesia, occurring after Soeharto resigned from his position as Head of State and was replaced by the third president, B.J Habibie, on

22. GM Sudarta, *40 Tahun Oom Pasikom: Peristiwa dalam Kartun Tahun 1967 – 2007* (Jakarta: Penerbit Buku Kompas, 2007) pp. xxiv.
23. For more details on this, see Richard Ostrom, *Risky Business: Three Political Cartooning Lessons from Indonesia during Suharto's Authoritarian Rule*, Political Science and Politics, Vol. 40 No. 2 (April 2007) Publisher : American Political Science Association. pp. 297. Downloaded from http://www.jstor.org/stable/20451948, accessed on July 27, 2016 at 06:14 pm.
24. Editorial Cartoon *Kompas* Daily, January 19, 1974.
25. In this case, the realization is done in the form of metaphors and euphemisms that are vague, sometimes so vague that the meaning in the editorial cartoon itself becomes blurred. To better explain this, see Priyanto Sunarto in *TEMPO*, August 17, 2007.

May 21, 1998.[26] During this time, editorial cartoons in Indonesia were experiencing freedom, despite pressures that were previously found in the New Order. The reform era has breathed "fresh air" in the development of editorial cartoons and press freedom. It then made a big change in editorial cartoons themselves in the mass media at the time, which would return to being critical and dare to express their opinions as the part of the euphoria of freedom that occurred after the fall of the New Order regime under Soeharto leadership.[27]

Figure 9: Editorial Cartoon *Merdeka* Daily, November 21, 1998[28]

Cartoonists at this time became more at liberty to do their job as "watch dog". Not only in a range of political issues, but later expanded on the economic, social, poverty, and others. On the other hand, the criticism they made were not merely an expression of satire anymore, but also they were also able to form a solution, which was then presented in the form of image visualization. This made cartoons in this period more dynamic and critical than in cartoons in the past.

Figure 10 : Editorial Cartoon *Kompas*, July 18, 1998[29]

Conclusion

Referring to the development of editorial cartoons in Indonesia, an editorial cartoon can be used as a reference in shedding some light on growing public opinion related to a phenomenon in a certain period of time, for which usually historians have better resources to, but cannot explain the underlying attitude in that situation. In addition, cartoons will not only provide deep insights related to emotions enveloping the soul at the time, but can also be the foundation stone upon assumptions in order to form them into opinions. It is then emphasized that editorial cartoons, as forms of reflection events from time to time in visual form, are worthy to serve as referral sources, and coupled with other contemporary sources, to be used as writing materials to be a part of history in the next generation.

26. Anhar Gonggong, et al. (Ed.), *Sketsa Perjalanan Bangsa Berdemokrasi* (Jakarta : Departemen Komunikasi dan Informatika, 2005) pp. 200
27. Gatot Eko Cahyono, *Reformasi dalam Kartun* (Jakarta : Puspa Swara, 1998) pp. xiii.
28. Editorial Cartoon *Merdeka* Daily, November 21, 1998.

29. Editorial Cartoon *Kompas*, July 18, 1998.

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2nd
Prize Winner

Bringing
the 'Legend' Back in:
Revolution Ideas
in Saur Sepuh
under New Order Regime

In the midst of today's dominant visual culture this essay reminds us the importance and power of radio as a tool to educate the public, especially in the face of authoritarian leadership. Using the widely-listened radio drama series called Saur Sepuh, the author demonstrates the use of audio narrative to inspire the people to fight against oppression and injustice. Well done.

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Intro

The tight censorship regulations in New Order era showed one indication that such regime was so authoritarian in the context of freedom of speech.[2] Protecting the political interests of President Suharto's military regime was *raison d'être*.[3] Every information channel, such as films, magazine features, newspaper columns, television programs and so forth, became the restriction victims of the regime. There was also no exception for radio programs as they, at that time, had a bigger impact than other forms of media[4].

For radio programs context, it can be assumed that Suharto knew very well about the concept of how radio works, in which radio concept is more centralizing while the press concept is more decentralizing and individual. So that, according to Hale[5], through radio, it is possible to reach millions of people daily, even hourly, and to impress upon them on an idea, one thought, one set of stereotypes. Thus, on one hand, Suharto decided to take restrictive gesture to limit the 'power' of radio, both national radio and local radio. But, on the other hand, Suharto instead using national radio as propaganda tools[6].

However, amidst of the media suppression, there was one radio drama play which could gave people some notions of freedom through revolution. Qualifying the censorship, the radio drama entitled *Saur Sepuh,* became a "legend" in Indonesia during the 80's. This depicted the bloody journey of an invincible warrior, Brama Kumbara, who later became a king in one of the northern region kingdom named Madangkara. Though this play was mostly arrayed by the stories of battle between warriors and kingdoms, but it was bandage-wrapped in political intrigue and the ideas

1. *Understanding Media: The Extensions of Man* (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1964).

2. See: Merle C. Ricklefs, *Sejarah Indonesia Modern 1200-2008* (Jakarta: Serambi Ilmu Semesta, 2008), 623; Steven Drakeley, *The History of Indonesia* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2005), Ross Tapsell, "Old Tricks in a New Era: Self-Censorship in Indonesian Journalism," *Asian Studies Review* 36, no. 2 (June 2012): pp. 227–45.

3. Peter Schumacher, "Press Censorship in Indonesia," *Index on Censorship* 2, no. 1 (March 1973): 101–3; Krishna Sen and David T Hill, *Media, Culture and Politics in Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2006); David T. Hill, *The Press in New Order Indonesia* (Jakarta: Equinox Publishing, 2007); Michael R. J Vatikiotis, *Indonesian Politics under Suharto: The Rise and Fall of the New Order* (New York: Routledge, 1998).

4. Krishna Sen, "Radio Days: Media-Politics in Indonesia," *The Pacific Review* 16, no. 4 (December 2003): pp. 573–89.

5. "Nationalism in Press, Films, and Radio," *The ANNALS of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* 175, no. 1 (1 January 1934): pp. 110–16.

6. Edwin Jurriëns, *From Monologue to Dialogue: Radio and Reform in Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2009).

of the revolution in its dialogues.

The radio drama was established as a new medium for dramatic expression with plays originally written for the ear. In radio, the sighted listener bridges the perception of the real world with existence in imagination and consciousness.[7] Thanks to Indonesian language that became the national language, *Saur Sepuh* could be understood by all of the people in Indonesia.[8]

The purpose of this essay, *first*, is to describe how *Saur Sepuh* radio drama gave demonstration in terms of revolution notions in its storyline. *Second*, it also discusses how the radio was used as a medium to ground the notions of tyranny state in the middle of Suharto's oppressive regime. Finally, *third*, I argue that the playwright is a prodigy who managed to spread the ideas of revolution to the Indonesian people in her radio drama play, since she could still get away from the tight censorship imposed by the New Order.

Saur Sepuh at a Glance

Saur Sepuh was broadcasted through the airwaves in the 1980s in Indonesia. This radio drama play, as covered by Historia, the first popular history magazine in Indonesia, was able to hit millions of listeners across the country.[9] In each particular hour, most of the Indonesian people would try taking the time to listen to this colossal drama. At that time, when television still remained a tertiary goods, radio was the only medium of entertainment for Indonesian majority. Saur Sepuh was became a "legend" in its own time.

Written by Niki Kosasih, *Saur Sepuh* was set in the reign of King Hayam Wuruk of Majapahit Kingdom in the early modern period, c.1350-c.1389.[10] The first episode narrated that Brama Kumbara, the main character of this play, was separated from his mother, Gayatri, when the village located in the Kingdom Madangkara was attacked by Kuntala Kingdom, a vast-wide kingdom who had many colonies in that region. Though, in fact, this attack would be a beginning of the story of a boy which would be a future king in the Kingdom Madangkara on the future. Therefore, he would come back and strike back the invaders from his homeland.

In this essay, I only delve one of the episodes of Saur Sepuh, entitled *Bloody Journey* (*Perjalanan Berdarah* in Bahasa). This episode is the episode two from the total twenty

7. Tim Crook, *Radio Drama: Theory and Practice* (London: Routledge, 1999).
8. James N. Sneddon, *The Indonesian Language: Its History and Role in Modern Society* (Sydney: University of New South Wales Press, 2003).
9. "*Dari Telinga Turun Ke Mata*," *Historia*, April 17, 2013, http://historia.id/budaya/dari-telinga-turun-ke-mata.
10. See: Tim Hannigan, *A Brief History of Indonesia: Sultans, Spices, and Tsunamis: The Incredible Story of Southeast Asia's Largest Nation* (Tokyo: Tuttle Publishing, 2015); Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

episodes contained on this radio drama. This episode revolved around how Brama, a descendant of the rightful king, led the revolution in order to eradicate oppression from Madangkara.

This revolution started when Brama has managed to get a lot of knowledge and power from his teacher as well as grandfather, the third king of Madangkara, Astagina. Hence, Brama became a newly-born invincible warrior who was nearly unbeatable.[11] From here on, he began his calling to do a revolutionary struggle to liberate Madangkara from Kuntala's grasp. His action was later welcomed by many sympathizers who also wanted the liberation of Madangkara. Political consolidation was also conducted by Brama with his compatriots, such as Mantili, Raden Samba, and also oppressed people in Madangkara. Brama's struggle also received endorsements from Gotawa, a wealthy merchant as well as former Senopati of Madangkara before it was colonized by Kuntala.[12] Along with Gotawa, Brama led the revolution troops and the people who shared same objectives.

Madangkara's struggle for independence was also fully supported by the adoptive father and the biological mother of Brama, Tumenggung Ardalepa and Gayatri. Ardalepa was a Kuntala official that actually hated the oppression and persecution against small people. For that reason, Ardalepa was more intimate to Madangkara people rather than Kuntala people.

At the moment of leading the revolution, the status of Brama was just a king without a throne. But thanks to the support of the people, Mantili, Raden Samba, and alliances of several small kingdoms that formed Dewangga Army, the struggle from below, led by the king without a throne, had successfully achieved its objectives.[13] With the consent of the people and as a leader of the nationalist movement of Madangkara in the battle against the Kuntala Kingdom, Brama was appointed as the new King of Madangkara following their triumph in the battlefield.[14]

After the bloody battle happened, Brama's figure, likewise Ardalepa, became closer to the people of Madangkara. The good relationship among the warriors, which he built in the martial arts realm, made Brama reckoned by friends and foes alike. The diplomatic relations among the empire that he built was also excellent. A long-lasting

11. Saur Sepuh, *Sandiwara Radio Saur Sepuh: Episode 2 Perjalanan Berdarah Babak 1*, MP4, Saur Sepuh, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Ag163Daaae0&list=PLa1I7ScPR_sN-G-kXt4xfFpfPHWDjmh4G&index=1.
12. Ibid.
13.Saur Sepuh, *Sandiwara Radio Saur Sepuh: Episode 2 Perjalanan Berdarah Babak 2*, MP4, Saur Sepuh, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=lUjDUHe4mDw&list=PLa1I7ScPR_sN-G-kXt4xfFpfPHWDjmh4G&index=2; Saur Sepuh, *Sandiwara Radio Saur Sepuh: Episode 2 Perjalanan Berdarah Babak 3*, MP4, Saur Sepuh, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=paGwtCOcVtI&index=3&list=PLa1I7ScPR_sN-G-kXt4xfFpfPHWDjmh4G.
14. Saur Sepuh, *SAUR SEPUH*, 2015; Saur Sepuh, *Sandiwara Radio Saur Sepuh: Episode 2 Perjalanan Berdarah Babak 4*, MP4, Saur Sepuh, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=UuHvAXp3jGo&list=PLa1I7ScPR_sN-G-kXt4xfFpfPHWDjmh4G&index=4.

alliance that Brama created since the battle of Madangkara liberation, had caused Madangkara to never have a conflict with any of the surrounding kingdoms, namely Padjajaran, Tanjung Singguruh, Sumedang Larang, Niskala, Ajong Kidul, Selimbar, Majapahit and so forth.[15]

In piecing the story of the *Saur Sepuh* Episode 2, Niki Kosasih was trying to demonstrate to the audience that political intrigue in the kingdoms of Nusantara era is very ordinary. Using kingdoms-atmospheres in the Nusantara, the imagination of the listener was directed to the resistance movement, which was conducted by Madangkara people toward the invaders who often treated the people of the colony as second class citizens.

Borrowing Crook's[16] question, what did the listener get from the story written by Niki Kosasih when realizing an idea in imagining consciously about the 'truth' by which the authorial sender wished to communicate explicitly or through a lexicon of symbols? Roland Barthes, a French literary philosopher-cum-linguist-cum-semiotician, called it the 'obtuse meaning'. It is both an emotional and an intellectual experience. It is indifferent to the obvious story, it is discontinuous. It is a form of 'meta-language'.[17]

According to Barthes, on radio, conversely, we know only what we know, because what constitutes spectacle is purely imaginary. As a consequence, radio inclines us to favour the action of the mind above the actuality of matter. This, without denying that the mind has its limits, in so far as the world may refuse to conform to the mind's impression of it.[18] Consequently, the perception of revolution notions, which was transmitted by Kosasih to the listener, was always dependent on the listeners' imagination. But, I believe that we will live right inside the radio when we listen to it.[19]

The Notions of Revolution amidst the Oppressive Regime

What is revolution? Revolution, usually preceded by countless protests, is a consequence of the inherent lack of democracy, or also called egalitarian systems, corrupt dictatorships, engaged in severe repression against political opponents.[20]

It occurred and is expressed through violent means, namely popular rebellions, revolts, armed struggles, liberation armies, and more centralized military coups.[21] Nevertheless, before the action transpired, the core of revolution notions, is the introduction of a new utopic system that could best serve the nation rather than merely a privileged elite.

Then, what if the notions of revolution emerged in the amidst of the military dictatorship? The worst possibility that could be imagined is the massacre of the groups expressing these ideas. In Indonesia, New Order repressions made any sort of mass politics impossible, and democratic ideals could only be developed and nurtured as intellectual projects in the relative security of university classrooms and bulletins.[22] Nevertheless, different from Sen, I found that radio drama could also develop the ideas of democracy and freedom. This could be heard on *Saur Sepuh*, in my case, particularly on episode two.

In episode 2 stage 1 of *Saur Sepuh*, the narrator opened the episode by giving an illustration of the Madangkara's liberation movement leader election to the listeners. In the dialogue below, it can be seen that the movement has agreed to choose Brama Kumbara as the leader of their liberation movement.

> **Narator**: Then unanimously, the Madangkara people named freedom fighter Brama as their leader (1:44 – 1:54, *Saur Sepuh 2: Bloody Journey, 1*).

Even so, in the Gotawa's dialogue below, Kosasih was providing illustrations to the listeners that the election of leader of liberation movement was in fact appointed democratically by the members.

> **Gotawa**: Yes, and I think, we do not want to enthrone a king, rather appoint a leader who will lead the struggle of our nation (5:00 – 5:20, *Saur Sepuh 2: Bloody Journey, 1*).

The dialogue above is totally contradictory to the reality that was happening in Indonesia at that time, in which the presidential election was not conducted democraticly.[23] The dialogue above is a sharp critique to the authoritarian New Order government.

Then, in Mantili's dialogue below, she explains the key factor that led to civil unrest in a country. The widening economic gap between the rich and the poor, so-called economic injustice, is the major reason to create revolution.

> **Mantili**: That's all the result of an imbalance in the social order, Kanjeng Tumenggung... the people only rob the rich, right ? Well, this is a result of a wide gap between the rich and the poor... glamorous and too flashy, which is

15. Saur Sepuh, *SAUR SEPUH*, 2015; Saur Sepuh, *Sandiwara Radio Saur Sepuh: Episode 2 Perjalanan Berdarah Babak 5*, MP4, Saur Sepuh, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eSJ6l0r6Mzo&index=5&list=PLa1I7ScPR_sN-G-kXt4xfFpfPHWDjmh4G; Saur Sepuh, *Sandiwara Radio Saur Sepuh: Episode 2 Perjalanan Berdarah Babak 6*, MP4, Saur Sepuh, 2015, https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=pVyb9ElxQfQ&index=6&list=PLa1I7ScPR_sN-G-kXt4xfFpfPHWDjmh4G.

16. Crook, *Radio Drama*.

17. See: Roland Barthes, *Image, Music, Text* (New York: Hill and Wang, 1977); Crook, *Radio Drama*.

18. Crook, *Radio Drama*.

19. McLuhan, *Understanding Media*.

20. Immanuel Ness, ed., *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest: 1500 to the Present* (Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell, 2009).

21. See: Gregory Fremont-Barnes, *Encyclopedia of the Age of Political Revolutions and New Ideologies, 1760-1815* (Westport, Conn.: Greenwood Press, 2007), xviii–xix; Ness, *The International Encyclopedia of Revolution and Protest*.

22. Sen, "Radio Days," 576.

23. Stefan Eklöf, *Power and Political Culture in Suharto's Indonesia: The Indonesian Democratic Party (PDI) and Decline of the New Order (1986-98)* (Copenhagen: NIAS, 2004).

only enjoyed by a few people, while most suffer. Is that fair? (9:44 – 9:56, *Saur Sepuh 2: Bloody Journey, 2*)

Yet, again, the author seemed to want to contrast utopic matters with the existing reality in Indonesia. In Kendala's dialog below, for example, he said that the suffering felt by the people, as it was said by Mantili, did not exist in the country.

> **Kendala**: I do not see people suffer… (10:00 – 10:15, *Saur Sepuh 2: Bloody Journey, 2*).

Gardika's dialogue also shed a light on Kendala's statement, who said that detrimental policies to the people were applied by them not to sorrow Madangkara's people. Rather, these policies were for people who did not have the strength to fight against the–tyrannical–regime.

> **Gardika**: Not made to suffer. But not made to give too much chance. Since pleasure will cause looseness. Allowance will rise to power. And power will create resistance (10:20 – 10:45, *Saur Sepuh 2: Bloody Journey, 2*).

Disagreement about who was right in the context of suppressing the people tried to be presented several times by Kosasih. Just as noted below:

> **Mantili**: Tumenggung is misunderstood. Sorry, I think just the opposite. Aptly deprivation will cause chaos. People become restless, anxious of the fate that is uncertain. Complaints and dissatisfaction heard here and there. And finally arise unlawful acts such as the occurrence of robberies lately (11:10 – 11:45, *Saur Sepuh 2: Bloody Journey, 2*).

Even further, in Gardika's dialogue, acts of violence, using Kraton army, needed to be done for the glory of the nation. With violence, the people would be afraid to relegate stability created by the existing regime.

> **Gardika**: For the sake of the greatness of our nation, Kuntala. What is wrong with acts of violence? So, they are afraid and do not dare to mess around with our large and strong army (12:00 – 12:25, Saur Sepuh 2: *Bloody Journey, 2*).

Yet, Kosasih was very aware that the power of the army has only trapped nations in a deadlock situation. Emphasizing freedom of the people would give birth to rebellions. Underground movements will continue to emerge that aim to destabilize the government. And finally, a nation will collapse on itself. That is what I captured when listening to Mantili's dialogue below:

> **Mantili**: Indeed, people are afraid of the combat forces of Keraton. But secretly they will develop strength! Then staged riots here and there. When that happens, the situation becomes unsafe and automatically, the wealth of this country will fall (13:05 – 13:30, *Saur Sepuh 2: Bloody Journey, 2*).

At last, the dialogues that were raised by Gardika and Kendala, on one hand, clearly represented the dominance of the New Order period. However, on the other hand, the revolutionary dialogues posed by Mantili and Gotawa instead represented the wishes of the people who had been oppressed by the regime. There was an idea

where the people were no longer pleased with the existing regime. Suppressing people constantly through the armed forces, depicted by Kosasih in her *Saur Sepuh*, was not the right way to make the country prosperous both economically and socially.

Conclusion

Under the New Order, a number of sensitive social and political issues were banned outright from discussion, such as ethnic and religious animosity and the corruption and nepotism in high-level government circles.[24] This aim is simple in extreme, namely to 'protect' the people from ideas and information that could pose a threat to the military regime of President Suharto.

But, conclusively, despite the rampant censorship of the New Order, the ideas of revolution could always be voiced in various ways. *Saur Sepuh*, for instance, was one of the entertainment of the people who managed to escape censorship despite having a plot that includef the notions of revolution, which could endanger the continuity of the New Order regime. In general, these notions were difficult to see amidst the blurriness.

The playwright, Niki Kosasih, in this case is a prodigy who can outsmart the tight system of censorship applied by Suharto's New Order. In addition, the story of a radio drama written by Niki Kosasih also proves that the voices of liberation can still be voiced in addition to the areas mentioned by Sen's work. Furthermore, the infiltration of the revolution notions depends on the imagination of the listener.

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24. See: Ibid.; Jennifer Lindsay, "Making Waves: Private Radio and Local Identities in Indonesia," *Indonesia*, no. 64 (1997): 113.

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3rd
Prize Winner

Act of Writing: Pramoedya Ananta Toer in Buru Island (1969 - 1979)

"Samsul's essay showed Pramoedya Ananta Toer's tenacity in using writing as a weapon to fight and to survive."

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"Who may seize and take away my right to have a dialogue with myself."
(PAT, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*)

Being a political prisoner can cause a person to lose - or rather deliberately being omitted - civil rights attached to him, including the right to write. This happens to Pramoedya Ananta Toer (PAT) throughout the time when he was a political prisoner of the New Order regime in Buru Island (1969-1979). In addition to losing the right of expression through writing, many of his writings prior to his imprisonment in Buru were also destroyed and banned from publication. Meanwhile, the ruling regime considers the disposal of the prisoners to Buru Island as an "administrative procedure" of the completion of a G-30-S case[1] .

The strategy of political exile in the sense of throwing someone into a new place far away from his homeland for political reasons has been implemented long before the arrival of the Europeans (Farid, 2013). The kings and princes of the empires in the now-called Indonesia often abducted political opponents or their family members to achieve their goals. Such method was also carried out by VOC in the 17th century and they even made it more systematic. With its military strength, VOC could arrest, imprison, and dispose unwanted people to one of their ruled territories. During the *Nederlandsch Indische* era, exile strategy was even more vigorously performed. With *exorbitante rechten* or the privileges owned by the Governor General, he could perform any action on those whom he regards as jeopardizing the safety and security of the colonies, including arresting and exiling the people who are considered dangerous.

During the New Order era, the practice of limitless power by the Governor-General seemed to be repeated again (Farid, 2013). *Exorbitante rechten* at that time was in the hands of Kopkamtib[2] - then Bakorstanas[3] - which could arrest, detain and exile someone without going through court process. General Suharto as a supreme leader of Kopkamtib had similar position and functions with Governor-General in dealing with the safety and security of the nation. The first victims of this mechanism were political prisoners of the G-30-S incident. Ten thousands of people were detained without court process for several years to further exiled to Buru Island for ten years.

The prisoners who underwent exile in Buru consisted of people with various educational backgrounds and professions. According to PAT's writings and from other sources, Buru prisoners consisted of people with various professions such

1. Hilmar Farid, "*Pengasingan dalam Politik Kolonial*". *Jurnal Prisma Special Edition* Vol.32 No.2 & 3 (2013).
2. Kopkamtib: Command for the Restoration of Security and Order during Suharto Era. A central organization that was under the command of the president of Indonesia during those periods. Kopkamtib was dissolved by Suharto in 1988 and replaced by Bakorstanas
3. Bakorstanas: Coordinating Agency for National Stability Assistance. It was a replacement for Kopkamtib which dissolved in 1988.

as teachers, painters, directors, movie stars, sports teachers, students, engineers, authors and other professions.[4] They were generally considered to have an affiliation with Indonesian Communist Party (PKI).

In general, activities of political prisoners in Buru Island can be seen from the records or memoirs made by a number of political prisoners and this number is very limited. Of thousands of political prisoners, there were at least six people who wrote about their life during their exile on the island.[5] This limited number of records shows the struggle these prisoners faced to write their experience. This condition is reflected in PAT's writing during his first four years of detention in Jakarta (1965-1969) where he said that it was no longer possible for him to write unless he signed official papers[6]. He also wrote *"In those four years as well, the activities of mind as cornerstone of writing activities were paralyzed."*[7]

Although the act of writing was very difficult either because of internal factors of the authors or the repressive treatment from ruling authorities during the time, his detention period in Buru Island generated a number of writings. On top of that, Buru Quartet, which considered as the magnum opus, was born there.[8]

This paper attempts to provide an overview of PAT's life during his exile in Buru Island and how these *settings* and creative process happened. I argue that creativity and productivity generated by PAT in Buru did not only indicate the quality of PAT as a consistent writer, but also a symbol of resistance and rebellion against the restraints of independence and freedom principles.

PAT's Detention

Shortly after the outbreak of the incident later called the G-30-S in 1965, PAT was arrested at his home in Jakarta. The process of arrest and investigation of his house was something that he regarded as very unfortunate, because his personal library and the entire collection which has been treasured for over 20 years, was destroyed.[9] In addition to those very valuable library collections, as many as eight manuscripts were burnt.[10] PAT also lamented the arrest of himself that he thinks as an unjustified act and without court process.[11]

Something later questioned by historians (see for example Roosa, 2015) is that if the

government intended to insist that PKI organized G-30-S, then the government should be able to provide clear explanation about the internal persons in PKI who organized the movement. Did the three million party members have overall responsibility? Or only some of them? And were concurring organizations such as LEKRA[12] also considered to be responsible? In the official document issued by the government, there was an understanding that all members of PKI were deemed to be involved G-30-S both directly and indirectly.[13] PAT himself admitted that his membership in LEKRA was just an honorary member.

PAT was detained for four years in Jakarta (1965-1969) and transited in Nusa Kambangan penitentiary for one month. On August 17, 1969 PAT was dispatched to Buru Island by ship, which departed from Port Sodong in Nusa Kambangan. All the political prisoners exiled to Buru Island were included in Category B, a group of people who had been sworn or, according to the witnesses, had become the members of PKI or part of the board of other like-minded mass organizations or those who undermine the government's efforts to suppress G30S / PKI.[14] According to PAT, there were at least 800 political prisoners from several prisons in Java on the ship that brought him to Buru Island.[15] The sail itself took 10 days to reach the destination.

Since the beginning of their arrival, the prisoners were greeted with the tasks and work that consumed their time and sucked their energy. In an interview with ABC journalists in 1977, PAT said he was doing the same tasks as other prisoners. The tasks include clearing the forest, constructing roads, preparing fields for cultivation, cutting through coarse grass, working on rice fields, chopping woods, and acting as a blacksmith for about six months. Tasks he never done were oaring a traditional bamboo raft and squeezing sago plants.

On November 12, 1979, PAT was released from his detention in Buru Island after living there for ten years.

Writing in Exile

There are many writers of the world who got their inspiration and produced their work in prison or in exile. Not infrequently, the works born during those times are a masterpiece and turn out to be famous in the future. In Indonesia alone, there are some great works created when the author was under confinement. In the 50s, Hamka for instance, finished his magnum opus work Tafsir Al-Azhar when he was imprisoned for more than two years during Sukarno era. In Buru Island, following a

4. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, 18.

5. Zefri Alkatiri, "*Tujuh Buku Memoar tentang Pulau Buru*." *National History Conference Papers* (No Year).

6. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, 63.

7. Ibid., pp. 63.

8. Consisting of four titles: This Earth of Mankind, Child of All Nations, Footsteps, and House of Glass.

9. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, 19.

10. Vltchek and Indira, *Saya Terbakar Amarah Sendirian!*, 71.

11. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu,*19.

12. LEKRA is Lembaga Kebudayaan Rakyat/Institute for the People's Culture, was a literary and social movement associated with the Indonesian Communist Party

13. National Security Agency, *Bahan-Bahan Pokok G-30-S/PKI dan Penghancurannya*, the second part (March 1969), 17-18, in Roosa, J., *Dalih Pembunuhan Masal: Gerakan 30 September dan Kudeta Soeharto.* Institut Sejarah Indonesia and Hasta Mitra, Jakarta: 2008.

14. Krisnadi, *Tahanan Politik Pulau Buru (1969-1979),*

15. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, pp. 3.

permission to write given by the government at that time, PAT completed the Buru Quartet and a historical romance 'Arus Balik'.

PAT's writing activities in Buru can be described as follows. As he gotten formal permission to write in 1973, PAT began to organize and prepare the necessary equipment for writing. The permission to write was granted as a following step of the release of government's policy allowing the prisoners in Buru to develop the skills they previously owned. At the beginning of the permission, PAT was even rewarded with a pen, a bottle of ink, and a thick notebook by the prison authorities in Buru.[16] PAT personally believed that the permission was granted as a result of international pressure to the government.[17]

PAT admitted that his constant desire to write has become a mental burden. However, it was not easy for PAT to immediately write and concentrate after a long pause. PAT said: *"But look, just at the time when papers, pen, ink, and writing permission was granted, I could not write. Concentration was easily said than done."*[18]

Because of this condition, it can be assumed that writing productivity of PAT has not been much and any result of his writing had failed to satisfy him. A team of psychologists from UI-UGM brought to Buru in November 1973 also asked whether PAT was still writing. PAT answered that the time spent to write and read was still very limited: *"If there was a chance and if I was not too tired. In general, if I could write, I could only do it for a quarter hour a day, and three to five minutes to read".*[19] Writing activity, according PAT, was done solely as an effort to treat his mental and physical deterioration.[20]

Apparently, for one year from the beginning until the end of 1974, PAT managed to restore his mind and became more productive in writing. At the end of that year, he completed a romance 'Arus Balik' and entrusted the manuscript to the prison authorities in Buru. PAT called it a weak script since it was not supported by adequate literature sources. But in these conditions, PAT assumed that his work was the utmost result he could do in the middle of savannah desert in Buru Island.[21]

Regarding the tetralogy, PAT said: *"Before being detained to Buru, I've already had a concept for Tetralogy and had every intention of writing".*[22] The materials required by PAT had been collected in the period before his arrest in Jakarta. According to PAT, working papers for this Tetralogy was very spacious. Most of these materials were collected with the help from his students at University of Res Publika Jakarta. The students were asked to review newspapers from the beginning of the century until their recent time. On the completion of the Tetralogy, PAT wrote as followed:

16. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, pp. 63.
17. Vltchek and Indira, *Saya Terbakar Amarah Sendirian!*, pp. 39.
18. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, pp. 63.
19. Toer, *Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu*, pp. 17.
20. Ibid., pp. 64.
21. Ibid., pp. 99.
22. Vltchek and Indira, *Saya Terbakar Amarah Sendirian!*, pp. 74.

"During the time when Tefaat[23] had already changed into Inrehab[24] and controlled by Colonel Soetikno, I have successfully completed four manuscripts for National Awakening Period. All were still unfinished, an imperfect ones. Those can't be. Even with sufficient materials and references, four years were still needed to generate scripts with publishing quality. After all, I felt happy to be able to write appropriately without interruption. When I began to write the final manuscript, I was feeling that the needed materials, which in fact were not necessarily true and contained a lot of mistakes, have been drained. The same went to my strength. The older we are, the faster we are to get tired. "(Nyanyi Sunyi Seorang Bisu, pp.114)

Another issue he worried was the safety of the manuscripts of the Tetralogy. PAT argued, though writing was an activity that already had an official permission in Buru, it was possible at any time for his manuscripts and wittings to be seized and destroyed by the ruling government. Therefore, he performed a strategy to duplicate his manuscripts into several copies. One copy for himself, another one was distributed among his prisoner friends in order to be read and remembered, and the last copy was entrusted to the Catholic Church. This way the entire manuscript could find its way out of Buru Island and be published.

Epilogue

A great work is the dream of every writer. The way to produce such great work is merely by being persistent and constantly believing that success will eventually come. Before his arrest in Jakarta, PAT has had a dream to create an eternally remarkable work at the age of 40. But life leads his to another direction. Right at the age of 40, he was arrested and lost his civil rights, including the right to write. At that time, PAT thought that writing about the conditions and circumstances surrounding him would be unexciting and make him depressed instead.

In such condition, writing was not solely a mean of self-actualization to reinforce his position in national or international level, but also an expression of freedom and rebellion against the oppression. PAT also said: *"Writing for me is a fight. In all my books, I always encourage people to fight. I was raised to be a warrior"*[25]. In addition, in the midst of uncertainty and ambiguity, keep on writing for PAT was a powerful way to answer the challenge: *"When I think of (the circumstances), I think of it as a personal challenge to me. And my answer was to keep on writing in prison "*[26].

23. Tempat pemanfaatan / places' utilization
24. Instalasi rehabilitasi / rehabilitation installation
25. Vltchek and Indira, *Saya Terbakar amarah sendirian!*, pp. 76.
26. Ibid., pp. 71.

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The Changing Landscape of Rural Governance in Indonesia and Its Socio-Political Implications: From Post-Independence to Post-Reformasi

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Introduction

The passing of Law No. 6 of 2014 on Village sparked a renewed attention towards rural Indonesia as a locus of socio-political action and contestation. Coinciding with the 2014 presidential election, the Law brought rural area into the heart of policy debates, as each candidate vowed to win the votes of rural constituents. Prabowo coined the slogan "a billion Rupiah for every village", while Jokowi proposed 'building Indonesia from the periphery' as part of his 'Nawacita'.[1] Even after the election, the government's policy to allocate 'Dana Desa' from the national budget to each and every village became a national issue of interest. This clearly marked a resurgence of villages and rural development within Indonesia's mainstream policy discourses.[2]

Indeed, the existence of *desa* (village) as a distinct social unit of Indonesian society long preceded the birth of the Indonesian state or even Dutch colonial rule on the archipelago.[3] Yet, the wellbeing of rural societies almost always ranked last. The number tells it all: from 1990 to September 2013, the percentage of Indonesia's total poor that lives in rural area consistently stands above 50%, barely changing in the span of more than twenty years.[4] Moreover, out of the 74.093 villages in Indonesia, 20.432 still falls under the underdeveloped criteria as of 2014.[5] As if not enough,

1. On Prabowo Subianto's campaign promise, see: Prabowo Subianto and M. Hatta Rajasa, *Visi, Misi, dan Program Bakal Calon Pasangan Presiden dan Wakil Presiden*, http://www.kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_prabowo-Hatta.pdf (accessed November 6, 2016). Meanwhile, Nawacita is a nine-point policy proposals espoused by Joko Widodo during the Presidential Election of 2014, which was eventually incorporated into the national priority agenda under the National Mid-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2015-2019 as he won the election. For a complete document, see: Joko Widodo and M. Jusuf Kalla, *Jalan Perubahan Untuk Indonesia Yang Berdaulat, Mandiri, dan Berkeperibadian: Visi, Misi, dan Program Aksi,* http://kpu.go.id/koleksigambar/VISI_MISI_Jokowi-JK.pdf (accessed November 6, 2016).

2. The tendency to neglect rural area in development policy discourses is a phenomenon which Michael Lipton terms as 'urban bias', where development policies and strategies are designed by and for people living in urban areas while most poor people live in rural areas. Consequently, growth and development in many developing countries happen at the expense of rural areas. See, for example: Michael Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor: Urban Bias in World Development* (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1977).

3. The earliest Western account of Indonesian rural communities, on the coastal Sumatera, Nusa Tenggara, and Maluku, was recorded in the *Suma Oriental*, depicting the travel of a Portuguese merchant, Tome Pires, from Malaya to China by way of Indonesia in 1512. Another important record came from 1521, from the diary of the Venetian Antonio Pigafetta who provided early descriptions of the coastal communities on Alor, Timor and several other islands in East Indonesia during the round-the-world journey on board Fernando Magellan's ship of *Victoria.* See: Koentjaraningrat, "A Survey of Social Studies on Rural Indonesia", in Koentjaraningrat (ed.), *Villages in Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007), pp. 1.

4. Central Statistics Agency, "*Jumlah Penduduk Miskin, Persentase Penduduk Miskin dan Garis Kemiskinan, 1970-2013*", December 17, 2014, https://www.bps.go.id/linkTabelStatis/view/id/1494 (accessed on November 6, 2016).

5. Ministry of National Development Planning/National Development Planning Agency (Bappenas), *Indeks Pembangunan Desa 2014: Tantangan Pemenuhan Standar Pelayanan Minimal*, Jakarta:

major developmental problems such as low quality of education, minimum access to healthcare services, and environmental degradation still plague rural Indonesia.[6]

This is where the governance question becomes relevant. It relates with how rural affairs are managed by the prevailing political order and, consequently, its developmental outcomes. Throughout Indonesian history, different regimes have in fact tried to harness the social and economic forces of rural Indonesia. This is done through the institutionalization of rules and norms that fit the regimes' broader socio-political and economic objectives. An understanding of how rural governance evolves overtime in Indonesia is an absolute necessity in the context of improving ongoing national efforts of institutional reform and development at the rural level. This article thus seeks to encapsulate how rural affairs are governed and development strategies are taken within different era since Indonesia's independence. It also highlights the underlying rationales and legal basis for such arrangements, as well as its socio-political and economic implications.

Rural Indonesia in The Post-Independence Era

The post-independence era in Indonesia was marked by a heightened sense of 'nation-building' and revolutionary spirit. During this era, rural imagery and values helped shape the contours of nation-building enterprises. This can be seen, for example, in how the notion of *dorpsrepubliek* or 'village republic' greatly influenced the formulation of the 1945 Constitution.

Originally conceived by Ter Haar and Van Vollenhoeven, *dorpsrepubliek* is actually an epithet ascribed to ancient villages in Indonesia that were known to be greatly autonomous and self-sufficient, having their own structure of government, customs/norms, and territories.[7] Yet, the notion inspired a return to traditional rural values and spirit in seeking for the ideal foundation, purpose, and structure of the Indonesian state. Soepomo as one of the drafters of the 1945 Constitution imagined an integral-unitary state reflecting the ancient Javanese philosophy *manunggaling kawula gusti* (unity of the soul between the leaders and the governed), which could best be seen in the social structure of villages and most rural societies.[8] Even Soekarno asserted that if *Pancasila* were to be squeezed into an ultimate *Ekasila*, that *sila* would be 'Gotong

Royong',[9] a socio-cultural virtue rooted in the tradition of rural societies.[10]

Under the original 1945 Constitution,[11] rural affairs shall be governed by taking into account the 'rights of origins' (*hak asal-usul*) in 'special regions' (*daerah-daerah yang bersifat istimewa*).[12] What these actually mean are the rights to maintain indigenous structure, norms (*adat*), and internal autonomy bestowed upon certain regions and rural communities during Dutch colonial rule.[13] This practice would continue under Law No. 22 of 1948 and Law No. 1 of 1957, warranting a high degree of village autonomy and plurality, which then created a great variety of village nomenclatures and local practices.[14]

Nevertheless, this condition would last only until 1965, when Law No. 19 of 1965 on *Desapraja* was issued. Fueled by the re-glorification of the revolutionary spirit following Presidential Decree of 5 July 1959 and President Soekarno's 'Manipol USDEK',[15] the Law repealed previous legislations on rural governance that were deemed to have feudalistic Dutch-colonial 'odor'. It drew rural Indonesia closer into the prevalent revolutionary rhetoric, as seen in the Law's General Elucidation:

> "Those rural communities with history dating back thousands of years had great resilience during the painful colonial era and had made invaluable contributions throughout the struggle against colonial rule. In the future, it is expected of those rural communities to play important roles in concluding and attaining

9. Floribeta Aning (ed.), *Lahirnya Pancasila: Kumpulan Pidato BPUPKI* (Yogyakarta: Media Pressindo, 2006), pp. 150.

10. On Gotong Royong, see: Koentjaraningrat, "The Village in Indonesia Today", in Koentjaraningrat (ed.), *Villages in Indonesia* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2007), pp. 394-397.

11. The 1945 Constitution has been amended four times following Indonesia's Reformasi, which were done respectively in 1999, 2000, 2001, and 2002. The original text can be found in the document legislated by the Indonesia's Independence Preparation Committee (Panitia Persiapan Kemerdekaan Indonesia or 'PPKI') on August 18, 1945.

12 People's Consultative Assembly of the Republic of Indonesia (MPR RI), *Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945* (Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, 2011), pp. 25.

13 As part of its colonial strategy, the Dutch granted autonomous practices to rural communities through *Inlandshe Gemeentee Ordonanntie* Jawa en Madura (for those residing in Jawa and Madura), as well as through *Inlandshe Gemeentee Ordonanntie Buitengewesten* (for those residing outside Jawa and Madura). See: Ni'matul Huda, *op. cit.*, pp. 10.

14. Throughout Indonesia, the name of rural communities differed. In Sumatera, they could be referred to as *Kampung, Mukim, Negeri*, or *Marga*, whereas in Java, Bali, and Madura they were commonly called *Desa*. The term commonly used In Kalimantan is *Temenggungan*, in Sulawesi: *Wanua, Distrik Pekasan*, in Maluku and West Irian: *Soa, Hoana, Negory*. See: *Ibid*, pp. 134-135.

15 Manipol USDEK is an acronym. Manipol for *Manifesto Politik*, and USDEK for *Undang-Undang Dasar* 1945 (the 1945 Constitution), *Sosialisme* Indonesia [Indonesia's Socialism], *Demokrasi Terpimpin* (Guided Democracy), *Ekonomi Terpimpin* (Guided Economy), and *Kepribadian Indonesia* (Indonesian Character). These ideals affirmed President Soekarno's rule on the basis of guided democracy following Presidential Decree of July 5, 1959, which marked the end of liberal democracy era from 1950 to 1959.

Bappenas, 2015, pp. 3.

6. These development problems are elaborated in greater details in Sunyoto Usman, Derajad S. Widhyarto and Amelia Maika, "*Strategi Penciptaan Pelayanan Kesehatan Dasar untuk Kemudahan Akses Penduduk Desa Miskin*", *Jurnal ISIP*, Vol. 18, No. 2, 2014; Gregorius Sahdan, "*Menanggulangi Kemiskinan Desa*", March 2005, http://jer.mubyarto.org/edisi_22/artikel_6.htm, accessed 12 November 2016.

7. Ateng Syafruddin and Suprin Na'a, *Republik Desa: Pergulatan Hukum Tradisional dan Hukum Modern Dalam Desain Otonomi Desa* (Bandung: PT Alumni, 2010), pp. 4.

8. Ni'matul Huda, *Hukum Pemerintahan Desa Dalam Konstitusi Indonesia Sejak Kemerdekaan Hingga Era Reformasi* (Malang: Suara Press, 2015), pp. 3.

the purpose of revolution considering that the primary forces of revolution as stated in *Manifesto Politik* existed within those rural communities"[16]

Analysis on Law No. 19 of 1965 is yet to be completed if detached from the broader socio-political dynamics and power struggle in the 1960s between the rising Indonesian Communist Party (PKI) and its rivals (the military and religious elements). It is no secret that villages featured prominently in PKI's political narrative and doctrines.[17] Under Aidit, PKI had also launched a 'rural offensive' to win sympathy and cemented footing in the rural area.[18] Through its affiliated mass organization, *Barisan Tani Indonesia* (BTI), PKI managed to gain major support from rural peasants.[19] The creation of *Desapraja* provided a momentum for PKI to further expand its political grip on villages by consolidating and actively engaging village elites and village apparatus. This resulted in PKI taking over the Association of Indonesian Village Servants (*Asosiasi Pamong Desa Indonesia*) in 1965.[20] When conflict finally erupted between PKI and anti-communist forces following the failed 'coup' on September 30, 1965, the Indonesian countryside witnessed much of the infamous bloodbath of hundreds of thousands of PKI members and those accused of being one.[21]

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16 Translated from the original excerpt: "*Kesatuan-kesatuan masyarakat hukum yang telah mempunyai sejarah ribuan tahun itu, dimasa penderitaan jajahan ternyata mempunyai daya tahan yang kuat dan selama peperangan kolonial telah mempunyai jasa-jasa yang bernilai tinggi. Untuk masa depan dapat diharapkan bahwa kesatuan-kesatuan, masyarakat hukum adat itu akan mempunyai peranan penting pula dalam penyelesaian dan mencapai tujuan revolusi, mengingat bahwa bagian terbesar dari pada tenaga-tenaga pokok revolusi sebagaimana dinyatakan dalam Manifesto Politik, terdapat didalam kesatuan-kesatuan masyarakat hukum tersebut.*" See: General Elucidation of Law No. 19 of 1965 on Desapraja as a Form of Transition to Accelerate the Realization of 3rd Degree Region Throughout Indonesia [*Desapraja Sebagai Bentuk Peralihan Untuk Mempercepat Terwujudnya Daerah Tingkat III Di Seluruh Wilayah Indonesia*].

17 On PKI's rural policy and 'rural offensive', see: Rex Mortimer, *Indonesian Communism Under Soekarno: Ideology and Politics, 1959-1965* (Singapore: Equinox Publishing, 2006), pp. 291-303.

18 PKI's Chairman, D.N. Aidit, stated in 1964 that villages play at least four important roles in communist revolution: 1) as source/supplier of food; 2) source of manpower for revolutionary soldiers; 3) as a retreating ground if hit back in cities; and 4) as a staging ground for offensives to retake cities. D.N. Aidit, *Kaum Tani Mengganyang Setan-Setan Desa*: *Laporan singkat tentang hasil riset mengenai keadaan kaum tani dan gerakan tani di Jawa Barat* (Jakarta: Yayasan Pembaruan, 1964), pp. 11-12.

19 BTI was estimated to boast more than 7 million members as of 1964. See: D.N. Aidit, *op. cit.*, pp. 11.

20 Mashuri Maschab, *Politik Pemerintahan Desa di Indonesia* (Yogyakarta: PolGov, 2013), pp. 98.

21 The slaughter of hundreds of thousands of people branded as 'PKI' and the gravity of the situation in rural Indonesia at that time are vividly narrated by Adrian Vickers, *A History of Modern Indonesia*, 2nd Edition (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2013), pp. 163-164. As Vickers recounts: "whole quarters of villages were left empty by the executions. The houses of those killed or imprisoned were looted and frequently turned over to military men."

Villages Under The 'Repressive Developmentalist' New Order

The 'Gestapu' tragedy and anti-communism uproar that followed served as the death bell for President Soekarno's reign. Soeharto eventually ascended to presidency in 1967 and established the 'repressive-developmentalist' New Order.[22] The regime's mantra was national stability and economic development – to which everything else had to bow down – while utilizing 'Pancasila' exercised in a doctrinaire fashion to legitimize its rule.[23] To achieve these, the regime embarked upon nation-wide depolitization and centralization. Reflecting on the experience of dealing with social conflicts in rural area during the anti-communist purge, the New Order must have recognized the importance of villages and thus aspired to maintain order and political control in the countryside. Thence began a new era of rural governance and development.

A centerpiece of New Order's regulatory framework to govern rural affairs was Law No. 5 of 1979. The Law generally reflects the regime's antipathy toward diversity and autonomy; it regarded them as an obstruction to economic progress.[24] Consequently, the Law transformed villages into the lowest administrative branch of the central government and established firm control/supervision by higher authorities. Village structures were homogenized and village leaders were made as members of *Golkar*, the electoral machine of the New Order, and inducted into the national bureaucracy.[25] It eventually created a system of village government that responded upwards, rather than downwards, and that left very few spaces for participation or recognition of individual and collective actors other than those sponsored by the state.[26]

22 Herbert Feith, "Repressive-Developmentalist Regimes in Asia: Old Strengths, New Vulnerabilities", *Prisma* (19), 1980, pp. 39–55.

23 Jean Gelman Taylor, *Indonesia: Peoples and Histories* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2003), pp. 361-362.

24 This can be read from the General Elucidation section of the Law: "The existing legal arrangements do not regulate village government uniformly and do not provide the much-needed push for dynamic growth of societies. As a result, the current form and pattern of villages and village governments are too diverse, each region has its own characteristics, which can sometimes act as an obstruction toward intensive guidance and control in order to increase the wellbeing of their societies." [*Peraturan perundang-undangan di atas ini tidak mengatur pemerintahan Desa secara seragam dan kurang memberikan dorongan kepada masyarakatnya untuk tumbuh kearah kemajuan yang dinamis. Akibatnya Desa dan pemerintahan Desa yang ada sekarang ini bentuk dan coraknya masih beraneka ragam, masing-masing daerah memiliki ciri-cirinya sendiri, yang kadang-kadang merupakan hambatan untuk pembinaan dan pengendalian yang intensif guna peningkatan taraf hidup masyarakatnya*]. See: General Elucidation of Law No. 5 of 1979 on Village Government [*Pemerintahan Desa*].

25 Hans Antlov (a), "Village Government and Rural Development in Indonesia: The New Democratic Framework", *Bulletin of Indonesian Economic Studies*, Vol. 39, No. 2, 2003, pp. 195-196.

26 Of this situation, Antlov pictures an image of government offices in the countryside heavily decorated by compulsory forest of signs that read 'PKK (*Pembinaan Kesehateraan Keluarga*)', 'KUD (*Koperasi Unit Desa*)', 'Karang Taruna', 'Golkar', and many others; all were state-sponsored associations active in communities. See: Hans Antlov (b), *Village Governance in Indonesia: Past, Present, and Future Challenges*, Paper presented at the PERCIK Conference "Dynamic of Local Politics in Indonesia", Yogyakarta, July 3-7, 2000, pp. 1-2.

Meanwhile, 'depolitization' of rural area under the New Order was orchestrated with Presidential Instruction No. 6 of 1970, which enforced the principle of 'singular loyalty' toward civil servants, including village officials, to support *Golkar* as the main electoral vehicle of the New Order.[27] The process was completed through Law No. 3 of 1975 on Political Organization that essentially banned political activities below the district level, and permitted only *Golkar* to organize in the countryside.[28]

The homogenization and depolitization of rural affairs was supplemented with a range of basic infrastructure projects, and other top-down social programs. Various line ministries and agencies set up a variety of programs in the rural area, the most familiar of which include 'Electricity Comes to the Village' (*Listrik Masuk Desa*), 'The Military Comes to the Village' (*ABRI Masuk Desa*), 'Television Comes to the Village' (*TV Masuk Desa*), and 'Student Community Service' (*Kuliah Kerja Nyata*).[29] Other social service infrastructures such as public schools, health centers (*Puskesmas*), roads, irrigation, and mosques were erected too.[30]

Granted, this strategy of development managed to generate socio-economic success, which can be seen in significant declines in income based poverty, child mortality, and the increase in educational attainment since the 1970s.[31] Yet, such growth was fragile as it compromised the social fabric of rural society. Indigenous institutions and traditional social security mechanisms were lost, villagers' capacity to organize withered, and local enterprising spirit eroded.[32] Most worrying of all, perhaps, corruptive culture grew deep within village heads and officials. In a system where development resources and job security of the village leadership depended on how well they serve the interests of the supra-village authorities, there was virtually no room for horizontal accountability, and misappropriation of public funds was widespread.[33] When the 1997 financial crisis finally struck Indonesia, millions of rural dwellers fell back into destitution.[34] The fateful event did not only tear down the New Order, but also most of what the regime had built over the Indonesian rural space.

The Post-Reformasi Scene of Rural Governance and Development

27 David Reeve, *Golkar of Indonesia: An Alternative to the Party System* (Singapore: Oxford University Press, 1985), pp. 288.

28 Hans Antlov (a), *op.cit*., pp. 196.

29 *Loc. cit.*

30 Michael T. Rock, *The Politics of Development Policy and Development Policy Reform in New Order Indonesia*, William Davidson Institute Working Paper No. 632, November 2003, pp. 13.

31 Anthony Bebbington, et. al., "Local Capacity, Village Governance, and the Political Economy of Rural Development in Indonesia", *World Development*, Vol. 34, No. 11, 2006, pp. 1964.

32 The negative effects of New Order's rural development strategy is described by Sudir Santoso, "Desa Dalam Kekuasaan Supra Desa", http://pspk.ugm.ac.id/artikel-terbaru/95-desa-dalam-kekuasaan-supra-desa.html (accessed November 10, 2016).

33 Anthony Bebbington, et. al., *op. cit*., pp. 1961.

34 World Bank, *Indonesia Poverty Reduction in Indonesia: Constructing a New Strategy*, Report No. 23028-IND, October 29, 2001, pp. 1-9.

Following the fall of Soeharto's New Order in 1998, euphoria erupted as wave of democratization swept across the country. Soon after, a process of decentralization followed, which was a response to mounting popular demands and dissatisfaction of local elites from – mostly outer Java – resource-rich provinces.[35] As many commentators would later note, Indonesia's decentralization is one of the most radical ever attempted. It was a 'big bang', encompassing political, administrative, and fiscal aspects.[36] On the political side, local checks and balances mechanism was reenergized as legislative bodies (DPRD) that were merely deemed as 'stamp giver' in the past gained significant budgetary and oversight power. Administratively, a number of functions that had traditionally been the domain of the central government were handed over to the local governments. Fiscally, local governments now possessed higher degree of autonomy in allocating and spending their budget.

The decentralized framework of governance transpires on the rural spectrum as well. A cornerstone regulatory product in this respect is Law No. 22 of 1999 on Local Government. This Law eventually overturned the monochromatic and hierarchical modes of rural governance as it established autonomy for villages; opened up space for diversity, participation, and responsiveness to local customs and traditions; and encouraged greater local democracy through direct village election. The General Elucidation of the Law makes clear of these progressive spirits as follows: "The basis for the provision on the governance of villages is diversity, participation, real autonomy, democratization, and people's empowerment."[37]

Although provisions on rural governance existed in only 17 Articles (out of a total of 134), Law No. 22 of 1999 generated significant changes in the social contours of Indonesian rural society. Local socio-political forces are reinvigorated as grassroot movements started to proliferate in many rural parts of the country. One such movement is the thousands of *forum warga* or 'citizen forum' comprised of citizens concerned with problems affecting their immediate neighborhoods. Spread throughout Indonesia, the aim of these groups is to affect policy-making and see public funds reallocated for the benefit of their constituencies.[38] There are also *adat*-based groups that seek to revive the traditional culture in their respective regions or advocate rural indigenous

35 Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy, "Introduction: Decentralisation, Democratisation and The Rise of The Local", in Edward Aspinall and Greg Fealy (eds.). *Local Power and Politics in Indonesia: Decentralisation and Democratisation* (Singapore: Institute of Southeast Asian Studies), 2003.

36 Bert Hofman and Kai Kaiser, *The Making of the Big Bang and its Aftermath: A Political Economy Perspective*, paper conference at Andrew Young School of Policy Studies, Georgia State University, May 1-3, 2003, pp. 1.

37 Translated from the original excerpt: *Landasan pemikiran dalam pengaturan mengenai Pemerintahan Desa adalah keanekaragaman, partisipasi, otonomi asli, demokratisasi, dan pemberdayaan masyarakat*. See: General Elucidation of Law No. 22 of 1999 on Local Government [*Pemerintah Daerah*]

38 Hans Antlov (c), "Civic Engagement in Local Government Renewal in Indonesia", in H. Antlov, et. al. (eds.), *Citizen Participation in Local Governance: Experiences from Thailand, Indonesia and the Philippines* (Quezon City: Institute for Popular Democracy, 2004), pp. 158-159

communities.[39] Furthermore, the Law also allowed villages to be called by their traditional name again, which resembled earlier practice of rural governance prior to New Order.[40] Instead of *desa*, villages in West Sumatera, for example, can be named *nagari*, while in Central Sulawesi they can be called *lembang*. This revived diversity in rural life and ensured respect toward local culture and tradition.

Another important implication of the Law on village structure is in the creation of Village Representative Council (*Badan Perwakilan Desa* or 'BPD') which functioned in more or less the same way as a legislative at the national and regional level. It drafts village legislation, approves village budget, oversees the village head (*kepala desa*), and its members are democratically elected through village election. The existence of this institution helped to reinforce public accountability that had been missing during the New Order's reign.

In 2014, a separate legal arrangement for rural governance finally came in the form of Law No. 6 of 2014 on Village. This new Law provides a more comprehensive regulatory framework for rural governance and secured the position of villages as socio-cultural, political, and even legal entity within Indonesia's national governing system. As stipulated under the Law, villages are now considered as a 'hybrid' organization', a blend of 'community' and 'government',[41] which implies stronger community presence in every aspect of rural affairs. This is translated through the introduction of *Musyawarah Desa* (village assembly) as an institution of accountability and participation where villagers take part in providing inputs for village development plans, cooperation, and other affairs.

Finally, Law No. 6 of 2014 mandated the provision of Village Fund (*Dana Desa*) to each and every village in Indonesia to be managed and allocated toward local development projects by villagers themselves. It remains yet to be seen how this new policy will be able to fulfill the ideals and expectation of a 'village-drive development' (as opposed to 'state-driven development') that was prevalent during the formulation of Law No. 6 of 2014. Indeed, much still needs to be done to prove that the new Law is not just a 'paper tiger', but able to answer the critical issue of rural wellbeing. Of course, much of the burden this time rests on the shoulder of rural societies themselves as the 'subject' (as opposed to 'object') of development.

From *Zamrud Khatulistiwa* to 'the land of a thousand islands', and most recently 'the improbable nation' after Elizabeth Pisani's bestselling book; many epithets have been ascribed to Indonesia. One particular notion often escapes our attention though, and that is the idea of Indonesia as a 'village republic'. As this essay has demonstrated, rural imagery and philosophy have contributed invaluably to the nation-building endeavors of this Republic as notions such as *gotong royong* and *musyawarah mufakat* became a cornerstone in our public affairs. Villages were also featured in the revolutionary rhetoric and upheaval during the 1960s before being muted by the ensuing New Order. The onset of *Reformasi* in 1998 breathed new air toward rural governance and development in the country as diversity, participation, and democracy flourished. In the future, villages will likely remain at the forefront of public goods and service delivery.[42] Hence, villagers hold important roles in the efforts to alleviate poverty and underdevelopment and any policies or strategies taken must place them as 'subject', rather than 'object' of development.

Concluding Remarks: Charting the Way Forward

39 One such group described by Antlov is *Perekat Ombara* whose members comprised of ethnic Sasak villagers and had been successful in pushing for the reinstatement of their local customs and tradition in their villages. See: Hans Antlov (c), *op.cit.*, pp. 159

40 This provision is given in Article 1 point o and in the Elucidation of Article 93 of Law No. 22 of 1999.

41 This can be seen from the General Elucidation of Law No. 6 of 2014 on Village [Desa].

42 Patrick Doupe, *Village level institutional change and ethnic majorities: evidence from decentralising Indonesia*, Crawford School Working Paper No. 13-05, January 2013, pp. 3.

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Indonesian Messianic Figures Historicized: Manseren Manggundi of Biak and Javanese Ratu Adil

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Messianism and the Universality of Messianic Expectation

Messianism is a universal phenomenon. That is to say that it can be found in many parts of the world and different cultural settings. The Western tradition, which has the Judeo-Christian origin, recognizes such phenomenon and usually relates it to the expectation of a personal savior. Etymologically, the term "messiah" was rooted in the Jewish term *māshîah* 'the anointed (of God)'; 'the chosen (one)'. This term was not without history, and its meaning has indeed changed from a general one into a particular interpretation (Lanternani 1962, 52-53). As a working hypothesis, Vittorio Lanternani (1962, 52) uses the term "messiah" to refer to "any being, singular or plural, more or less anthropomorphic, expected by a community as the future savior in a religious context". In many societies, such belief is usually present as a socio-religious movement.

The following brief exposition aims to reintroduce two messianic figures from two very different parts of *Nusantara*, Papua and Java, while attempting to see preliminarily the parallels between these figures and their respective historical contexts. Through this below juxtaposition of the mythological characters of *Manseren Manggundi* and *Ratu Adil*, I would like to attempt to circumlocutory engage myself in the theoretical discussion about myths and historical discourse.

Manseren Manggundi of Biak

As a matter of fact, the messianic phenomenon in Papua is recurrent until today. The biggest wave ever recorded of the so-called messianic movements occurred in 1938-1943 in the Biak-Numfor culture area. A movement usually takes form in an organized ceremony led by a *konoor* (the herald of the returning Messiah—known as *Manseren Manggundi*). According to studies of the movements during 1938-1942 as well as of many numerous movements in the later period, the movements often have heterogeneous expectations and motives, in which the economic motive is perpetually discernible (Kamma 1972, 226-227). In Papua, Christianity has rooted deep in the society, and thus many Christian elements had also been assimilated to the belief of *Manseren Manggundi*. Thus, the content of the Bible were often drawn into the indigenous mythical sphere (Kamma 1972, 282).

In the old days, the coming of the messiah was signaled by the arrival of migrants with their material goods. For indigenous people who were still living in a stone-aged situation, the contact with new foreign goods was very much giving them the idea of prosperity. The influx of migrants back then was usually from the west direction, for instance Moluccas or the Philippines, and later on from Europe (during the Dutch colonization) and Japan (in the period of the Pacific War). According to Lanternani (1962, 56) who studied messianism in the broader context, the so-called "culture-heroes" of the ancient mythology are indeed often depicted as being of white race.

The *Koreri* expectation has always been integrated in the way of life of the

Biak people. *Koreri* movements are the materialization of the messianic expectation for *Manseren Manggundi*. This means that the movements—with the ceremony, the mass gathering, the singing, the dancing and so on—are material cultures of the Biaks that represent their spiritual belief (Vlasblom 2004, 23). Several studies on the nature of the *Koreri* Movements agreed that the *Koreri* Movements as indigenous movements were primarily influenced by an internal cultural force. To put it differently, the messianic expectation is inherent in the indigenous culture. This is the case especially for the movements in Biak-Numfor culture region during the period of 1938 to 1943. Nevertheless, by the course of the time when foreign elements intruded the realm of the Biak ethnicity, external factors were starting to influence the later development of the used to be purely indigenous movement. The quest for *Koreri* 'utopia, ideal state' was subsequently colored by the new undertone of the indigenous nationalism addressed towards foreign oppressors.

Several years ago, a demonstration held by Papuan people took place in Biak City in July 1998. During the demonstration, several Papuans became victims of the clash with the Indonesian military. It was reported that the community of Biak Island joined in the independence demonstrations that occurred hither and thither in the then Irian Jaya, as the Indonesian new president in Jakarta spoke of the subject of human rights—also triggered by the issue of dialogue over East Timor. The supposedly peaceful massive protest went on for several days, until on the day of July 6, the Indonesian army allegedly opened fire on the sleeping crowd (Kilvert 1998). This event was also internationally known as the Biak massacre or the bloody Biak.

In his article about the incident, Muridan S. Widjojo (2000) describes the bloodstained demonstration as follows: "The same spirit of the *Koreri* movements was still very much alive when the Morning Star was hoisted in Biak in July 1998. The Papuans launched a "war" against the Indonesian Military and the police for five consecutive days, during which they danced, sang and chanted as they circled the flag post in a ceremony to herald the coming of their spiritual leader. The incident claimed the lives of several Papuans who died for the Morning Star". This article is one of a number of articles evaluating the Biak incident in July 1998. Like many others writers, Muridan Widjojo follows the viewpoint of anthropologists and theologists asserting that this phenomenon of flag raising ceremony relates to the cargoism movements—another terminology for messianic movements, one of which were the *Koreri* movements that have been discussed earlier.

Koreri movement basically is a pacific movement which consists of a mass gathering to welcome the return of the messiah. However, during the setback of the Japanese occupation in West New Guinea, which marked the birth of proto-nationalism, the movement has developed into a more nationalistic movement rather than religious movement. During the Japanese occupation, the people of Biak who were also *Koreri* followers, gathered and formed the *Koreri* Army (Rutherford 2003, 196). At that moment, the idea of 'Pan-Papuan' emerged as it was stated that the *Koreri* Army should consist of the indigenous people from New Guinea, instead of only from Biak where *Koreri* Movement rooted. Much later, the Biak Incident in 1998 could certainly

be regarded as another manifestation of the movement which was heavily influenced by the then political situation—that is the strenuous relation between the Papuans and the Indonesian Central Government.

Javanese *Ratu Adil*

Meanwhile, Javanese people in general are quite familiar with the idea of a messiah conceived in several terms like *Ratu Adil*, *Heru Cokro* (also *Herucakra* or *Erucakra*). These terms are usually in line with another popular term like *zaman edan* 'time of madness' which also denotes the difficult degenerate times, the age of slump, and the increasing evil life. This was actually coined by Javanese poet Ranggawarsita (1802-1873) in his work *Serat Kalatidha* (Hindarto n.d., 2). In fact, the messianic expectation is usually interwoven with the belief in cyclical time. The messianic expectation in Java in contemporary days is also seen as a part of the Hindu revivalism with the more and more imminent trend in Indonesia towards an "Islamic state". Some Javanese Muslims indeed still retain aspects of their indigenous and Hindu traditions with their "Javanese religion" (*kejawen*) and the non-orthodox "Javanese Islam" (*abangan*) (Reuter 1993, 330).

People translate the ancient myth in the contemporary context in such a way, yet, the main motive of the myth remains the same, that the supposedly *Ratu Adil* appears as a charismatic leader during a chaotic period. Such phenomenon did occur repeatedly in later periods. During the Dutch era on Java, the prophetic expectation was once put on the Javanese cultural figure Pangeran Diponegoro. The first president of the Republic of Indonesia Soekarno was also projected as a potential figure of *Ratu Adil*. According to certain Javanese belief which is also shared by people in the lower strata in many Indonesian societies, one's political power is the result of a personal predestination with supernatural powers (Labrousse 1993, 176). In many writings mentioning the belief of *Ratu Adil*, the sets were mostly during the political turbulences in Java. Some assert that during difficult times (Javanese) men indeed tended to find solace and hope in mysticism and myths. The making of symbols and myth became important, and in time it became a way of life. Accordingly, people longed for a messiah, which in Javanese mythology is called a *Ratu Adil*—or the promised *Imam Mahdi* of the Islamic beliefs (Lubis 1977, 43).

Among the Javanese, the pre-Islamic existence of *Ratu Adil* was in the form of belief in the above-mentioned Erucakra, of which the first written text was developed in the first half of the eighteenth century. According to scholars who based their study on the oldest materials found, the mythical figure of *Ratu Adil* originated in the period of the decline of the power of the Javanese princes (Hardjamardjaja 1962, 5). In the later period, the European played an antagonistic role in the myth as the teaching of *Ratu Adil* began to savor of stronger political agitation. In the coming period of the European domination in the archipelago, behind the wars and hardship experienced by the people, there indeed thrived a rich cultural tradition, which was based on a strong spiritual sense of spirituality and religiosity. This was often greatly influenced

by Islam, but sometimes also by other ideas. One can find parallels of such cultural development in many parts of the archipelago (Ricklefs 2008, 65).

The exemplary case of the incarnation of the myth in certain individuals—of which information is quite accessible—is the depiction of Bung Karno or Soekarno as the expected *Ratu Adil* 'Just King'. An article by Pierre Labrousse (1993) assesses popular views of the personality and historic role of Bung Karno in numerous corpora. In one interpretation of the myth, there will be "several" *Ratu Adil* before the real definitive *Ratu Adil* finally appears, and some believed that Soekarno was the first *Ratu Adil*. Perhaps such interpretation of the belief is not largely shared by all Javanese. However, we still can see several typical characteristics of a personage onto whom people put their messianic hope.

From the beginning until today, there have been many interpretations of the figure of *Ratu Adil* in the Prophecies of Jayabaya. The premise on this prophetic figure remains similar to the general concept of a messianic figure: the chosen one who will bring change from a degenerate time to an era of prosperity. These messianic projections in Java were often attributed to kings, and later in the modern period to political leaders. Simply put, the messianic manifestation in Java is always projected to a *Ratu*, be it in royal or presidential office.

Concluding Remarks

The belief in the messianic figure of *Manseren Manggundi* is prevalent in Biak-Numfor regions. From a rather general point of view, the messianic characters of *Manseren Manggundi* are comparable to the quite well-known figure of *Ratu Adil* in Javanese mythology. The universal character of messianic expectation is present in the myths revolving both figures. However, the projections of the messiah character of the figure *Manseren Manggundi* and *Ratu Adil* are distinctive in several aspects. Naturally, this is related to the different cultural milieu in which the respective myth lives. It is also clear that the collective experiences also influence the projection of the myth.

Earlier in this paper, I have mentioned about the hypothesis of Vittorio Lanternani regarding to what or whom the term "messiah" may refer. Within its original setting of the Judeo-Christian traditions, it refers indeed to a single personal savior. In Christian belief that would be none other than the Christ himself, while in the Jewish belief, the *Mashiakh* would be a descendant of the King David. In Papua and Java, it is not the case; *Manseren Manggundi* and *Ratu Adil* are manifested in different individuals. The contemporary trend of messianism is rather similar in both regions. Even today, the myths are still very much alive, and the imagery of both figures is often incarnated as the figures of modern prominent political leaders.

Taking place in two very different cultural settings which concomitantly having quite different historical trajectories, the above-described examples of the messianic expectation in the Indonesian archipelago indeed demonstrate the universality of the optimistic belief of a savior or an usher from a tumultuous time and to an era of peace. This delineates the main characteristic of messianic phenomena. It is noteworthy that the belief to *Manseren Manggundi* and *Ratu Adil* respectively can create unity among people, often transforming religious and cultural ideas into people movements— frequently those with a political undercurrent.

This brief essay is basically a humble attempt to showcase that historical endeavor often comes into contacts with the (indigenous) spiritual world or the metaphysical realm, which is not always empirically perceivable, yet historically relevant. The whole discourse about this matter will always engage methodological debates. But I shall stand for the proposition that when one speaks of the hero system of society, it is not at all far-reaching to also speak of mythical figures. In so many respects, as what can be inferred from many academic studies, the mythical figures of *Manseren Manggundi* and *Ratu Adil* are indeed "historical"—the much more compelling question is, however, in what way and to what extent are they (and probably other culture-heroes and mythical figures) historical?

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Anti Chinese Violence in the time of Revolution: Re-Examining the Historiography of Indonesia Revolution

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Introduction

Anti-Chinese violence is not a new phenomenon in Indonesia, with its roots traceable even prior to the birth of Indonesian nationalism in the early 20th century. Since the Dutch VOC period, Chinese were often convenient scapegoats for the nation's problems, becoming frequent targets of rioting or robbery. Burning, looting and confiscating Chinese property was frequently carried out by militant groups and ordinary Indonesians, whose hatred of the Chinese transformed them into "violent mobs."[1] Several historians mark the Chinese massacre dating back to 1740, when more than 10,000 Chinese were massacred in Batavia, as the beginning of a series of anti-Chinese violence in the later period of Indonesian history.

The Chinese in Indonesia were, and are, a small, heterogeneous, and complex minority. They are as diverse as the Indonesian archipelago itself. According to Anthony Reid, the Chinese were already residing in Indonesia as early as the end of the 13th century, part of the invading Mongol army that entered Java in 1293. Some of the troops opted to remain in Java, and were among the first Chinese that settled in this Island.[2] In the colonial era, they served as intermediaries between the Indonesians and Dutch, purchasing goods for resale to the latter for export, and buying products from Dutch importers for resale to the Indonesians. Peter Carey argues that before the coming of the Dutch to Indonesia, the Chinese Indonesian community had a harmonious relationship with indigenous Indonesians, and contributed to agricultural and culinary development in Indonesia.[3]

However, regime changes in Indonesia, as history shows, have often been accompanied by fierce anti-Chinese violence. Such was the case with the overthrowing of the Dutch colonial regime in 1942 and the Japanese in 1945; the Indonesian revolutionary period from 1945-49; the transition period from Sukarno to Suharto in 1966 (preceded by the killings of anywhere between half a million and perhaps a few millions of Indonesian Communist Party sympathizers and alleged communists); and the fall of Suharto in 1998. A similar situation also occurred in many places in Java and Sumatra following the declaration of Indonesian independence, which provided the catalyst for an atrocity on such a massive scale. During the vacuum of power that existed between the retreat of the Dutch and the consolidation of Japanese rule, Indonesian extremists plundered, burned, and looted Chinese homes and establishments *en masse*, aggravated by the 'scorched-earth' tactics of the Dutch or Indonesian military.[4]

This essay seeks to examine several factors contributing to the outbreak of the

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1. Abidin Kusno, "Remembering/Forgetting the May Riots: Architecture, Violence and the Making of 'Chinese Cultures in Post-1998 Jakarta," *Public Culture,* Vol. 15. No. 1, (2003), pp. 150.
2. Anthony Reid, "The Rise and Fall of Sino-Javanese Shipping," in Geoff Wade (eds.) *China and Southeast Asia.* (London: Routledge, 2009), pp. 74.
3. Peter Carey, "Changing Javanese Perceptions of the Chinese Communities in Central Java, 1755-1825," *Indonesia*, Vol. 37, (1984), pp. 3-5.
4. Mary Somers Heidhues, "Anti-Chinese Violence in Java during the Indonesian Revolution, 1945-49," *Journal of Genocide Research,* Vol. 14, (September 2012), pp. 383.

violence, particularly in the time of the Indonesian revolution (1945-1950). Why were the Chinese especially targeted during the revolution? This study places the violence against Chinese during the revolution in a broader paradigm of violence by tracing the roots of anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia to the colonial period. Ultimately, it argues that anti-Chinese violence in Indonesia cannot be understood from a single perspective.

Chinese in the Time of Revolution

Thomas Lindblad and Freek Colombijn write of Indonesia as 'a violent country,' with anti-Chinese violence within the country as an important issue to examine in the history of violence in Indonesia. According to them, Chinese Indonesians suffered recurrent violent treatment perpetrated both by state or society under various political regimes in the colonial and post-colonial period.[5]

The Indonesian Revolution years of 1945-1949 were considered the most violent era in modern Indonesian history. Taufik Abdullah describes the period as 'multi-complex,' as it was not merely a period of decolonization, but also a time of "revolution full of social tensions and political conflicts between social classes."[6] During this period, violence erupted unexpectedly in many parts of the country. The main cities of Java and Sumatra became scenes of countless kidnappings, disappearances, shootings, thefts, street fights, and murders, with former Dutch internees systematically attacked and fired upon.[7] For Leo Suryadinata, the Indonesian revolutionary period was the genesis of modern anti-Chinese movements in Indonesia: "The government had changed and were now in the hands of the 'indigenous' population, but the economic factor, at the root of past conflicts, remained."[8]

As a 'remembered history,' the Indonesian revolution is often remembered as a period of upheaval (in Javanese, *gegeran*), marked by ousters, takeovers, and annexations, besides being glorified as a moment of unified struggle in Indonesian history. Sartono posits that conflicts between groups were inevitable, given the political crisis, and the government's subsequent inability to guarantee the safety of its citizens.[9] Most contemporary Indonesian history textbooks portray this episode as a heroic revolution, which saw the deaths of many revolutionaries at the hands of the Allied

5. Freek Colombijn & J. Thomas Lindblad, "Introduction", in Freek Colombijn & J. Thomas Lindblad (eds.), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia* (Leiden: KITLV, 2002), pp. 14-15.
6. In Soejatno & Benedict Anderson, "Revolution and Social Tensions in Surakarta 1945-1950," *Indonesia,* No. 17, (April 1974), pp. 104.
7. Peter Post, "Historical Overview: Introduction," in Peter Post (ed.), *The Encyclopedia of Indonesia in the Pacific War* (Leiden/Boston: Brill, 2010), pp. 20.
8. Leo Suryadinata, "Anti-Chinese Actions in Southeast Asia: In Search of Causes and Solutions," in Dewi Fortuna Anwar (eds.), *Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific* (Jakarta: Yayasan Obor Indonesia, 2005), pp. 155.
9. Sartono Kartodirdjo, "Wajah Revolusi Indonesia Dipandang dari Perspektivisme Struktural", *Prisma*, Vol. X, No. 8, (August 1981), pp. 3.

Forces. While these facts are partially correct, these books are biased, and indeed hide one of the darkest chapters of Indonesia's struggle for independence, as they conveniently omit the fact that radical Indonesian nationalists were also involved in assaulting, kidnapping and murdering civilians, particularly the Chinese and Indo-Europeans.

The initial wave of the revolution shattered the fragile Republican state structure, paving the way for the national leadership to take over the country from the Japanese and Dutch-trained bureaucratic elite. The first year of the Indonesian struggle for independence was also rocky, with many places in Java and Sumatra experiencing a destabilization of its local government helmed by local leaders. *Jawara* groups emerged, revolutionary groups began to prepare for combat, and authority was increasingly shunned and disregarded. All elements of the old regime, such as the *pangreh praja* and the pre-existing police were eliminated, with revolutionaries determined to start afresh in the absence of any pro-Republican leadership.

Why were Chinese Targeted?

A number of scholars have tried to seek a comprehensive explanation concerning why Chinese were specifically targeted, instead of other ethnic groups. Various historians have put forth the 'middleman minorities' theory. The theory argues that Chinese were positioned as a buffer or intermediary between colonial elite and society, as they engaged in trading and distributing merchandise produced by members of the dominant group to other customers.[10] As a result, the Chinese were often used as scapegoats by the elite to prevent riots. The Chinese middleman became a perfect target because they were seen as 'elite-collaborators,' 'a powerless community,' and in some cases 'infidels.'[11] According to the theory, the position of Chinese Indonesians as the trading class and persecuted minority is similar to that of the Jews in Europe,

10. Mely G. Tan argues that the concept of "middleman minority" has been developed by Blalock, Jr. These are minorities who "occupy intermediate positions owing to a competitive advantage or a high adaptive capacity. Such minorities are often associated with special occupational niches by virtue of a combination of circumstances, plus a cultural heritage that has been used as an adaptive mechanism over a prolonged period." As examples of this group, he mentions the history of the Jews in Europe, the Chinese in Southeast Asia, and East Indians in Burma and South Africa. Blalock's ideas have been further developed in Turner and Bonacich, in which they propose a composite theory developing 9 propositions to account for the conditions promoting the (1) concentration of ethnic populations in middle-rank economic roles, (2) development of patterns of intragroup solidarity, (3) hostility from the non-ethnic population. These propositions can be applied to the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, at least for the beginning of the formation of the community. See Huber M. Blalock, *Toward a Theory of Minority Group Relations* (Wiley and Sons, 1967); Jonathan Turner and Edna Bonacich, "Toward a Composite Theory of Middleman Minorities," *Ethnicity*, (1980), pp. 144-58.
11. Jemma Purdey, *Anti-Chinese Violence in Indonesia, 1996-1999* (Leiden: KITLV Press, 2005), pp. 24-25.

the Indians in East Africa, the Arabs in West Africa, and the Vietnamese in the former Indo-China.[12]

The significant role that the Chinese have played in the Indonesian economy, primarily as middlemen in colonial intermediary trade in the Dutch East Indies, was instrumental in creating the gap between Chinese and Indonesians. The notion that the Chinese were economically more privileged than the native Indonesians was encouraged by the Dutch colonial authorities, and naturally incurred the jealousy and ire of the locals. The 'Foreign Oriental' legacy during the Dutch colonial period that separated Chinese from other racial/ethnic groups also contributed to the further alienation of Chinese within the scheme of Indonesian society.

Economic turmoil and instability, combined with widespread suffering during the Japanese occupation, had pushed large sections of Indonesia's population, especially those in rural Java, to support a revolution that rejected traditional—that is to say, Dutch colonial—rulers, as well as their local accomplices. In particular, the Chinese and to a lesser extent Eurasians were accused of profiting from the colonial system.

The presence of Chinese in Indonesia was like a 'time-bomb' that could explode anytime and anywhere. Owing to the Indonesian Chinese being 'socially thin', as Benedict Anderson suggests[13], the stigmatization of Chinese was inevitable during the revolutionary period. In few cases, Chinese were labelled as 'triple-minorities.' They were depicted as actual puppets in colonial hands and profiteers of colonial rule; as capitalists; and as non-Muslims. They were never seen as *asli* (genuine) and therefore could never be 'true Indonesians.'

So why were the Chinese especially targeted in the massacre? To answer this question I would like to refer to Blagojevic, who said: "ethnic conflict occurs when a particular set of factors and conditions converge: a major structural crisis; presence of historical memories of inter-ethnic grievances; institutional factors that promote ethnic intolerance; manipulation of historical memories by political entrepreneurs to evoke emotions such as fear, resentment, and hate toward the "other."[14] Most of the anti-Chinese violence in the time of revolution fit in this case, especially if when we look back to the situation of the region at that time. Localized social and political tensions also had a part to play in the bloodshed.

Those anti-Chinese violence in all over Java and Sumatra have shown in which both the Dutch and the Indonesian Republic failed to protect the lives of the Chinese population during the Indonesian Revolutionary period. Although considerable efforts were made by the Republic to protect the Chinese in order to enlist their support, the Republic's military forces were insufficient to prevent hostile acts by extremist elements whose

animosity had been directed against the Chinese. Soon after the notorious massacre in Tangerang (1946), more cases of anti-Chinese violence emerged in other parts of Indonesia: Bagan Siapi-Api (1946), Cirebon (1947), Cibadak (1947), Cilimus (1947), Nganjuk (1948), Blitar (1948), Tulungagung (1948), Kediri (1948), and so on. To date, no specific research has been conducted to examine the communal violence in those areas.

Conclusions

This essay has reminded us that systematic acts of anti-Chinese violence began in Indonesia during the period of Dutch colonial rule, and increased in scale during the Indonesian Revolution. The legacy of 'othering' the Chinese emerged during the colonial period and continued during the Japanese occupation and Indonesian Revolution. All these experiences inevitably contributed in alienating Chinese from Indonesians. This legacy of 'othering' even continued with the Sukarno and Suharto regimes, when Chinese maintained an exclusively ethnic-based business network, and were treated as 'economic animals.' Both regimes, especially Suharto's New Order, had forced Chinese to withdraw themselves from society and to start living exclusively.

The colonial system that used a "divide and rule" strategy to create or separate groups along ethnic lines in order to strengthen the power of the colonial system, was still strongly embedded in Indonesian society. The Dutch colonial regime's special treatment towards the Chinese has provided a contentious legacy for the Chinese community in Indonesia.[15] Moreover, the colonial 'apartheid' stratification also stimulated the relationship between the state and strongmen.[16] Henk Schulte Nordholt argues that the long-standing use of thugs as vigilantes by politicians and administrators was and remains "a concubinage of crime and the state". The state also resorted to intimidation and criminal gangs to maintain a regime of fear for the rest of the colonial era.[17] During the Indonesian revolution, gangsters teamed up with radical young nationalists to form militia groups in Jakarta, sharing a belief in action, heroism, and resistance against a hegemonic power.[18]

William Frederick says that "the Indonesian Revolution is one of the most important and successful of the postwar anticolonial revolutions, but it is also a complex phenomenon that, despite considerable study, we still do not understand very

12. Mely G. Tan, "The Role of Ethnic Chinese Minority in Development: The Indonesian Case," *Southeast Asian Studies*, Vol. 25. No. 3. (December 1987), pp. 66.
13. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler, *Tensions of Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World*. (California: University of California, 1997), pp. 223.
14. Bojana Blagojevic, "Causes of Ethnic Conflict: A Conceptual Framework," *Journal of Global Change and Governance*, Vol. III, (Winter 2009), pp. 3.

15. Thung Ju Lan, "LIPI Conflict Management and Transformation Program," in Dewi Fortuna Anwar (eds.), *Violent Internal Conflicts in Asia Pacific: Histories, Political Economies and Policies* (Yayasan Obor Indonesia: Jakarta, 2005), pp. 77.
16. Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad, "Introduction," in Freek Colombijn and Thomas Lindblad (eds), *Roots of Violence in Indonesia* (Singapore: ISEAS, 2002).
17. Henk Schulte Nordholt, "The Genealogy of Violence," pp. 40.
18. Robert Cribb, *Gangsters and Revolutionaries: The Jakarta People's Militia and the Indonesian Revolution 1945-1949.* (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1991).

clearly."[19] Therefore, further examination about the Indonesian revolution is necessary in order to deconstruct the prevalent historiography, which mainly glorifies the struggle of Indonesian combatants who expelled the Dutch from Indonesia with only bamboo spears, without shedding light on the atrocities suffered by powerless communities such as the Chinese, Eurasians, Timorese or Arabs. Therefore, further research about this period need to be conducted in order to reveal other facts that have been silenced under the New Order regime.

Indonesia has to start to make peace with its own history. The Indonesian government should cover both sides of the revolution including the violence perpetrated by Indonesians. The roots of violence must be studied in order to understand the roles held not only by the victimizers as well as the victims, but also those of the seemingly innocent bystanders and the international community at large. By studying this topic, we are also developing a complex understanding of mass murder, ethnic cleansing, and other cruel forms of eradication of ethnic groups. With this knowledge, we can work collaboratively to develop models and policies towards early warning, prevention, peaceful conflict resolution, reconciliation and reconstruction based on history.

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19. William Frederick, "Review," *The Journal of Asian Studies*, Vol. 47, No. 2 (May 1988), pp. 426-427.

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